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**AN EVALUATION OF BRITAIN'S POSITION IN THE  
EUROPEAN UNION**

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## PREFACE

*In recent years, the future of the European Union has been widely debated. Specifically, the recent enlargement has caused a widespread suspicion about the stability of the EU as an institution. In this study, the position of Britain in the EU, and the causes and effects of Eurosceptic activities that have affected its policies, will be analyzed.*

*I would like to thank Assist. Prof. Dr. Armagan Emre akır, who contributed greatly to my research. I would also like to thank Melanie McLean, Co-ordinator of the London Office of the UK Conservative Party, who informed me of Eurosceptic activities in the UK, and Nicky Sinclair, Council Member of the UK Independence Party. Lastly, the support of my family during my studies has been invaluable, and my thanks go to them as well.*

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## ABBREVIATIONS

<b>AFL</b>	: Anti-Federalist League
<b>BNP</b>	: British National Party
<b>CAP</b>	: Common Agricultural Policy
<b>CFP</b>	: Common Fish Policy
<b>CP</b>	: Conservative Party
<b>CW</b>	: Cold War
<b>EC</b>	: European Community
<b>ECSC</b>	: European Coal and Steel Community
<b>EU</b>	: European Union
<b>EMS</b>	: European Monetary System
<b>EMU</b>	: European Monetary Union
<b>EPP</b>	: European People's Party
<b>ERM</b>	: Exchange Rate Mechanism
<b>IGC</b>	: Intergovernmental Conference
<b>LP</b>	: Labor Party
<b>MEP</b>	: Member of the European Parliament
<b>MP</b>	: Member of the Parliament
<b>NATO</b>	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>PR</b>	: Proportional Representation
<b>SEA</b>	: Single European Act
<b>SU</b>	: Soviet Union

- UEN** : Union for a Europe of Nations
- UK** : United Kingdom
- UN** : United Nations
- UKIP** : United Kingdom Independence Party
- UNSC** : United Nations Security Council
- USA** : United States Of America



# 1. INTRODUCTION

Fear is one of the most basic human characteristics. Being afraid of fundamental changes or seemingly incomprehensible institutions, is found in almost all historical periods and places. In this regard, there is nothing wrong to have some skepticism. As long as scepticism remains on healthy ground, it generally makes people immune against populist extremism; because opposition is an integral part of modern democratic life. But Britain's relationship with the European Union and its predecessor institutions over the last forty years appears to be no longer in the category of healthy scepticism and it is argued that British people show considerable skepticism towards the EU.

Generally, Britons are more eurosceptic than other EU nations. Also, in that point Euroscepticism should not be confused with anti-Europeanism. However Euroscepticism causes opposition, which is about the rules, laws, institutions and also structure, it does not mean to be anti-European. It is perfectly possible to feel as a European in a geographical and cultural sense, but be oppose to the European Union on political and economic grounds with acceptable reasons. It is vital to set differences properly between antipathy towards Europe and skepticism towards the European Union. Furthermore, most Britons are hesitant to the European Union as an institution rather than Europe as a continent.

This thesis examines the development of opposition and skepticism to the European Union in Britain, especially after 1980. The main aim of this thesis is to understand how and why opposition to the EU has been emerged in Britain; but this study especially includes the development of Euroscepticism in England which is a main nation of the United Kingdom. It discusses the reasons for the emergence and mobilization of that opposition. This will be followed by an examination of the parameters that the study will encompass, in particular the definition of what constitutes opposition to the European Union. All of these will be explained under the question of why English cannot be a little more European or Europe a little more English, with the effect of historical background, public opinion, media, European system and institutional structure.

## **“2. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF BRITAIN’S POSITION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION**

Britain is currently one of the 25 member states of the European Union, but it is not one of the founding members. In 1951, the ‘European Coal and Steel Community’ (ECSC) was established by France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy. At that time Britain did not want to join this union but later some international developments provided its applications for the EC membership. In this chapter, the process of Britain’s entry to the EU and the Britain-EU relations which caused EU opposition to increase in Britain will be evaluated.

### **2.1. Britain’s Entry to the European Union in the Post-War Period**

For a long time, its world trading relationship led Britain to create stronger overseas links than with the Continent. After the Second World War period, Britain was recognized as one of the three leading Allied powers. Britain had formed a Colonial empire Britain, because it had established an enormous colonial tie with the weakest part of the world as a result. Furthermore, Britain could also conduct a skilful and generally successful diplomacy within Europe. However, international and domestic factors have led to the dramatic shift in Britain’s positions throughout time.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Arthur Cyr, **British Foreign Policy and the Atlantic Area**, (Macmillan Publishing, London, 1979)

Britain has often been peripheral to the economic and political integration that has characterized the EU history. Having been the leading European nation at the end of the Second World War, Britain chose not to participate in the development of supranational European integration and has often been marginal since. British governments distrusted the “supranational aspirations” of the emerging European Community in the 1950s and 1960s.<sup>2</sup>

It can be claimed that with the development of the Cold War, Britain was overshadowed by her much more powerful wartime partners. Moreover, the bipolar conflict between the US and the Soviet Union led to a dramatic change in the international system. The structure of this new system prevented Britain from engaging in the sort of balancing among great powers. The importance of this sort of balancing among great powers is due to its customary historical role. Moreover, some crucial economic problems such as slow growth, high unemployment, balance of payments deficit, declining industries and exceptionally high and growing rates of inflation emerged in Britain. Britain had to find new alternatives for her future. In the 1950s British governments saw their interests in terms of three overlapping spheres of influence: the Empire / Commonwealth, the USA and Europe. “Britain never seemed able to decide which option to pursue. By trying to combine all three, Britain ran a risk of losing each.”<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, “the hesitations of Britain’s European

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<sup>2</sup> Philip Giddings and Govin Drewry, **Britain in the European Union: Law, Policy and Parliament**, (Paperback Publishing, 2004)

<sup>3</sup> Henry Kissinger, **The Trouble Partnership**, (Doubleday and Co., New York, 1965), p.77

policy over more than a decade reflected an unwillingness to place Europe above her other interests or even on the same level with them.”<sup>4</sup> The desire of Britain was to play an important role in Europe without strong sanctions.

After these developments; this situation was reevaluated with the effect of the USA starting from the 1960s and led to membership applications in 1961-1963 and 1967. At that time Britain had two objectives: to improve its economic performance and to sustain its role in the world. Unfortunately, Britain’s membership applications were not accepted mainly because of the President de Gaulle. According to President de Gaulle, Europe was the third greatest force between the superpowers of both east and west. He thought “Britain would seek to dominate the EC and place it firmly in the American bloc.”<sup>5</sup> Moreover, as McNaughton mentioned Britain wished to preserve some of the Commonwealth preference agreements and gain an advantage over the existing members. On the other hand, the existing members were certainly not willing to offer Britain a special deal. Also, in 1962 Macmillan concluded that the “Nassau Agreement” with the USA, which states that Britain would be able to stay in NATO, remain America’s closest ally, but also retains an independent nuclear capability. Because of these reasons, France was suspicious of Britain’s close

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<sup>4</sup> Kenneth Waltz, **Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics**, (Little Brown and Co., Boston, 1967), p. 234

<sup>5</sup> From the Speech of President Charles de Gaulle, ‘*Britain’s Proposed Entry into the Common Market*’, **European Affairs**, 16 May 1967

relationship with the USA.<sup>6</sup> On the other hand, in 1969, France and Germany, which made up the heart of European Integration, changed such a way that is advantageous to Britain's possible membership. Especially the change of government in France opened the door to UK membership.

Each Member State has a veto right over new developments. Because of British hostility to any deepening of political integration, this acted as a restriction to any non-economic initiatives during the 1970s and early 1980s. And secondly, Britain was partly responsible for ending this state of affairs through excessive use of its national veto in the early 1980s. Because of these reasons an image of Britain as a "bad European" among the officials and politicians of the Member States was established.<sup>7</sup> But it is important point that the EU membership had an extensive impact on British politics, economy and society.

There were really important economic problems in Britain after 1960. In the term of Labours, the government simply increased spending on the Welfare State. Taxation increased dramatically from 32 % of gross domestic product in 1964 to 43 % in 1970. The government's failure to carry through a radical program alienated many supporters within the Labour movement. By 1970 increasingly "militant trade

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<sup>6</sup> McNaughton, Neil, **Understanding British and European Political Issues**, (Manchester University Press, 2003), p.250

<sup>7</sup> Benedikte Richter, *British Entry to the European Community, and Cognitive Paradigm of Foreign Policy Change*, Ph.D. Thesis, Nottingham University, 1997, p.71.

unions” were demanding more fundamental reforms and were prepared to use their “bargaining muscle” to extract higher wages from employers.<sup>8</sup>

The new Conservative government led by Edward Heath unexpectedly won the election in 1970 with only the commitment to negotiate Britain’s terms of entry to the “Common Market”. And this government was intent on reforming industrial relations, by imposing a more rigid framework of law on trade union activity. The 1971 “Industrial Relations Act” provided unions to accept certain legal restrictions on their activities and a fixed exchange rate was abandoned by this government. At the same time, they negotiated British entry to the EC in 1972. On the other hand, the Conservative government failed to exercise real control either over incomes or over public expenditure and inflation took off, soaring from “6.4 %” in 1970 to “9.4 %” in 1971. And with the famous “U-turn” of November 1972, Edward Heath announced a prices and incomes policy. Following these problems, British EC membership was expected to stimulate British industry by exposing it to new competitive pressure while at the same time opening up new markets.<sup>9</sup> For the membership, Heath had promised that the “full-hearted consent of parliament and people” was required before a decision to join would be made. Many people thought that a referendum would be held for public support, but this never happened. Heath never sought the “electorate’s full-hearted consent” before signing the Treaty of Rome and passing the

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<sup>8</sup> Alan Lord, **Britain and the European Community**, (Blackwell Publishing, 1994), pp.18-22

<sup>9</sup> Lord, p.28

European Communities Act in parliament, which took Britain into the European Community on 1<sup>st</sup> January 1973.<sup>10</sup> “Since Britain’s membership, the sphere of influence of the EU over UK policy has greatly increased.”<sup>11</sup>

At the same time, the Common Agricultural Policy increasingly began to be seen as an expensive, wasteful and inefficient structure. By the late 1970s agricultural surpluses in the form of “Food Mountains” had emerged, which is the result of the inability of European farmers to sell their products at the market-determined world price. Instead, the EC bought the products at a higher price and stored them for future use. These “mountains” emphasized the “protectionist and interventionist” side of EC policies.<sup>12</sup>

After the EU membership efforts, with the 1974 election, the new Labour government continued the “Conservative’s interventionist policies” while trying to conciliate the trade unions. “The Industrial Relations Act” was repealed, a state holding company to encourage investment and improve productivity was created, and a system of planning agreements between industries and state established. A new “Social Contract” bound both government and trade unions to moderate wage

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<sup>10</sup> See [www.europeansinglecurrency.com/referendum](http://www.europeansinglecurrency.com/referendum) for the details about the 1975 referendum.

<sup>11</sup> David Richard and Martin J. Smith, **Governance and Public Policy in the United Kingdom**, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005)

<sup>12</sup> David McKay, Ian Budge, Ivor Crewe and Ken Newton, **The New British Politics**, (Pearson Publishing, London, 3.ed., 2004)

demands. In fact, the “Social Contract” resulted in anything but “moderation”. Inflation bounded ahead, from “16.1 %” in 1974 to “24.2 %” in 1975.<sup>13</sup> In addition to these, Britain held a referendum on Europe in 1975. The question in the referendum was “Do you think the UK should stay in the European Community (The Common Market)?” and “67.5 %” of votes were in favor of staying in.<sup>14</sup>

Especially, the year 1974 was a bad one for all the development countries because of oil crises of the 1970s. In order to handle their problems that emerged because of economic dislocations, national governments generally started to prefer national solutions rather than collective solutions. Shortly, “protectionist” policies had become important for the national governments. Britain’s industrial competitiveness continued to decline. British trade unions were more successful than those in many other countries in “keeping wage rates” up to or beyond the rate of inflation. Like the Conservatives before them, Labour announced an incomes policy that was in effect compulsory.<sup>15</sup> After early compliance by the unions, the government faced growing resentment and industrial unrest. Most commentators agree that this almost certainly cost Labour the election in May 1979 and finally the Conservatives won the 1979 election.

