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AVRUPA ARAŞTIRMALARI ENSTİTÜSÜ
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI

**DISCOURSES ON TURKEY IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT:
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PERCEPTION ON TURKISH
IDENTITY**

DOKTORA TEZİ

SEZGİ ERDOĞAN

İstanbul, 2022

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ABSTRACT

DISCOURSES ON TURKEY IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PERCEPTION ON TURKISH IDENTITY

This Ph.D. research aims to evaluate whether developments in EU-Turkey relations between 2007 and 2015, during which time Turkey exhibited some signs of de-Europeanization, affected the perception of Turkish identity and thereby European identity in the European Parliament (EP). Moreover, this thesis also tries to determine the extent to which MEPs' articulations of Turkish and European identities in this period diverged from or converged with those in the period 1997-2007, mainly known as its Europeanization process. These aims are realized through the discourse-historical approach (DHA) to critically analyze the EP discourses on Turkey from a social constructivist perspective in which identities are socially constructed through the discourses of agents. In this context, the discourses of MEPs in the official EP debates whose titles include the words "Turkey" or "enlargement" between 2007 and 2015 have been analyzed in detail.

Within this framework, the main research question of this thesis is: How was the discourse on Turkey articulated in the EP between 2007-2015 in an attempt to support or reject Turkey's EU accession similar to or different from the EP's discursive constructions of Turkish identity in the 1997-2007 period? The thesis identifies discourse topics, divided into macro-topics and related subtopics under them. These topics are grounded on different representations of the Turkish identity discursively constructed in the discourses of the MEPs, and thus, various conceptualizations of Europe, such as *European security community*, *European democratic values*, *European cultural space* and *European political/economic project*.

This study asserts that under the influence of the changes in the context, the perception of the EP of Turkish identity between 2007 and 2015 is predominantly inclined towards discursive othering of Turkey and excluding Turkish accession through various fallacies and interdiscursivities, sometimes even by challenging "European democratic values," which in turn reveals that MEPs are also more critical of European identity.

Keywords: Europeanization, de-Europeanization, Turkish identity, Discourse-Historical Approach, European Parliament.

ÖZET

AVRUPA PARLAMENTOSU'NDA TÜRKİYE ÜZERİNE SÖYLEMLER: TÜRK KİMLİĞİNİN ALGILANMASINA İLİŞKİN ÇIKARIMLAR

Bu doktora çalışması, Türkiye'nin Avrupa'dan uzaklaşma belirtileri gösterdiği 2007-2015 yılları arasında AB-Türkiye ilişkilerinde yaşanan gelişmelerin Avrupa Parlamentosu'nda (AP) Türk kimliği ve dolayısıyla Avrupa kimliği algısını etkileyip etkilemediğinin değerlendirmesini amaçlamaktadır. Bu tez aynı zamanda AP üyelerinin bu dönemde belirttikleri Türk ve Avrupa kimlik ifadelerinin, ağırlıklı olarak Avrupalılaşma süreci olarak bilinen 1997-2007 döneminden ne ölçüde ayrıldığını veya bu döneme ne ölçüde yakınlaştığını da belirlemeye çalışmaktadır. Bu amaçlar AP'nin Türkiye hakkındaki söylemlerini, kimliklerin kişilerin söylemleri aracılığıyla sosyal olarak inşa edildiği sosyal inşacı bir perspektiften eleştirel olarak analiz etmek için Söylemsel-Tarihsel Yaklaşım aracılığıyla gerçekleştirilmektedir. Bu bağlamda 2007-2015 yılları arasında, başlıklarında “Türkiye” veya “genişleme” kelimelerini içeren resmi AP tartışmalarındaki AP üyelerinin söylemleri ayrıntılı olarak analiz edilmiştir.

Bu çerçevede bu tezin temel araştırma sorusu şudur: Türkiye'nin AB üyeliğini desteklemek veya reddetmek amacıyla AP'de 2007-2015 yılları arasında AP'nin 1997-2007 dönemindeki söylemsel Türk kimliği inşalarına benzer veya onlardan farklı olarak Türkiye söylemi nasıl dile getirildi? Ayrıca tez, makro konulara ve bunların altında ilgili alt konulara ayrılmış söylem konularını tanımlamaktadır. Bu konular AP söylemlerinde inşa edilen Türk kimliğinin farklı temsilleri ve böylece, *Avrupa güvenlik topluluğu*, *Avrupa demokratik değerleri*, *Avrupa kültürel alanı* ve *Avrupa siyasi/ekonomik projesi* gibi Avrupa'nın çeşitli kavramsallaştırmaları üzerine temellendirilmiştir.

Bu çalışma bağlamdaki değişikliklerin etkisi altında 2007-2015 döneminde AP'nin Türk kimliği algısının, çeşitli yanılgılar ve söylemlerarasılıklar yoluyla, hatta bazen “Avrupa demokratik değerlerine” bile meydan okuyarak, çoğunlukla Türkiye'yi söylemsel olarak ötekileştirmeye ve Türkiye'nin üyeliğini dışlamaya meyilli olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Bu da AP üyelerinin Avrupa kimliğine daha eleştirel yaklaştığını ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupalılaşma, Avrupalılaşma Sürecinden Uzaklaşma, Türk kimliği, Söylemsel-Tarihsel Yaklaşım, Avrupa Parlamentosu.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>AECR</i>	Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists
<i>ALDE</i>	Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Party
<i>AKP</i>	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi
<i>Brexit</i>	British Exit from the European Union
<i>CAP</i>	Common Agricultural Policy
<i>CDA</i>	Critical Discourse Analysis
<i>CDU</i>	Christian Democratic Union of Germany
<i>CEEC</i>	Central and Eastern European Countries
<i>CFSP</i>	Common Foreign and Security Policy
<i>CHP</i>	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi
<i>CSO</i>	Civil Society Organization
<i>CSU</i>	Christian Social Union in Bavaria
<i>DHA</i>	Discourse-Historical Approach
<i>EC</i>	European Commission
<i>ECC</i>	European Economic Community
<i>ECHR</i>	European Court of Human Rights
<i>ECJ</i>	European Court of Justice
<i>ECPR</i>	European Consortium for Political Research
<i>ECSC</i>	European Coal and Steel Community
<i>EEC</i>	European Economic Community
<i>ECR</i>	European Conservatives and Reformists Group

<i>EFD</i>	Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group
<i>EFDD</i>	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy
<i>EP</i>	European Parliament
<i>EPP</i>	European People's Party
<i>EPP-ED</i>	European People's Party – European Democrats
<i>ESDP</i>	European Security and Defense Policy
<i>EU</i>	European Union
<i>EULEX</i>	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
<i>EUPOL</i>	European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories
<i>GDP</i>	Gross Domestic Product
<i>Greens/EFA</i>	Greens/European Free Alliance
<i>GUE/NGL</i>	European United Left-Nordic Green Left
<i>HADEP</i>	Halkın Demokrasi Partisi
<i>IND/DEM</i>	Independence/Democracy
<i>IR</i>	International Relations
<i>ISIL</i>	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
<i>ISIS</i>	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
<i>JPC</i>	Joint Parliamentary Committee
<i>MEPs</i>	Members of the European Parliament
<i>MHP</i>	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi
<i>MP</i>	Member of Parliament
<i>NATO</i>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

<i>NI</i>	Nonattached Members in the European Parliament
<i>OECD</i>	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
<i>PKK</i>	Partîya Karkerên Kurdistanê
<i>PPE</i>	Groupe du Parti Populaire Européen
<i>PSE</i>	Party of European Socialists
<i>PVV</i>	Dutch Party for Freedom
<i>S&D</i>	Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats
<i>SPD</i>	Social Democratic Party of Germany
<i>TBMM</i>	Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi
<i>TEU</i>	Treaty on European Union
<i>TFEU</i>	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
<i>UK</i>	United Kingdom
<i>UKIP</i>	United Kingdom Independence Party,
<i>UN</i>	United Nations

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my thesis supervisor Prof. Dr. Armağan Emre Çakır, for his guidance and feedbacks. I would also like to present my deepest thanks to the members of my thesis monitoring committee, Prof. Dr. Yonca Özer, Associate Prof. Dr. Catherine Macmillan and Prof. Dr. Senem Aydın-Düzgit who has been in my thesis monitoring committee for a long time and has a significant share in my thesis. I am also grateful to Prof. Dr. Münevver Cebeci for her contributions during my thesis defense and to Asst. Prof. Sam Bennet for sharing his valuable views and comments.

In this regard, I would also like to express my sincere thanks to the International Projects Office at Istanbul University, where I have been working as an EU projects expert since 2016, for the understanding and support of my colleagues, our vice-coordinators Prof. Dr. Gürel Çetin and Asst. Prof. Evren Türkmenoğlu and our coordinator Prof. Dr. Bekir Kayacan during most of my Ph.D. studies. I would like to give my last and most important thanks to my mother and father, who have always supported me.

INTRODUCTION

The Subject Matter

The EU has experienced its most challenging period full of various crises during the last few decades. Eurosceptic voices on the center-left, the center-right, and among the liberals have increased in the EP because of voters' discontent over immigration and substantial job losses starting from the global economic crisis in 2008. These Eurosceptic voices were mobilized in the UK referendum, resulting in the UK's departure from the EU in 2016, known as "Brexit," and causing social and economic changes in the Union. In the meantime, the increase of religious extremism worldwide and the rise in the number of people fleeing their homes because of unrest and seeking refuge in Europe, referred to as the "migrant crisis," especially between 2015 and 2019, have also placed enormous pressure on the Union. The departure of US President Donald Trump, who acted contrary to the fundamental principles of European integration and strained relations between Western allies, has not brought the expected calm in the world. Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, seen as the largest military attack in Europe since World War II, threatens stabilization, security, and prosperity in the EU and its neighborhood, which are still suffering the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. These contemporary challenges have led EU elites to more soul searching about the future of the Union, while the latter has reached the 65th anniversary of its founding act, the Treaty of Rome in 1957.

The issue of Turkish accession has also remained an ongoing challenge and has provoked an ontological inquiry about the EU in terms of identity (Baban & Keyman, 2008, p. 109; Kylstad, 2010, p. 2). In the present EU discourse, the nationalistic and extreme right-wing opposition discourse complicates this matter further by revitalizing the centuries-old images of Turks. For centuries, kings, popes, diplomats, agents, merchants and travelers in Europe all constructed the perception of Turkish identity and preserved this constructed image of Turks in Europe. Since Islam was the primary Other of Christendom in medieval Europe and was frequently demonized, Turks were firstly categorized as a primarily religious Other with the terms “unbelievers” or “Saracens” because of their Muslim identity during the early Middle Ages from 500 to 1000 (Neumann, 1999, p. 42). For the period between the Late Middle Ages in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and the second siege of Vienna in 1683 by the Ottoman Empire, Kuran Burçoğlu (2000, pp. 93-106) states that the European perception of Turks was based not only on the detestation of their religion but also on the fear of their military power. In the eighteenth century, known as the “Age of Enlightenment,” Turks were perceived within a despotic, barbarian and unbeliever image in European discourse. In the nineteenth century, known as the “Industrial Revolution” in Europe, the Ottoman Empire became the “Sick Man of Europe,” as Tsar Nicholas supposedly stated (Levin, 2011, p. 162). Accordingly, the Ottoman state framed as the sick man became open to colonization and exploitation by Europe (Levin, 2011, p. 162). While the Ottoman authority was depicted as “oriental despotism; as brutal, stagnant, oppressive and barbaric,” Turkish society was described as “effeminate, exotic, and ripe for conquest and/or in need of protection” in this period (Levin, 2011, p. 162). The foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 and the sustainability of the radical reforms undertaken in this new republic began to change these views and provided a new perception of Turkish identity as being closer to Western values (Kuran Burçoğlu, 2000, p. 12). Nevertheless, with the end of the Cold War in 1991 and, in turn, a shift in the priorities of Europeans, this new positive perception of Turkish identity that had prevailed since the 1920s was replaced by a relatively negative Turkish image, partly based on centuries-old clichés about Turks in the aforementioned Ottoman period (Aydın-Düzgit et al., 2017b, p. 19).

Because of this historical background, the Turkish bid for EU accession has provoked many debates on the compatibility of Turkish identity with EU membership since the end of the 1990s. With the 1999 Helsinki Summit, in which Turkey was finally granted formal candidate status, various discussions on the Europeaness of Turkish

identity, and thus assessing whether it could become a part of European integration, were initiated. Since EU membership has become possible for Turkey with this Summit, controversy over Turkey's democracy, culture, religion, geography, history, and people, has been much more visible and outspoken than before, especially for center-right leaders such as Sarkozy and Merkel. Nevertheless, as Albrecht Karl Konecny, who is a member of the European Socialist party group (PSE), states, Turkey's bid for EU membership has been "turning more and more into a debate about the way the European Union sees itself" – in other words, a key case in order to describe the ideal European identity¹ (Levin, 2011, p. 185).

Besides the controversy on identity, the developments in Turkey and the EU have also caused divergence in the relations that already suffered from "misperceptions, misunderstandings, prejudices and irrational expectations" (Paul, 2012, p. 25). The EU membership of the Greek Cypriots in 2004 without a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue, the "open-ended" accession process of Turkey's EU membership according to the Negotiating Framework with Turkey on 3 October 2005, and then the suspension of negotiations on eight chapters because of Turkey's restrictions in terms of the Republic of Cyprus in 2006 caused a dramatic decrease of the public support for EU membership in Turkey in 2007. This demotivation in Turkey caused a serious slowdown in the pace of Turkey's reforms and the typical problem in the de facto implementation of these reforms. In the meantime, a new foreign policy strategy intended to make Turkey an independent and respected global player and an essential mediator in conflicts in the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Caucasus, known as a "neo-Ottoman foreign policy," was launched by then-incumbent party AKP, after the 2007 general election. This proactive foreign policy was regarded as an alternative to the EU rather than complementary. In the same vein, the 2011 general election also made the AKP the sole democratizing and pro-reform actor without the EU, while the 2013 Gezi Park protests also distanced the AKP further from the EU.

Turkey's de-Europeanization, mentioned above, in the 2007-2015 term as the focus period of the thesis has also been kept alive since then and even turned into anti-

¹ Despite the "Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity" in 1973, the initiatives of the EU to construct a European identity among EU citizens were generally seen in the 1980s, and especially the 1990s, through the principle of "unity in diversity" (Delanty, 2002, p. 350; Öner, 2008, pp. 78–80). For this reason, it can be stated that the debates on the compatibility of Turkish identity with EU membership have remained popular since the beginning of the formation of European identity.

Western populism² in Turkey. The prolonged standing state of emergency after the coup attempt on 15 July 2016³, the call of the EP in its resolution to freeze accession negotiations with Turkey in November 2016 as a response, the Turkish Constitutional referendum in April 2017, the statement of the EU's General Affairs Council on 26 June 2018 foreseeing no further progress in Turkey's accession negotiations, and the escalation of tensions in the eastern Mediterranean have strengthened the perpetual stagnation in the relations. Therefore, both bilateral cooperation and accession efforts have been damaged in the meantime. Despite some developments, such as the March 2016 EU-Turkey "refugee deal" financially extended until 2022 and the firefighting planes from the EU to help Turkey during the 2021 Turkish wildfires, the stalemate in EU-Turkey relations still firmly remains.

The Aim and the Main Research Question with Its Sub-Questions

Within this context, this study attempts to analyze how Turkey and, in turn, Europe were discursively constructed through the representations of Turkey in the EP between 2007 and 2015. In other words, the main goal of this study is to provide an in-depth analysis of the discursive representations of Turkey in the EP in order to disclose the European perception of Turkish identity and, in turn, to reveal the different visions of Europe that these EP discourses relationally construct in Turkey's de-Europeanization process with the impact of the conjuncture between 2007 and 2015 compared to its Europeanization process in the 1997-2007 term. In this respect, the dependent variable of this research is the change in the discourse of the EP on Turkish identity, while the independent variable is the de-Europeanization process in Turkey in this thesis. Within this framework, the thesis includes a main research question and its sub-questions. The main research question of this thesis is: How was the discourse on Turkey articulated in the EP between 2007-2015 in an attempt to support or reject Turkey's EU accession similar to or different from the EP's discursive constructions of Turkish identity in the 1997-2007 period? The sub-questions are: What kind of discourses on Turkey, and thus Europe, did the EP construct through the discourses on Turkey in the period between 2007 and 2015? Meanwhile, what kind of discourse topics, *topoi*, discursive strategies,

² In the article by Kaliber and Kaliber (2019, p. 1), how de-Europeanizing in Turkish foreign policy discourse systematically turned into a severe anti-Westernism is explained.

³ In the aftermath of this attempt, growing criticism over the rule of law and civil liberties in Turkey, which are described as serious backsliding and cause concern "over the systemic lack of independence of the judiciary and undue pressure on judges and prosecutors," has been observed in the EU (European Commission, 2021a).

fallacies, interdiscursivities, intertextualities, and other linguistic devices did MEPs employ within these discourses in the 2007–2015 period? What were the characteristics of the EP discourses on Turkey in the EP in this term? To what extent did MEPs’ articulations of Turkish and, in turn, European identity in this period diverge from, or converge with, those in the 1997–2007 period?

The Main Argument with Its Sub-Arguments

In order to answer these questions, the main argument of this thesis is that under the influence of the changes in the context, the perception of the EP of Turkish identity in the 2007–2015 term is predominantly inclined towards discursive othering of Turkey and excluding Turkish accession through various fallacies and interdiscursivities, sometimes even by challenging “European democratic values,” which in turn reveals that MEPs are also more critical of European identity. This argument is grounded on the notion that discourse, shaping perception, is interchangeably and mutually both constituted by context and constitutes it. In this context, the first sub-argument of the thesis is that the perception of the EP of Turkish, and therewith European identity composed by MEP discourses is influenced by EU-Turkey relations as the political and economic context. The second sub-argument is that during the 2007-2015 period, in which Turkey de-Europeanized and Europe was also struggling with severe economic and political problems, MEPs justified either Turkey’s conditional inclusion based on the European values and principles equated with the Copenhagen political criteria⁴ as in the 1997-2007 term or, more dominantly, its exclusion from eventual full membership of the EU. In this way, the effect of the context on discourse and thus on the perception of both the self and other identities is expected to be revealed, which makes the context the *sine qua non* for making sense of the identity representations.

Selection of the EP and Data

The reason for selecting the EP in this thesis mainly originates from the discursive power of the national and EU elites in the EP in relations to the EU’s enlargement policy and the EP’s representative power for all citizens and political parties in the EU member states. Moreover, the parliamentary discourse, including the EP, is essentially an under-

⁴ These criteria are not only perceived as membership of applicant countries but also the meaning of becoming a European country in the EP – in other words, “the real identity of the Parliament and the European Union,” according to an MEP in 1999, as well as “basic European principles” and “shared value ground,” as stated by other MEPs in 2002 (Levin, 2018, p. 197).

researched area, which constitutes the other reason to study the EP in this research. Despite the importance of political discourse for political scientists, the increasing visibility of the EP with mediatization, and its nature as the only EU institution directly elected by citizens of Europe, the EP representing a wide array of views in Europe has been insufficiently researched (Ilie, 2010, p. 57).

As regards data, only the discourses of MEPs during the official EP debates whose titles cover either the words “Turkey” or “enlargement” between 2007 and 2015 have been analyzed in detail to limit the scope of the research. In this regard, 30 EP debates meeting these criteria out of 315 EP debates, equaling 618 pages and 942 speeches, have been found for this nine-year period, each year of which is examined in 12 different categories. These categories consist of discourse topics, basic events referred to in that year’s debate, discursive strategies, intertextuality/interdiscursivity, discourses of the EP groups, the country of the relevant MEPs, fallacies, representations of Turkey and resulting representations of Europe, divergence within the EP groups, divergence within the countries, comparison to the period between 1997 and 2007, and general evaluation of the specific year.

Theory

With regard to the theoretical framework of the thesis, the analysis is grounded on a social constructivist basis, which necessitates discursive practices being studied in the EU as a process of construction of meaning that allows for specific interpretations while excluding others (Risse, 2004, p. 165). Its emphasis on identity and the self/other dichotomy in identity construction and the role of language and discourse in constructing reality make it a suitable theory for this thesis (Tekin, 2010, p. 9). Unlike essentialist approaches such as neo-realism and neo-liberalism, identity is accepted as a nonfixed and changing concept since social realities are shaped in discursive contexts (Tekin, 2010, p. 9). In this regard, the theory of social constructivism contributes to a better understanding of the construction of identities in the EU context. Accordingly, “actors’ interests, preferences, and the perceptions of the situation are no longer fixed, but subject to discursive challenges,” while focusing on communicative practices provides the ground for how Europe and the EU are discursively constructed and “how actors try to come to grips with the meaning of European integration” (Risse, 2004, pp. 149–151). This emphasis on communicative practices has allowed scholars such as Joerges and Neyer (1997) and Checkel (2007), who have made contribution to the development of the social

constructivist approach towards European integration, to study European institutions as discourse. Most social constructivist works treat language and discourse as explanatory rather than constitutive due to the characteristics of this theory. Nevertheless, social constructivism also paves the way for alternative constructions of agents' identities that are discursively constructed (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, pp. 41–42). In this regard, this work treats language and discourse as constitutive and thus accounts for articulations of, explicitly, Turkish identity and, implicitly, European identity through the EP discourses on Turkey.

Methodology

In terms of the methodology of the thesis, the analysis of the EP discourses on Turkey in this study is carried out using the discourse-historical approach (DHA)⁵. It is an excellent tool for analyzing national identities and the construction of European identities (cf. Krzyżanowski & Oberhuber, 2007; Krzyżanowski & Wodak, 2008; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; Wodak et al., 1999). The DHA necessitates firstly identifying “discourse topics”; in other words, topics of discourses are defined. It is followed by investigating the “discursive strategies” utilized in the identity formation in the narrative. For this aim, Reisigl & Wodak (2001a, p. 44) direct the following empirical questions to the texts: “How are persons named and referred to linguistically? What traits, characteristics, qualities, and features are attributed to them? By means of what arguments and argumentation schemes do specific persons, or social groups, try to justify and legitimize the exclusion, discrimination, suppression, and exploitation of others? From what perspective or point of view are these namings, attributions, and arguments expressed? Are the respective discriminating utterances articulated overtly, are they even intensified, or are they mitigated?” The word “persons” in the first question above can be accepted as Turkey, Europe, and the EU in the EP debates for this thesis. Within this framework, the first and second questions of Reisigl and Wodak aim to discover referential/nomination strategies and then predicational strategies. The third question aims to discover argumentation strategies, while the fourth one reveals the strategies of perspectivation, framing, or discourse representation. The last question provides intensification and mitigation strategies in the texts. Since the DHA is applied in this thesis, these questions

⁵ The contribution of the personally attended 2-week ECPR Methodology School in August 2015 to learn and apply the DHA to this thesis is worth mentioning here. Moreover, a paper from the findings of this thesis entitled “Impact of EU-Turkey Relations Between 1997 and 2007 on Perception of Turkish Identity in the European Parliament” was also presented at the ECPR Virtual General Conference in August 2020.

are asked about the EP discourses on Turkey in order to fulfill the second step of the DHA. Finally, the “linguistic means” of realizing these strategies are examined in this study as the third dimension of the DHA.

The Limitations

There are three main limitations confronted in this thesis. The intensity and complexity of the EP debates on Turkey and its intricate structure with many issues and events are at the forefront of these. Sometimes even a single sentence articulated about Turkey can simultaneously address Turkish identity in terms of security, democratic values, culture, politics, and even economics, which shows the difficulty of its analysis. Secondly, analyzing the debates between 2013 and 2015 is particularly challenging since the EP decided to drop the translation of the verbatim report of proceedings on 20.11.2012, entering into force on 12.12.2012, with the aim of cutting costs⁶. Therefore, each debate whose title included either the word “Turkey” or the word “Enlargement” between 2013 and 2015 had to be listened to in English and then written down in order to carry out the analysis. For this reason, the “written explanations of vote” sections in the EP debates between 2013 and 2015 could not be analyzed since it is not possible to listen to these parts. Thirdly, the country of the MEPs in each debate had to be searched one by one, which was a time-consuming process. The verbatim report only shows the MEPs’ group and the language used during their speeches. In the meantime, a group of MEPs does not use the language of their own country, while some other groups of MEPs, such as those from Greece and Cyprus or those from Germany and Austria, also prefer to use the same languages. For this reason, it was necessary to check each MEP’s country one by one in order to do the analysis correctly.

Chapter Overviews

In terms of an overview of the chapters, the thesis contains four main chapters besides the Introduction and Conclusion parts. The thesis focuses firstly on the historical background of the perception of Turkish identity in the EP. This historical background is presented under three subtitles by giving the definitions of Europeanization, EU-ization, and de-Europeanization, which are different periods that Turkey has gone through. In this framework, the first subtitle deals with the Europeanization period of Turkey until 1997

⁶ The relevant decision of the EP can be found on the official EP website: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-7-2012-0423_EN.html.

and the literature review compiled from studies investigating the perception of Turkish identity in the EP. The second subtitle is also based on the literature review compiled from studies investigating the perception of Turkey in the EP, along with the Europeanization and the EU-ization periods observed in Turkey during the period 1997–2007. Unlike the previous sections, the third subtitle deals with the controversy among scholars on the starting year of the de-Europeanization period in Turkey, the concept of de-Europeanization, and the events after 2007, as well as compiling the studies that search the perception of European identity in Turkish political discourse – in other words, Turkish Parliament. With regard to the impact of all the events on the Turkish political elites’ perception of European identity and thus how de-Europeanization was discursively constructed in the Turkish Parliament after 2007, many similarities and differences that emerge with Turkish perception in the EP are revealed.

The second chapter is based on a brief presentation of the EP and the impacts of parliamentary discourse on political discourse so as to reveal the importance of the EP within political discourse in the EU. Therefore, the influence of the EP in shaping EU discourses on Turkey is disclosed since the data analyzed here are the texts formed by parliamentary debates on Turkey. These debates have a dialogical nature as the genre. This dialogical nature stems from the MEP’s responses to discourses articulated by other MEPs and other voices outside the EP (Bayley, 2004, p. 24). The following chapter defines the theory and the method of the study. In this respect, social constructivism is introduced as the theoretical basis while its relation with identity, discourse, and European studies is also mentioned. DHA as a branch of CDA is examined as the methodological framework of the thesis. As the empirical part of the study, the chapter on DHA analysis identifies the discourse topics divided into macro-topics and related subtopics under which different representations of Turkish identity are discursively constructed in the discourses of MEPs, and thus various patterns of Europe, namely the European security community, European democratic values, European cultural space, and European political/economic project, are also described.

Within the image of the European security community, the construction of Turkey as a strategic partner and a security threat in the region is elaborated. In terms of European democratic values, images of Turkey in a difficult process of democratic transformation and Turkey as increasingly turning away from European norms and values are addressed. The constructions of Turkey as having a place in multireligious and multicultural Europe

and Turkey as a non-European threat to European cultural structure with its Islamization agenda are analyzed within the representation of European cultural space. Finally, in the scope of the European political/economic project, the discursive constructions of Turkey as being indispensable for the European political/economic project and as being incompatible with the European political/economic project are displayed. Thus, the aim is to fill a gap in the academic research on how Turkey's de-Europeanization is perceived in the EP discourses and how this perception affects the articulations of Turkish identity and, in turn, European identity. Furthermore, new empirical findings are also expected to contribute to this field.

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND EUROPEANIZATION / EU- IZATION / DE-EUROPEANIZATION

The meaning of language use and thus the meaning of a text cannot be fully grasped without history. History is profoundly important in shaping both opposition and supporting discourse and, in turn, the current constructs of understanding (Tekin, 2010, p. 169). Past images, metaphors, representations, memories, and fantasies frequently reveal themselves in present-day controversies and in constructing realities. Discursive practices are embedded in, and linked to, the sociopolitical and historical context (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p. 41). It leads DHA “to integrate knowledge about historical sources and the background of the social and political fields” in examining political topics and texts (Wodak, 2001, p. 65). In other words, DHA integrates historical context into the interpretation of discourses and texts since discourse is historical because of its interconnected nature.

Discourses are always dependent on other discourses produced earlier, synchronically, or subsequently (Wodak, 1996, p. 19). This is why one of the research foci in DHA covers dealing with a “problematic” past (Wodak et al., 1994). In his “historiographic” study, Levin (2011, p. 20) states that societies create collective

autobiographical narratives of histories, contributing to the construction of collective identities. Thus, history writing is essential for societal identity construction processes, which is also underlined by the constructivist view of language and history through narration and interpretation. Accordingly, “history is thus socially reconstructed in the context of present needs” without reducing it to fiction (Levin, 2011, p. 21). Levin also states that “the interpretation and writing of history take place in a societal context that is itself the product of history and is, therefore, neither independent of it nor prior to it” (Levin, 2011, p. 21). For these reasons, DHA as the methodology and social constructivism as the theory of this study make the section below based on the historical context of Turkish identity necessary.

Before analyzing this historical context, it is essential to explain the terms “Europeanization,” “de-Europeanization,” and “EU-ization” to associate them with relevant events in Turkey with its EU membership bid, which contributes to the contextualization of the historical part below. Europeanization generally refers to the fact that “domestic structures, identities, national policy preferences, interests, and national patterns of governance are affected by pressure from developments at the European level” (Uluğ-Eryılmaz, 2014, p. 434). Ladrech defines Europeanization as an “incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policymaking” (1994, p. 69). Even though the first examples of Europeanization in the literature were constructed on the basis of the relationships among the member states, its employment in the 2000s included the candidate countries, especially the central and eastern European countries (CEECs) and the third countries. Radaelli (2004, p. 5) prefers to state that, “Europeanization consists of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion, and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms that are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures, and public policies.”

Two distinctly different approaches are mentioned for the aim of Europeanization. The first one is the adaptation of the EU’s formal policy decisions by national governments, which is evaluated as “the emergence of a common foreign policy behavior among the member states” (Knill, 2001). The other approach is to increase social interactions between European and national actors, which is more of a constructivist kind

of Europeanization (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003, pp. 495–518). European collective identity and norms are superior to those of the EU (Manners, 2002, p. 240). Nevertheless, the EU is still the most prominent demonstration of the Europeanization process since it is the only organization with enforcement mechanisms (Sipahioğlu, 2017, p. 54).

In this respect, Kaliber (2012, p. 57) states that much of the Europeanization literature treats the reductionist and essentialist presumptions concerning the domestic impact of the EU as its definition. Therefore, he prefers to make an analytical distinction between EU-ization and Europeanization, which had already been made by Wallace (2000, p. 370). Wallace (2000, p. 370) defines EU-ization as change demanded exclusively by EU membership, which covers both formal and informal remarks by EU bureaucrats, MEPs, politics from the member states, declarations of the EP, and other formal documents of the EU. Since Kaliber (2012, p. 57) finds it too vague as a criterion, he makes a more specific and restricted definition of EU-ization. He defines EU-ization as a concrete and restricted sphere of alignment with the EU's body of law, policies, legal structures, and institutions. Kaliber (2016, p. 61) frames it as “a formal process of alignment with the *acquis communautaire* that is particularly effective during accession negotiations.” It is a technical and institutional domestic process of adaptation to the EU and can also be referred to as “EU-induced legislative reforms” while its most powerful effects are observed during accession negotiations (Aydın-Düzgüt & Kaliber, 2016, p. 4). Thus, it is an integral part and the most crucial instrument of Europeanization (Aydın-Düzgüt & Kaliber, 2016, p. 4). Nevertheless, it should also be underlined that EU-ization does not cover the whole Europeanization.

There are various differences between EU-ization and Europeanization in terms of agents, duration, area, concept, application, and other aspects. In terms of concept, Europeanization refers to a context or a situation, although EU-ization is considered a technical process (Aydın-Düzgüt & Kaliber, 2016, p. 4). Compared to EU-ization, Europeanization is based on a more abstract ground and a broader historical, sociopolitical, and normative context. It is of “a normative/political context where European norms, values, and policies are constantly negotiated and shaped by different European societies and institutions,” making it much more profound than EU-ization (Aydın-Düzgüt & Kaliber, 2016, p.4). For instance, the Council of Europe's activism and reports rather than the EU have led Greece to gradually liberalize the minority and citizenship policies beginning from the 1990s (Kaliber, 2012, p. 58).

Accordingly, Europeanization is seen in domestic policies when domestic actors and elites holding social and political capital prefer to utilize the European context and the EU as a legitimating context to justify new policies, support agendas, and criticize opponents (Rumelili, 2005, p. 46). Increased social interaction between European actors and national actors is also referred to as “Europeanization” in a more constructivist way (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003, pp. 495–518; Sipahioğlu, 2017, p. 54). Nevertheless, EU-ization is “a more concrete and restricted sphere of alignment with the EU’s body of law and institutions” for the candidate countries to the EU (Kaliber, 2012, p. 57).

In terms of duration, Europeanization appeals to a relatively more extended time and even centuries, while the term “EU-ization” is applied mainly during accession negotiations of a candidate country, which has lasted decades in the Turkish case. In this regard, Kaliber (2014, p. 32) states that Europeanization became the main normative and political context for modernizing Turkish elites to legitimize their image of state and society in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century and during the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Besides providing a context for norm definition and modernization, its implications have also been seen in terms of the Turks’ identity confirmation and future orientation beginning from the Ottoman Empire (Kaliber, 2012, pp. 52–59). Nevertheless, EU-ization in Turkey was intensively experienced in 1999, when Turkey was granted candidate status even though EU-ization is presumed to be applied, especially during accession negotiations (Kaliber, 2012, p. 61)

For the Turkish case, Kaliber (2012, p. 67) states that there has conversely been significant slowing down of EU-ization reforms in Turkey since 2005, while Alpan (2016, p. 17) also accepts the slowing down of the EU-led reforms, especially after the launch of negotiations in 2005. In regard to agents, there is a broader and more crowded group of elites aiming at Europeanization compared to EU-ization. National parliaments may pass EU-ization reforms while relevant institutions and bodies implement these reforms and “other technical, institutional, and policy requirements of the *acquis communautaire*” (Kaliber, 2012, p. 67). Nevertheless, Europeanization of domestic politics comes under the responsibility of “powerful domestic actors such as not only political elites, bureaucratic apparatus, and legislatures” but also societal actors including “CSOs, less organized social groups, social movements, small or medium-sized grassroots organizations, and other types of citizen initiatives” (Kaliber, 2016, pp. 61–63). Aydın-

Düzgüt and Kaliber (2016, p. 16) add journalists and intellectuals to the list of these domestic actors.

In terms of area, Europeanization is associated with not only the EU member and candidate countries but also third countries, while EU-ization is limited to the candidate countries that are in their accession process to the EU (Aydın-Düzgüt & Kaliber, 2016, pp. 3–4; Wódka, 2015, p. 154). As for application, “the process of transformation through Europeanization is presumed to be unilinear and evolutionary” (Kaliber, 2012, p. 56). This is because how it is “experienced in a society depends on the actions and discourses of both national and European actors shaping the normative, ideational, and institutional structure of Europeanization” (Aydın-Düzgüt & Kaliber, 2016, p. 5). Nevertheless, EU-ization is a more linear, empirically observable, and testable process of alignment with, and implementation of, the *acquis communautaire* since it refers to the specific changes exclusively required for EU membership (Kaliber, 2012, p. 57). Moreover, EU-ization is often linked to the EU, “thereby de facto excluding other processes that may also logically be regarded as Europeanization” (Flockhart, 2010, pp. 789–790). In this respect, EU-ization does not directly correspond to Europeanization since, in Europeanization, European societies and institutions such as the Council of Europe other than the EU institutions also take part in the views, norms, and values reconstructed by European societies in their debates and “used at the level of subnational, national, and supranational politics” (Kaliber, 2014, p. 30).

Unlike EU-ization, it should also be emphasized that discourses on Europeanization are contested (Olsen, 2002, p. 921). Other scholars define it with EU conditionality and as an “evolutionary and linear sequence of development and modernization defined mainly as a process of technical adaptation to the EU model” (Kaliber, 2014, p. 32). To sum up, EU-ization is a concrete, more linear, technical, formal, and observable process of alignment with the EU basically for candidate countries during their accession negotiations, while for the most part national parliaments can pass EU-induced reforms for EU-ization. Nonetheless, Europeanization is abstract, open-ended, and nonlinear. It refers to a broader sociopolitical and normative context for both EU member and candidate countries, and it lasts for a longer period of time in which various agents both from government and civil society should take part.

Diez et al. (2005, pp. 1–15) propose four different types of Europeanization, namely Europeanization of policies (policy Europeanization), Europeanization of

political processes (political Europeanization), Europeanization of identities (societal Europeanization), and Europeanization of public discourses (discursive Europeanization). It has been observed that Turkey has covered a significant distance in all the categories in time. Within the framework of this study, the Europeanization of national identities gains importance for this thesis. In this respect, Europeanization refers to the integration of Europe and the EU into one's national or other sense of belonging (Risse, 2010, p. 45). The EU and Europe become a part of identities, and they provide new identifications such as European Germans, French Europeans, or Polish in the EU (Risse, 2010, p. 45). Instead of the one replacing the other, the EU membership affects identity's meaning and inner substance among citizens and makes identities permeable. Thus, differences among national identities become less important while their similarities are highlighted.

Nas (2016, p. 24) underlines that Europeanization of identities means “a change of national identities under the influence and interaction with the processes, exchanges, institutions, values, and norms engendered by European integration.” In this respect, Nas (2016, p. 24) points to the Copenhagen criteria as the translation of the values of the European integration and the guiding post. She states that the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership provide a change in the definition of identity and identification with Europe, which means Europeanization of identity through “consolidation of a democratic system respectful of human and minority rights” (Nas, 2010, p. 28). In this context, Turkish identity, which includes both cultural identity and collective state identity, is examined in respect of the adoption of norms and values of the EU, which are “adherence to democracy as an overriding political norm embodying a system of checks and balances and moderation of power, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, nondiscrimination for disadvantaged groups such as women, respect for minorities” as regards the Europeanization of identity (Nas, 2010, pp. 24–25).

In this context, de-Europeanization is described as “the loss or weakening of the EU/Europe as a normative/political context and as a reference point in domestic settings and national public debates” (Aydın-Düzgüt & Kaliber, 2016, p. 5). It is basically seen in two ways: “firstly as the weakening of the appeal and influential capacity of European institutions, policies, norms, and values and secondly as the growing skepticism and indifference in Turkish society towards the EU/Europe, risking the legitimacy of the EU/Europe as a reference point” (Aydın-Düzgüt & Kaliber, 2016, p. 5). Aydın-Düzgüt and

Kaliber (2016, p. 6) add that de-Europeanization refers to those cases in which policy change is realized “with minimal or with largely negative reference to the EU/Europe.”

Aydın-Düzgıt and Kaliber (2016, p. 6) use de-Europeanization in a different way from backsliding and retrenchment to show the weakening effect of the EU on member or candidate countries. Accordingly, backsliding means the breach of EU principles, while retrenchment is used for the adverse and paradoxical effects of the EU (Aydın-Düzgıt & Kaliber, 2016, p. 6). Nevertheless, de-Europeanization refers to those cases where policy change occurs out of the normative and political context of the EU even though this country is in its pre-accession process (Aydın-Düzgıt & Kaliber, 2016, p. 6). In the Turkish case, it is seen “as the distancing of society and politics in Turkey from the European system of norms, values and policy expectations” (Aydın-Düzgıt & Kaliber, 2016, p. 6).

To sum up the meanings of the terms “Europeanization,” “de-Europeanization,” and “EU-ization” within this study, Europeanization refers to a wide range of historical, political, social, and normative contexts in which domestic and European actors constantly discuss, adopt, and apply European norms, values, and policies, which started in Turkey in the nineteenth century. De-Europeanization means the weakening impact of the EU and European norms, values, and policies as a reference point in a candidate country to the EU, which started in Turkey in 2007. In this sense, de-Europeanization is handled broadly, including the worsening in formal, technical, and institutional alignment defined as “EU-ization” and the normative sense called “Europeanization.” Lastly, as the most crucial instrument of Europeanization, EU-ization signifies a formal, technical, and institutional process of alignment with the EU through the EU-induced legislative reforms of national governments, especially during their accession negotiations, which has been applied in Turkey since its candidate status in 1999.

In the present EU discourse, historical lexicalization fulfills a significant role in constructing Turkey’s bid by revitalizing centuries-old memories regarding Turkey and Turks. The stereotypical historical images of Turkey are often utilized in the present-day debates in EU member states and institutions regarding the Turkish accession process. While the nationalistic and the extreme right-wing opposition discourse in the EU makes use of centuries-old clashes such as the Crusades, the Battle of Mantzikert, the conquest of Constantinople, or the sieges of Vienna, the supporting discourse makes references to the historical image of Turks as “tolerant of other religions” or sufficiently talented “to

make a multicultural society coexist peacefully” (Tekin, 2010, pp. 170–172). This shows the need to examine the history of the interaction between Turkey and Europe.