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<sup>13</sup> Lord, pp.37-41

<sup>14</sup> See [www.harvard-digital.co.uk/euro](http://www.harvard-digital.co.uk/euro) for the details.

<sup>15</sup> Richter, p.102

In fact, the political and economic events after the 1975 referendum disappointed some of the British citizens, because those were not their desire about the membership of Britain into the EU. As economically, indicators were not positive for Britain. After these developments, there have been periodic outbursts of Euroscepticism.

Indeed, over the last 30 years or so Britain has become closely engaged with the EU across a range of policy areas with important implications for British policy and politics. This suggests that “reluctance” is not the whole story. Actually, British governments have been positively enthusiastic in some areas such as the development of the European single market.<sup>16</sup> As already mentioned there are some areas where European integration may connect with state policy preferences. And they are considered as both in the interests of that state and strengthening it by increasing the likelihood of key objectives, such as those in the area of market liberalization, being attained.

Since the British government joined the EC, Britain is considered as a “reluctant European” in the European Union.<sup>17</sup> While most other countries saw it as a political project, the European Community was an economic structure for Britain.

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<sup>16</sup> Alan Lord, pp,51-55

<sup>17</sup> Giddings and Drewry, p. 23

According to this perspective, this was a potential source of conflict. Actually, this was not a very clear situation until the late 1980s.

## **2.2. The Developing relations between Britain and the EU especially from 1980 to the present**

A necessary complement to developments at the European level is the reception of those developments within the national system of the Britain. First of all, looking through only at this reception, it is possible to understand the development of European integration as an issue within a national context. This thesis only states that national systems receive and adapt European developments; and Britain is one of these systems.

In practical terms, this requires a consideration of several elements. At the broadest level, there is a need to cover the general sweep of national interactions with the European Union during the revision of EU project. In other words, attention will be paid on events that might give rise to discussion and debate within national systems on European matters. This includes both European events, such as treaty ratifications and policy developments, and national events, such as national elections, where Europe can potentially play an important role.

### ***2.2.1. Turning Points in British Policy after 1980 with the effect of Thatcherism***

In the 1979 election, the Conservatives came into power and the period which is called as Thatcherism began. This term can be defined an attempt to establish a new political and ideological framework based on a mixture of liberal and authoritarian ideas. There are some elements of the Thatcherism such as a new way of managing the economy, privatization, authoritarianism, new style of government and also Victorian values.

“Monetarism”, which rejects the aims of economic management proposed by Keynes, was tried. According to “Keynesianism”, the main goal is to maintain full employment; but on the other hand for monetarism, keeping inflation under control is more important. Monetarists claim that the government’s only role should be to control the money supply. It is important that, by trying monetarism, the first Thatcher government took an important step in breaking with the post-war consensus.<sup>18</sup>

Moreover, it was necessary to reduce government borrowing. There was a one way for them; “privatization”. According to the Thatcherites, privatization could bring 3 benefits. It would raise government funds. It would improve the efficiency of the formerly nationalized industries and since the money from privatization would be

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<sup>18</sup> Richard Barnett, **British Politics: New Labour and Thatcherism**, (Penguin, 1995), pp.43-47

raised by selling shares to the public.<sup>19</sup> Finally, privatization would encourage wider share ownership.

In addition to these, during the post-war period, the relationship between government and unions was close even when the Conservatives were in power. The “New Right” was against to trade unions because of the 3 factors. First one was fear of the unions. Secondly, the “New Right” argued that the activities of trade unions distorted the working of the market by allowing the growth in wages to outstrip growth in productivity. They should be blamed for Britain’s economic decline. Finally, “New Right” believed that inflation could be reduced by controlling the money supply not by making agreements with trade unions.<sup>20</sup> It can be said that Thatcher government decided that it was necessary to make a legislation which would restrict the power of the unions.

Authoritarianism is central of the “Thatcherite ideology”. It was so essential to restore the authority of the state for Thatcherism. As a result, the phrase “free economy, strong state” has been applied to the “Thatcherite project”.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Mark Bauer, **Conservatives in Britain**, (Macmillan, 1994), p.63

<sup>20</sup> Barnett, 1995, p.49

<sup>21</sup> Bauer, 1994, p.53

According to Kavanagh, Thatcher had an unusually decisive, “confrontational style” and forceful personality. She was an activist in the Cabinet. She saw herself as the leading participant in Cabinet discussion and pushed ministers into what she believed was right rather than what was useful. Finally she was a “combative parliamentarian”. On the other hand, Thatcher and her supporters often looked back to the “Victorian period” for inspiration and to justify their attitudes. Thatcher also admitted that one of her aims was to destroy “socialism”. Famously, she claimed that there was “no such thing as society.”<sup>22</sup>

Thatcher’s period after 1980 continued until 1990 and this term was turning point for the British politics. Also there were some important developments about the relationship with European Union. Soon after the various impasses of the 1970s and early 1980s had been largely resolved at “the Fontainebleau Summit” in 1984 and 1985 marked the start of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) for the Single European Act.<sup>23</sup> And in 1985, Britain had realigned herself with the rest of the Community. Majority of the British society saw the liberalization across the EC as a way to reach new markets.<sup>24</sup> The Single European Act not only would formalize the single market project, but also would introduce new skills for cohesion, the environment and research, as well as the beginnings of an integrated foreign policy. Moreover, the Single European Act would extend the powers of the European

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<sup>22</sup> See Dennis Kavanagh, **Politics After Thatcher**, (Paperback, 1997)

<sup>23</sup> Anthony Clark, *The Process of EU System*, Ph. D. Thesis, Nottingham University, 2000, p. 46

<sup>24</sup> Christopher Pennino, *The Opposition Formation in Britain*, **Britannia Express**, 22 November 2004.

Parliament and reintroduce “qualified majority voting” as an alternative to the “de facto unanimity” that had persisted since “the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966”.<sup>25</sup> At the same time, the momentum of the Single European Act would enable the Community to reform its budgetary procedure and start more extensive modifications to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).<sup>26</sup>

Although some British politicians were not satisfied with the treaty (SEA) signed in 1986, Thatcher and her government were happy with the treaty, having been among the more vocal supporters of the single market.<sup>27</sup> Quick ratification followed and the legislative program of the “White Paper” was rolled into place. However, at this point, the problems that were to initiate the British debate on Europe were beginning.<sup>28</sup>

The general election of 1987 in Britain revolved around national issues. In Britain, Thatcher was confident that the on-going “neo-liberal project of the

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<sup>25</sup> P. Cecchini, M. Catinat & A. Jacquemin, **The European challenge 1992: The benefits of a Single Market**, (Aldershot, Wildwood House, 1988)

<sup>26</sup> See C. Grant, **Delors: Inside the house that Jacques built**, (Brealey Publishing, London, 1994)

<sup>27</sup> D. Dinan, **Ever closer union: An introduction to European Integration**, (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2.ed, 1999), pp.102-124.

<sup>28</sup> P. Taylor, ‘The new dynamics of EC integration in the 1980s’, in J. Lodge (Eds.), **The European Community and the challenge of the future**, (Pinter, London, 1.ed., 1989), pp. 3-25.

Conservative” was in tune with popular wishes, at least not because Labour was still in a state of disarray after the 1983 elections.<sup>29</sup>

While Thatcher had seen the Single European Acts in itself, the other member states wanted to go further. The Delors Committee on EMU was a case in point, like the growing discussion within the British government about Sterling joining the ERM.<sup>30</sup> By September 1988, Thatcher was making her crucial speech at Bruges, setting out her view of a Community of “willing and active cooperation of independent sovereign states”, and rejecting a “European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels.”<sup>31</sup> Shortly, this speech asserted a vision of a Europe of nation states and opposed key aspects of the plan for future European Integration; but at the same time it was a sign for ending of the Thatcher’s period.

At some extent, it was internal party divisions over Europe that made politicians reluctant to engage in discussion of the subject. The 1989 European elections were the very first examples of such divisions in the Conservative Party which were very difficult to manage. The change in Thatcher’s policy in the wake of her Bruges speech in 1988 caused “a deep split” within the party, while Labour

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<sup>29</sup> P. Cozens & K. Swaddle, ‘*The British general election of the 1987*’, in *Electoral Studies*, 1987, Vol. 6-3, pp.263-266.

<sup>30</sup> See Stephans, **Politics and the Pound: The Conservative’s struggle with sterling**, (Macmillan, London, 1996), pp. 70-99

<sup>31</sup> M. Thatcher, ‘The European Family of Nations’, in M. Holmes (eds.), **The Eurosceptical Reader**, (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1996), pp. 88-96, p.92.

completed its European conversion and concentrated on exploiting Tory divisions.<sup>32</sup> It was good opportunity for Labours. Since 1979, there has been extensive reform of the structure and organization of the Labour Party to be able to win new elections.

At that time, France was especially pushing on to the next stage of monetary integration, so the British debate on membership of the ERM became important, as Thatcher was forced into joining the system by her new Chancellor John Major. Before that, membership had become a static issue, rather than one based on reasoned economic argument, a fact that was to come back to haunt Major just three years later. And with a high possibility Thatcher had not made the choice voluntarily, as her distrust to Europe grew. However, coupled with growing problems on domestic tax issues, her position became ever weaker and at the end, in December 1990 she was replaced by Major.<sup>33</sup>

The British government faced a newly confident group of Eurosceptics on its backbenches, resulting in the start of a long and difficult passage through the Commons. Without entering into much more detail, it was apparent in this case that the debate was focused more on domestic concerns, or at “best Europe” as a

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<sup>32</sup> A. Adonis, ‘Great Britain’, in *Electoral Studies*, 1989, Vol. 262-269

<sup>33</sup> George S., **An awkward partner: Britain in the EC**, (Oxford University Press, 3. ed., 1998), pp.209-230 for details about Thatcher’s premiership.

general issue, rather than on the specifics of the treaty in question.<sup>34</sup> And it can be said that those in power lost much of their credibility and status. Major was already suffering the effects of a very small majority in the Commons (which left him open to radical elements within his party pushing for more Eurosceptic positions).

By the time of the 1992 British general election, the surprise victory of the Conservatives was achieved by negative campaigning on Labour's tax plans, despite coming only a few months after the signing of the Treaty on the European Union. Mortimore notes that this election was marked by more attention to packaging rather than content of policy.<sup>35</sup>

### ***2.2.2. Power change from the Conservatives to the Labours in 1990s***

Matters were not helped at all by the speculative attacks on the ERM during 1992-1993. The effect of German reunification on monetary policy had put increasing strain on the other currencies in the system, particularly those which were not closely linked to the Deutschmark. In September 1992, the Bank of England unsuccessfully

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<sup>34</sup> For the British parliamentary debate, see D. Baker, A. Gamble & S. Ludlam, 1993a, '*Whips or scorpions? The Maastricht vote and the Conservative Party*', in **Parliamentary Affairs**, Vol: 46-2, pp.151-166; D. Baker, A. Gamble & S. Ludlam, 1994, '*The parliamentary siege of Maastricht 1993: Conservative divisions and British ratification*', in **Parliamentary Affairs**, Vol.47-1, pp.37-60, and K. Alderman, 1993, '*Legislating on Maastricht*', in **Contemporary Records**, Vol.7-3, pp.499-521.

<sup>35</sup> R. Mortimore, '*The British general election of 1992*', in **Electoral Studies**, 1992, Vol. 11-4, pp.352-355, p.352.

fought to keep Sterling within the system limits, but the final result was the suspension of currency from membership. "Black Wednesday" indicated not only a damaging blow to the Conservative's European Policy, but also the end of public confidence in their management of the economy, a factor that would play an important role in the 1997 general election.<sup>36</sup> At that time, intervention was successful and backed up first by the *Bundesbank* and then by a complete recasting of the ERM's structure, leading many people in Britain to claim that they had been unfairly treated.