In considering its past and its present, various prominent academics and commentators suggest different definitions for Turkey and, in turn, Turkish identity. For instance, some of them describe Turkey as being stuck between East and West (Heper, 2005, pp. 33–44), a shattered and torn country (Huntington, 1996), “straddling Europe and Asia, in between the West and the Muslim world,” the one constantly experiencing identity crisis to problematize Turkish identity (Ahmad, 2004, pp.1-29), or a Western-oriented power despite objections from the neutrals and the Islamic fundamentalists in the country with the metaphors of “bridge,” “gate,” and “crossroad” (Yanik, 2009, pp. 531–549). In this point, MacMillan (2013, p. 154) and Rumford and Turunç (2016, p. 221) reject the description of Turkey as a bridge among civilizations since this definition excludes it from being an inherent part of Europe.

Rumford and Turunç (2016, p. 236) conceptualize Turkey as being divided into two branches on the axis of laicism and Islam and summarize their perspective with this description of the country whose heart is in the East and whose mind is in the West. Thus, it is observed that they categorize it as neither pure Eastern nor pure Western, although they culturally associate it with the Middle East and ideologically with Eastern values. Moreover, they assert that Turkey’s Islamic identity is one of the fundamental reasons why Europeans reject its membership (Rumford & Turunç, 2016, p. 237). They summarize the present-day views of the European society on Turkish identity as Muslim Turkey that collides with democracy and human rights (Rumford & Turunç, 2016, p. 237).

In terms of Turkey’s identity between East and West, the perspective of Rumelili (2003, p. 2012), along with Suleymanoglu-Kurum (2017) and Morozov (2012), should also be mentioned here as it describes it within the concept of liminality. Turner (1969, p. 95) describes the entities in “social transitions as liminals that are neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremonial.” It causes vagueness of liminals since they “elude or slip through the network of classifications that normally locate states and positions in cultural space” (Turner, 1969, p. 95). Liminals subvert the borders of identity and apparent division between the self and other, and thus their inclusion can cause dilution of community identity (Rumelili, 2003, pp. 219–221). For these reasons, Turner (1969, pp.

108–109) states that liminal communities are discursively constituted as threatening, unstable, dangerous, insecure, and anarchical entities that should be exposed to prescriptions, prohibitions, and conditions. Liminality is not pre-given or pre-existing. It is a contextual position that is discursively and socially produced (Rumelili, 2012, p. 496). Rumelili (2012, p. 499) states that its application is regarded as “the structural incompatibility between international collective identities,” namely the West and Asia. As an undertheorized and underutilized concept in international relations (IR), Rumelili (2012, pp. 498–501) underscores that liminality is underrated in constructivist theories and poststructuralist and postcolonial approaches. A limited number of academic works refer to liminality primarily to identify the in-betweenness and peripheral identity position of some countries such as Turkey (Rumelili, 2012, p. 498).

The position of Turkey as a liminal identity dates back to the civilizationist discourses in the eighteenth century during the Ottoman Empire and, in turn, the effect of these discourses with the more particularistic discourse on Europe (Rumelili, 2012, p. 505). Rumelili (2003, p. 221) states that Turkey has also been characterized as a liminal in the EU since its association agreement with the EEC in 1963. Although Turkey’s liminality was less articulated during the Cold War because of the then-categorization of identities as communist or capitalist, the end of the Cold War led to the reconstruction of the European order and, in turn, social categorization based on “belonging to Europe” (Rumelili, 2012, p. 505). Between 1995 and 1999, in contrast to the states in central and eastern Europe, the EU hesitated a lot to declare Turkey as a candidate country and debated Turkey’s Europeanness while the institutional relationship between Turkey and the EU also showed “a broader ambivalence about the belonging of Turkey within the European collective identity” (Rumelili, 2003, pp. 221–224). In other words, the liminal identity of Turkey became more apparent in the perception of the EU with the end of the Cold War.

Despite violating its standards, Turkey, as “partly European and partly not and insisting on being recognized as Europe,” is perceived as a threat to European identity in the EU (Rumelili, 2003, p. 221). Rumelili (2012, p. 505) states that Turkey’s position in the EU as an in-between and peripheral identity stems from incompatibility “between two cross-cutting discourses on European identity,” namely Europe as an inclusive identity based on universal norms adaptable by others and “Europe as an exclusive identity based on a pre-existing geography and culture” (Rumelili, 2012, p. 505). Since these discourses

do not overlap, she states that they cause this ambiguity in social identity categories (Rumelili, 2004, pp. 27–47).

In the section above, the importance of historical context for DHA and identity construction, the identification of the terms “Europeanization,” “EU-ization,” and “de-Europeanization,” and then giving some examples of the current controversial images of Turkish identity and, in turn, European identity are described. Nevertheless, it is also worth remembering that many topics that complicate the Turkish accession to the EU maintain their validity until today, and still shape the European perception of Turkey. Besides the religious difference mentioned above, Turkey’s population, its population growth rate, the incompatibility of Turkey’s socioeconomic situation with European countries, the economic and democratic necessities that the EU demands from Turkey, and the Cyprus issue, as well as the Armenian and Kurdish problem, maintain their importance in the European perception of Turkish identity. Furthermore, they are likely to be multiplied with new debates originating from these issues in the near future.

For this reason, the following chapters scrutinize the Europeanization period of Turkey until 1997. This is followed by a literature review compiled from studies investigating the perception of Turkey in the EP, along with the Europeanization and EU-ization periods observed in Turkey during the period 1997–2007. The third subtitle deals with the de-Europeanization period in Turkey after 2007 and, unlike the previous subtitles, by compiling the studies investigating the perception of European identity in Turkish political discourse. Thus, it is aimed to make sense of the European perception of Turkish identity and vice versa in a certain period of history and to uncover the roots of both ossified and new debates as well as to bring a holistic perspective to the perception of identity that both sides see as the other.

1.1 Turkey’s Accession Process to the EU and Images of Turks until 1997

Historical context is essential for current understanding. The roots of the present European perception of Turks have arisen from events in the past. In other words, even though this study is based on examining the European perception of Turkish identity in the period between 2007 and 2015 in order to compare it with the period between 1997 and 2007 with a view to revealing the difference and the change in time, the basic

perceptions and judgments of Turkish identity in the EP cannot be fully grasped without the historical background of the EU and Turkey relations before 1997. In this context, Hauge et al. (2018, p. 1) state that the conflictual rhetoric in the debates on EU-Turkey relations, which affects the perception of Turkish identity, exhibits a recurring pattern while this rhetoric is seen as having been extremely high in the last few years. In other words, the conflictual rhetoric identified during the de-Europeanization process of Turkey can also be of a recurring nature, which necessitates the examination of the events in the history of EU-Turkey relations and the European image of Turks. For these reasons, the following chapter is based on the prominent events in the history of the relations until 1997 while it is complemented by the perception of Turks in the EP in this period as the baseline of all kinds of Turkish images in history and today.

1.1.1 Turkey's Europeanization Process in the Pre-1997 Period

The interaction between Turkey and Europe has a long-established history, which evolved to Turkey's Europeanization after a certain period of time. Religion became the primary difference and one of the reasons for othering among the sides in the first place. As an Islamic empire based on religious law, the Ottoman Turks became neighbors with the Byzantine Empire, which initiated the first interactions between Europeans and Turks in the Late Middle Ages. The Ottoman state expanded and then turned into an empire in years in which the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 had profound consequences for Europe. After its military priority for centuries in the Western world and the start of decline with never-ending wars and conflicts, the Empire tried to compensate for its failures in wars with Tanzimat Fermanı (Imperial Edict of Reorganization) in 1839, the Islahat fermanı (Edict of Reform) in 1856, Abdülaziz's visit to Europe in 1866, and the Treaty of Paris in 1856 so as to include the Ottoman Empire in the European state system as an effort towards Europeanization.

The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War and then partitioning and occupation of the country resulted in the creation of the Turkish War of Independence as the Turkish nationalist movement was led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk between 1919 and 1923 in the interwar period of Europe. The foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, strengthened by radical reforms undertaken in the country, is accepted as the milestone of Turkey's modernization period, which overlapped with the country's

Westernization and Europeanization movements (Kuran Burçođlu, 2000, p. 12). During the Second World War between 1939 and 1945, Turkey's neutrality and the symbolic declaration of war on Germany and Japan with a view to joining the future United Nations (UN) made it one of the original members of the UN in 1945. It followed the Cold War period, which started with Turkey's membership of the Council of Europe. This membership consolidated its commitment to European values such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law and its allegiance to the Western Alliance during the Cold War. Furthermore, the historic election of the Democratic Party government in 1950 was accepted as the participation of the Turkish people in the politics of the country for the first time in Europe. The Turkish elites aimed to strengthen this rapprochement based on their security, political, and economic motivations and especially to make real one of the primary targets of the Turkish foreign policy with application to the EU, i.e., the European Economic Community (EEC), in 1959.

When the Ankara Agreement was signed in 1963 and entered into force in 1964 as an association agreement that started Turkey's preparation stage for its accession, being "European" was the only criterion for the applicant countries according to Article 237 of the Rome Treaty. Moreover, the then-EC President Walter Hallstein declared Turkey to be a part of Europe at its official signing ceremony. Since its reason was based on Turkey's strategic significance as the southern pillar of NATO during the Cold War because of the security concerns of the European Economic Community (EEC) as well as the political motivation to show that the Community was an open community, it was clear that the conditions of the time made Turkey a part of Europe. Thus, the proximity between Europe and Turkey was seen as the closest in the history of the Turkish accession process mainly because of the security concerns against the rising Soviet Union threat as the collective other of western Europe. In this respect, Tekin (2010, p. 78) states that Europe was then evaluated as an intergovernmental construction in progress since the Congress of Vienna in 1815. This attempt by the Turks was complemented by Turkey's accession to NATO in 1952 and the OECD in 1961 despite the May 27 military coup in Turkey in 1960.

In terms of the relations between the EU and Turkey, the Turkish community living in EU member states, especially in Germany, is an essential factor in the direct contact on the societal level. This contact was initiated with the influx of Turkish guest workers in the 1960s and 1970s. In the same years as the application, Turkey began to

send Turkish workers to the Federal Republic of Germany as labor immigrants in 1961 to assist with Germany's economic development and industrial expansion. Turkish labor, which was perceived as comprising guest workers for a few years in the 1960s, turned into the most significant ethnic minority in Germany, which is one of the founding countries of the EU. Nevertheless, this Turkish community was marginalized and isolated from German society and pushed into a cultural and identity crisis. This isolation and disintegration made them targets for German nationalist and racist groups (Brewin, 2000, p. 96).

The Turkey-EU relations in the 1970s and the 1980s as a part of the Cold War period can be described as unstable because of various developments mentioned below, the negative clichés about the Turkish community in the EU member states, Turkey's problems with minority rights, and its democratic deficiencies. During this period, adverse events such as the military memorandum in Turkey in 1971, the Cyprus problem in 1974, the release of the movie *Midnight Express* in 1978, a coup d'état in Turkey in 1980, and the assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II by Mehmet Ali Ağca in 1981 harmed Turkey's Europeanization process. Nevertheless, positive events such as the enforcement of the Additional Protocol between the EU and Turkey in 1973, which initiated the transitional stage for Turkish accession, Turkey's return to civilian rule after the 1980 coup d'état, the efforts at liberalization, especially in the economic sector with the 24 January decisions in 1980, the Özal government's handing in of Turkey's formal application for full membership to the EU on 14 April 1987, and the recognition of the right of appeal to the ECHR in Turkey in 1987 maintained Turkey's Europeanization and accession process to the EU.

The 1990s started with the end of the Cold War in 1991 as a result of the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, which caused a shift in the priorities of the Europeans thanks to the lack of security concerns and thus decreased the importance of Turkey. While Turkish politicians and media began to hope for EU membership soon with the Customs Union Agreement in 1995 between Turkey and the EU, which started the final stage of Turkish accession according to the Ankara Agreement, the Madımak Hotel fire in Sivas in 1993 attracted considerable attention in Europe. This was because this fire was deliberately started by a furious group of people against "laics," causing the death of 33 people comprising writers, musicians, artists, and intellectuals in Turkey who were stayed in the Madımak Hotel for a cultural festival of the Alevi (Arslan, 2015). Additionally, in

the 1990s, Erbakan's rise, regarded as the Islamic transformation of Turkey, worried Europe. In this regard, Robins (1996, p. 72) states that the West had observed "the breakdown of modernization, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, or the reawakening of Turkic expansionism" in Turkish society since the mid-1980s in his book in 1996.

The postmodern coup of 28 February 1997 as the military intervention led an essential part of the Islamists as the opponents of European integration to review and change their stance regarding Turkey's integration into Europe (Kaliber, 2012, p. 62). They changed their utterances from Islamization to Turkey's democratization, which was later represented by the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (AKP)). Thus, in this period, Turkey gained the trust of the EU through its political and economic stability in terms of the Copenhagen criteria for its full membership of the EU despite some challenges. All in all, the relations between the EU and Turkey had to deal with various problems in order to maintain their existence. The events mentioned above until 1997, which were full of ups and downs, caused the construction of not only an alive, *sui generis*, and dynamic but also a sensitive and conflictual nature of EU-Turkey relations depending on different times and actors. The impacts of these ups and downs on the European perception of Turkish identity are the subject of the next section.

1.1.2 Literature Review: Perception of Turkish Identity in the Pre-1997 Period in the European Parliament

In this section, analyses on the perception of Turkish identity in the EP until 1997 with relevant remarks of MEPs are mentioned. In this sense, Levin's examination of the images of Turkey in the various EP debates is quite valuable. The reasons for choosing Levin's study are based on: the usage of the same methodology, namely DHA in CDA; the focus area on the same EU institution, namely the EP; the same subject, namely the perception of the Turkish identity in the EP and the coverage of the time period before 1997. Besides these reasons, the limited Internet usage and technological development in the pre-1997 period, which affects access to the debates in the EP, also make Levin's analysis the main study mentioned in this part. In his study, Levin (2011, p. 182) points out that the issue of Turkish accession raises the question of European identity. In this context, he states that two competing European self-images, i.e., inclusive and exclusive understandings of European identity, are discerned in the historical analysis of the

Turkish identity's representation (Levin, 2011, pp. 4–6). Accordingly, these two orientations of European identity cause the discursive construction of three images of Turkey in the EP debates.

Within the first image of Turkey, which is “a dangerous other,” negative attributions of some MEPs to Turkish identity are identified within the exclusive understanding of European identity. In this concept, the EP debate in 1996 is remarkable in terms of references to the situation of human rights in Turkey connected to the violent conflict with the Kurdish terrorist group known as *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê* (PKK) in the 1990s (Levin, 2011, p.189). In this debate, Turkey was described as a country that demonstrated “shamelessness in violating human rights” and implemented “dark methods – including murder,” “torture,” “killing,” “political repression,” and “disappearances and extrajudicial killings” (Levin, 2011, p. 189). These attributions, which recall medieval images of Turks such as “barbarian” or “cruel,” discursively constructed the image of Turkish identity as a dangerous other at the end of the 1990s (Levin, 2011, p. 189).

The otherness of Turkish identity is underlined in different ways in the EP debates within the exclusive understanding of European identity. Besides its dangerous nature, Turkish identity is also the other as a threat in the same debate, which is the second image of Turkey mentioned in Levin's analysis. In this regard, "the troublemaker of the international community," "militaristic," "ever more violent and brutal," and "multifaceted aggressiveness" were just some of the descriptions of Turkey in the EP debate in 1996 (Levin, 2011, p. 191). As a "destabilizing, provocative" country that "can create problems and even threaten peace in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the Aegean, and beyond" as well as causing "serious infringement of international law" and "threats of war," Turkey is mainly referred to as a threat against Greece or Cyprus⁷ (Levin, 2011, pp. 191–192). In this regard, it should be highlighted that the EP actively follows the Cyprus issue, and this issue was placed on the European political agenda and that of EU-Turkey relations due to the efforts of the EP, especially after Turkey's membership application in 1987 and the membership application of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU in 1990 (Green & Collins, 2003, pp. 27–41). Therefore, the active participation of the EP

⁷ For practical reasons, the word “Cyprus” in this thesis refers to the “Republic of Cyprus,” which became an EU member state on 1 May 2004 (Işıksal, 2019, p. 119). Nevertheless, it is officially called the “Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus” by the Republic of Turkey because of the lack of a lasting solution to the Cyprus problem (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate for EU Affairs, 2019). The word “Cyprus” is preferred in the debates, which has also made this research adopt the same usage.

in the Cyprus issue played a role in the perception of Turkish identity as a threat to Cyprus.

Within the second image of “Turkey as a threat,” there are also attributions to Turkey’s political situation in terms of Islamist leanings in its political parties in a different study (Giannakopoulos and & Maras, 2005, p. 6). Thus, the perceived danger of the possible creation of an Islamist Front in Turkey as a threat to Europe is formed among MEPs. As an example, some members of the right-wing EPP-ED/EPP/PPE group in the EP debate in 1996 described Turkey as “a tyranny run by religious extremists” and “the resistance to compatibility with Europe” because of the government of the Virtue Party’s Islamist leader Necmettin Erbakan in Turkey, which accordingly necessitated the suspension of the EU attempts to develop relations with Turkey (Giannakopoulos and & Maras, 2005, pp. 4-6). Some EPP-ED/EPP/PPE parliamentarians also stated in the EP debate in 1996 that Islamist leanings in its political parties were a part of a structural characteristic of Turkey’s socio-cultural situation within the exclusive understanding of European identity and thus, accordingly, Turkey “would prefer to be a leading power in the Islamic world” rather than becoming an EU member (Giannakopoulos and & Maras, 2005, p. 6).

There are not only negative images attributed to Turkey in the EP within the exclusive understanding of European identity in this time period. There are also MEPs in inclusive understanding in this term, such as parliamentarians from the PSE as the socialist group in the EP in 1996. They perceive Turkey as neither dangerous nor a threat, and they believe in Turkey’s accession to the EU with the development of democratic structures in Turkey (Giannakopoulos & Maras, 2005, p. 12). In this sense, the third image of Turkey, that of “a troublesome student” in need of the EU, appears (Levin, 2011, p. 193).

The representation of Turkey as a troublesome student is based on the logic of conditionality distinguished in the narratives of MEPs. Based on the asymmetric role relationship between the EU member states and Turkey as an applicant country, this logic affects not only Turkey’s image but also the self-understanding of Europe in a unique way (Levin, 2011, p. 193). Within the logic of conditionality in which the EU decides on an applicant’s membership, Turkey is depicted as the weaker side in need of the EU for democratization. This aid from the EU is perceived as an obligation of the EU as the stronger side (Levin, 2011, p. 195). In this sense, it is also observed that some MEPs use

terms recalling 19th-century representations and terms such as the “Sick Man of Europe” for Turkey and “*European mission civilisatrice*” (European civilizing mission) in order to refer to this obligation of the EU, which brings these MEPs closer to the exclusive understanding of European identity (Levin, 2011, p. 198).

The third image of Turkey as a troublesome student in need of the EU as its teacher is constructed as a result of the EP’s role in the Turkish accession process. The EP evaluates the EC’s Progress Report for Turkey drafted by a rapporteur of the EP in its debates since the EP is charged to monitor, assess, and judge Turkey’s progress towards EU membership along with other EU institutions. In order to hasten the pace of reform and ensure its implementation in practice, some calls from the EP debate in 1996 such as “...powerfully urge Turkey...” are observed (Levin, 2011, p. 194). However, it is also pointed out that Levin is skeptical of the real views of MEPs about Turkish accession. Accordingly, especially in these early debates, MEPs from both right and left groups used only different reasons in practice for objecting to Turkish accession. As a result, Levin concludes that inclusive identities that accept themselves as superior are inclined to “become either aggressively expansive or revert to something closer to an exclusive and parochial self-image” when another does not leave its own identity (Levin, 2011, p. 194). Thus, it is understood that Turkey is perceived as an unchanging country despite the efforts of the EP, which makes this troublesome child a hopeless case and directs the EP to a more exclusive stance of European identity.

To sum up, there are three outstanding images of Turkey discursively constructed based on two competing understandings of Europe and an argument based on examining the EP debates until 1997, according to Levin’s study. While the fact that the issue of Turkish accession raises the question of European identity is underlined, three representations of Turkey, namely Turkey as a dangerous other, as a threat, and as a troublesome student, within the scope of inclusive understanding and exclusive understanding of Europe are identified from MEPs’ narratives in the EP by Levin (2011). In the next section on the perception of Turkish identity in the EP between 1997 and 2007, these representations of Turkey, as well as images of Europe and European identity, are significantly diversified with the increasing number of EP debates on Turkey and domestic developments in Turkey, especially after its candidate status in 1999 and the opening of its accession negotiations in 2005.