Before Maastricht came into force, opinion of the government and the public across the Union were much more oppressed. And European elections of 1994 in the UK was seen by the majority as testing grounds for national issues. For instance; "the Conservative rout reflected popular discontent with the part, rather than their line on the Union, despite the sharp fall in popular support after 1992's Black Wednesday."<sup>37</sup>

For the British, being free from the constraints of the ERM and enjoying an economic upturn, the problems of their Union neighbors seemed distant. Major was continuing his fight with the help of his party; his vision was at the "heart of Europe" and did not match with his actions. Minor issues over qualified majority voting

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<sup>36</sup> D. Butler & D. Kavanagh, **The British general election of 1997**, (Basingstoke, Mavmillan, 1997)

<sup>37</sup> Mortimore, '*Great Britain*', in **Electoral Studies**, 1994, Vol. 13-4, pp.341-343

weightings; the enlargement of 1995 and the choice of a new Commission President were used by Major to give his party the impression that he was playing tough.<sup>38</sup> While the rest of the Union was pushing on with extra-Treaty cooperation, as with the Schengen Treaty of 1995, Britain continued to fight with itself.

Matters came to a head in 1996, when the beef crisis in Britain took on an EU dimension, as the Commission imposed a prohibition on beef exports from the UK.<sup>39</sup> A last attempt in 1996 to block the Union's work, by means of a refusal to participate in meetings, failed and seemed to do little more than to raise Major's unpopularity among the voters. The coincidence of the beef prohibition with the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference was also a cause of further delays and barriers.

While it has been apparent that European issues have not played a major role in the elections up to 1995, the general election of 1997 proved that this was not always the case. It can be claimed that the impact of British membership to the EU played an important role in the fate of the elections. The period after 1994, Tony Blair and his colleagues have begun to argue the idea of modernization. This process had not gone far enough for the party to win over enough voters to gain a majority in the forthcoming general election. He always aimed to win over those people living in "Middle England". As a result, Blair and his colleagues set about distancing the

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<sup>38</sup> Telephone Interview, William Wallace, Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics, 12 November 2004, LSE, Holborn-London.

<sup>39</sup> See <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-006a.htm> for the details.

current LP (“New Labour”) from the LP of the past (“old Labour”) and the 1997 election was victory for the Labours under Tony Blair.<sup>40</sup>

The Conservatives in Britain had struggled through the previous five years on a very small majority, which had further served to the internal party splits on European policy. Matters were worsened still by the rapidly approaching question of membership of the single currency. James Goldsmith’s Eurosceptic Referendum Party pushed the main parties into agreeing to hold a referendum on the issue. However, while Goldsmith ensured that the parties had to take account of the Euro debate, this merely reinforced the “large-scale use of tactical voting” to get the Conservatives out of office after 18 years.<sup>41</sup> As mentioned before, the importance of this debate should not be overstated, given that this election came in a period of persistent decreasing in support for membership.

The IGC was left to deal with the Treaties, although the lack of agreement was used as an excuse to the unnecessary extension of the negotiations until the European Council in Amsterdam in June 1997. It was only a partial coincidence that this date was three months after the British general elections, as it had been clear that the Conservatives, who were in power since 1979, were probably going to lose against Labour. The importance of this situation laid in the increasing hard line that

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<sup>40</sup> Roy Grant, **Reforms Process within the Labour Party**, (Oxford University Press, 1999)

<sup>41</sup> Anthony Cygon, **The British Parties and Their Structure**, (Macmillan Publishing, 1999), p.58

the British had been taking, under domestic pressure, and which other governments expected would disappear with a new administration. This was in fact the case, and as a part of “Labour’s new European policy, the Social Charter”, which had been excluded from full incorporation into Maastricht, was “fully communitarised”.<sup>42</sup> Nevertheless, it was clear that Britain was not the only country which had reservations about the EU, and Amsterdam was not the great leap forward that some had expected, particularly in the field of institutional reform.

If the 1997 elections had seen the EU developing into a noticeable issue in campaigning, then that position was continued in the 1999 European elections. The switch to “Proportional Representation” (PR) in the UK allowed the strongly anti-EU UK Independence Party (UKIP) to gain a national stage, through its campaigning and its first elected seat. Still undergoing the consequences of the collapse of 1997, the Conservative party took a skeptical line, “vowing to keep the Sterling”, a policy that helped it to regain seats lost in 1994.<sup>43</sup>

It is really only at the end of the development period that European factors have played a significant role in electoral campaigns. In the 1997 and 1999 elections, European issues were being considered in specific national contexts (do we want to lose the pound?) putting this back into the question of how elections might affect

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<sup>42</sup> Jan Leonard, *Beyond Party Politics: power struggles in Britain*, Ph.D. Thesis, Nottingham University, 1999, pp.87-95.

<sup>43</sup> Cygon, p.91

public opinion. Even that effect might not be seen as elections affecting opinion, but opinion affecting elections. Certainly this would be true in the British case, where the Euro/Sterling debate had been high controversial since at least 1996 and where the Conservative position was based on perceived electoral benefit as well as it was on principle. New currency Euro was started to be used in 11 countries in 2002. In Britain, Labour decided in 2003 not to join the monetary union until after the next general elections. Britain's decision on Euro is not still clear.

In addition to these, September 11 was a very important turning point for the international relations. It has affected the relationship between Britain and European Union too. The aim of USA was to attack Iraq and the most important ally of the USA was Britain, British Labour Party. These developments, especially Blair's "shoulder to shoulder"<sup>44</sup> stance with President Bush has created some problems between Britain and some EU member states, such as France and Germany. All of these could not prevent Britain to continue its alliance with the USA during the Iraq war. "Every other coalition member in the Iraq war provided only enough troops to provide political, but not active military support, Britain gave an able-bodied force of nearly 30,000 soldiers. In the post-conflict phase, Britain is providing a force of 12,000. In addition to these the Hutton inquiry into the suicide of Dr. David Kelly has harmed the Blair government. These developments become so important at the national level in

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<sup>44</sup> See <http://www.prospect.org/web/page.wv?section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleId=937> for the details.

Britain; and the public's trust in his leadership-Tony Blair has fallen to 27 percent."<sup>45</sup> But finally, he won the last election which was made in May 2005. Moreover in the contemporary world structure, the future of the new EU Constitution is being discussed and Britain is one of the EU members which have been suspicious about the Constitution.

As a result of these, the opposition to the EU increases in Britain generally; but particularly the period between 1980 and 2000 was so important to be able to understand the development of party-based Euroscepticism in the UK, especially in England which is the main nation of United Kingdom. So in this thesis, especially this term was evaluated

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<sup>45</sup> See *United Kingdom* in Euro – **Focus**, Volume:9, No:6, 17 October 2003

### 3. THE REASONS OF BRITAIN'S SEMI-DETACHED STATUS IN EUROPE

There can be little doubt that Britain's relationship with Europe, until 1972 at least, was largely one of detachment. Even since joining in 1973 Britain has often been seen as pursuing narrow self-interest rather than being fully committed to the European ideal, leading Stephan George to argue that Britain has acquired a reputation as an "awkward partner".<sup>46</sup> Whilst "awkward" may not be the right term to use given its somewhat negative connotation other terms are "reluctant" European or "semi-detachment".<sup>47</sup> David Allen argues that, whilst governmental institutions in Britain have adapted to the EU, the wider political system has not contributed to "semi-detachment".<sup>48</sup> Before 1972 Britain had remained detached from European developments, but even after this date Britain has clearly not been at the "heart" of Europe.<sup>49</sup> Britain's "semi-detached" status includes generally geographical, historical, economic, cultural and institutional explanations.

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<sup>46</sup> S. George, **An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community**, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994), and p.1. For criticism of this approach see J. Buller, "*Britain as an Awkward Partner*", **Politics**, No: 1, 1995, pp: 33-42; S. George, "*Reply to Buller*", **Politics**, No: 1, pp: 43-47.

<sup>47</sup> J.W. Young, **Britain and European Unity 1945-1992**, (Macmillan Press Ltd. London, 1993); D. Watts, **Reluctant Europeans**, (PAVIC Publications, Sheffield, 1994); S. George (Ed), **Britain and the European Community: The Politics of Semi-Detachment**, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992).

<sup>48</sup> D. Allen, "Britain and Western Europe" in M. Smith and B. White (Eds.), **British Foreign Policy**, (Unwin Hyman, London, 1988), pp: 168-192. Term also had been used by former Labor Chancellor Roy Jenkins, **Federal Trust Conference, Britain and Europe: the Forthcoming British Presidency of the EU**, 4/12/1997.

<sup>49</sup> J. Major, Speech to the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 11/3/1991.

### 3.1. The Geographical Factor

Although from the perspective of British foreign policy, Europe has been seen as a central preoccupation for British from the medieval era to the present day, Britain has been a detachment from the European continent in terms of geographically and psychologically, As President Churchill proclaimed that Britain is part of Europe, but not of it.

Because the geographical explanations focus on Britain's status as an "offshore island", Britain has a peripheral status in the eyes of the majority society of Europe.<sup>50</sup> Traditionally Britain's policies have not exclusively focused on Europe. Reliance on the empire and then on the Commonwealth after 1945, however, proved to be no substitute for membership of the European Community.<sup>51</sup> In the immediate post-war period, Churchill quickly set British foreign policy into the intersection of three circles between the USA, Europe and the Commonwealth.

Viewed from today's perspective, after the end of Empire, the Commonwealth has become an "elegant camouflage" for a surprisingly effective, unique and voluntary grouping of states. In the 1970s, placing the Commonwealth

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<sup>50</sup> See G. Radice, **Offshore: Britain and the European Idea**, (I.B. Tauris, London, 1990) and M. Chisholm, **Britain on the Edge**, (Routledge Publishing, London, 1994).

<sup>51</sup> Neal Ascherson, "*Britain and her European Partners*", Introductory Paper of **EU Conference at the Madingley Hall, Cambridge**, November 2001.

was relevant to both Britain and Europe which would have seemed “quixotic.” But indeed, since the end of the Cold War with the accelerating impact of globalization, the trend of relative importance of Commonwealth has been decreased. On the other hand, Britain still keeps her commonwealth approach in global outlook. As evidence, it can be asserted that Britain is still “the second biggest overseas investor” all over the world after the USA in absolute terms.<sup>52</sup>

Undoubtedly the Commonwealth has been losing its importance in the post-war Period but “the Atlanticist dimension”, based on the “special relationship” with the USA, remains as a prominent factor. The special relationship with US was seen as corporation and coordination in foreign and defense policy. In addition to that, this relation is also on the basis of “Anglo-Saxon liberalism” which stays against to “the European social model”. Actually, for Britain it seems dilemma because Britain mainly continue to follow the Anglo-Saxon model, however, she endorse and embedded only some aspects of “the continental European welfare model”. Therefore, Britain would remain as an “awkward partner” in Europe. But in Britain, the “special relationship” with America is interpreted as an endangering close alliance.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Crispin Blunt, Britain’s Place in the World: Time to decide, **National Report Collection**, 1998.

<sup>53</sup> Alice Rumford, ‘USA: *Special Partner for Britain*’, **Political Review**, Vol:7, No:3, 1995

### 3.2. Special Partnership between the Britain & the USA

One concern for the future is that the post 1945 “Anglo-American special relationship” has been based more on utility rather than on a “broad-based similarity of views”. During the Cold War, Britain acted as America’s leading security ally and therefore, an alliance cemented in intelligence sharing and sensitive military cooperation. Since the end of the Cold War, at critical moments, Britain’s utility to the United States has been significant – in the bombing of Libya, in Operation Desert Storm and in the anti-Saddam alliance since 1991 which ended with the Iraqian war.<sup>54</sup>

The close relationship with the USA has allowed Britain an effective nuclear deterrent at a reasonable cost. The benefits of the nuclear, defense and intelligence relationship have also underwritten the justification for the Britain retaining a seat as a permanent member of UNSC. This situation has helped Britain to sustain its role as a leading nation of “the world’s second greatest power.”<sup>55</sup>

The strength and stability of the Anglo-American relationship from 1957 onwards is explained by shared interests and British Policy. It is firmly supported on four pillars of shared interests: “defense and security”, “commitment to democracy

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<sup>54</sup> Niblett, Robin, *‘Britain’s Relationship with other States’*, **European Studies**, 1997

<sup>55</sup> Blunt, Crispin, *Britain’s Place in the World; Time to decide*, **National Report Collection**, 1998

and the rule of law”, “commitment to free trade and the liberal market economy” and “common cultural heritage”.<sup>56</sup> According to Hugo Young, Britain’s first aim is ‘Atlanticist’.<sup>57</sup> He also mentions in his speech that Tony Blair emphasized Britain must never forget the historic and continuing US role in defending the political and economic freedoms.<sup>58</sup>

Because of its global role and its self-image, the majority society of Britain was very proud. Britain was a European nation, but this was generally considered the least important of its three alternatives which are the EU, the Commonwealth, and the US in foreign policy. As Blunt mentioned, Britain always wants to be in Europe, but not run by Europe.

The future of this relationship is now in question, but historical developments and some researches show that the special partnership between the USA and Britain is very likely continue in the future. According to the MORI statistics, this question was asked to the British citizens: “In a crisis, which of these - Europe, the Commonwealth or America - do you think would be Britain's most reliable political ally?” The result is as expected; America is always seen as most reliable political ally for the British citizens.

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<sup>56</sup> See the Speech of Malcolm Rifkind, *The Atlantic Community*, 30 January 1995.

<sup>57</sup> Young, Hugo, **This Blessed Plot**, ( Macmillan, 1998)

<sup>58</sup> Speech by the Prime Minister Tony Blair at Lord Mayor's banquet, 10th November 1997.

**Table 1: Britain's most reliable political ally**

	%
<i>Europe</i>	16
<i>Commonwealth</i>	15
<i>America</i>	59
<i>All the Same</i>	1
<i>None of these</i>	3
<i>Don't know</i>	6

Source; from the MORI data<sup>59</sup>

### **3.3. The Economic Factors**

In Britain's semi-detachment, economic factors may have played a role. Initially, a high proportion of Britain's trade remained with states outside the EC, especially the Commonwealth. However, as the percentage of trade with EU members rose "from 22% in 1958 to over 49% in 1988", the trade patterns changed dramatically.<sup>60</sup> The declining trade with other states was a key factor behind British attempts to join the EC in the 1960s.

However, although trade interdependence increased especially with the launch of the Single Market, four structural economic differences have stayed

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<sup>59</sup> See '<http://www.mori.com/polls/1999/ec990927.shtml>' for the research details about the British Identity.

<sup>60</sup> George, 1992, p.19

significant. First of all, the CAP has clearly not satisfied Britain. Secondly, Britain's net contribution to the EU budget has caused the specific British budget rebate, which continues to cause tensions. The third difference is "the limited progress" towards a single market in financial services, a key and growing part of the British economy. Lastly, Britain's "individualist liberal capitalism" contrasts with "Rhineland capitalism" with its greater social dimension:<sup>61</sup> these are two main strains of capitalism. The first is the Rhineland model that has existed in Germany for more than a century. (and in Japan as well). In Rhineland capitalism, a company is an institution. It serves anyone who "holds a stake" in its operation, specifically: clients, suppliers, employees, stockholders, and the surrounding social community. On the other hand, second model is "Anglo-Saxon" capitalism, as practiced in the United States and (to a lesser extent) Britain. Whereas Rhineland capitalism serves "stakeholders," variously defined, Anglo-Saxon capitalism serves "shareholder". "Stakeholder societies" favored long-term investments that supported technological improvements, while shareholder companies, focused on the short term, simply juiced up profits with "layoffs and accounting gimmickry" in a way that was deleterious over the long term. The distinction can be differently put, as one between the "managerial" capitalism of Europe and the "proprietary" capitalism of the United States. It should be stressed that the Anglo-Saxon version was the newcomer innovation. Although its defenders presented it as a purer form of capitalism, a removal of "artificial" constraints and regulations, Albert thought it was nothing of the sort. It came into being only with the start of the 1980s when, inspired by Reagan and

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<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.* Pp: 18-21.

Thatcher, corporations that had been as “managerial” as their European counterparts repudiated a variety of debts to their employees and communities.<sup>62</sup>

### ***3.3.1. The place of British economy in the world***

Britain is a world leader: ‘Britain can boast a number of the world’s leading multinational and global companies, including Glaxo-Wellcome, ICI, Shell, BP Amoco, Grand Metropolitan Diageo, Reuters and BT.’<sup>63</sup> The capital city of England, London is one of the world’s leading financial centers, with a workforce of over 800.000 and a currency market turnover that is greater than that of New York and Tokyo combined.<sup>64</sup>

Reflecting its position as the fifth largest trading nation in the world, exporting more per head than the United States or Japan, Britain has been the leading proponent of free trade. Moreover, as competition for capital investment increased in the 1980s, conservative governments took a positive approach to the pressure of economic globalization and adapted “the domestic regulatory environment” according to their demands. As a result, in recent years, Britain has

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<sup>62</sup> See Michel Albert, **Capitalism versus Capitalism**, (Four Walls Eight Windows, 1993) for details.

<sup>63</sup> See [www.companies-house.gov.uk/info](http://www.companies-house.gov.uk/info) for details.

<sup>64</sup> See Saskia Sassen, **The Global City: New York, London and Tokyo**. (Princeton University Press, 2.ed., 2001)

benefited from large levels of foreign direct investment. A testament to its success under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher is introducing “flexible labor market” and taking the lead in “public sector privatization” strategies with which many other industrialized countries are still grappling. Foreign companies have brought not only financial investment, but also new work and management practices. In addition to the financial sector, British firms also hold leading global positions in creative service industries such as advertising, the music industry, film and animation, retailing and computer games.<sup>65</sup>

On the other hand, despite these obvious successes, since the 1950s Britain has been overwhelmed by a “sense of economic decline” compared with other European countries and globally. This sense of decline is partly “subjective”. Despite its strong showing at the company level and in the financial sector, Britain is perceived to excel in areas that are rooted in the past, such as “traditional food” and “classic craftsmanship” (clothes and sports car).<sup>66</sup> However, in real terms, a thirty-year history of low economic productivity and low quality has damaged the competitiveness of the British manufacturing sector, and British companies are now excluded from domestic electronic appliances and even from the mass car industry.

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<sup>65</sup> Royce Turner, **The British Economy in Transition: From the Old to the New?**, (Routledge, 1995), pp.198-215

<sup>66</sup> Mark Leonard, **Britain TM: Renewing our Identity** , (London, Demos, 1997).

The reason for this decline is partly the legacy of having been the world's first industrialized country, a fact which is complicated Britain's transition to "the just-in-time and knowledge era economies". On the other hand, Britain has 90 Nobel Prizes for science and its long list of significant technological inventions since the Second World War. Although a great testament to the creativity of British scientists and inventors exist, British companies face with difficulties in translating their genius into "marketable products" and "successful business ventures". Some argue that "the City's fixation on shareholder returns" has trapped Britain in a "state of economic short-termism" that starves businesses of the stable investment capital which is necessary for long-term economic modernization and growth.<sup>67</sup>

### ***3.3.2. The Sterling and the European Monetary Union***

Britain's semi-detached relationship with the EU is appropriately illustrated in the area of monetary politics prior to EMU<sup>68</sup>. Britain participated very briefly in the first European Monetary System. She joined in "May 1972" as a "clear gesture of solidarity" but left after speculative flows a few months later in "June 1972".<sup>69</sup> This

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<sup>67</sup> This argument was forcefully made by Will Hutton, in his book; **The State We're In**, (London, Jonathan Cape, 1995)

<sup>68</sup> For detailed histories see K. Dyson, **The Elusive Union: the Process of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe**, (Longman Group Ltd. Harlow, 1994); P. Stephans, **Politics and the Pound; the Tories, the Economy and Europe**, (Macmillan Publishing, London, 1996).

<sup>69</sup> K. Dyson, **the Elusive Union, the process of economic and monetary union in Europe**, (Longman Publishing, London, 1994), p.85.

short engagement with European monetary systems was a notable precursor to later developments. For the early exit of sterling, three main explanations have been advanced. First, in 1972 in many states, sterling was still widely held as a reserve currency. Moreover, as a result of war lending, Britain's overseas dominions held "sterling balances". These large sterling reserves made it difficult for governments to steadily devalue a clearly overvalued sterling without "precipitating a wider devaluation". Secondly, given their desire to pursue an "expansionary domestic policy", Prime Minister Heath and his Chancellor Barber did not want economic policy to be focused on exchange rate factors. This was characterized in the brief "Barber boom" prior to the "first oil-price shock" and the "resultant recession". Finally, there was a sense that sterling was overvalued and course given the breakdown of the "Bretton Woods system", free floating of sterling was the correct. This was seemingly confirmed by a fall in the value of the pound of over 20% against most European currencies in 1973.<sup>70</sup>

The launch of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1978 was the next significant episode in terms of Britain's relationship with European monetary issues. The Labour government under Callaghan with Healey as Chancellor was instinctively less pro-European but it rejected the membership of EMS for similar reasons to Barber. Because sterling balances had been sharply reduced during Callaghan's term, these were less of a factor. The 1976 sterling crisis and the option to take

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<sup>70</sup> P. Stephans, **Politics and the pound: the Tories, the economy and Europe**, (Macmillan Publishing, London, 1997), p.3.

financial aid (from the IMF) limited enthusiasm for “pegged rate schemes” which are vulnerable to speculative attacks. The desire to pursue domestic economic policies in favor of maintaining employment levels was again the main factor. Euroscepticism on the Labor backbenches for a minority government was also another restraining factor.<sup>71</sup> The Conservative opposition, even under Thatcher’s leadership was much more favorable toward the EMS.

The last element of Britain’s historical relationship with European monetary politics was a brief but “disastrous membership” of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) starting from October 1990 to September 1992. Having stood aside from the ERM at the beginning, its seeming success in “curbing inflation” and “providing stability”, led to a widespread domestic consensus by 1990 to join the ERM. The British government eventually joined the ERM at the overvalued rate of 2.95 Deutschemarks to one pound presenting a target for speculators. Following a series of speculative attacks, sterling withdrew from the ERM on “Black Wednesday”, 16 September 1992. The ERM crisis was international with many other currencies being devalued and in August 1993, the ERM was effectively sidelined with the decision to move to “+/- 15 % bands”. The reasons of the crisis varied including a tight monetary policy by the Bundesbank, economic recession and institutional weaknesses in the ERM (which led to a lack of coordinated central bank action during the crisis).<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.* p.6

<sup>72</sup> J. Frieden and B. Eichengreen, **The Political Economy of European Monetary Unification**, (Westview Pres, Oxford, 1994), p.4

Three factors associated with the ERM crisis played a key role in relation to Britain. First of all, and most significantly, the speed of Britain's withdrawal caused a serious embarrassment for the British Conservative government from which it arguably never recovered. Within one day, interest rates were raised by 5% before falling by the same amount when Britain suspended ERM membership and 4 billion pound of reserves were spent in an unsuccessful attempt to remain in the ERM.<sup>73</sup> Secondly, the tight monetary approach of the Bundesbank during the crisis further damaged British-German relations.<sup>74</sup> Thirdly, "the domestic political fallout" from the ERM crisis led to a higher sensitivity during British government dealings with European monetary politics.

During the British government's relationship with the ERM, Helen Thompson stressed "short-term political considerations". These considerations included the desire to utilize exchange rate policy in order to avoid recession and the need for some influence over the Maastricht Treaty negotiations. Moreover, another purpose was to avoid the fact that Thatcher, having already lost Chancellor Lawson and Foreign Secretary Howe, was forced, reluctantly and eventually, to support Chancellor Major and Foreign Secretary Hurd.<sup>75</sup> In the haste in order to decide whether to enter the ERM, the actual entry rate was not considered in much detail

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<sup>73</sup> P. Stephans, *op.cit.*, p.257

<sup>74</sup> K. Dyson, *op.cit.*, p.161

<sup>75</sup> Thompson, Helen, **The British Conservative Government and the European Exchange Rate Mechanism 1979-1994**, (Pinter Publishing, London, 1996), p.176

leading to the inappropriate rate of 1 pound to 2.95 Deutschemarks being used.<sup>76</sup> There was a lack of agreement between the government, who saw the move as a medium-term stabilization policy, and the Bank of England, who saw the move as a “necessary deflationary move” to combat the aftermath of the “Lawson Boom”.<sup>77</sup> Since the parity entered at a too high rate, Major saw the need to defend the parity rate as much in terms of maintaining credibility for his “heart of Europe” strategy as maintaining British pride in avoiding devaluation.<sup>78</sup> This necessity underlined Britain’s unsatisfied experience with European monetary politics and it illustrated her semi-detachment once more.