1.2 Turkey's Accession Process to the EU and Images of Turks between 1997 and 2007

The 1997 Luxembourg Summit and the 1999 Helsinki Summit are meaningful both for the EU regarding its enlargement and deepening and for Turkey regarding the grant of candidate status. At the Helsinki Summit, the EU decided to start negotiations with all the initially nonadmissible candidates from the CEECs, added a good-neighborhood criterion to the list of accession conditions, and strengthened a common European policy on security and defense as the most remarkable results. Nevertheless, this Summit has a different meaning in terms of Turkey's future after its hard work to remove the legacies of the Luxembourg Summit. Thanks to this Summit of the European Council, Turkey started its EU-ization process even though it was interrupted, beginning in 2007 with Turkey's de-Europeanization. As the baseline for comparison in this study, the section below examining the events in EU-Turkey relations between 1997 and 2007 and the perception of Turkish identity in the EP is vital in order to evaluate the difference and changes in the European representation of Turkish identity between 2007 and 2015 as the period of Turkey's de-Europeanization.

1.2.1 Turkey's Europeanization and EU-ization Process between 1997 and 2007

In terms of EU-Turkey relations, the Luxembourg Summit in 1997 was the beginning of the two-year-long stagnation of the relations to the deep anger of the Turkish government, which paved the way for the 1999 Helsinki Summit. The EU had already given its signal with the decision of the EC to exclude Turkey from the enlargement process in the report "Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union" on 16 July 1997 before the Summit (Aybey, 2004, p. 29). This Summit has a negative reputation in Turkey's accession process and EU-Turkey relations since, at this Summit, Turkey was excluded from the list of prospective members through not providing a pre-accession strategy for Turkey as well as being placed even beneath CEECs as former communist states and Cyprus. Despite a high degree of polarization in the EP debates in October and December 1999, the legacies of this Summit in 1997 were removed at the Helsinki

Summit in December 1999, at which Turkey was formally granted candidate status (Hauge et al., 2018, p. 13).

Between 1997 and 1999, some critical developments led to recovery in the relations and then its accession process. First of all, changing preferences of the governments of some member states, such as Germany and Greece, were of decisive importance in drawing a positive conclusion for Turkey. Theo Pangalos, a long-standing adversary of Turkey, was replaced by the more pragmatic George Papandreou as Greece's Foreign Minister in 1999. Since Greece was trying at that time to gain membership of the European single currency, a relaxation of tensions with Turkey would offer significant savings on defense expenditure in order to cut the budget deficit for the European single currency. Furthermore, the change of position in Germany from the CDU-CSU government under Helmut Kohl in 1998 to an SPD-Green government under Gerhard Schröder, who wanted to integrate the large Turkish minority in Germany, contributed to Turkey at the Helsinki Summit (Bache et al., 2011, p. 546).

Second, a terrible earthquake in Turkey in August 1999 and the consequent terrible losses of life created widespread sympathy among public opinion across Europe, especially in Greece, for Turkey. Third, there was a growing appreciation of European leaders, notably Britain's Tony Blair, claiming that the conclusions of the Luxembourg Summit for Turkey were wrong and a new attempt must be prepared to manage the Turkish question. Fourth, Finland, holding the then-EU presidency at the Helsinki Summit, was more conciliatory and pragmatic than Luxembourg in 1997 (Rumford, 2000, p. 340). Fifth, Schröder's efforts strengthened with then-Prime Minister Ecevit's letter on his commitment to fulfilling the domestic reforms for the Copenhagen criteria and the personal determination and insistent efforts of then-Foreign Minister İsmail Cem with his Greek colleague Yorgi Papandreou. Sixth, in this term, Greece understood that Turkey's divergence from the EU would not be advantageous for Greece in the long term, and this would deteriorate the Cyprus problem and the Aegean dispute.

The seventh reason is that the demilitarization of the state security court's structure in Turkey, the open and fair tribunal of Abdullah Öcalan, and HADEP's participation in the elections in April 1999 provided a positive atmosphere at the Helsinki Summit (Çalış, 2008, p. 344). Eighth, it was known that the US administration had made both indirect and direct efforts to convince the member states that Turkey would not be a burden on the Union (Çalış, 2008, p. 347). Lastly, Çalış adds that with the worsening

economy after 1997 and the depoliticization process in Turkey, the Turkish citizens understood that only the EU could be the triggering force for a change in Turkey (Çalış, 2008, p.349).

The declaration of Turkey as a candidate country in the 1999 Helsinki Summit is a milestone in the history of the relations between Turkey and the EU as well as the Turkish accession process. In this respect, Bölükbaş et al. (2010, p. 465) observe that the Europeanization literature on Turkey was mainly proliferated by its candidate status in 1999. Studies by Müftüler-Baç (2005), Patton (2007), Öniş (2007), and Kubicek (2011) also claim that the instrument of EU conditionality became reliable with Turkey's candidate status in the 1999 Helsinki Council, which mainly encouraged and accelerated Turkey's Europeanization. The Helsinki Council is also influential in terms of sustaining the proper background for the launch of the EU-ization period of Turkey through the EU-induced legislative reforms. Considering Wallace's distinction between Europeanization and EU-ization, the EU-ization of Turkey as its formal process of alignment with the *acquis communautaire* was initiated with the start of the accession negotiations in 2005. It led Turkey to a formal, technical, and institutional alignment process with the EU. Nevertheless, Turkey's Europeanization, which means the usage of the European context as the main normative and political context, had already started in the nineteenth century.

After the 1999 Helsinki Summit and the acceptance of its candidacy status, the 2002 European Council Summit in Copenhagen became the second positive prominent interaction between the EU and Turkey despite the initiation of the 9/11 2001 era of the "clash of civilizations" (Lindgaard et al., 2018, p. 1). The Summit in 2002 also strengthened Turkey's Europeanization, although the Helsinki Summit integrated the Cyprus issue and border problems with Greece into its accession process. According to the results of the Copenhagen Summit, Turkey sufficiently fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria, and thus its accession negotiations would start "without delay." During the coalition government in Turkey between 1999 and 2002, the Turkish political parties stood behind the EU reforms because of the strong EU conditionality with the 1999 Helsinki Summit, although none of them were pro-EU, and they were even hard Eurosceptics, especially on critical issues such as minority protection (Yılmaz, 2016, p. 89).

The new Turkish government with the AKP, which became the principal agent of Europeanization in Turkey as the ruling party with the general election on 3 November

2002, also totally adopted this Europeanization tendency at the beginning of this era (Saatçioğlu, 2014, p. 86). Following the electoral success, the AKP started a series of visits throughout Europe regarding the Turkish accession. It was supplemented with changes to the Turkish Constitution, such as two major constitutional amendments in 2001 and 2004 and eight harmonization packages between 2002 and 2004, known as the “EU-ization reforms,” at the same time as the implementation of the economic reforms of Kemal Derviş already launched by the previous Ecevit government.

The AKP created a pro-reformist and pro-EU coalition with the Republican People’s Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (CHP)) as the main opposition party despite the CHP’s soft Euroscepticism about reforms concerning monolithic national identity and secularism as well as suspicions about the real intentions of the AKP (Eylemer & Taş, 2007, pp. 571–572; MacMillan, 2016, p. 113; Yılmaz, 2016, p. 89). Aydın-Düzgit (2018, p. 22) and Alpan (2016, pp. 16–20) state that in its first term between 2002 and 2007, the AKP continued the foreign policy of the Western-oriented Kemalist vision and depicted Europe as “the ‘promised land’ of democracy and improved welfare/governance standards, as well as the ‘natural direction’ for Turkey,” which empowered the AKP against its various rivals, including the secularist military and the judicial establishment.

This rapprochement between the EU and Turkey was supported in the Commission’s Progress Report for Turkey in 2004, which approved Turkey’s sufficient fulfillment of the Copenhagen political criteria. Even though the EU was dealing with the rejection of the Netherlands and France for a European Constitution following consultative referenda and a two-day diplomatic deadlock caused by Austria’s populist government with its last-minute objection to Turkish accession, the Europeanization process of Turkey was not damaged. Under these circumstances, the determination of 3 October 2005 as a specific date to start its official negotiations at the 2004 Brussels Summit explicitly indicated Turkey’s ongoing Europeanization process.

Therefore, this period between 2002 and 2005 is evaluated as the period of ups and the initial “golden age of Europeanization” due to the growing “impact of the EU on the policies, politics, institutions, societies, and discourses” of Turkey (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009, p. 8). Moreover, the civilian control of the military, the vitalization of civil society through the activities of nongovernmental organizations, and the significant progress in minority and cultural rights such as broadcasting and education in languages other than Turkish were launched in this period. In 2004, Turkey also actively joined in the debates

about the future of Europe as the candidate state, as well as signing the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. Thus, it was observed that the EU positively influenced the traditional understandings of the limits of state power, democratic representation, the role of the military, gender equality, and the rule of law, rights, and freedoms in Turkey.

Despite the rapprochement after 1999, and especially in 2005, called the “EU-ization period,” it is also necessary to mention the initial indications of the upcoming period, which caused the current and ongoing de-Europeanization process of Turkey. Baykal and Arat (2013, p. 337) state that the end of the Cold War triggered Europe to question its need for Turkey as an ally. Additionally, they define the EU in the research of identity and transformation in that period in which it had to carry out both deepening and enlargement (Baykal & Arat, 2013, p. 338). While enlarging and deepening simultaneously, the EU had to decide where its borders ended, which necessitated the definition of the aim, future, direction, and scope of European integration and the characteristics of the European identity. The 2000 Nice Summit, the 2001 Laeken Summit, and the 2004 Constitutional Treaty, which opened the way for the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, became the outcomes of this research and transformation. In this process, the role and the existence of Turkey in this integration were questioned and re-evaluated.

The clause in the Negotiating Framework with Turkey on 3 October 2005 that for the first time caused permanent derogations in the free movement of people, structural policies, and agriculture, as well as an open-ended process, can be regarded as one of this evaluation’s results and signs of the forthcoming period since it was indisputably accepted in the EU despite the violation of the equal treatment in the EU enlargement policy. Therefore, Turkey’s Europeanization period started with uncertainty, although it evolved positively. The term between 1999 and 2007 ended up with growing disenchantment on both sides, which brought a down period in the relations. The first symptoms of the tensions in the relations were identified in France and Germany, while some halts in the accession negotiations were also observed for the first time towards the end of this process. In this context, the Eurobarometer surveys in 2005 and 2006 indicated that Turkey was generally seen as an issue rather than an asset, especially among the older member states (EU-15) (Dostál et al., 2011, pp. 207–209). Other surveys in 2006 showed

the importance of cultural differences⁸ and the impossibility of the Turkish accession even if it complied with all of the conditions (Levin, 2011, p. 176). In the same vein, Eurobarometer also showed a sharp decline in Turkish public support for EU membership from 71% in 2004 to 44% in 2006 (Kaliber, 2012, p. 67; Yaka, 2016, p. 159).

In addition to the 1999 Helsinki Summit, the electoral success of the AKP on 3 November 2002 in Turkey gave rise to a significant change in the French manner. According to France, Turkey's accession to the EU was seriously on the agenda, with this new ruling party regarded as forming an Islamist government in Turkey (Tekin, 2010, p. 82). Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, who was then French President and the head of the Convention on the Future of Europe, described Turkey in November 2002 as non-European and warned the Europeans not to let Turkey become a part of the EU (Tekin, 2010, p. 82). Thus, on the eve of the Copenhagen Summit, it was recorded that for the first time, France explicitly pronounced its opposition to Turkish accession, which still continues today. This refusal was not based on geographical reasons since d'Estaing had defined the country "as a different culture, a different approach, and a different way of life" in November 2002 (Tekin, 2010, p. 82).

Furthermore, Merkel publicly verbalized the idea of a "privileged partnership" in this period during her visit to Turkey in 2004 and her election campaign in 2004 (Insel, 2012, p. 4). Following German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing also supported the idea of a "privileged partnership" instead of Turkey's full membership (Müftüleri-Baç, 2008, p. 221). This idea was based on the claim that Turkey was not a European state according to Article 49 of the Treaty of the EU and that the EU lacked the absorption capacity (Türkeş-Kılıç, 2019, p. 5). Nevertheless, it did not come to the fore further after Sarkozy was replaced by François Hollande in 2012, and Merkel removed the term "privileged partnership" for Turkey from her election campaign in 2013.

Merkel and Sarkozy also had the same concerns regarding the accession of a majority-Muslim populated country staying mainly in Asia to the EU, referring to Turkey (Louis et al., 2018, p. 11). Lastly, the French law recognizing the killing of Armenians as genocide in 2001 and the French bill criminalizing the denial of the 1915 mass killings of

⁸ Despite the relatively rapid progress between 1999 and 2005, the increasing opposition to Turkey in the EU may be on the grounds that increased closeness to something accepted as culturally other usually causes discomfort (Levin, 2018, p. 160).

Armenians in 2006, which was rejected in May 2006 by the French Senate, were perceived as French hostility to Turkey and relatedly its accession process. On the same day as this French bill, the famous Turkish writer Orhan Pamuk won the Nobel Prize for Literature. This award became a factor that offended the Turkish government and harmed its motivation for EU membership since Orhan Pamuk had previously been charged with insulting Turkishness because of an interview in which he mentioned mass killings of Armenians and Kurds.

Despite these oppositions to the Turkish bid to join the EU, this period unarguably became the most productive term for EU-Turkey relations and the Turkish accession process. In short, the period between 1997 and 2007 became the highest of the ups in the relations, as it included the “Golden Age of Europeanization” and the launch of the EU-ization period of Turkey with the EU-induced reform, while whether the Turkish image in Europe benefitted from this approaching in parallel is mentioned in the next section below.

1.2.2 Literature Review: Perception of Turkish Identity between 1997 and 2007 in the European Parliament

In this section, four studies⁹ conducted by Levin in 2011, Aydın-Düzgit in 2012, Lindgaard et al. in 2018, and Türkeş-Kılıç in 2019 are mentioned in terms of the perception of Turkish identity in the EP in the time period between 1997 and 2007. The reasons for selecting these four studies are based on the usage of the focus area on the EP as the same EU institution, the perception of the Turkish identity in the EP as the same subject, and the coverage of the period between 1997 and 2007. There are many other studies, such as those that focus on the representation of Turkish identity in European newspaper articles, popular journals, editorials, the Western media coverage, the European political parties through discourses of their leaders and members, some of the EU member states through Eurobarometers and narratives of their leaders or the political campaigns as well as the other EU institutions besides the EP. Nevertheless, including all these studies as a whole could damage the consistency, concurrency, and sustainability

⁹ Summaries of these four studies in tables are also present in Appendix I.

of this research topic, and thus this could cause a deviation from the main aim of this research.

As the first analysis in this sense, Levin (2011) maintains his claim that there are three ongoing images of Turkey discursively constructed in this time period as in the period before 1997. The first representation of Turkey as a dangerous other continued to be used in order to describe the country in terms of political and military violence after 1997 in the EP. Statements such as “a state based...upon power, threats, compulsion, and authoritarian demands for loyalty,” “militarization,” “threaten...communities with extinction,” “villages...destroyed,” “torture and persecution,” “neither individuals’ rights nor people’s rights are respected,” “not so much a state with an army but an army with a state” and “a military dictatorship... since General Atatürk’s revolution in the 1920s” are examples of some MEPs’ understanding of human rights and democracy in Turkey between 1998 and 2006 (Levin, 2011, pp. 189–190).

Within the first image of Turkey as a dangerous other examined by Levin, a shift is observed towards sexual violence in the perception of Turkish identity in the EP debates, especially after 1999, which constructs Turkish society as violent, backward, and oppressive based on its Muslim nature (Levin, 2011, p. 191). The de-escalation of Turkey’s long-lasting Kurdish conflict with the capture of Abdullah Öcalan as the leader of the PKK, the PKK’s decision to agree to a ceasefire in 1999, the acceptance of Turkey’s candidacy for membership of the EU at the 1999 Helsinki Summit, and the introduction of reforms for minority rights and human rights in Turkey caused this shift in perception of Turkish identity (Levin, 2011, p. 190). In this sense, increasing human rights violations of women in Turkey became one of the most striking topics for MEPs. *Topoi* of “forced marriages and honor crimes” were commonly utilized by MEPs both from the left and right groups based on the *topos* of how Turks (mis)treat women in a broad sense (Levin, 2011, p. 190).

Levin (2011, p. 190) gives some example narratives from the EP debates on how Turkey is discursively constructed as a dangerous country that mistreats women. While a Slovak Eurosceptic MEP from a right-wing group in the EP debate in 2004 reused the centuries-old image of Turks who “sell their daughter” as in Luther’s and Voltaire’s imagery of Turks, a German conservative MEP depicted women in Turkey as “second-class citizens” who were exposed to virginity tests, forced marriages, honor killings, and bigamy in the same debate (Levin, 2011, p. 190). In this regard, Islam was frequently

referred to as a supporting factor for this situation for women in Turkey (Levin, 2011, p. 191). MEPs, mainly from the right-wing group, also criticized Turkey as a “non-European and Islamic” country that is a place of “intolerant suppression of religious freedom, in particular concerning Christians” who were “subject to intimidation, violence, and administrative prejudice” in 2004 with the *topos* of Islam.

The image of Turkish identity as a threat is the second ongoing common representation examined by Levin (2011), beginning from the term before 1997 with some changes. New threats along with the Turkish foreign policy related to Cyprus and Greece were observed after 1999. They are “fears of uncontrolled immigration” and “the supposed Islamization of Europe” (Levin, 2011, p. 192). MEPs, especially on the far right, preferred to explicitly warn the EP and state in the EP debates in 2004 and 2006 that “...the presence of a Muslim member state, and the mass immigration of millions of unemployed young Turks – which is a certainty – would result in a series of social and economic catastrophes” and exportation of “some of its unemployed and criminals to Britain” as well as “the dangers posed by Islamist extremists politicizing religion” (Levin, 2011, p. 192). A Polish Eurosceptic MEP predicts that Turkey will become “a gateway for terrorism” with its membership in the EU instead of a bridge between the Muslim world and Europe, which will cause “the end of Europe” (Levin, 2011, p. 192).

As for the image of a dangerous country, MEPs from the mainstream conservative group state their fear and the dangers of Turkey’s membership as a threat to the EU by referring to the most common religion in Turkey in more carefully chosen terms. While one MEP states that “the rules of this Islamic country that strictly forbids the use of alcohol will also be imposed on our peoples...who are proud to love our wine and our beer,” a “new type of Ottoman commonwealth” planned by Turkey and a threat of possible Turkish occupation for its neighbors as experienced for centuries between Ottoman Turks and Europeans were claimed by other conservative MEPs in the EP debate in 2006 (Levin, 2011, p. 192). As well as the EP, a similar view is determined in the EC. As an extreme example, Fritz Bolkestein, the European Commissioner for the Internal Market, warns that Turkish accession will cause the “Islamization of Europe” and that, for this reason, the “deliverance of Vienna in 1863 will have been in vain” (Traynor, 22 September 2004).

As in the term before 1997, the third image of Turkey, that of a troublesome student as a result of Levin’s analysis, continues to be frequently seen in the EP.

Compared to other applicant countries, Levin (2011, pp. 193–194) points out two different aspects that the EP underlines for the Turkish case after 1997 in particular. As the first one, there is a greater emphasis on the Copenhagen political criteria in assessing the Turkish accession. The perceived need to control the application of these criteria in practice is the second one, which is mentioned by two groups of MEPs from both the inclusive and exclusive understandings of European identity (Levin, 2011, p. 194). Accordingly, while a group of MEPs who support Turkish accession in an inclusive stance is faithfully critical of the implementation of the political criteria, another group, who is against Turkey’s membership for cultural and religious reasons within exclusive understanding, puts forward the problems in the reform process in order to cover their original reasons based on essentialist differences (Levin, 2011, p. 194).

In various EP debates, Turkey is constructed as a troublesome student with calls for the EP to hasten the reform process and its implementation. For this aim, some MEPs ask the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament “to use every opportunity to urge the Turkish government” as dictated within the logic of conditionality (Levin, 2011, p. 194). Furthermore, there are MEPs who partly thank the EU for any progress made in Turkey since, accordingly, this progress is accomplished with the acknowledgment of Turkey’s candidature in 1999 and the prospects of its membership of the EU, which clearly depicts Turkey in an inferior position and the EU in a superior role (Levin, 2011, p. 195). In this asymmetric role relationship, the EU was represented as “the values which Turkey wishes to adopt” in 2004, while the Turkish accession process was seen as a long journey that necessitated the application of the Copenhagen political criteria in order to end this journey in Europe (Levin, 2011, p. 196). This shows that these criteria are to determine not only membership of applicant countries but also the meaning of becoming a European country – in other words, “the real identity of the Parliament and the European Union,” according to an MEP in 1999, as well as “basic European principles” and “shared value ground” as stated by other MEPs in 2002 (Levin, 2011, p. 197).