### 3.4. Britain as an International Actor

In the middle of twentieth century, Britain has fallen from being the world’s leading imperial power to being now a middle-ranking country with only some parts of its once global empire under its governance. But later, Britain continued to play the role of a global player in the 1990s as a result of its position as one of the world’s recognized nuclear powers, its permanent membership of the UN Security Council, and its participation in the Group of Seven leading industrialized countries, despite

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<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, p.173

<sup>77</sup> H. Thompson, “The UK and the Exchange Rate Mechanism 1978-1990” in B. Brivati & H. Jones (Eds), From **Reconstruction to Integration: Britain and Europe since 1945**,(Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1992), p.237

<sup>78</sup> H. Thompson, **the British Conservative Government and the European Exchange Rate Mechanism 1979-1994**, (Pinter Publishing, London, 1996), p.194.

the decline in its relative diplomatic influence and economic wealth that accompanied de-colonization. Britain's role in these organizations reflects not only simply a hangover from its Great Power past and status as a Second World War victor, but also its desire to protect its still sizeable global network of trading links and foreign investments.<sup>79</sup>

In addition to these, a universal language, English is one of the very important weapons of Britain as a global tool. So, the importance of English cannot be ignored. Considering the number of native speakers, English is not the most widely spoken language, but it is the most widespread language in the world.

Estimating the exact number of English speakers is difficult, but roughly speaking there are more than "350,000,000" native English speakers and more than "400,000,000" speakers of English as a second language or foreign language. However, even these numbers do not really indicate the importance of English as a world language, because less than fifteen percent of the world population speaks English.<sup>80</sup> The importance of English is not related with the number of people who use it but what it is used for. English is the major language of some governments, news, information, international business, diplomacy, travel, science and the

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<sup>79</sup> According to the OECD, Britain is second only to the United States as a source of outward investment, investing nearly \$400 billion in 1995 alone. Overseas direct investment by British companies is nearly 3% of UK GDP compared with less than 1% in Italy, France, Japan, Germany, and the United States (The OECD in figures, 1998)

<sup>80</sup> Kitao, Kenji, *The Importance of English*, *The Internet TESL Journal*, Vol. II, No. 4, 1996, p.1

professions in the world. In the contemporary world, speaking English means being able to do business with virtually the whole world.

### 3.5. The Lack of Historical Affinity between Britain & EU

Some explanations emphasize the different historical backgrounds of Britain in comparison with continental Europe. The central theme of these explanations is to stress the different war experiences that Britain had as compared to the rest of continental Europe.<sup>81</sup>

After the Second World War, to avoid possible any more war in Europe is the crucial key motivations behind the formation of the EC project. In the Second World War Britain had a different war experience in which she had defiantly “stood alone” until 1940.<sup>82</sup> Traditionally the strategy of Britain in Europe had been on the basis of providing a balance of power on the continent by acting as a balancer in the overall power equation while using its relatively super power whereas she attempted to avoid getting fully involved in continental European affairs.

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<sup>81</sup> See Speech of N. Parker, “*The Lion and the Sheepdog: The Ex-Imperial State in the European System*”, 13<sup>th</sup> Lothian Conference, London, November 1997.

<sup>82</sup> S. Bulmer, “Britain and European Integration: Of Sovereignty, Slow Adoption and Semi-Detachment” in S. George (Ed.), **Britain and the European Community: the Politics of Semi-Detachment**, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992), p.9.

Because of the lack of historical similarity with the fears and ambitions of the founding countries of the European Community in the British people, the British has perceived European integration as a uniquely economic exercise and, since joining, UK governments have been an obstacle rather than a “dynamic contributor” to almost all broader European integration initiatives.<sup>83</sup> Also, The British people’s lack of historical affinity with the continent Europe has not been mitigated by British accession, by successive EU enlargements. Moreover, the success of the EU in promoting the growth of a single European market that now accounts for 50% of British exports cannot be enough on the hostility and alienation of Britain towards Continental Europe.

Moreover, the growth of the EU as a political entity has been based on a Franco-German mutual agreement. Also, European Union project had achieved a political dominance over European affairs that Britain had long fought to prevent. Therefore, successive British governments have sought to weaken this alliance. Other historical situations that make Britain isolated and different than the continent Europe were the existence of the “relative unity of the British state” (following the union with Scotland in 1707), the “relative absence of revolutionary activity” and the “progressive development of democracy”, the “relative absence of ethnic tensions” (excluding Northern Ireland) and the idea of a common identity among the British

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<sup>83</sup> From the Speech of Nicholas Ridley, *the EU as “a German racket”*, 1991

people (whether English, Scottish or Welsh).<sup>84</sup> Because of these all reasons, in Britain, people are supposed to be consistently felt their prime identity to be national rather than European in contrast with other continental states. These factors all serves to encourage the British sense of semi-detachment.

### **3.6. The British Institutional Structure**

A variety of institutional factors have been proposed to account for British semi-detachment. Britain's political institutions play a central role both in the British people's perception of their national identity and in outsiders' perception about Britain's national uniqueness, more so than do the political institutions of other West European countries such as France and Germany. The reasons behind having the institutional differences are that Britain had long history. Throughout this long history, British political establishment has consciously built on the concept of the United Kingdom. As a result, the political institutions of Britain are directly effected from the concept of United Kingdom.

There is a crisis in Britain's institutions which lose its reliability. It is all the more worrying, therefore, that in the period 1983-96; the British people's confidence

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<sup>84</sup> Benn, John, 'The Relationship among the British and Irish', Ph.D Thesis, London School of Economics, 2002, p.201.

in their institutions appeared to collapse. Confidence in the monarchy, already low in the early 1980s at a little over 25%, dropped to 18%. Confidence in the church fell from 52% to 25%; in the civil service from 46% to 14%; and, perhaps most worryingly, in the Parliament from 54% to 10%.”<sup>85</sup>

Wilks has argued that Britain’s centralized state institutions run against to the more decentralized institutions of the rest of Europe. Margaret Thatcher applied policies that accelerate the centralization of power. These policies are also against a corresponding decentralization of power even in France. Buller rightly criticizes this view by stressing the minimum state idea of Thatcherism and the idea that the “centralized state apparatus” is a cohesive force.<sup>86</sup> The “game” in Brussels depended on long negotiations, flexibility and consensus, which contrasted with the relatively inflexible approach of British negotiators. Therefore, another institutional factor lays the bargaining style of the British bureaucracy. The political system in Britain characterized by “adversarial politics” and political system is not based on two way negotiations. Reversible policy positions are distinct from most EU states in which the consensual and continuous nature of EU decision making have been existing.<sup>87</sup> In Britain’s primarily “two party system” the opposition is considered as an opposition to

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<sup>85</sup> The Henley Centre, *Planning for Social Change 1996-97*, (London: Henley Centre), quoted in Mark Leonard, **Britain**.

<sup>86</sup> J. Buller, “*Britain as an Awkward Partner in the European Union: a Critical Assessment of New Institutionalism*”, Paper had been presented at the **PSA Conference**, Keele, April 1998, p.11.

<sup>87</sup> J. W. Young, **Britain and European Unity**, (Macmillan Publishing, London, 1993), p.180.

government policy that efforts to make continuity difficult.<sup>88</sup> A final political-cultural explanation for semi-detachment is the dominance of “British pragmatism”. In British political culture, to follow the agendas and seeks legalistic implementation are absent. Also, in British pragmatism eschews “rhetorical goals” focus on issues “per se”<sup>89</sup>

### 3.7. British Culture and Sense of Nationhood

Disappointments with Britain’s political institutions also reflect an ongoing cultural transition in Britain starting from 1945. First of all, the British citizens are evolving from a settled and insular people to a more educated, well-traveled and socially fluid generation. A more drawn-out erosion of the economic power of Britain’s landed gentry and upper class have been mirrored by the decline in levels of manual labor and in the power and membership of labor unions over the past twenty years. Pre-war and immediate post-war social divisions into “upper”, “upper middle”, “middle”, and “lower” or “working” classes have started to diminish with the help of not only the gradual disappearance over the past twenty years of Britain’s working class but also the growth of a prosperous “middle England” which identifies less and less “conflictual undertones” of the Tory versus Labour political debate.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> N. Ashford, “The Political Parties” in S. George (Ed.), **Britain and the European Community: The Politics of Semi-Detachment**, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992).

<sup>89</sup> A. Forster, **Britain and the Maastricht Negotiations**, (Macmillan Publishing, London, 1999), p.25

<sup>90</sup> Niblett, Robin, *Social Structure in Britain*, **European Studies**, 1999

However, John Major's vision of forging a "classless" society in the early 1990s, stayed premature. Structurally, social and cultural divisions continue to be affected by an education system that contains wide differences in curriculum and levels of achievement between state-sponsored and private schools. At the same time, there is a certain sense of security in the invisible but ever-present reach of class division. When social and economic pressures on the individual appear to be growing, it is unclear what vision of national identity, the British nation can gather around<sup>91</sup>

The unsettled nature of Britain's national psychology extends to the very "sense of Britishness" and it is very much another name for "Englishness", or English national identity. Internally, by the increasingly diverse ethnic composition of British society which now contains over three million people, the distinctiveness of "Britishness" has been challenged. However, the superficial sense of continuity is reinforced by the noticeably low levels of ethnic minorities in positions of power and influence, such as barristers, judges, generals, politicians and civil servants. Only in soccer, the ethnic mix in Britain has become patently visible. By the increasingly cosmopolitan nature of British society such as its constant invasion of higher education and English language students, its regular diet of American and Australian

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<sup>91</sup> See John Major, **John Major**, (Perennial, 2001)

TV dramas and “soaps”, and even the sight of Frenchmen and Dutchmen managing traditional British soccer clubs, “Britishness” has been challenged.<sup>92</sup>

The concept of “Britishness” depends upon an external context. It was never inherited, but learned in the eighteenth century and was bound up with the creation of the British Empire.<sup>93</sup> All Britons, independent of whether they were Englishmen, Scotsmen or Welshmen, were involved in promoting and protecting Britain’s interests against external threats. Because of the loss of the empire since 1950 and the forging of ever closer economic and cultural ties with Britain’s traditional European enemies, the concept of “Britishness” has lost its external effect. Actually, Margaret Thatcher tried to recreate the past but she could not succeed because the international and domestic context in which Britain finds itself in the last decade of the twentieth century could not support this campaign. On the other hand, being British is very important in Britain, because the “Britishness” is a kind of indication for their power in the world and they always see themselves different from other nationalities.

Considering the Britain-EU relationship, not many British citizens find themselves European, except in a purely geographical sense. In autumn 1998, the European Commission's Eurobarometer survey (Eurobarometer 50) asked samples

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<sup>92</sup> See Robert Miles, *Are we changing?* **Britannia Express**, Vol;41, 17 October 2004

<sup>93</sup> Keith Robbins, “*British and Europe: Devolution and Foreign Policy*”, **International Affairs**, Vol. 74 /1, 1998, p.106.

across the EU whether "In the near future, you see yourself as (nationality) only, (nationality) and European, European and (nationality) or European only". 43% of the sample admitted only their own nationality and 43% to their nationality first but also to seeing themselves as European. Only 11% felt European first (7%) or solely (4%); 2% didn't know. In 7 of the 15 member states, more felt at least partly European than not European at all. In contrast, in Britain, 62% said they felt British only, 27% British and European and just 9% European and British or only European. Consider the characteristic of this question defining the national superiority current; 49% of the public agree that it is important that the British remain very different from all other nationalities and 71% of them agree that Britain is their heritage. These views correlate strongly, and people who agreed with the first statement agreed with the second statement in general.<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> See The European Commission's Eurobarometer survey in Autumn 1998; Eurobarometer 50

## **4. DEVELOPMENT OF THE EU OPPOSITION IN BRITAIN**

### **4.1. The Effect of Euroscepticism in Britain**

#### **4.1.1. The Meaning of Euroscepticism**

Analyzing Euroscepticism requires several questions. The first one is what is the “skepticism” of Euroscepticism? As the term has developed in political discourse, Euroscepticism is roughly the opposite of the less commonly used term “europhilia”, and denotes opposition to “the European project”. However, it is important to realize that “skepticism: ordinarily refers to doubts or reservations rather than outright opposition.” Colin mentions that there are some opinions on the European project; it may be a mistake to lump those who are actively opposed to further integration, or indeed who would like to undo some of the “progress” that already has been made or would like to have their countries withdraw from the EU altogether, together with those who merely want to hurry up or who express uncertainty about the wisdom of some or all of the proposed “advances”.<sup>95</sup>

Secondly, what is it that Eurosceptics oppose, or what does Eurosceptics have doubts about? In this regard, one can distinguish several objects of skepticism

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<sup>95</sup> See Edward Colin, **Euroscepticism in the Western Europe**, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1993), pp.23-25

in the scholarly literature and in popular political discourse. For the moment taking skepticism and opposition as synonyms, Euroscepticism most generally may refer to opposition to the development of any form of "supranational European institutions" that would or do affect national sovereignty and "the traditional European state system". More specifically, this could mean: opposition to the expansion of the EU to include more members; opposition to increasing the range of responsibilities of the EU and opposition to specific institutional changes affecting the balance of powers among the EU and the member states. Specifically, but also perhaps most commonly, Euroscepticism could mean opposition to EMU.<sup>96</sup>

#### ***4.1.2. Types of the Euroscepticism***

It is necessary to understand the concept of Euroscepticism as defined by Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak. Euroscepticism is a British invention. Euroscepticism as a word means having doubt about Europe. On the other hand, Taggart and Szczerbiak came up with a simple explanation for Euroscepticism, which includes a hard and a soft version.

"Hard Euroscepticism" is where there is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their

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<sup>96</sup> Richard S. Katz, "Opposition Europe: Euroscepticism and Political Parties", in Richard S. Katz and Bernhard Wessels, (Eds.), **The European Parliament, and European Integration**, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999) p.3.

countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived.<sup>97</sup> There are two methods of assessing whether a party is “hard Eurosceptic”. The first is if it is a single issue anti-EU party. It can be assumed that a party would only mobilise solely against the EU, if it were opposed to it on principle. The second method is to ask whether the opposition to the EU is framed in language that stresses that it is too “capitalist / socialist / neo-liberal / bureaucratic”, depending on ideological position (“communist / conservative / socialist / populist”), and calls for a fundamental re-casting of the terms on which their country is an EU member that is incompatible with the present route of the European project. This is sometimes expressed as conditional support for EU membership but on conditions so unattainable that it is tantamount to being “de facto opposed” to EU membership.<sup>98</sup>

“Soft Euroscepticism” is more complex. Soft Euroscepticism can only meaningfully be said to exist where a party uses the “rhetoric of contestation” over the European issue as part of their political repertoire. Taggart and Szcerbiak divide Soft Euroscepticism into two components: “policy” and “national interest”. “Policy Euroscepticism” could be defined as opposition to legislation meant to substantially deepen European integration in the political (EU Constitution) and economic

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<sup>97</sup> Paul Taggart, and Aleks Szcerbiak, *Parties, Positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in the EU Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe*, **Sussex European Institute Working Paper**, (No:46, Sussex, UK: 2001),p.10.

<sup>98</sup> Giacomo Benedetto, “Scepticism and its Antithesis: The Case of Eurosceptics in the European Parliament”, this paper had been presented at the **Seventh Biennial International Conference of the European Community Studies Association**, 31 May 2001.

(EMU) spheres. “National-interest Euroscepticism” involves employing the rhetoric of defending or standing up for the national interest in the context of debates on the EU.<sup>99</sup> It must be stressed that neither of these forms of soft Euroscepticism are in favor of withdrawal from the EU.

Another distinction must be made regarding “party affiliation” to hard or soft Euroscepticism. Taggart and Szczerbiak point to a dichotomy between “core and periphery parties” and the levels of Euroscepticism they adopt. According to their findings, core parties never adopt hard Euroscepticism as the official party line. After all, they are either in power or have the potential to gain power at any election. Parties on the periphery are mostly excluded from decision-making processes and this fact, in turn, makes them appeal to the latent fears shared by all societies about the loss of sovereignty to Brussels. Parties on the political periphery based in England, such as the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), Veritas, and the British National Party are all supporters of hard Euroscepticism in order to attract disappointed voters.

On the other hand, nationalist parties from the “Celtic periphery nations” of Scotland and Wales do not advocate any type of Eurosceptic ideologies. For instance, “The Scottish National Party” in Scotland and “Plaid Cymru” in Wales make the case for being independent states within the European Union. The generally

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<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.* p.11

subject of this thesis is the Britain, but specifically it has shown that Euroscepticism is strongest in the nation of England. On the other hand, only England elected twelve UKIP candidates to be Members of the European Parliament in the 2004 elections. Due to the fact that England is the main nation of the United Kingdom, if Euroscepticism reaches a “fevered pitch there” and withdrawal from the European Union is demanded; Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland will be forced to go along.<sup>100</sup>

In the end, the decisions made by the English as to their place in the EU will affect millions of others who do not share their viewpoint. A good follow-up to this paper would be an investigation of what might happen in Scotland and Wales especially if the English force a UK withdrawal from the EU. Would this fuel Scottish nationalists to break away from the UK and establish their independence within the EU? Would the Welsh follow suit? No matter the answer to that question, for now Euroscepticism is a problem of increasing significance in the UK.

Therefore Scotland and Wales are examples of the exception to the core/periphery rule. Of course, this is not meant to suggest that only England is experiencing Euroscepticism. However, without the data on Euroscepticism from

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<sup>100</sup> Bryan S. Glass, **The Impact of Scottish and Welsh Devolution on English Identity and Administration**, (University of Cambridge, 2001), p.101

England there would be no reason to write this thesis. But infact, it must be remembered that the vast majority of Eurosceptic sentiment is found in England.

In addition to these, another and finally type of euroscepticism is “Xenophobic Euroscepticism”. This type is an extreme form of the phenomenon and an absolute rejection of the entire project of European political and economic integration. Infact, Xenophobic means fear of strangers and this word is often used as a political insult against racists, isolationists and nationalists. So, Xenophobic Euroscepticism is defined as hostility towards the European Union because its institutions are seen as the reason behind mass, unwanted immigration into the country. Xenophobic Eurosceptics demand the immediate withdrawal of their country from EU membership because of the possible mass immigration from relatively less developed EU member countries. While the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) could be considered as a standard hard Eurosceptic party having an anti-immigrant tendency, the newly formed Veritas Party headed by Robert Kilroy-Silk is the essence of xenophobic Euroscepticism.<sup>101</sup>

Unlike the dichotomous relationship of hard and soft Euroscepticism, the xenophobic variety can overlap with either of the other two. A person can be a hard and xenophobic Eurosceptic at the same time. For example, the newly-formed

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<sup>101</sup> See Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, ‘*Opposing Europe: Party Systems and Opposition to the Union, the Euro and Europeanisation*’, **Sussex European Institute Working Paper**, ( No:36, Sussex, UK: 2000).

Veritas Party shows that an entire fringe party can promote withdrawal from the European Union (hard) based on a fear of increased immigration as a direct result of EU membership (xenophobic). Therefore, it can be said that xenophobic Euroscepticism bridges the divide between hard and soft Euroscepticism.

#### ***4.1.3. The Formation of Party-Based Euroscepticism in Britain***

Menno Spiering argues that the term Euroscepticism emerged in Britain in the mid-1980s because of the difficulties to reach towards integrating the European Union project that has been started to form with the establishment of the ECSC in 1951.<sup>102</sup> This explanation shows Eurosceptic opinions did not recently emerge.

There are two theoretical approaches to the Euroscepticism in Britain. The first approach is the “culturalist approach” pointed by Mark Lichbach. This approach claims that individuals are dependent on “society” and “culture” in order to form their identities.<sup>103</sup> The educational establishment does not focus on teaching of contemporary history (post-1945) in Britain, for primary and secondary school students. This educational establishment makes the subject of European integration unfamiliar to British students. Instead, history classes in Britain focus heavily upon

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<sup>102</sup> Menno Spiering, ‘British Euroscepticism’, in Robert Harmsen, and Menno Spiering, (Eds.), **‘Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity, and European Integration’** (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 2004), p.127.

<sup>103</sup> See Mark I. Lichbach, **Is Rational Choice Theory All of Social Science?** (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2003), pp.75-87.

the great events, personalities, wars, and conquests. “History classes in Britain, especially England, are meant as a boost to the collective ego”.<sup>104</sup> As a result, the formation of national identity with national symbols, history and institutions is greater in the British political discourse compared with a potential identification of European symbols, history and institutions. Moreover, the history that is taught to British students generates a tendency towards scepticism on Europe as the “Other”. So being conditioned and defined by education, culture plays an important role in the “formation of anti-EU sentiment”.<sup>105</sup>

The second theoretical approach in Britain that is critical to elite-imposed Euroscepticism is “rational choice”. After the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) turned to be successful in the European Parliament election, there is a renewed power among Eurosceptic parties. Euroscepticism is the key issue underscored by not only UKIP but also the Veritas Party, formed under the leadership of Robert Kilroy-Silk MEP, and the British National Party (BNP). According to “rational choice theory”, actors in the system behave rationally in order to optimize their returns or ends. It is reasonable and rational for periphery parties to be enthusiastic about the electoral success associated with a Eurosceptic party platform. Kilroy-Silk is a political opportunist and his failed proposal to take control of UKIP points out his move to found a new party that defend Euroscepticism where he

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<sup>104</sup> Oliver J. Daddow, **Britain and Europe since 1945: Historiographical perspectives on integration** (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2004), pp. 22-3.

<sup>105</sup> See Linda Colley, **Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837** (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992)

will try to enjoy, and further cultivate, the spoils of anti-EU sentiment.<sup>106</sup> The “rational choice approach”, is not only valid for actors inhabiting periphery parties. What will a Labour MP, who has been for European integration in the past, do when faced with the possibility of losing an election over the issue of Europe? Will the MP play to the Eurosceptic sentiment in the constituency? Or will the MP stay still and risk the humiliating possibility of losing a seat at Westminster to a member of a periphery party? These questions related with the importance of “electoral success” indicate the significance of “the rational choice approach” during the analysis of the Euroscepticism of political elites in Britain.<sup>107</sup>

As a result of these; the latest Eurobarometer statistics for the United Kingdom demonstrate high levels of anti-Europe sentiment among the population. For instance, when a random sample was taken and asked if they had a positive or a negative view of the European Union, the answer of twenty-six percent was positive while that of thirty-seven percent was negative.<sup>108</sup> To another question, sixty-one percent responded that they were scared of losing their national identity and culture in an expanding Europe. Considering immigration, fifty-four percent of the respondents believed that the EU plays a negative role.<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> See George Tsebelis, *Nested Games, Rational Choice in Comparative Politics* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1990), pp. 18-9.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, p.41.

<sup>108</sup> "Eurobarometer 61: **National Report United Kingdom**, (Brussels: European Commission, spring 2004), 35.

<sup>109</sup> "Eurobarometer 61....," 41, 50.

#### ***4.1.4. Party- Based Euroscepticism in the UK Political Parties***

The debate between Eurosceptics and pro-Europeans is ongoing. Labour Party and the opposition Conservative Party, the two main political parties in Britain, the governing, both have within them a broad spectrum of views concerning the European Union.

The governing UK Labour Party is divided into two groups: Eurosceptic and pro-European. Historically, the party tended towards Euroscepticism, but today, under Prime Minister Tony Blair, it is strongly pro-European. According to Hugo Young, "the first Eurosceptic" was the former Labour Party leader Hugh Gaitskell. The Labour Party was originally so Eurosceptic, because following the Second World War, the new Labour Government under Clement Attlee was pushed through social reforms that included the establishment of the National Health Service. The leaders of the Labour Party believed that their hard-won social gains would be undermined by their membership in the European Community.<sup>110</sup> During the 1960s and 1970s, despite individual exceptions, Labour Party argued that the European Community

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<sup>110</sup> Young, Hugo, **This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair**, (London: Macmillan, 1998), p.161.

would bring changes to the market economies of member states.<sup>111</sup> But, they were sceptic about the future of European integration generally.

There exists a dominant school of thought running out of control among Eurosceptics in Britain that has changed Europe's economic position. Eurosceptics started as a liberal and forward-looking economic consortium in the 1950s and they claim that in today's world, EU is marked by high regulations and taxation, inflexible labor markets, and restrictive policies on trade and investment. In the light of this claim, it is not a surprise that following the 1983 General Election disaster for Labour, the party quickly decided against taking an anti-Europe stance. After all, the "capitalist club" impression of the EU was quickly diminishing. This diminishing in the impression of EU is viewed in almost all of the countries in the European Union. The anti-EU sentiment was declining according to the economic liberals in Britain. Most of them just happen to be sitting on the Conservative benches.<sup>112</sup>

Anyone familiar with Euroscepticism in Britain would understand the importance of the Bruges speech given by then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher on September 20, 1988. On 20 September 1988, in the Bruges speech, Thatcher advocated that the European Community should be nothing more than an

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<sup>111</sup> See Andrew Gamble, "The European Issue in British Politics," in *Britain For and Against Europe*, eds. David Baker, and David Seawright (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).