After the analysis of Levin (2011) mentioned above, the analysis of Aydın-Düzgüt in 2012 is the second study examined in terms of the perception of Turkish identity in the EP for the time period between 1997 and 2007. Aydın-Düzgüt (2012, p. 27) defines four discursive constructions of Europe and eight representations of Turkey under these images of Europe in her analysis of debates in the EP and interviews with MEPs between 1999 and 2010. Within the analysis of Aydın-Düzgüt (2012, p. 30), the first discursive

construction of Europe is Europe as a security community. In this construction, Turkey is represented as a panacea for the clash of civilizations in terms of the potential security implications of Turkey's membership of the EU, especially between 2002 and 2005, on the one hand, and as a potential security threat for Europe on the other (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 30).

In regard to the image of a panacea for the clash of civilizations, the center-right EPP-ED/EPP/PPE discourse generally justifies the geostrategic importance of Turkey within a strong interdiscursivity with the clash of civilizations discourse (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 31). These MEPs highlight the importance of Turkey as a “steadfast” and “loyal” ally during the Cold War within NATO, and they include Turkey in terms of constructed security interests while this does not mean the inclusion of Turkey as a European country (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 32). Similarly, Öner (2009, p. 251) also states that some MEPs discursively construct Turkey as one of the instruments to prevent the “clash of civilizations” according to the European Elites Survey in 2007 and the author's interviews in Brussels in 2006.

The image of Turkey as a panacea for the clash of civilizations did not totally contribute to the perception of Turkish identity in a positive meaning, although this image constructs Turkey as a key dialogue player among civilizations. Along with other uses of the bridge metaphor, Turkey was predicated by one MEP as “a bridge to the Arab world” in an EP debate in 2004, which causes a distance based on the clash of civilizations thesis and the representation of Turkey as a country “in between” (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, pp. 32–35). In the same vein, the then-President of the EC José Manuel Barroso (2004) also supported this metaphor and defined Turkey with its “size, historical background, its geographical situation and its potential role as a bridge between Europe and the Islamic world.”

Within the image of Turkey as a panacea for the clash of civilizations, Turkey is also depicted as a stable model country compared to its southern neighborhood, which can be sustained with the help of the EU. As a matter of “interest” for Europe as a security community for both right- and left-wing groups in the EP, Turkey is depicted as a country that needs Europe for democratizing itself and for stability, while its neighboring regions, such as the Middle East and the Caucasus, are otherized as regions of “confusion,” “despotism,” and “instability” (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 33). In other words, they are described as security threats through the securitization of the southern neighborhood. In

this way, the *topos* of threat is used to refer to the situation of Turkey, which is left alone in this region when it is excluded from EU membership (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 33). Despite (re)constructing a cultural/civilizational fault line between the “Islamic World” and the West as separate, essential, monolithic, and homogeneous civilizations ready to conflict with one another, it is attempted to prove that the clash of civilizations can be prevented with Turkey as a security asset to the EU and as a stable model for its southern neighborhood region (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, pp. 33–35). In this same vein, even chairman of the EP Martin Schulz (2005) expressed the possible necessity of “the increase in security that could result from Turkey’s full membership” against threats from the Middle East in 2005, which shows the importance of security for Europe.

In the construction of Europe as a security community, MEPs who depict Turkey as a potential security threat to Europe are mainly from the right, Eurosceptic, extreme-right, and extreme-left factions in the EP, according to Aydın-Düzgit’s analysis (2012, pp. 52–53) between 1999 and 2010. Accordingly, through the *topos* of (security) threats and the metaphor of the *cordon sanitaire*, Turkey is defined as a “buffer zone” whose southern borders could damage “secure and “stable” Europe upon Turkey’s accession to the EU, which creates the securitization discourse in this representation of Turkey. Moreover, Aydın-Düzgit adds that the so-called “new foreign policy orientation” in Turkey after 2007 based on a zero-problem approach with its neighbors and the need to be proactive in its region is not welcomed by MEPs, especially those from the center right and far right (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 54). This new policy is interpreted as the increasing anti-Europeanism and anti-Westernism in Turkey, as well as increasing Islamization in some cases as a threat to European security (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 54).

The second construction of Europe examined by Aydın-Düzgit (2012, pp. 66–72) is “Europe as an upholder of democratic values” as a result of the discursive construction of Turkey as an undemocratic country. This undemocratic image is based on its problems regarding fundamental rights and freedoms, minority rights, civil-military relations, women’s rights, the rule of law, the Cyprus conflict, and bilateral relations with Greece and Armenia. Nevertheless, there are two kinds of representations of Turkey in terms of the deficit of Turkish democracy as the core obstacle to Turkish accession, namely Turkey as a statically undemocratic country incapable of change by its nature on the one hand, and “Turkey as an undemocratic country capable of change under European assistance” on the other (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, pp. 66–72).

With respect to the issue of whether Turkey is an undemocratic country capable or incapable of change, MEPs basically from right, left, and liberal groups differ from each other. MEPs, mainly from center-right and far-right groups in the EP, repeatedly depict Turkey as an undemocratic country that is incapable of change through essentialization of the notion of democracy and exclude any alternative account of democratic progress in Turkey without the resolution of conflicts in the Cyprus issue (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, pp. 68–72). On the other hand, a majority of left and liberal groups and a small fraction of the EPP-ED/EPP/PPE state that change is possible in Turkey despite being undemocratic, although they do not prefer to call it fully anti-democratic, especially after 2002 (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, pp. 77–81). In this respect, these MEPs use the *topos* of history since the nationalist and militarist past of Europe is defined as its other because of the lack of democracy then (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 78). Therefore, they state that Europe, which is constructed as an active agent bringing democracy within the “normative power” discourse, especially in 2004 and 2005, can guide Turkey towards change, which recalls the image of Turkey as a troublesome student in Levin’s analysis in 2011 (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 80).

The third discursive construction of Europe is Europe as a political project, which refers to the representation of “Turkey as a potential threat to the European political project” on the one hand, and Turkey as a country that is adaptable to this project on the other (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 99). According to Aydın-Düzgit’s (2012, pp. 99–103) analysis, the discursive construction of Europe as a political project with an institutional and financial core was observed mainly with the debate on the future of Europe in 2004 and the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005. In these images of Turkey, MEPs basically from right and left groups make similar choices to those in Turkey’s image of an undemocratic country. In order to represent Turkey “as a potential threat to the political cohesion of Europe,” parliamentarians from the EPP-ED/EPP/PPE as center-right commonly prefer to use the *topoi* of finances, threat, burdening, and numbers for the aim of disclosing potential negative impacts of Turkish accession to the EU (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 101). It can be seen from the interviews with MEPs between 2006 and 2008, basically from the center right, that a strong monolithic, given, and static national identity is attributed to Turkey, which makes it incapable of change and essentially different from Europe “as a supranational project” (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 102).

The image of Europe as a political project contains the representation of Turkey as a country that is adaptable to this project from the perspective of some other MEPs. Unlike conservative MEPs, interviews with MEPs from the Socialists, the Liberals, and the Greens between 2006 and 2008 showed that they believed in the EU regarding “the capacity of the political project to reform itself in the face of further enlargement” (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 110). Turkey is accepted as being adaptable to this project in this sense. Moreover, it is also observed that a minor group of MEPs from the EPP-ED/EPP/PPE perceive the “unEuropean essence of Turkey” “as a contribution to their vision of Europe as a political project of *nation states*” and “a catalyst for a change in the European Union” (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, pp. 111–112).

The fourth and thus last discursive construction of Europe, according to Aydın-Düzgit’s analysis, is “Europe as a cultural space,” which is connected to the representation of Turkey as a threat to the cultural homogeneity of Europe on the one hand, and the representation of “Turkey as a contributor to cultural diversity in Europe” on the other (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, pp. 131–138). The image of Turkey as a threat to the cultural homogeneity of Europe is based on its “non-European cultural essence” (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, pp. 131–138). Within this image, Turkey functions as the “diluter of European cultural homogeneity” according to a major group of parliamentarians from the center-right and a minor group from Eurosceptic and extreme-right factions in the EP. In this regard, Europe is constructed “as a culturally bounded and exclusive entity” as well as “a homogeneous cultural space resting on essentialist grounds” with “a particular European history and a delimited European geography” through the *topoi* of culture and history (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, pp. 131–132).

Turkey as a threat to the cultural homogeneity of Europe is justified in various ways. One MEP from the EPP-ED/EPP/PPE based the exclusion of Turkey on “reasons of history, geography or culture” in 2004, while another one defined four characteristics of being a European country and European culture, namely “the Greek philosophy,” “the Roman organization and law,” “Christianity,” and “enlightenment” along with territory and thus he concluded in 2008 that Turkey was not a part of Europe as a cultural and historical entity (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, pp. 132–133). MEPs, mainly from the far right, in their typical speeches, explicitly resort to cultural superiority in this matter and utilize the argumentation strategy of “extreme case formulation” as an argumentative fallacy by referring to the dilution of European cultural identity as a result of Turkish accession and

Turkish immigrants usually through the *topoi* of threat and abuse (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, pp. 134–135).

The positive image of the European cultural self and its negative predicated Islamic other for Turkey are frequently used for the image of Turkey as a threat to the cultural homogeneity of Europe. For this aim, the stereotypical representation of Islam as “anti-libertarian,” “anti-women,” and “anti the European public” is preferred by MEPs (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, pp. 134–135). Turkey was constructed as a cultural other and a threat as typical right-wing anti-immigration rhetoric, while Muslim/Turkish immigrants were negatively predicated as “primitive people” by one MEP in 2008 (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, pp. 134–135).

Within the image of Turkey as a threat to the cultural homogeneity of Europe, interdiscursivity with neo-orientalism is also revealed through criticism raised against Turkish secularism. Aydın-Düzgit (2012, pp. 136–136) underlines that there are MEPs, especially from the right wing, who criticize Turkish democracy and secularism in terms of their deficiencies “as a cultural problem implicated in Islam” while they discursively construct democracy, human rights, secularism, and others as unique and essentially European characteristics. This neo-orientalist discourse, which is strikingly obvious in debates over secularism in Turkey, causes both unbreakable disparities and an asymmetric relationship with the Orient, which is Turkey here (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 137). In this context, it was also observed in the EP debate in 2003 that some MEPs from ALDE, like the Liberals, talked about Kemalism, mainly known as the secular modernization movement in Turkey, and discursively constructed it as “enlightened despotism” and thus as an obstacle to Turkey’s compatibility with Europe, while they were also skeptical of the function of “Kemalist laicism” in overcoming radical Islamists in Turkey (Giannakopoulos & Maras, 2005, pp. 16–17).

Within the representation of Europe as a cultural space, there is also the discursive construction of Turkey as a contributor to cultural diversity in Europe, preferred by MEPs mainly from the left and the liberal groups in the EP. They predicated Europe as a land of cultural diversity in this regard (Aydın Düzgit, 2012, pp. 149–154). Accordingly, they frequently base “European values” on “a particular and teleological historical narrative involving the Judeo-Christian heritage, Hellenic roots of democracy and the Roman legacy,” as MEPs from the right-wing group do in order to improve the construction of this particular historical narrative of Europe (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 150). Nevertheless,

the liberal and left-wing MEPs differ from right-wing EP discourse and view adopting these values as possible for a country that should be affected by these values in its history (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 150).

In the representation of Turkey as a contributor to cultural diversity in Europe, interdiscursivity with the multiculturalist ideology of the national realms is also found in the EP discussions and interviews with MEPs. Accordingly, the multiculturalist discourse is observed in interviews with some MEPs between 2006 and 2008 through the *topos* of threat and reinforcing asymmetrical and unequal power relations (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p.151). Therefore, it is concluded that this discourse viewed even among the left and the liberals in the EP is questionable regarding its political implications, while the center-right multiculturalist discourse is already generally based on “assimilationist aversion” or “essentialised, encompassing and deterministic cultures as incapable of change” (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 152).

As the last argument for the image of Turkey as a contributor to cultural diversity in Europe, the role of the Islam religion in Turkish politics and society within the laicist ideology is discussed in the EP in a controversial way. On the one hand, it is observed in the interviews with MEPs from the left between 2006 and 2008 that for modernity, religion should be eliminated from public life (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, pp. 152–155). On the other hand, Turkish secularism, which imposes rigid lines between the public and private realms and prohibits the headscarf at university, is criticized. Nevertheless, “a secularist narrative with clear delineations between public and private life in the expression of religion” still dominates the discourse of the left, the liberals, and the EPP-ED/EPP/PPE (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 152).

The third analysis worth mentioning in this chapter on the perception of Turkish identity in the EP is the article by Lindgaard et al. in 2018 (2018, pp. 1–2). They identify four drivers of European identity-based representation of Turkey after 1999 through analyzing public debates and official statements in the EP within references to two components of European identity. In this identification of drivers, they also show various representations of Turkish identity either in civic or cultural references to European identity (Lindgaard et al., 2018, p. 3). While the first driver, which is based on “the domestic debates on integration, security, religion, and identity in Europe, especially in the post-9/11 era of the clash of civilizations,” does not directly attribute specific images to Turkey, the second driver is grounded on various representations of Turkey. The

second driver is that Turkey was represented in European foreign policy discourse as a well-functioning market economy, a nonviolent Muslim-majority country, especially after 9/11, and a model secular democracy to the Arab countries (Lindgaard et al., 2018, p. 15). These representations of Turkey are regarded as a liminal identity because of the usage of the terms “bridge,” “gate,” or “alliance” among civilizations within both civic and cultural conceptions of European identity (Lindgaard et al., 2018, p. 15). In the same vein, Öner (2009, p. 257) also states that Turkey is constructed “as a model for the Muslim world” in the EP according to the European Elites Survey in 2007 and the author’s interviews in Brussels in 2006.

The third driver revealed by Lindgaard et al. (2018, p. 16) does not construct specific images of Turkey due to its focus on developments in Europe, such as the “pan-European deepening-widening debate on the future of the EU,” while the fourth driver is based on diverse images of Turkey. According to the fourth driver of Lindgaard et al. (2018, p. 17), the majoritarian and outright authoritarian political culture in Turkey was not compatible with European political culture, especially for the European liberal left in the EP who were supportive of the Turkish accession against the rising nationalism in Europe (Lindgaard et al., 2018, p. 17). In other words, Turkey is depicted as a majoritarian and outright authoritarian country in this driver. Moreover, they add a shared driver with both the Turkish representation of Europe and the European representation of Turkey. This driver is the fact that the various types of identity that highlight the representation of the other are used both in Turkey and the EP (Lindgaard et al., 2018, p. 20). Therefore, the identity politics of both sides based on the representation of the other affects EU-Turkey relations in a more conflictive way.

The last study regarding the analysis of the perception of Turkish identity in the EP is the article by Türkes-Kılıç in 2019. She finds that there were frequent attempts to justify the image of Turkey as a privileged partner, particularly between 2005 and 2012, as an alternative formula for EU membership (Türkes-Kılıç, 2019, p. 2). In her analysis, Türkes-Kılıç (2019, p. 1) emphasizes that MEPs from right-wing parties support this image by referring to the benefits of privileged partnership and the costs of full membership of Turkey in the EU within the scope of pragmatic arguments. For example, one MEP from NI mentioned this partnership’s importance for security issues and stated in an EP debate in 2009 that “positive aspects, such as an improvement in energy security, can also be achieved by means of a privileged partnership.” In order to oppose Turkey’s

EU membership, these MEPs portray the image of Turkey as a populous country that affects decision-making and budget distributions in the EU on the one hand, and imports its problems into the EU on the other (Türkeş-Kılıç, 2019, p. 12).

In order to strengthen the image of Turkey as a privileged partner, Turkey is also described as a security threat because of its southern neighbors suffering from instability and conflict (Türkeş-Kılıç, 2019, p. 12). In this respect, in its updated program in 2000, the CDU in the EPP-ED/EPP/PPE group asked for an answer to the issue of European borders before the EU became neighbors of Iraq and Iran with Turkey's membership (Akşit et al., 2009, pp. 37–38). Thus, the CDU used the fear of conflicts in the Arab world rather than Turkey's possible positive roles in the region with its accession to the EU. By referring to Europe "as a space of shared values," the exclusion of Turkey from the EU is justified with its perceived lack of these values, such as the rule of law, freedom of expression, and freedom of thought (Türkeş-Kılıç, 2019, p. 15). Furthermore, some MEPs perceive Islam as a security threat and build a European identity based on religious grounds (Türkeş-Kılıç, 2019, p. 16). Therefore, they ignore the performance of Turkey as a candidate in order to "reconstruct a European identity in which Turkey is the constitutive other" (Türkeş-Kılıç, 2019, p. 1).

All in all, various researchers point out many representations of Turkish identity after analyzing the perception of Turkish identity in the EP between 1997 and 2007, which also provides a discursive construction of various images of European identity. In the first study examined above, Levin (2011) finds three representations of Turkey, namely Turkey as a dangerous other, a threat, and a troublesome student, after examining the EP debates within the scope of inclusive understanding of European identity and exclusive orientation of European identity. In the second study, Aydın-Düzgit (2012) defines four discursive constructions of Europe, namely Europe "as a security community, as an upholder of democratic values, as a political project, and as a cultural space," in her analysis of debates in the EP and interviews with MEPs. Within these images of Europe, eight representations of Turkey are identified. Accordingly, Turkey functions as a key trigger for exploring these four various discursive constructions of European identity. Under the first discursive construction of Europe, which is Europe as a security community, Turkey is represented as a panacea for the clash of civilizations on the one hand and as a potential security threat for Europe on the other. In the scope of the second discursive construction of Europe, which is Europe as an upholder of democratic values,

there are two images of Turkey, namely “Turkey as a statically undemocratic country incapable of change” and “Turkey as an undemocratic country capable of change under European assistance.”

The other two representations of Europe examined by Aydın-Düzgit also trigger two subimages of Turkey. Within the third discursive construction of Europe, which is Europe as a political project, the discursive analysis in the EP shows the representations of Turkey as a potential threat to the European political project and as a country that is adaptable to this project. In the scope of the last discursive construction of Europe, which is “Europe as a cultural space,” two images of Turkey, namely “Turkey as a diluter of European cultural homogeneity” and “Turkey as a contributor to cultural diversity in Europe,” are concluded.

In the study of Lindgaard et al. in 2018, the second and fourth drivers of European identity-based representation of Turkey after 1999 point to the representations of Turkey as a model secular democracy to the Arab countries, Turkey as a majoritarian and outright authoritarian country, Turkey as a well-functioning market economy, Turkey as a nonviolent Muslim-majority country, especially after 9/11, and thus Turkey as an Other. In these representations of Turkey, references to civic and cultural components of European identity are also identified. The analysis of Türkeş-Kılıç (2019) is another valuable study mentioned at the end of this chapter. It is basically on the justifications of the image of Turkey as a privileged partner in the EP debates. For this aim, Turkey is depicted as a populous country, a security threat, and thus a constitutive other for Europe.

Last but not least, there are some general similarities among the studies mentioned above. It is observed that frequent references to Samuel Huntington with his thesis on the clash of civilizations as intertextuality are common in the analyses of both Aydın-Düzgit in 2012 and Türkeş-Kılıç in 2019. Moreover, it is crucial that in all the studies except the analysis of Türkeş-Kılıç in 2019, various images of Turkish identity revealed as a result of the analyses of the EP discourses are also taken into consideration regarding relevant discursive constructions of European identity that these representations of Turkey lead. Finally, all of the studies underline the otherness of Turkish identity in the perception concluded from the analysis of the EP debates.

1.3 Turkey's Accession Process to the EU and Discursive Construction of (de-) Europeanization in Turkish Political Discourse as of 2007

The issue of Turkey's de-Europeanization process is controversial. There is disagreement, especially among scholars, on its starting year and the concept itself. Some academics accepted that it began in 2011 with the general elections as the start of the third election period of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)) in Turkey, or in the year 2013 with the Gezi Park protests in Turkey, which distanced the AKP further from the EU. Nevertheless, some other researchers do not agree with referring to the change in the relations as "de-Europeanization" at all (Sipahioğlu, 2017, pp. 52–61).

Yılmaz (2016, p. 88) preferred to divide the domestic change in Turkey into three periods to identify three different Europeanization phases: progressive Europeanization between 1999 and 2004; selective Europeanization between 2005 and 2010; and de-Europeanization between 2011 and 2014. Some political scientists referred to the period between 2005 and 2010, before the AKP's third election period with the 2011 elections, as the stagnation or transition period between Europeanization and de-Europeanization because of the stagnation in Turkey's democratization (Sipahioğlu, 2017, p. 56). Nevertheless, Turkey's de-Europeanization does not have to be assessed only with democratic regress since democratization is only one of the aspects of Europeanization.