<sup>112</sup> See Anthony Forster, *Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics: Opposition to Europe in the British Conservative and Labour Parties Since 1945* (London: Routledge, 2002), p.135

association of states working to strengthen its independent members. Moreover, Thatcher argued that a successful EC could only be built on the "willing and active cooperation between independent sovereign states," not by the unelected Commission aiming for a United States of Europe under the guidance of its federalist President Jacques Delors. Thatcher, a clear supporter of economic integration and the free market, did not believe that further political and social deepening was necessary or desirable.<sup>113</sup>

According to Anthony Forster, this speech lent credibility to "an intellectual form of Euroscepticism". Moreover, as Thatcher increasingly fell out of grace with her own party, she began to turn up the rhetoric against European integration in her more populist speeches. This tactic had a "two-sided effect". First, Thatcher accelerated her political failure and second, she polarized the Conservative Party between anti- and pro-European groups for the first time.<sup>114</sup>

In November 1990, Thatcher's forced resignation as Prime Minister was a distressing occasion for Conservative Eurosceptics. They had lost their newly-emerging leader and were very close to face with "the most compelling piece of

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<sup>113</sup> See Margaret Thatcher, "The European Family of Nations," in Martin Holmes, (Eds.), **The Eurosceptical Reader**, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), p.91. and Margaret Thatcher, **The Downing Street Years: 1979-1990** (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), pp.742-46.

<sup>114</sup> A. Forster, pp.76-80

integrationist legislation” in other words, the Treaty on European Union.<sup>115</sup> Many Conservative MPs treated the Maastricht Treaty as a threat to British sovereignty. Although the new Prime Minister and Conservative Party leader John Major succeeded in securing a British opt-out on the single currency and social chapter issues, as well as ensuring that the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Justice and Home Affairs Pillars would remain intergovernmental, he was faced with a rebellion by eighty-four backbench MPs over ratification of the treaty. Despite this seeming vote of no confidence by his own party, Major’s ability to achieve the opt-out on monetary union did help to reunite a party standing over the integration fault line. Major was able to keep the Eurosceptic and pro-European wings of his party together until the 1997 General Election which was defeat for the Conservatives. However, for many Eurosceptics in Britain, such as Margaret Thatcher, Jacques Delors stands out as “the father of European federalism”. According to Alan Walters, “the Brussels Leviathan” was used by Delors to create a United States of Europe that could compete with the United States of America for supremacy on the global stage.<sup>116</sup>

After the election defeat and the immediate resignation of Major the Conservatives were involved in a harsh leadership battle which was an indication of their divisions on EMU. Hague, Redwood, Howard and Lilley ran on an “EMU-sceptic

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<sup>115</sup> See Steve Ludlam, "The Cauldron: Conservative Parliamentarians and European Integration," in David Baker, and David Seawright, (Eds.), **Britain For and Against Europe: British Politics and the Question of European Integration**, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp.31-6.

<sup>116</sup> Alan Walters, "**The Brussels Leviathan**," in Patrick Minford, (Eds.), **The Cost of Europe**, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1992), pp.24-9.

platform” while Clarke and Dorrell continued the “wait and see policy”. Hague’s ultimate victory prefigured a change in EMU policy in spite of a surprising last minute alliance between Clarke and Redwood. Hague was determined to clarify the policy on EMU away from “wait and see” policy, to accord with his personal scepticism toward EMU.<sup>117</sup>

Following these developments, the other important thing is that why the Conservative Party also lost the General Election of 2001. They claim that domestic issues influenced the British electorate more than European affairs did. This is shown by the poor performance of the breakaway Pro-Euro Conservative Party in the 1999 European Election. Furthermore, following the electoral defeat of the UK Conservatives in 2001, the issue of Euroscepticism played an important role in the contest to elect a new party leader. The winner, Iain Duncan Smith, was seen as more Eurosceptic than his predecessors and his concern was expressed that his victory could result in an inflammation of the issue within the party. Being an opposition leader, Iain Duncan Smith tried to separate the British Conservative Members of the European Parliament from the federalist European People’s Party Group. As MEPs must maintain a pan-European alliance to retain parliamentary privileges, Duncan Smith sought the merger of Conservative MEPs into the Eurosceptic Union for a Europe of Nations (UEN) group. Because of the presence within the UEN of representatives of neo-fascist parties who do not share similar

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<sup>117</sup> Raymond John Keitch, **Britain and the EMU**, (Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.246

domestic politics, Conservative MEPs vetoed this move. In 2004, Michael Howard, Duncan Smith's successor, emphasized that Conservative MEPs would remain in the EPP Group so they will maintain influence in the European Parliament.<sup>118</sup> However, all these efforts could not prevent election defeat of the Conservatives on 5 May 2005.

In this process the Labour party was in power and they are still continuing under the leadership of Tony Blair. New Labour is an alternative name for Labour Party which originated from 1994. After 1994, the modernization process was started for Labour party.

The UK Independence Party was formed on 3 September 1993 at the London School of Economics by several members of the Anti-Federalist League (AFL). The main goal of the UK Independence Party is to have Britain withdrawn from the European Union.

With the help of the combination of its anti-EU message, given credence by the current debate over the adoption of the EU Constitution, and the use of charismatic political elites, UKIP made an important splash in the 2004 European Parliament election. Roger Knapman, UKIP party leader used a chance encounter

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<sup>118</sup> Interview, Melanie McLean, Co-ordinator of Regional Office, 8 February 2005, UK Conservative Party Local Office (Islington), London.

with Dick Morris, the former polling guru for President Bill Clinton, to learn the tactics of creating and sustaining political momentum. One of the suggested ideas was to get celebrities involved in the cause. In addition to receiving support from television stars like Joan Collins, UKIP found a chance to influence masses when former Labour MP and chat show host Robert Kilroy-Silk decided to run for the position of MEP. As Robert Kilroy-Silk entered as a major player on the UKIP political scene in the spring of 2004, the UKIP had its charismatic shining star and a succeeding strong showing in the 2004 European Parliament elections.<sup>119</sup>

According to UKIP, EU membership is not only bad for Britain's economy and prosperity, but also it is an alien system of government that is totally unacceptable to the British people. UKIP wanted to replace Britain's membership of the European Union with various agreements on free trade and also co-operation. UKIP members don't hate Europe or Europeans, but it could be said that they are not keen on the European Union. They simply believe that the UK should be independent to make its own laws. Moreover, according to the UKIP, cost of EU membership is excessive. For example, British citizens pay from their taxes directly to Brussels, "30 million pounds" a day. With this amount of financial aid, building a new hospital somewhere in the UK in every 3 days is possible. However, the UK has the lowest unemployment rate of the major EU economies. In June 2003, German unemployment was "10.2%" while the euro zone average was 8.9%. In the UK, the unemployment rate was

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<sup>119</sup> Interview, Nicky Sinclair, Council Member of UK Independence Party, 28 January 2005, UKIP Central Office, London.

“5%”.<sup>120</sup> So, entering the EU is not necessary for the UK Independence Party. Also, they believe that foreign companies invest in the UK because Britain has a highly skilled labor force, a more stable currency and low taxation compared with other EU nations. Moreover, English language makes trade much easier.

Moreover, UKIP is against the CAP. They advocate that it is an absurd system that increases the cost of your food, without benefiting the farmer. Patricia Hewitt MP has admitted that “the CAP adds £475 to the cost of a family of four's food bill each year”. Moreover, when the British government joined the Common Market, it surrendered out fisheries as a Common European Resource. Since early 2003, all EU fishermen have had equal access to British fisheries. However, although almost 80 per cent of the EU fishing zone was originally UK territorial waters, British fishermen are allowed only 20 per cent of the catch quota. In other words, these quota restrictions drive ever more of the British fisherman from the sea. Moreover as the quota system requires perfectly edible fish to be thrown back into the sea dead, the CFP has also created an ecological disaster. Over 2 million tons of such fish were discarded in the 1980s and 1990s under these rules each year.<sup>121</sup> Unfortunately, these ideas and campaigns were not enough, because 2005 election became disappointment for the UK Independence Party.

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<sup>120</sup> Interview, July Kaiser, Regional Director of the UKIP, 29 January 2005, UKIP Central Office, London

<sup>121</sup> Telephone Interview, Patricia Hewitt, MP, Former Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, 2 March 2005, London.

In 2005, the Labour Party has won election with 35.2% vote. However, the Tories only gained 32.3% barely more than the vote in last election which was held in 2001. The vote percentage of the Liberal Party has become 22.1%. Considering 645 of 646 seats declared so far, this has given the Liberal Democrats another 11 seats in Parliament, but the Conservatives have gained another 33 seats. The Labour Party has lost 47.<sup>122</sup> Although Tony Blair's policies especially about the Iraq war affected the result of the last election, they could not prevent the Labour Party to become first party in the UK.

## **4.2. National Media in Britain**

Considering the role of the media is necessary in order to have a complete understanding of the formation and development of opposition to the EU. One should not disregard the fact that media-based Euroscepticism is a powerful force in Britain today.

Earlier, opposition was categorized into three main groups such as "elite, popular and intermediate levels", but there was no attempt to address the question of how these levels communicate with each other and within themselves. The media not only formed a key conduit for these communications, and so required an understanding of how it is used by various actors, but it also had the potential to

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<sup>122</sup> [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk\\_politics/vote\\_2005/constituencies/default.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/vote_2005/constituencies/default.stm).

become an actor itself. As much as the media carries news and information, it shapes them to its own agenda and interests, a process that has a potentially deeply influential impact on elite and popular attitudes.<sup>123</sup>

From this point of view, it must be considered whether the media does indeed shape opinions and attitudes or not. As McQuail notes, since there is a “paradoxical relationship between the general and the particular”, there is little agreement on the nature or extent of the assumed effects of the media: “We can be sure that particular effects are occurring all the time without being able to see or predict the aggregate outcome or to know after the event how much is attributable to the media.”<sup>124</sup> Even if a view of the media as all-powerful is ignored or rejected, then it can still be claimed that it is important in contributing to the construction of meanings within the public sphere.<sup>125</sup>

The scope of this piece of research does not allow for the consideration of the entirety of the various media present in the UK. Indeed, that research which has been conducted has tended to focus either on specific events such as European Elections, or the Commission’s resignation in 1999, or on “individual media in individual countries”. As a result, this brief overview will concentrate on the “dominant

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<sup>123</sup> Simon Smith, *Media effect in Britain*, Ph. D. Thesis, Nottingham University, 2002, p.168.

<sup>124</sup> D. McQuail, **Mass Communication Theory**, (4.ed., London, 2000), p.416

<sup>125</sup> See McQuail, 2000, pp. 417-422 for the details about the evolution of media effect research.

media forms” for news communication – newspaper and television – in order to give a hint on of how they relate to the public discussion on European integration.<sup>126</sup>

The best-known media element related with European integration is in the British press which has been the subject of much political as well as academic interest.<sup>127</sup> This has been as much due to the concentration of newspaper ownership into a small number of hands as it has to actual content. Since the 1975 referendum began to break down at the end of the 1980s, the almost complete enthusiasm for integration that had existed, as the Conservative press followed Prime Minister Thatcher’s change of view after her Bruges speech, most famously captured in *The Sun’s* headline “Up Yours Delors!” (1 November 1990). While the Maastricht Treaty was generally accepted at the time of signing, the crises of 1992, and the ejection of Sterling from the ERM in particular, saw a further wave of objections to the integration process, which was to continue throughout the decade.

According to Wilkes and Wring, while most of the Conservative broadsheets were to follow their right-wing tabloid counterparts down this path of dissatisfaction, there was still support for membership on economic grounds from *The Times*,

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<sup>126</sup> Fabian Brincker, *Public Opinion about EU and Media Effect in Western European Countries*, Ph.D. Thesis, Nottingham University, 2000, p. 88.

<sup>127</sup> P. Anderson & T. Weymouth, *Insulting the public? : The British press and the European Union*, (Addison Wesley Longman, London, 1999) and G. Wilkes & D. Wring, ‘The British press and European Integration: 1948 to 1996’, in D. Baker & D. Seawright (eds.), **Britain for and against Europe: British politics and the question of European Integration**, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998), pp. 185-205.