In this research, the year 2007 is accepted as the start of Turkey's de-Europeanization period. The following two sections examine first Turkey's de-Europeanization process as of 2007 because of various factors arising from Turkey, the EU, and the international arena and then the discursive construction of Europeanization, de-Europeanization, and the perception of European identity among Turkish political elites after 2007 to provide a holistic perspective about the perception of both sides of each other during Turkey's de-Europeanization process.

1.3.1 Turkey's de-Europeanization Process since 2007

The year 2007 is accepted as the start of Turkey's de-Europeanization in this research for various reasons pertaining to Turkey, the EU, and the international arena. In Turkey, the government and the public were already alienated from the EU in 2007. Some

political developments pushed the Turkish political elites and public opinion away from the EU membership objective. Despite the modification of Turkey's Cyprus policy between 2002 and 2004 with the EU membership intention, the EU membership of the Greek Cypriots in 2004 without a resolution on the island caused disappointment among Turkish public opinion (Yaka, 2006, p. 33). The "open-ended" accession process of Turkey's EU membership as presented in the Negotiating Framework with Turkey on 3 October 2005 and then, in particular, the December 2006 decision of the European Council to suspend negotiations on eight chapters because of Turkey's restrictions in terms of the Republic of Cyprus greatly exacerbated Turkish public disappointment.

Although the year 2008 was announced as the "Year of Europe" by the AKP, the Turkish Parliament adopted the "National Program" for the adoption of the *acquis communautaire* in 2008, and a new Ministry of European Union Affairs was established in Turkey in 2011, the dramatic decrease in EU reforms and public support for EU membership could not be halted in Turkey (Alpan, 2016, p. 23). A survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States (2008, p. 1) confirmed this tendency in Turkey since a hugely positive attitude in 2004, in which 73% of Turkish people had a positive view of the EU membership of Turkey, dropped to 40% in 2007. Moreover, the Eurobarometer survey in 2009 (Eurobarometer 71, 2009, p. 93) showed that only 39% of Turkish people regarded Turkish accession to the EU as a good thing, while 71% of Turkish citizens were of the same opinion in Eurobarometer in 2004 (Eurobarometer 61, 2004).

This attitude in the EU also displeased Turkish politicians and bureaucrats, diminished the EU conditionality's credibility, weakened EU commitment in Turkey, and undermined the EU's transformative power (Saatçioğlu, 2014, p. 97). The widespread enthusiasm and the EU membership objective in Turkey gradually vanished from the Turkish political agenda (Yaka, 2016, p. 154). The demotivation in Turkey, which even caused the Eurosceptic movement, damaged the Turkish government's incentive to adopt costly EU reforms (Saatçioğlu, 2014, p. 97). It caused a significant slowdown in the pace of reforms in Turkey beginning from 2007 and the typical problem in the de facto implementation of these reforms, which also triggered Turkey's de-Europeanization as of 2007 (Kaliber, 2016, p. 60; Saatçioğlu, 2014, p. 97; Sipahioğlu, 2017, p. 56). Furthermore, Kaliber (2016, p. 60) stated that beginning from 2007, domestic actors such as political leaders, opinion makers, and civil activists in Turkey increasingly avoided

referring to European policies, institutions, norms, values, and expectations in public debates because these actors found them either unnecessary or damaging.

Balkır and Eylemer (2016, p. 36) stated that the AKP still had a reasonably positive discourse on the EU and underlined the reforms, while the CHP and the MHP had a more Eurosceptic manner during the 2007 general election. Nevertheless, in its second term between 2007 and 2011, the AKP kept on with the EU reforms by selecting only those that increased its “power and its potential empowerment against military and high judiciary” rather than applying all the EU reforms (Müftüler-Baç, 2005, pp. 17–31; Sipahioğlu, 2017, pp. 59–60). Saatçioğlu (2014, pp. 86–101) also claimed that the AKP began to slow down or selectively adopt the EU reforms concerning civilianization at full speed and significantly to reverse the reforms regarding the rule of law and the fundamental freedoms in its second term, beginning from 2007.

Various scholars agreed that its rising power motivated the AKP to achieve new self-confidence and political will after the 2007 general election despite the 2008 AKP closure trial (Aras, 2009, p. 7; Kanat, 2010, pp. 213–214; Yaka, 2016, p. 155). Thus, it began to follow a new foreign policy strategy based on its overall hegemonic project to make Turkey an independent and respected global player and an essential mediator in conflicts in the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Caucasus (Aras, 2009, p. 7; Kanat, 2010, pp. 213–214; Yaka, 2016, p. 155). For this aim, the incumbent AKP party launched a neo-Ottoman foreign policy or a kind of “civilizational geopolitics” (Bilgin & Bilgiç, 2011, pp. 173–195).

Turkey’s new foreign policy depended on “the core themes of Muslimhood” and its Ottoman past as a regional power and a model country in its larger neighborhood (Saraçoğlu & Demirkol, 2012, pp. 301–319). This new proactive foreign policy was regarded as an alternative to the EU rather than complementary (Bürgin, 2012, p. 573). In other words, the 2007 elections in Turkey let Turkish authorities apply a different foreign policy approach, including its “privileging relations with Islamist parties in the region,” which did not suit its status as a candidate country to the EU (Aydın-Düzgüt & Kaliber, 2016, p. 3). Thus, this new approach opened the way for de-Europeanization in Turkey, although the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu claimed that its actions in the Middle East aimed to overcome Turkey’s problems in its neighborhood to get ready for EU membership (Rumelili, 2011, p. 237).

Some developments in Turkey after 2007 provided an environment that continued the process of Turkey's de-Europeanization, although there were also some positive developments in EU-Turkey relations. The 2011 general election, with 50% of all votes going to the AKP, "doubled the legitimacy of the AKP rule and its reforms, and granted public approval to the AKP as the primary democratizing actor of the country" and made the AKP the sole democratizing and pro-reform actor outside the EU (Yılmaz, 2016, p. 94). The reduced need for the EU was also reflected in Prime Minister Erdoğan's "2023 speech" at the 2012 AKP congress, where he did not make any reference to the EU (Nas & Özer, 2017, p. 98). Apart from the 2013 Gezi Park protests distancing the AKP further from the EU, the change of the AKP's group in the EP from the European People's Party (EPP) as a Christian Democrat party to the Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists (AECR) as a Eurosceptic group against EU enlargement in November 2013 was questioned in terms of the AKP's motivation for EU membership (Sipahioğlu, 2017, p. 62).

On 16 December 2013, Turkey and the European Union launched a Visa Liberalization Dialogue based on the implementation of a roadmap for Turkish citizens' short-term travel without a visa, while on the same day, parallel with the Dialogue, they also signed the Readmission Agreement for irregular migrants residing without authorization (European Commission, 2014, p. 4). Furthermore, Turkey outlined a new EU strategy in 2014 comprising the political reform process, socioeconomic transformation, and the EU Communication Strategy to ensure its accession to the EU (European Commission, 2014, p. 1). On 18 March 2016, the EU and Turkey signed an agreement in order to stop the deepening of one of the most severe migration crises in Europe in exchange for re-energizing the accession talks, including the opening of Chapter 17, the fulfillment of the visa liberalization roadmap, and the disbursement of billions of euros in order to assist refugees relocated to Turkey (Louis et al., 2018, p. 14).

Nevertheless, Turkey's anti-terror law and the 15 July coup attempt in 2016, which aimed to dislodge President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and overthrow the government, blocked the process of visa liberalization and the Turkish accession process (European Commission, 2016, p. 72). This attempt also led to discussions on the reapplication of the death penalty in Turkey, which did not suit a candidate country to the EU (European Commission, 2016, p. 70). Other developments in Turkey, such as the cross-border Turkish *Barış Pınarı* (Peace Spring) operation in Syria in 2019 and the constitutional

change from a parliamentary democracy into a presidential system in Turkey in 2017, became significant challenges to EU-Turkey relations and, therewith, Turkish accession to the EU in recent years (MacMillan, 2020, pp. 538–539).

Turkey's Progress Reports by the EC, which inform the EP and the Council on recent developments for this candidate country's conformity to the EU acquis, have witnessed Turkey's de-Europeanization process as of 2007. The 2007 Turkey Progress Report criticized Turkey for the blocked accounts of Amnesty International Turkey, the rise in the number of honor killings in 2007 compared to 2006, the freedom of expression with the assassination of Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in 2007, the freedom of religion with the killing of three Protestants in Malatya in 2007, and other adverse events, more than in previous years, in terms of the political criteria (European Commission, 2007, pp. 15–16). It also added that “strained relations between the President and the government contributed to slowing work on political reforms,” which showed the EU's displeasure regarding the pace of reforms (European Commission, 2007, p. 7).

The 2008 Turkey Progress Report continued severe criticisms of some developments appearing in 2007, namely legal amendments damaging Turkish democracy, such as the anti-terror law in 2006, the Law on the Duties and Authority of the Police in 2007, and some problems during the investigation of an alleged criminal network known as *Ergenekon* in 2007 (European Commission, 2008, pp. 4–14). In the following years, the significant slowdown in the pace of reforms observed since 2007 was also underlined in these reports (European Commission, 2015b, p. 4). In the same vein, the 2012 Turkey Progress Report by the EC contained heavier criticisms of political rights, the freedom of expression, and civil liberties concerning the rule of law in Turkey (European Commission, 2012, pp. 9–31). In this context, in her speech in 2012, H el ene Flautre, the Co-Chairman of the Turkey-EU Joint Parliamentary Committee, stated that “it is deceptive to describe this report as a progress report on Turkey's EU accession process when there is no progress,” while Prof. Dr. Burhan Kuzu threw a copy of the 2012 Turkey Progress Report into the bin (Economic Development Foundation, 2014, pp. 21–22).

In terms of the factors arising from the EU that made the year 2007 the start of de-Europeanization in Turkey, various developments in the EU that weakened the credibility of the EU conditionality became prominent. First, the open-ended structure of the negotiations for the first time, according to the Negotiating Framework Document of

Turkey on 3 October 2005, had already created mistrust in Turkey, as mentioned before (Nas & Özer, 2017, p. 95). Secondly, according to diverse scholars, Turkey was discussed using the terms “enlargement fatigue,” “absorption capacity,” and “privileged partnership” after 2006 in the EU under the right-wing Sarkozy-Merkel axis rather than the Copenhagen criteria (Keyman & Aydın-Düzgit, 2013, pp. 276–277; Yılmaz, 2016, p. 87). In this respect, while the wording on “open-ended process” existed in the Croatian Negotiating Framework in the same year, it was without the wording on “absorption capacity” and “strong bonds” for the EU membership of Croatia, which undermined the credibility of the EU conditionality in Turkey (Levin, 2011, p. 168).

Third, the existence of the EU’s absorption capacity, which had not been debated in enlargements in 2004, 2007, and 2013 as intensively as Turkey’s membership in the same document, weakened the EU’s credibility. Fourth, the prospect of permanent derogations for Turkey in agriculture, structural policies, and free movement of persons, which were only limited to five plus two years for the CEECs, discouraged Turkish domestic actors and caused the perception of EU double standards in Turkey (Levin, 2011, p. 168). Fifth, the EU policies that linked the Turkish accession to the Cyprus issue diminished the EU conditionality since this issue substantially blocked the negotiations as a specific condition beyond the Copenhagen criteria (Levin, 2011, p. 168). In this regard, the European Council’s decision to suspend negotiations on eight out of the 35 negotiation chapters because of the dispute over Cyprus in 2006 and then the veto of Cyprus and France, respectively, on various negotiation chapters can be exemplified (Müftüler-Baç & Çiçek, 2017, p. 192). Moreover, France and Austria stated in 2009 that they would put Turkey’s accession to the EU to a referendum even though this was not constitutionally necessary, which also demotivated the Turkish domestic actors (Nas & Özer, 2017, p. 97).

The Euro crisis in 2008, which led the EU member states to think negatively about the enlargement in the EU, became another factor arising from the EU (Sipahioğlu, 2017, p. 58). The enlargement fatigue of the EU in the aftermath of the 2004/2007 enlargements was said to be another driver since the EU could not convince EU citizens that the previous enlargements had been politically and economically successful and that the next potential enlargements with huge countries such as Turkey and Ukraine would not damage the EU budget (Alpan, 2016, p. 23). In this respect, the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands in their national referenda in 2005

was interpreted as an unwillingness to accept further enlargement in the Union (Yaka, 2016, pp. 153–154). Besides economic reasons, concerns about terrorism, instability, and a mass refugee problem from Turkey to the EU with its accession also occupied the EU member states' agenda (Aydın-Düzgit & Kaliber, 2016, p. 2).

It has been noted that the tension between the EU institutions and Turkey has been increasing over the years, which has kept Turkey's de-Europeanization alive. The EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan upon the unprecedented refugee crisis in 2015 fell short of expectations since it positioned Turkey as a buffer zone and a strategic partner of the EU rather than a potential future member (Aydın-Düzgit & Kaliber, 2016, p. 3). On 18 November 2017, the EP stated that its pre-accession funds for Turkey would be reduced by €105 million and that it would suspend a further €70 million in 2018 because of the situation in Turkey regarding democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and press freedom (Zihnioglu, 2019, p. 1). Thus, the political grounds led the EU to cut its pre-accession funds for the first time in its history. Furthermore, on 25 April 2017, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe decided to reopen the monitoring procedure in respect of Turkey because of "serious concerns and established violations of human rights under the state of emergency, as highlighted by the Venice Commission and the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights," although Turkey had already been under post-monitoring dialogue since 2004 (The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 2017, p. 4). The Assembly stated that "the developments pertaining to freedom of the media and expression, erosion of the rule of law, and the alleged human rights violations" threaten the functioning of democratic institutions in Turkey and its commitment to its obligations to the Council of Europe (The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 2017, p. 2).

On 6 July 2017, the EP called on the EC and the EU member states to officially suspend¹⁰ accession negotiations with Turkey if the constitutional reform package was implemented without any change. It also called for initiating a temporary freeze of

¹⁰ In this respect, Article 5 of the the Negotiation Framework Document adopted in 2005 as the grounding rules for the accession negotiations with Turkey states that "in the case of a serious and persistent breach in Turkey of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law on which the Union is founded, the Commission will, on its own initiative or on the request of one third of the Member States, recommend the suspension of negotiations and propose the conditions for eventual resumption. The Council will decide by qualified majority on such a recommendation, after having heard Turkey, whether to suspend the negotiations and on the conditions for their resumption. The Member States will act in the Intergovernmental Conference in accordance with the Council decision, without prejudice to the general requirement for unanimity in the Intergovernmental Conference. The European Parliament will be informed."

ongoing accession negotiations with Turkey on 24 November 2016. This was because this package and its amendments do not “respect the fundamental principles of the separation of powers, do not provide for sufficient checks and balances, and are not in line with the Copenhagen criteria” (European Parliament, 2017, p. 5). Furthermore, as a candidate for the next EC presidency in 2019, Manfred Weber formally promised to stop Turkey’s accession process for EU membership in 2018, although its progress was already quite slow, with 15 out of 35 negotiation chapters opened as of 2016, and only one, science and research, provisionally closed in 2006 (Aydın-Düzgit & Kaliber, 2016, p. 3; Euronews, 24 April 2019; MacMillan, 2020, p. 530).

In recent years, various political events in the EU member states have ensured the continuity of Turkey’s de-Europeanization. As regards Germany as one of the leading countries of the EU, issues such as the German resolution on the 1915 events in 2016, the allegations from Germany on possible Turkish religious spying in 2017, the detention of German-Turkish journalist Deniz Yücel in 2017, the alleged speech bans on Turkish politicians in Germany in 2017, and the crisis about taking German troops out of Incirlik in 2017 created severe tensions between Germany and Turkey. Furthermore, the decision of Germany to grant asylum to Turkish military personnel accused of taking part in the failed coup of 15 July 2016 aggravated the tensions between Germany and Turkey. (Özbek, 2 June 2017). The usage of “Nazi” analogies by President Erdoğan to describe German authorities’ identity in 2017 also damaged Germany-Turkey relations as an identity-based red line that unified the European leaders against Turkey (Lindgaard et al., 2018, p. 12). Thereupon, Martin Schulz stated that he would immediately cease negotiations upon his election in a TV debate, while German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that she would push the EU to reconsider its relationship with Turkey (Anderson, 2017). In 2017, Merkel also stated that Germany would not allow an update to the Customs Union with Turkey because of concerns over the rule of law in Turkey (Zihnioğlu, 2019, p. 1).

In terms of France, Turkey froze its political and military relations with France in 2012 after the French Senate approved the “bill outlawing the denial of the 1915 mass killings of Armenians” (Louis et al., 2018, p. 13). Even though the French bill was ruled unconstitutional and overturned by the highest court in France one month after January 2012, this bill caused one of the lowest points in Turkey’s relations with France as a member of the EU (Louis et al., 2018, p. 13). Additionally, Turkey’s dispute with Greece

and Cyprus over natural gas resources in the eastern Mediterranean aggravated the tensions between the EU and Turkey in 2020. This dispute even led 27 foreign ministers of EU member states to evaluate the grounds for economic sanctions on Turkey (Emmott, 7 December 2020).

The dangerous orientation in the EU member states based on rising populism, radicalism, and even authoritarian tendencies also worked unfavorably against Turkey. As the most crucial example, the UK Independence Party's (UKIP) campaign for Brexit, referring to "British exit" from the EU, because of the rising right-wing populism and nationalism became one of the factors contributing to Turkey's de-Europeanization, although the campaign's central issue was actually about the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. Prime Minister David Cameron, who was supportive of Turkish accession, was forced to change his approach during the 2013 Gezi Park protests in Turkey and began to reject Turkey's possible membership to the EU because UKIP made Turkey's possible membership of the EU and Cameron's support for this accession a critical element in its campaign for Brexit (Lindgaard et al., 2018, p. 11). For this reason, Cameron took a hard stand and stated that "at the current rate of progress, they will probably get round to joining in about the year 3000," while referring to the possible Turkish membership of the EU (Asthana, 22 May 2016). In addition to UKIP in the UK, the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria, *Marine Le Pen* in France, *Podemos* in Spain, *Movimento 5 Stelle* in Spain, *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD) in Germany, the Coalition of the Radical Left-Progressive Alliance (SYRIZA) in Greece, and the EFDD in the EP have been increasing their impact on the European electorates (MacMillan, 2020, p. 535). This tendency in Europe has been worsening EU-Turkey relations and thereby aggravating Turkey's de-Europeanization.

In the international arena, in terms of Turkey's de-Europeanization, Aydın-Düzgüt (2016, p. 45) and Alpan (2016, p. 22) stated that events such as the rapid deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations after the 2008–09 Gaza War, the subsequent "one-minute" crisis with Israel in 2009, "the relative normalization of relations with Armenia" in 2009, the Iranian swap deal broken with Brazil and Turkey in 2009, "Turkey's active rejection of the proposed sanctions on Iran at the UN Security Council," "Ankara's close relations with Syria," and the flotilla incident in 2010 involving the Turkish ship MV *Mavi Marmara* contributed to the Turkish foreign policy's inclination more to the Middle East and its southern neighborhood against the EU and the US. The outbreak of the Arab

uprisings in 2010 also led Turkey towards its de-Europeanization process, even though Turkey was depicted then as a model country in the EP debates about the Arab Spring (Lindgaard et al., 2018, p. 8). In the same vein, EU-Turkey relations could not be considerably improved, although as a result of the 2011 Syrian conflict, a large influx of Syrian refugees to many EU member states in the summer of 2012 brought the two sides closer and specific reforms in some policy areas such as migration and asylum continued in Turkey (Aydın-Düzgıt & Kaliber, 2016, p. 4).

To sum up, this part is based on explaining how de-Europeanization in Turkey started because of developments in Turkey, the EU, and the international arena as of 2007 and how it continued and even worsened. Various political events that caused further distancing of Turkey from the EU – in other words, increasing Turkey’s de-Europeanization – have been explained here. This section has also shown the latest status of the Turkish accession process and EU-Turkey relations. All in all, the events after 2007 indicate that Turkey has increasing problems with the EU. Therefore, Turkish accession to the EU has become less probable. The next part will show how all these events reflect on the Turkish political elites’ perception and thus how de-Europeanization was discursively constructed in the Turkish Parliament after 2007.

1.3.2 Views on (de-)Europeanization and Europeanization in Turkish Political Discourse since 2007

Although the perception of Turkish identity in the EP between 2007 and 2015 is analyzed in detail in this study, it is also necessary to get an idea of the Turkish perception of European identity and therefore make a holistic assessment of Turkey’s de-Europeanization. For this aim, the discursive construction of Europeanization and de-Europeanization among the Turkish political elites and how Turkey has been pushed away from the EU with the leading Turkish political elites’ narratives need to be examined. In this section, after a brief introduction of the general structure of the perception of European identity in Turkey, various analyses on the perception of European identity/Europe/the EU as of 2007 in the Turkish Parliament are mentioned below, along with Turkish political elites’ relevant remarks, which corresponds to the Turkish public according to some surveys below on their attitudes towards the EU accession.

The perception of European identity in Turkey is strange since both negative and positive conceptions of Europe coexist and conversely change suddenly with the changes in the political conjuncture (Yaka, 2016, pp. 156–157). Because of the Turkish modernization movement's problematic relations with the West, which means Europe here, conceptions of Europe in Turkey conflict (Yaka, 2016, p. 157). Conceptions of Europe in the minds of Turkish people symbolize not only *muasır medeniyet* (“contemporary civilization”), according to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as the founding father of the Republic of Turkey, but also “the enemy, the colonizer, the imperialist, the occupier,” which creates such inconsistent, ambivalent, and complex images of Europe in Turkey (Yaka, 2016, p. 157). MacMillan (2016, p. 105) also states that “in traditional Kemalist discourse, Europe has played a pivotal role in the construction of national identity, in which it has generally been constructed as both a model of civilization to be followed and, simultaneously, as having imperialist designs over Turkey and thus threatening national unity with the support of national minorities.”

Before mentioning various studies' analyses, it is necessary to introduce Turkey's leading political elites between 2007 and 2015. The prominent Turkish political elites between 2007 and 2015 in the Turkish Parliament, known as the “Grand National Assembly of Turkey” (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (TBMM)), were by then composed of the significant Turkish political parties, i.e., the AKP, the CHP, and the MHP as presented below according to the 2007 and 2011 general elections (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu, 2019).

Table 1

**Number of Deputies in the Political Parties in the TBMM According to the 2007
and 2011 General Elections**

Political Parties in the TBMM	Number of Deputies in the 2007 General Election	Number of Deputies in the 2011 General Election
Justice and Development Party (AKP , <i>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi</i>)	341	327
Republican People's Party (CHP , <i>Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi</i>)	112	135
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP , <i>Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi</i>)	70	53
Independents	26	35
TOTAL	549	550

Source: Yüksek Seçim Kurulu, 2019

In this chapter, the first analysis on the Turkish perception of Europe among the Turkish political elites is the article by Aydın-Düzgüt in 2016. This article examines certain discursive practices on Europe and the EU through critical discourse analysis (CDA) of the texts produced by Erdoğan during key election times in the 2011–2014 period to find out how Turkey became distanced from the EU. The first finding of this study was that less than a fifth of the public speeches between 2011 and 2014 made explicit references to Europe, while there were heavier references to Europe in the AKP's general election manifestos in 2002 and 2007 and Erdoğan's speeches after the elections in 2002 and 2007 (Aydın-Düzgüt, 2016, p. 50; Hatipoğlu et al., 2015, pp. 17–36; Zarakol, 2011a, p. 1). In that analysis, three instances were displayed as a relatively positive representation of the "EU" Other. The first instance was during the AKP's full

determinations for EU membership. Two other relatively positive instances were through the predication of the EU through the metaphors of “process” and “road” that Turkey would follow (Aydın-Düzgit, 2016, p. 50). Moreover, two isolated instances after the Gezi protests presented the EU as a “partner in crime” in order to justify the use of tear gas against protestors since Erdoğan stated, “[L]ook at the EU *acquis*, the police have the right to use tear gas” (Aydın-Düzgit, 2016, p. 50).

Nevertheless, this analysis is heavily based on Europe/the EU’s negative representations, which formed prevalent constructions of Europe in this period. These negative representations explained through various excerpts are “Europe/the EU as an unwanted intruder in Turkish politics,” which was also associated with the rise of the Sèvres Syndrome since the 1970s, “Europe/the EU as an essentially discriminatory entity,” and “Europe/the EU as democratically/economically inferior to Turkey,” which goes back to the late 1960s (Aydın-Düzgit, 2016, pp. 50–55, 2018, p. 29; Guida, 2008, p. 38). Within the last construction of Europe/the EU as an inferior entity to Turkey in political and economic terms, Aydın-Düzgit (2016, p. 55) underlined a paradoxical situation since the European/Western standards were also taken as a reference point for economic/social reform that Turkey deserved. In conclusion, Aydın-Düzgit (2016, p. 56) stated that these negative representations of Europe/the EU could be used to destroy “the discursive legitimacy of the EU’s democratic demands on Turkey, and to create a more difficult climate for the adoption of democratic reforms in the country” while they could also serve to “increase the difficulty of taking additional steps on the Cyprus issue.”

The second study for this part is the article of Alpan (2016). This study aims to show that the AKP’s various narratives on “Europe” considerably changed after the 2007 parliamentary elections with the change from the notion of “conservative democracy” to “advanced democracy” as binding and assertive empty signifiers, meaning signifiers without being signified (Alpan, 2016, p. 15; Laclau, 1997, p. 306). Accordingly, the empty signifier of “conservative democracy” between 2002 and the mid-2000s referred to a cosmopolitanism narrative in which Europe appeared as “the embodiment of a harmony between the local and the global” for the annulment of the clash of civilizations thesis for Turkey through the promotion of an “alliance of civilizations” in narrative one (Alpan, 2016, pp. 16–19). In narrative two of this signifier, “Europe” emerged as the promised-land narrative. These two narratives contributed to the discursive construction of Europeanization in Turkey. Nevertheless, in the post-2007 period, “advanced

democracy” as the empty signifier took the place of “conservative democracy” (Alpan, 2016, pp. 16–25). In this context, the regional leadership narrative was widespread during the Arab Spring while “Europe” was depicted “as a resented guardian and a partner in crime” as in the finding of Aydın-Düzgit (2016, p. 50) (Alpan, 2016, pp. 16–25).

The depiction of “Europe” as a guardian referred to “an outlook that is insufficiently appreciative of the efforts of Turkey” (Alpan, 2016, pp. 16–25). At the same time, the representation of “Europe” as a partner in crime also showed “its willingness to impose the limitation of individual rights and liberties” (Alpan, 2016, pp. 16–25). For the narratives of “Europe” as an unwanted guardian and a partner in crime, “Europe” was regarded in Turkey as lost because of its central role within political debates, while the other reason was the resentment towards the EU because of the idea of “privileged partnership” and the Cyprus issue (Alpan, 2016, p. 23). Nevertheless, Alpan (2016, pp. 16–17) does not interpret this shift in terms of the depiction of “Europe” as an indicator of a full-fledged de-Europeanization, although she accepts “growing skepticism and indifference in Turkish society towards Europe and even a turning away from Europe in many spheres of Turkish politics and society.” She explained this shift in narrating Europe as “different manifestations of ‘Europe,’ ‘as a normative-political context’ (Aydın-Düzgit & Kaliber, 2016, p. 9) and reference point at different times” (Alpan, 2016, p. 17).

The third study for this part is MacMillan’s article (2016). She aimed in her study to show how Europe/EU was described as Turkey’s Other in the four major Turkish political parties’ discourse. These parties are the AKP, which has been in power since 2002, the CHP as the main opposition and traditional Kemalist party, the MHP as a nationalist and Eurosceptic party, and the traditional Islamist Felicity Party (Saadet, Saadet Partisi) (MacMillan, 2016, p. 105). Accordingly, Europe is seen as alien and threatening because of the so-called “Tanzimat” and Sèvres syndromes mostly mentioned in the nationalist MHP on the one hand (MacMillan, 2016, pp. 108–110). On the other hand, it is perceived as a model of development and civilization by the traditional Kemalist discourse, as the dominant identity discourse in Turkey until the end of the Cold War, which was mainly represented by the CHP (MacMillan, 2016, pp. 108–110). Nevertheless, AKP discourse targeted in particular those from the right wing in Europe who excluded Turkey because of its religious/civilizational heritage/identity as “inferior Others” (MacMillan, 2016, p. 115).

Saadet and the AKP depicted Europe as violating universal principles because of the idea of a privileged partnership of Franco-German right-wing politicians instead of the EU membership to emphasize the unfairness and the violation of *pacta sunt servanda* (MacMillan, 2016, p. 115). Moreover, AKP discourse portrayed Europe as a “friendly” Other in its usage of the bridge and related metaphors for Turkey, which bridges Europe and Asian, Eastern and Western civilizations, and even the West and Islam as a key player against a clash of civilizations (MacMillan, 2016, p. 116). The last construction of Europe mentioned in this study was Europe as superior, seen within the Kemalist discourse and thus in particular the CHP since Europe was seen as a model and an example of prosperity and civilization for the Turkish Republic even by Atatürk himself, as mentioned before (MacMillan, 2016, p. 116). Consequently, she found that AKP discourse was inclined to construct Europe as inferior and the one from a different civilization as an indication of a more self-confident, inclusive, and Islamist national identity discourse, while traditional Kemalist discourse mainly represented by the CHP tended to frame Europe both as an existential threat and a civilizational model (MacMillan, 2016, p. 104).

This part’s last study is MacMillan’s 2020 article, in which she aimed to research the development and “interaction of AKP discourse with the EU’s political mythology” based on “its so-called ‘European’ values such as democracy, the rule of law, and human rights through a qualitative study of speeches made by AKP leaders” referring to the EU (MacMillan, 2020, pp. 530–531). It was observed that AKP discourse attempted to reject “the Orientalist discursive trope of the Turk as the ‘sick man of Europe’” while it even called Turkey “the Robust Man of Europe” with its dynamic economy, large market, and demographic vitality. In contrast, AKP discourse preferred to use the “sick man of Europe” to depict the EU because of its ageing population and the crisis-ridden economy, as well as its “comatose” employment and social security sectors (MacMillan, 2020, p. 535). In the context of calls for Turkey’s privileged partnership from right-wing politicians in the EU, the refugee deal, and the EU’s criticism of Turkey’s Barış Pınarı (Peace Spring) operation in Syria in 2019, the EU was frequently depicted as an “untrustworthy cheat” with accusations of “dishonesty and unreliability in its treatment of Turkey” (MacMillan, 2020, pp. 535–536).


As the third image, MacMillan (2020, p. 536) stated that AKP discourse frequently accused the EU of being a “Christian club” with regard to the Turkish accession process described as a test for the EU “to prove its secular and tolerant nature.”

This manner is reflected, for instance, in Erdoğan's referral to the EU as a "crusader alliance" and "enemies of Islam" for some decision-makers in the EU (MacMillan, 2020, p. 536). As the last and darkest image of Europe, among others, the EU is arguably described as a "fascist dystopia?" (MacMillan, 2020, p. 536). AKP discourse claimed, based on the refugee crisis in 2016, the EU's apathetic support for the Turkish government following the attempted coup d'état of 15 July 2016, the ban of pro-AKP rallies in European countries for the 2017 Turkish referendum on constitutional change, and the EU's criticism of Turkey's Barış Pınarı (Peace Spring) operation in Syria in 2019 that the EU was going back to "fascism, intolerance, and racism, domestically, in its foreign policies and the context of the refugee crisis" (MacMillan, 2020, pp. 536–539). Moreover, the increase in "xenophobic, anti-Islamic, and populist tendencies" in Europe was also underlined in AKP discourse, including comparisons to Nazi Germany. At the same time, it also tried to describe Turkey as more European than the EU itself and as "a panacea for xenophobia and populism in Europe" (MacMillan, 2020, pp. 536–539).

In conclusion, she argued that AKP discourse tried to reverse the tolerant, liberal, and democratic image of the EU/Europe. Instead of this image, the AKP framed it "as inherently discriminatory, characterized by xenophobia and racism" due to the repetition of its intolerant and xenophobic past (MacMillan, 2020, p. 540). Nevertheless, Turkey was discursively constructed as the "true" guardian of "European" values such as democracy, freedom, and the rule of law with its historically rooted tolerance based on "a glorious, liberal, and tolerant Ottoman past" (MacMillan, 2020, p. 540). Despite this de-Europeanization and discursive "enemization" of Europe/the EU in Turkey, it was also underlined in conclusion that Europe/the EU continued to play an essential part in Turkish political discourse and was not necessarily incompatible with its continued desire to pursue EU membership. In other words, with this discourse explained above, the AKP aimed to support Turkey's EU membership objective through trying "to deflect EU criticism of the Turkish government, while depicting Turkish accession as necessary to uphold the EU's 'European values' against the (supposedly) encroaching shadows of Europe's xenophobic past" (MacMillan, 2020, p. 540). In this regard, the AKP underlines that "both today and in our 2023 vision, European Union membership is our strategic goal" (Ak Parti, 2019). In the same vein, Şenyuva (2018, p. 10) also claimed that Erdoğan accused both the EU member states and the EU institutions of unfairness and even a hostile manner towards Turkey, although he also emphasized Turkey's commitment to EU membership.

In parallel to Turkish political discourse, Turkish public opinion towards Turkey's membership shows a continuing decline in support for EU membership, as shown in the table below:

Table 2
Eurobarometer Surveys Conducted in Turkey between 2001 and 2017
about the Support for EU Membership



Source: Şenyuva, 2019, p. 5

The Transatlantic Trends survey also suggests that there was a decline in the percentage of Turkish citizens believing Turkish accession to be a “good” thing from 73% in 2004 to 38% in 2010 despite the rise to 53% in 2014 (German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2004, p. 22, 2014, p. 7; Şenyuva, 2018, p. 3). A rise was also seen in the 2014 Eurobarometer survey regarding a positive image of the EU from 20% in November 2013 to 43% in 2014 (Şenyuva, 2018, p. 6). Nevertheless, Şenyuva (2014, p. 3)

understands that this rise is grounded on center-left voters discouraged by the AKP's policies and motivated by the EU "as a possible source of protection for liberties."

Finally, there are some general similarities between the studies mentioned above and those mentioned before regarding the European perception of Turkish identity. The majority of studies above about Turkish perception of Europe/the EU agree that AKP discourse is based on the construction of Europe as a democratically/economically inferior Other. Moreover, references to Samuel Huntington with his thesis on the clash of civilizations are observed in all of the articles in this part as in the analyses about the European perception of Turkish identity, especially in the studies of Aydın-Düzgüt in 2012 and Türkeş-Kılıç in 2019. All of the studies here emphasize the otherness of European identity and even perceive it as a threat, which resembles Turkish identity as a threat to Europe in the analyses mentioned in previous chapters. While the Turkish side uses clichés and stereotypes arising from *Tanzimat* and *Sèvres* syndromes for the construction of Europe/the EU, the European side also prefers to use centuries-old clichés and stereotypes rooted in the events during the Ottoman period for the perception of Turkish identity. Lastly, the negative representations of Europe/the EU outweigh the positive ones in the Turkish perception as in the European perception of Turkish identity. These similarities show that the discursive construction of Turkey's de-Europeanization is experienced through similar terms and in similar ways on both sides.

2. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND TURKEY-EU RELATIONS

For the development of democracy, parliaments are the main political institutions in the European tradition, which also hosts an exceptional parliamentary situation (Ilie, 2010, p. 4). In a strong complementarity, there are both national parliaments and the EP, which necessitates interparliamentary cooperation for transparency, democratic control, openness, and accountability in the decision-making system of the EU (Ilie, 2010, p. 4). In this respect, the EP is a unique assembly whose essence is not entirely captured in the political lexicon. The EP with the national parliaments makes parliamentary politics function in Europe at two levels and constitutes a uniquely transnational polity (Ilie, 2010, p. 22). Moreover, it is also necessary to remember that Europe, which the EU represents, is the “heartland of parliamentarism” due to Britain being “the birthplace of parliamentary government” and France being the first country to have a Parliamentary Republic in 1875 (Ilie, 2010, p. 6). Therefore, it is necessary to mention the EP as being one of the leading institutions of the EU in brief with its organization, powers, and groups as well as impacts of parliamentary discourse within political discourse in order to highlight the importance of the EP in the EU. In consideration of the general information about the EP and its place in political discourse, this part of the study is concluded by revealing the influence of the

EP on Turkey-EU relations through references to the relations and interactions between the EP and Turkey.

2.1 The European Parliament in Brief: Organization, Powers and Political Groups

The EP is one of the supranational institutions of the EU, besides the EC and the European Court of the Justice (ECJ), that focus on the general interests of the Union. Nevertheless, the EP differs from the others as the only representative of European citizens' interests and the only EU body whose members have democratically been elected by direct universal suffrage for a fixed term of five years, with nationally administered elections since 1979 (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011, p. 66). Direct universal suffrage for every five years brings its members into direct contact with the public in the EU member states and provides an opportunity for citizens to participate in the EU's politics, including its identity vision (Cuisan, 2012, p. 114). For this reason, a more comprehensive range of different views and comments is represented than in other EU institutions.

The EP is also the only EU institution whose debates are made open to the public. In terms of the number of its voters, the EP can be compared to the Parliament of India with the representation of 1,339 billion voters, even though there is a decline in voter turnout in each EP election. This decline is assessed as weakening the representation power of MEPs and thus a democratic deficit in the EU, which is also triggered by other factors such as the lack of "EU citizenship" awareness in Europe, the manifesto of the political parties of the EP based on national problems in every EP election, and the legislative and budgetary power of the Council of the EU and the European Council whose members are charged rather than being elected for these positions.

For each member state, the number of seats is based on a degressively proportional formula that guarantees a minimum of five seats for the smallest member state, Malta and a maximum of 99 seats for the biggest member state, Germany. The system of proportional representation in the EP places an organizational and administrative burden on the members during each EP election since there are different requirements for candidates to become a voter on the day of the election in each country. For example,

citizens aged 16 or over in Austria and Malta can vote, while the age limit in the other member states is 18. National parties in the member states are essential actors in the EP elections, whose dominant issues are generally national problems (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011, p. 66). Political parties in the EP are categorized and settled according to their ideological affinities in seven political groups rather than nationality. Since 1979, no political group has held the majority in the EP after the elections, which makes coalitions vital. As the other difference of the EP from the national parliaments, there have generally been coalitions composed of both right and left parties, namely EPP-ED/EPP/PPE and S&D, in the presidency of each new Parliamentary term, which seems to be over because of Brexit and in turn fewer MEPs in the groups.

As an autonomous organization, the EP has its own Rules of Procedures, which look similar to those of national parliaments. Labor and specialization through specialized parliamentary committees for each specific policy area are divided in the EP (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011, p. 70). While the plenary chambers of the EP catch the attention of the media in Brussels or Strasbourg, subgroups of the EP frequently coming together regularly in one of these committees actually deal with most of the issues of the EP (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011, p. 71). Committees whose political composition is based on the composition in the plenary Parliament are composed of at least two and at most 78 members. For some types of legislation, various committees can come together and debate. One of the committee members, called the *rapporteur*, summarizes these meetings and combines all the probable amendments in a draft report, which is only sent to the EP with the committee's approval and put to the vote in the EP. In terms of its organization, it should be mentioned that only the EP, among other parliaments, has three seats, i.e., in Strasbourg, Brussels, and Luxembourg, which creates an enormous financial burden for the EU. Strasbourg is the EP's official seat, where plenary sessions occur 12 times a year. Additional plenary sessions are held in Brussels, where most of the EP's work, including the meetings of MEPs in committees and political groups, is done (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011, p. 73). Luxembourg, as one of the seats, hosts the EP's General Secretariat and its departments.

Even though the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), like its predecessor in 1952, which was comprised of 78 members from the national parliaments, only functioned to supervise via its annual reports to the High Authority, the EP today has all the essential powers of a typical national parliament such

as legislative and budgetary competencies. The current powers of the EP, turning it from a relatively powerless institution into a relatively powerful one, are the result of the gradual transformation of the EU with every new treaty in the last six decades, which has also affected the national parliaments in Europe. When the Treaty of Paris was signed in 1951, the members of the Assembly, who were elected by the national governments of the six founding members, only had the right to dismiss the High Authority, which is the EC today. In terms of the policy process, the Assembly had only consultative powers. The Treaty of Rome in 1957 brought a specific provision for its members to be directly elected, which was actually implemented in 1979.

While the Treaty of Luxembourg in 1970 increased the budgetary competence of the Assembly, the Treaty of Brussels in 1975 strengthened this budgetary power concerning the right to reject the Community budget. In other words, the Assembly was empowered with greater budgetary powers and considerable influence on non-CAP spending in the 1970s. The Isoglucose judgment of the ECJ in 1980 reinforced the EP's right of consultation. Nevertheless, the EP obtained its current title with the Single European Act signed in 1986, which also consolidated its legislative powers with the introduction of the cooperation procedure and the assent procedure on some matters. While the assent procedure as one of the special legislative procedures in the EU, which is applied in many articles in the TFEU and TEU, grants the EP the right to approve or reject a proposal, the cooperation procedure revoked by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 allowed the EP to suggest modifications before the Council of the EU adopted a legislative proposal.