*Telegraph and Economist*.<sup>128</sup> However, the shift did point out the recognition of the gap between public opinion and political parties, as well as the change in the nature of membership. The change in the nature of membership was best demonstrated by the clearly differentiated stance that *The Sun* took from 1997 of supporting the Labour Party on its general European policy, but not on membership of EMU. George suggests that the Labour Party subsequently became beholden to this line, for fear of completely losing the support of a traditionally Conservative press.<sup>129</sup>

Several times, the Eurosceptic press shows the loss of British sovereignty as the reason behind its anti-EU stance. Headlines such as "No Surrender!; Battles for Britain" (*The Sun*, 12 December 2003), "Our history in the bin; Biggest threat to Britain" (*The Sun*, 21 May 2003), "Devastating effects of giving away our birthrights" (*Daily Mail*, 29 October 2004), and "Blair signs away Britain's sovereignty" (*Daily Mail*, 29 October 2004) all use British sovereignty as a legitimate reason for attacking the EU.

Other articles taken from the broadsheet *The Times* push that the EU is harmful for the economy ("Focus: UK PLC is top dog – who needs Europe?," 20 June 2004) or the controversial portrayal of Gestapo-like tactics used by Europe to

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<sup>128</sup> Wilkes & Wring, 'The British Press and European Integration: 1948 to 1996', in D. Baker & D. Seawright (Eds), **Britain for and against Europe: British politics and the question of European Integration** (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998, p.204)

<sup>129</sup> J. George, 'Britain: Anatomy of a eurosceptic state', in journal of **European Integration**, 2000, Vol: 22-1, pp. 15-34

encourage support for the EU Constitution ("They don't like the EU Constitution? Quick, send in the force," 21 January 2005). Although these anti-EU headlines and stories are good examples, they only scratch the surface of the impact of Euroscepticism in Britain.

Television has seen much more stability compared with print press, if the print press is considered to have developed upon divergent paths in the UK. In Britain, television (and to a certain extent, radio) has been seen as a generally pro-European medium.<sup>130</sup> Unfortunately, because of the difficulty of studying television's content and impact, such assertions must remain little more than impressionistic. At the same time, in the UK the position of the government-owned BBC on European matters has been a source of much debate, usually on the part of opposition groups who feel that it has a pro-European 'agenda' out of keeping with its public service role.<sup>131</sup>

According to this quick overview of the media landscapes in the UK, it has been both a forum for and a promoter of the various sides of the debate in Britain. The important result is that in certain circumstances, the media will have a noticeable constraining (or empowering) effect on development of the opposition.

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<sup>130</sup> See C. De Vreese, "Europe in the news", in **European Union Politics**, 2001, Vol. 2-3, pp.283-307

<sup>131</sup> Global Britain – an anti-EU group set up by Lords Pearson, Harris and Stoddart – has the most comprehensive set of data on this matter at its website (<http://www.globalbritain.org>).

### 4.3. Cost of the EU Membership for Britain

British Eurosceptics today argue that the financial costs of leaving the EU are much less than remaining an active member. However, the Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan initially proposed British membership in the EEC as a move to make the country more financially sound. In the 1960s and 1970s, membership made sense in economic terms. According to Andrew Moravcsik, the decision of Britain to join the European integration project was rational and it was driven by economic considerations, but economics and conditions have changed.<sup>132</sup>

Today, the view of Britain towards European Union membership is slightly different. Milne argues that only ten percent of the UK's economy is the result of trade with the EU and this would not be substantially altered if Britain decided to give up its membership because a free trade agreement could be established. Moreover, he mentions that leaving the EU would add from “£15 billion up to £40 billion” per year due to the fact that Britain pays more for EU membership than it ever receives in return. After all, with the importance of the structural funds for strengthening weak economies among EU members such as Spain, a strong economy is financially punished for its success.<sup>133</sup>

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<sup>132</sup> Andrew Moravcsik, **The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose & State Power from Messina to Maastricht** (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp.6-7.

<sup>133</sup> See Ian Milne, **A Cost Too Far? An analysis of the net economic costs and benefits for the UK of EU membership** (London: Civitas, 2004).

Also the opponents of the EU worry about the loss of Parliamentary Sovereignty, Britain loses much of its freedom of decision-making and for Eurosceptics and needs to cling to its sovereign power.<sup>134</sup>

As Nicky Sinclair mentioned, especially by the early 1980s, some Britons felt that their fears had been confirmed. They were worried about the Britain's unfair budgetary contributions. In other words they were afraid of the possibility that Britain puts in much more to the Community than it gets out. In the criticism they focused on Agricultural spending via the CAP. Moreover, since Britain joined, prices had risen because Britain could no longer buy goods from the cheapest markets in the world. In addition to these, sceptics are little worried about the difficulty of doing business with the European neighbors. Moreover, they are not convinced by the argument about inward investment. They stress that because of lower employment costs, a low level of corporate taxation, political and social stability, and comparatively honest public administration, Japanese investment has come to Britain primarily. According to the sceptics, Europe has not been a key factor, and indeed Britain's agreement to the Social Chapter and likely future involvement in a single currency could actually make investment less attractive.<sup>135</sup>

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

<sup>134</sup> See Duncan Watts, **Britain and the EU; an uneasy partnership**, (Sheffield Hallam University Press, 2000

<sup>135</sup> Interview, Nicky Sinclair, Council Member, UK Independence Party, 28 January 2004, UKIP Central Office London.

#### 4.4. Public Opinion in Britain

In addition to considering the development of elite and media attitudes towards European integration, so it is also necessary to have an understanding of public opinion. This opinion both shapes and is shaped by elite discourses, and so becomes an integral part of the political system. It can be said that measuring public opinion also plays a potential role in explaining relative amounts of anti-EU activities. Consequently, it is necessary to have a clear idea of popular attitudes towards integration and how it has changed over time in the UK.

The question “Do you think your country’s membership of the European Union has been a good thing or bad thing” has been one of the longest running questions asked by Eurobarometer. Figures 1 and 2 below represent the development of the figures for “Membership as a Good Thing” and “a Bad Thing” respectively.



Source: Eurobarometer 23-52 <sup>136</sup>

<sup>136</sup> The full data set is available at <http://www.mori.com/polls/trends/issues.shtml>. These graphics were formed according to the MORI data.

The other important question was that; in addition to your own sense of nationality, how European do you feel? As you see on figure 3, according to the results of this question; half of Britain (%50) does not consider themselves to be European and this feeling is equally spread between all three political parties. In addition to this it shows us young people in Britain feel more European than older people.

**Table 2: How ‘European’ the UK population feels**

	National	Stance on Europe		Age		Voting intentions at next election		
		Pro	Sceptic	< 40	40 +	Lab	Con	Lib
	<b>1060</b>	<b>348</b>	<b>310</b>	<b>481</b>	<b>569</b>	<b>437</b>	<b>251</b>	<b>108</b>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<i>Very European</i>	8	17	3	9	8	10	6	10
<i>Quite European</i>	16	27	6	19	13	15	15	19
<i>A little European</i>	24	30	17	28	21	23	29	21
<i>Not at all European</i>	50	25	74	43	57	50	50	48
<i>Don't know</i>	1	* Less than 0.5	-	1	2	1	1	2

Source; *Opinion Research Business (1997)*<sup>137</sup>

<sup>137</sup> Opinion Research Business, **Britain and the EU; ‘What People Think’**, March 1997.

In 1993, 57% said that Europe was the most important, with 15% citing America. When the same question was asked in 2003, the 57% had dropped to 42%, and those saying America had more than doubled to 34%. In MORI survey for The Financial Times in April 2003, 73% said that America is Britain's most reliable ally and 55% said that France was Britain's least reliable ally. According to the MORI data, support for EU membership is very changeable in Britain. The beginning of the membership period, in 1977, the value of supporting EU in Britain is 10%, but especially between 1980 and 1985 it is declining under the zero. It can be said that it was high level in 1990, 32%.<sup>138</sup> In June 2003, this question was asked by MORI on behalf of the Financial Times; if there were a referendum now on whether Britain should stay in or get out of the European Union, how would you vote?

**Table 3: Stay in or get out of the EU**

	%	%
Stay in	49	54
Get out	41	46
Don't know	10	-

The Results based on 1,002 British adults aged 16+

As a result of these, Britain remains the least enthusiastic of the current EU countries. Only 30% of the public says that EU membership is a good thing for

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<sup>138</sup> See <http://www.mori.com/pubinfo/sa/what-factors-change-peoples-minds.shtml> for the details.

Britain. This is the lowest score for any member country. Generally, British people support the EU as an institution but they never want to be ruled by Brussels. Finally, public opinion will be very important and also effective factor for the Britain-EU relations.



## ***CONCLUSION***

The main aim of this thesis has been to understand how and why opposition and Eurosceptic activities to the European Union have developed in the UK. Also the work presented here confirms the importance of studying EU opposition and Euroscepticism in the UK.

Opposition to the EU has developed in a changing European system. The existence of a consensus based system which was created at the European level with the lack of a European spirit might lead one to believe that the development of EU opposition has been a controversial process. The developing European system has always had an impact on European peoples at some point; a point apparently was reached at Maastricht. Since then, there has been a development of substantial opposition like in the UK. All of these serve to underline the way in which EU opposition develops. The UK is one of the most important EU countries where Eurosceptic ideas and opposition activities have emerged. Generally, the majority of Britain never perceives themselves as a European country, so the amounts of eurosceptic activities in the UK are more than other EU countries.

Indeed, Euroscepticism or opposition is an integral part of a modern democratic life and it is essential to the existence of democracy, since it is the necessary counterweight to democratic decision-making: it is the alternative position

that offers citizens the possibility of a different path. It is also driver of democracy. The growth of opposition to the EU has certainly contributed to an increased transparency, inclusion and the building of legitimacy. This has been a concern since Maastricht and one that has grown dramatically with each new treaty reform until the present day, when a new form of these treaty reforms is under way. As above mentioned, the results of the 2004 Intergovernmental Conferences may not calm many Eurosceptic groups in the UK and also in another member states, because the democratic credentials and potential of the Union should be improved from their point of view. But this effort does not show that EU system is a perfect system. The Eurosceptic groups in the EU countries especially in the UK do not want to give up their nation's being existence, because for them, the concept of the nation state is still very important. Despite all the talk of a federal super-state or an intergovernmental arena, there are not clear principles of organization, clear democratic and accountable structures. It can be said that these kinds of developments and decisions have always triggered Eurosceptic actions in the UK and in another EU countries generally.

In addition to these, opposition is a marker of the health of a political system, so it is a necessary factor. In the UK, Eurosceptic thinking shapes the political situation and also the future of this country. Of course it cannot be predicted that these activities will be useful for the UK in the long term, because future of the EU system is also an enigma in these days. Eurosceptic groups in the UK are not against EU totally, but they oppose the Union on political and economic grounds,

because they do not want the UK to lose its own power in the world. On the other hand, Britain has joined the EU not just for the opportunities that the Community offers as a common market, but also for the collective power of the European democracies. So, the European Union should not be thought as only economic structure by the Eurosceptic groups in the UK.

According to Eurosceptic groups, the UK should withdraw from the EU. It is noteworthy that the UK is one of the most powerful states in the world, thus, it may not be heavily dependent on other states. Yet, still, in today's global world, is it logical to move in a complete independence in the international arena. Also withdrawing from the European Union or taking on a lesser role in Brussels may have consequences on the growing transatlantic division between Europe and the United States. As Timothy Garton Ash mentions, Britain needs to be a full member of the European Union, so that it can determine “the Euroatlantic agenda” that will bridge the gap between Europe and the United States which is very important for the continuation of the balance of power.<sup>139</sup>

Finally, The decision on whether staying as a member of the EU or withdrawing from membership is not straightforward. Eurosceptic groups in the UK as an important part of the democracy helps the community to realize its deficiencies

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<sup>139</sup> Timothy Garton Ash, **Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West** (New York: Random House, 2004), p.181-2.

through their actions. Therefore, efforts should be made towards the prevention of deficiencies related with the structure of the community and maximization of the advantages rather than imposition of withdrawal ideas.



## APPENDIX






UK Independence Party




UK Independence Party



UK- Conservative Party



UK Independence Party



UK Independence Party



UK Independence Party



UK Independence Party

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