The Maastricht Treaty in 1992 increased the legislative and supervisory powers of the EP with the introduction of the codecision procedure for some legislation and the cooperation procedure's extension. This new decision-making procedure for 15 policy areas, such as internal market and environment, let the EP change legislative proposals before they were accepted. The codecision procedure, which is currently called the "ordinary legislative procedure," was the most commonly used decision-making procedure in the EU in order to adopt legislation, which also gave equal powers to the EP and the Council of the EU for legislation proposed by the EC (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011, p. 17). Moreover, the EP was given the final approval power over the membership of the EC with the Maastricht Treaty, which was regarded as an essential step for the EP's political control over the EU executive (Bux, 2018). The Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997

granted the EP the right to approve the Commission President and the simplified and broadened codecision procedure in scope.

While the Treaty of Nice in 2001 increased the EP's legislative and supervisory powers with further expansion of the scope of the codecision procedure for the EP, the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007 gave the EP the right to appoint the President of the EC and let the ordinary legislative procedure cover 85 legal bases, which meant more than 95% of the EU legislation (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011, p. 67). The Treaty of Lisbon equalized the EP with the Council as a lawmaker in many areas, such as setting the EU budget, agriculture policy, and justice and home affairs, which were previously outside of the EP's scope. At the present time, the EU's legislative authority is jointly composed of the EP and the Council of the EU. In other words, it debates and passes EU laws with the Council of the EU. In terms of supervisory powers, the EP can scrutinize the other EU institutions, particularly the Commission, to make sure that they democratically work, debate, and adopt the EU's budget with the Council of the EU in the scope of Article 226 of the TFEU.

Lelieveldt and Princen (2011, p. 67) summarize the current powers of the EP into four categories: budgetary powers, legislative powers, scrutiny of the executive, and appointment and dismissal of the Commission. The EP does not have the power to initiate legislation. Nevertheless, it can put pressure on the EC to take action on a specific policy by adopting its own reports, motions for resolution, and written declarations (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011, p. 67). Article 225 of the TFEU also states that the EP can formally demand the EC's submission of legislative proposals for the implementation of treaties as the primary law of the EU law due to their direct effect and supremacy. Otherwise, the EC has to give an explanation. Moreover, according to the White Paper on the Future of Europe: Reflections and Scenarios for the EU27 by 2025 (European Commission, 2017, p. 24), the EP will give the final decision on international trade agreements according to scenarios. On the official website of the EP, Novak (2018) also makes a detailed categorization of the EP powers in the scope of Articles 223 to 234 and 314 of the TFEU. Accordingly, he adds an appeal to the Court of Justice (ECJ) and petitions the President of the EP, organizing a hearing with the European citizens' initiative, and appointing the Ombudsman to the list of EP powers. These all indicate the increasing power and changing status of the EP as the representative of EU citizens' interests, which also shows the changing nature of the EU.

The term “political parties” is used for three different types of entities in the EU: domestic political parties, political groups in the EP, and European political parties (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011, p. 153). Domestic political parties of the member states are essential for the EU since they campaign for the seats of the EP during the EP elections and send MEPs to the EP at the end, as well as being the founder of the European political parties. Therefore, domestic political parties play a central role in this triangle. European political parties are out of the EP as the associations among the domestic political parties. Political groups as coalitions of like-minded MEPs from different member states sustain the daily operation of the EP and shape the voting behavior of the MEPs (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011, p. 152).

The EP is comprised of multinational party groups with different visions of the EU and various priorities, while these political groups are based on ideological affinities, as mentioned before. Therefore, diversity and all the national colors in the EU member states can be clearly seen in the EP. The European People’s Party is the center-right grouping, and the European Socialists is the center-left grouping, while smaller party groups include coalitions of liberal, green, far-right, far-left, and “Euro-sceptical” or nationalist MEPs, as shown in the table below. While Christian Democrats, Liberals, and Conservatives are defined on the right in terms of the classic ideological underpinning, (post-)Communists, Greens, and Socialists are shown on the left and comprise most of the political groups’ political position as a reflection of the member states. Only the Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group (EFD) differs from these groups because of being based on Euroscepticism.

Table 3**Political Groups in the EP between 2009 and 2014 (Seventh Term)**

Political Groups in the EP	Created in	Ideological Orientation	MEPs	% of Seats
EPP-ED – Group of the European People’s Party	1953 (as “Christian Democrat Group”)	Christian Democrat	265	36.01
S&D – Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists & Democrats	1953 (as “Group of Socialists”)	Social Democratic	184	25.00
ALDE – Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	1953 (as “Liberal Group”)	Liberal	84	11.41
ECR – European Conservatives and Reformists Group	2009	Conservative/Eurosceptic	55	7.47
Greens/EFA – The Greens/European Free Alliance	1984 (as “Rainbow Group”)	Coalition of Greens and regionalists	55	7.47
GUE/NGL – European United Left/Nordic Green Left	1973 (as “Communist and Allies Group”)	(Post-Communist)	35	4.76
EFD – Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group	1994 (as “Europe of Nations”)	Eurosceptic	32	4.35
NI – Nonattached Members – Members not belonging to any political group			26	3.35

Source: Lelieveldt and Princen, 2011, p. 155

In the EP, there are the three oldest political groups, Christian Democrats, Socialists, and Liberals, established within the Common Assembly in 1953 (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011, p. 156). At the same time, they are also the only groups with members from almost all the member states as a result of being the main political ideologies in Europe in the twentieth century (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011, p. 156). As the largest one, the group of the European People's Party (EPP-ED/EPP/PPE), representing the main center right, has problems in constituting political cohesiveness with domestic national parties since the Christian Democrats pay attention to local and national traditions, which provides a substantially different political profile for each party in the group (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011, p. 156).

Nevertheless, this problem is not very common among the Social Democrats represented by the center-left Party of European Socialists (PES, PSE), renamed the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) in the EP, despite some differences among social democratic parties in Europe (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011, p. 156; Scully, 2010, p. 167). The Liberal group of the EP covers two strands that are on the right of the political spectrum, including market liberalism and a minimal state as the first strand and a centrist, left-leaning spectrum highlighting equality of rights and social justice as the second one (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011, p. 157). For this reason, the Liberal group, in other words the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE, ELDR), also hosts liberal parties whose positions are quite different in their political system (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011, p. 157).

As a young group, the Greens were popular in the 1980s and existed under the Rainbow Group as stateless nations or regionalists (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011, p. 157). Although the Greens had formed their group in 1989 in the EP, two groups decided to reunite as Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA, Verts/ALE) in 1999 (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011, p. 157). The European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR) is composed of conservatives and Eurosceptics opposing Euro-federalism, which differs from the EFD, which is totally against the existence of the EU (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011, pp. 154–157). Communist or post-communist parties in the member states are hosted by the Confederal Group of European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL), representing the far left, which underwent significant changes with the fall of communism in the CEECs (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 16; Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011, p. 157). The Independence and Democracy Group (IND/DEM), renamed the Europe of Freedom and

Democracy Group (EFD, EFDD), is based on the Eurosceptic platform totally against European integration, as mentioned before (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 16; Scully, 2010, p. 174). In this respect, the British UK Independence Party (UKIP), as the EFD's largest member, succeeded in securing the withdrawal of the UK from the EU with the referendum of 23 June 2016.

There are also smaller groups, such as the Union for a Europe of the Nations (UEN) as a nationalist and Eurosceptic group between 1999 and 2009, the Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty Group (ITS) as a short-lived far-right group in 2007, and the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF, ENL) as a far-right group between 2015 and 2019 (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 16). Lastly, there are nonattached members (NI) for the MEPs who do not belong to any political group even though membership in a political group has many benefits for parliamentarians, such as longer talk time in debates and being informed on specific subjects by experts for a law draft (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011, pp. 157–158).

Table 4

Sixth to Seventh Parliamentary Terms from 2007 to 2015

2004–2009 (6th Term)			2009–2014 (7th Term)		2014–2019 (8th Term)	
Political Groups		% of Seats	Political Groups	Political Groups	% of Seats	Political Groups
1	EPP-ED	36.60	EPP	36.01	EPP	29.43
2	PES (Socialists)	27.30	S&D	25.00	S&D	25.43
3	ALDE	12.00	ALDE	11.41	ECR	9.32
4	Greens/EFA	5.70	ECR	7.47	ALDE	8.92
5	GUE/NGL	5.60	Greens/EFA	7.47	GUE/NGL	6.92
6	IND/DEM	4.40	GUE/NGL	4.76	Greens/EFA	6.66
7	UEN	3.70	EFD	4.35	EFDD	6.39
8	NI	4.60	NI	3.35	NI	6.92
732 Seats			736 Seats		751 Seats	
Turnout: 45.47%			Turnout: 42.97%		Turnout: 42.61%	

Source: European Parliament, 2014

The terms in the table above are essential for this analysis since this study is based on the EP discourses on Turkey between 2007 and 2015. When these three terms are analyzed, the decreasing turnout dropping from 45.47% of voters in the 2004 elections to 42.97% in 2009 and 42.61% in 2014 grabs the attention first, and is cited as the weakening democratic legitimacy of the EP despite the increasing number of seats (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011, pp. 157–158). While the top three political groups, EPP-ED/EPP/PPE, S&D, and ALDE, have all decreased in terms of the percentage of seats, S&D seems to be the most weakened political group, dropping from 27.30% in 2004 to 25.00% in 2009 and to 25.43% in 2014. Nevertheless, the smaller party groups in the EP composed of coalitions of liberal, green, far-right, far-left, and Eurosceptic MEPs clearly gain power with a considerable increase in the percentage of seats. This can mean that the MEPs representing the people of Europe are in search of alternative solutions for the problems in Europe, and they are decreasingly interested or engaged in the EU.

With regard to views on Turkish accession, the main center-right group under the EPP and the EPP-ED is largely known as being divided (Chatzistavrou, 2010, p. 393; Yuvacı, 2013, p. 574). On the one hand, Christian Democrat parties are largely critical of Turkey's EU bid, while on the other, other Conservatives, including the British Conservatives in the UK, Christian Democratic and Flemish in Belgium, the Croatian Democratic Union in Croatia, the People's Party in Spain, and Forza Italia in Italy are in favor of Turkish entry to the EU (Chatzistavrou, 2010, pp. 391–392). In contrast to the EPP and the EPP-ED, the center-left Social Democrat group represented by the PES, the PSE, and the S&D explicitly support Turkey's EU membership, which leads to 22% lower cohesion rates of the EPP than those of the S&D group (Kaeding & Schenuit, 2021, p. 256). The Liberal group under the ALDE and the ELDR, and the Greens (the Greens/EFA) take a similar stance on Turkey's EU accession (Kaeding & Schenuit, 2021, pp. 256–258). Smaller groups, including the Union for a Europe of the Nations (UEN), the Eurosceptic group known as the IND/DEM, the EFD, and the EFDD, and the ITS as a nationalist and Eurosceptic group, stand against Turkish accession while the European United Left/Nordic Green Left group (GUE-NGL) represents a special case through a significant reversal from support in 2005 to abstain in the 2010s (Kaeding & Schenuit, 2021, p. 258). Lastly, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) are also divided on this issue.

2.2 Political Discourse and Parliamentary Discourse

This part aims to point out the impacts of parliamentary discourse within political discourse in order to reveal the importance of the EP within political discourse in the EU. Political action in institutional terms necessitates communicative interaction across different genres such as policy briefings, parliamentary debates, election manifestos, and others (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 37). In other words, politics necessitates language structures while linguistic behavior covers structures of domination and legitimation, which shows the inextricably intertwined nature of politics and discourse (Gastil, 1992, p. 469). A considerable part of communication is provided within the public sphere through political discourse, whose effect is disseminated in larger societies through the media. As an important part of public discourse, political discourse functions as a mediator for the communication of public opinion in the discursive public sphere. It is also claimed that political discourse is identified “when political actors, in and out of government, communicate about political matters for political purposes” (Graber, 1981, p. 196).

Despite Bitzer’s (1981, p. 281) description of political rhetoric, which covers “every citizen who deliberates and creates messages about civic affairs,” it is more influential when political discourse is created by political actors such as politicians, electoral candidates, policy advisors, or civil servants. That is because these elites have a significant effect on “decision-making, planning, and control over the processes and relations of the enactment of power” (van Dijk, 1993, p. 255). In his theory of white elite dominance, van Dijk (1989, p. 27) states that politicians lead, direct, and dominate the public debate as the decision-makers and discursive agenda makers through political discourses such as laws, regulations, recommendations, and others. These politicians tell society who they are, what they should value, or what they should choose through policy. Thus, they try to secure, in particular, the borders of a collective identity through the exclusion and marginalization of Others (Campbell, 1998, p. 23).

Parliamentary discourse is accepted as a genre of political discourse (Ilie, 2010, p. 8). Discourse in parliament is not only affected by political, social, and cultural configuration in the world but it also affects discursively, cross-rhetorically, and cross-culturally (Ilie, 2015, p. 1). Parliamentary discourse is seen as “a norm-regulated interaction among politically elected representatives” for the aims of deliberation and decision-making in a specific political setting – in other words, a parliament. Ilie (2010,

p. 9) states that subgenres of parliamentary discourse include “ministerial statements, speeches, interpellations, debates, oral/written questions, and question time,” and they show specific institutionalized discursive features and ritualized interaction patterns. As the basic subgenre of parliamentary discourse taken into consideration in this study, parliamentary debates are a “part of the global political action of legislation” (Ilie, 2010, p. 42). As a type of interaction, it is a formal discussion between the members of government and the opposition on a specific topic within the control of an institutional set of rules and a moderator (Ilie, 2010, p. 10).

Within parliamentary discourse, parliamentarians’ discursive behavior is affected by “dialogically shaped parliamentary confrontation, the parliamentarians’ institutional role-based commitments, their party affiliation,” and their awareness of acting for a multilayered audience (Ilie, 2010, p. 9). They are charged with many institutionally special objectives, such as negotiating, persuading, agenda setting, position claiming, and opinion building (Ilie, 2010, p. 9). Parliamentarians have two roles, namely the role of the speaker and the role of the listener, in terms of parliamentary confrontation. As speakers, they need to have the discursive ability and rhetorical skills for interpersonal and institutional positioning as parliamentary identity management (Ilie, 2010, p. 14). Thus, parliamentary discourse and behavioral interaction both show and shape local and global identity construction, which means the identity co-construction in parliamentary discourse (Ilie, 2010, p. 13).

The major areas of political discourse are parliaments that provide parliamentary discourse. They are the place where laws are debated and enacted. It has to have a democratic structure for proper decision-making, problem solving, and political deliberation. Parliaments are the only institutions that supply open deliberation, dissent, and joint compromise among political adversaries. Members of parliament freely debate and challenge crucial issues and each other’s political standpoints in order to construct and legitimate their own discursive practices. Current conceptualizations of values, identity, and relationships, which are the basis of collective decision-making, are discursively (re)shaped and (re)framed by parliamentarians through negotiating ideas, opinions, proposals, and counterproposals (Ilie, 2010, p. 1). This causes a variety of political discourses, which shows political, social, and cultural configurations in the world while this also contributes to linguistically and rhetorically (re)shaping these configurations (Ilie, 2010, p. 1). This structure of parliaments and their central role in

media necessitate a systemic investigation of parliamentary discourse's argumentation patterns and rhetorical strategies in order to comprehend its usage and power. With regard to the EU, it is explicitly observed that the importance of the parliamentary discourse produced in the EP for the political discourse in the EU cannot be underestimated.

2.3 The Influence of the European Parliament on Turkey – EU Relations

In this section, the relations between Turkey and the EP are mentioned in order to show the EP's influence on Turkey-EU relations through its most instrumental tools, which are its debates and resolutions. The EP is an important actor for Turkey since Article 49 of the TEU requires the assent of the EP for any country's accession to the EU at the end of the accession negotiations, which shows the EP's direct influence on enlargement policy through the assent procedure in the final stage of enlargement (Aydın-Düzgit, 2015, p. 155). This means that the EP can veto the accession of Turkey at the end of negotiations. Thus, the EP is an indispensable EU institution that should be in favor of the Turkish bid for EU membership. Moreover, the institutional discussions of the EP with the EC, "informal contacts between the members of parliament (MEPs) and the representatives of the Council and the Commission, and parliamentary reports and resolutions drafted in the EP on the candidate countries and enlargement policy" provide the EP with other instruments for its significant discursive power in enlargement policy (Aydın-Düzgit, 2015, p.155; Judge & Earnshaw, 2003, p. 184).

The EP also plays a significant role in the pre-accession funds for candidate countries because of its role as one of the two EU budgetary authorities. As an example, the budgetary power of the EP can be seen in its decision on 18 November 2017 to cut the pre-accession funding of Turkey by €105 million and to suspend a further €70m in 2018 because of the situation in Turkey in terms of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. Moreover, it should be added that Turkey will be one of the most powerful countries in the EP with its membership to the EU due to its large and growing population, which makes Turkey a critical potential new country to the Parliament. These reasons make Turkey an important EU candidate country for the EP, which leads the EP to follow its progress in terms of the Copenhagen criteria.

The relations between Turkey and the EP date back to the Association Agreement signed by the EU and Turkey in 1963 – in other words, the Ankara Agreement. This agreement provided for the establishment of the Council of Association between Turkey and the EP and other related organs of the EU. Subsequently, a Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC), composed of two delegations from both sides, was established in 1965. The Turkish Grand National Assembly and the EP strengthened this interaction through the JPC. This Committee provided “a setting for direct exchanges between Turkish and European legislators” until the interruption in 1982 because of the coup d’état in Turkey in 1980 (Gürkan, 2018, p. 111). Thus, the sensitivity of the EP on the matters of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law explicitly appears and affects relations. The interparliamentary meetings under the JPC were recommenced in 1987, with the elections in Turkey in 1983 and 1984 as signs of the establishment of parliamentary democracy in Turkey (Aybey, 2004, p. 25). In this respect, the EP confirmed with its resolution in September 1988 that the EP was “prepared to consider a resumption of the association in light of developments in Turkey.”

In the history of relations between the EP and Turkey, criticisms of the EP on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in Turkey are often repeated. In the 1980s, the EP was one of the most criticized EU institutions in terms of the democratization process of Turkey with the 1985 Balfe Report and the 1988 Werner Report (Aybet, 1999, p. 106). Furthermore, for the first time in 1987, the EP requested Turkey in its resolution to recognize the events of 1915 in the Ottoman State as an Armenian genocide (Tekin, 2018, p. 8). The 1990s became a significant turning point not only for the perception of Europe but also for the perception of the Turkish identity in the EP because of the end of the Cold War in 1991. A shift in the priorities of Europeans was observed, which led to the questioning of Turkey’s European identity, especially within the scope of the fundamental values of the EU rather than its diminishing security concerns. In 1995, the meetings of the JPC were exposed to a new halt because of the trial of six Kurdish-oriented members of the Turkish Parliament as another example of the importance of human rights for the EP (European Parliament, 2018). For this reason, the negotiations over the Customs Union were also put aside with the EP’s demand until 1995, which explicitly also shows the EP’s influence on the Turkish accession and its insistence on fundamental values more than economic gains (Zürcher, 2004, p. 324).

The EP's ratification for this issue was made conditional on the improvement of Copenhagen political criteria in Turkey by MEPs who were already increasingly critical of Turkey's human rights record in the 1990s. This improvement was accomplished with the constitutional changes, a profound reform of its institutions, active lobbying of the American officials, and freed Kurdish political prisoners in 1995. Except for these two breaks, inter-parliamentary meetings have continued and reached 76 meetings in the middle of 2007. Moreover, the Delegation to the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee decided to intensify the meetings in 2011 according to the Committee's new Rules of Procedure. The new Rules allow the Committee to meet as many as three times a year rather than two times (European Parliament, 2010).

The EU institutions, including the EP, adopted an exclusive understanding of European identity towards the 1997 Luxembourg Summit. The EC decided to exclude Turkey from the enlargement process in the report "Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union" on 16 July 1997 before the Summit (Aybey, 2004, p. 29). In this respect, the Christian Democrats in the EP, who were in exclusive understanding of Europe, officially announced on 4 March 1997 that Turkey was not a candidate for EU membership, a few months before the 1997 Helsinki Summit (Zürcher, 2004, p. 325). Nevertheless, the EP, along with other EU institutions, changed its stance to the inclusive understanding due to the reasons mentioned before, as well as the contributions of liberal and particularly social democrat voices in the EP. In its resolution on 6 October 1999, the EP confirmed "Turkey's eligibility to apply for membership of the European Union," although Turkey "is still far away from meeting the Copenhagen criteria."

The resolution of the EP in 1999 was assessed as the approval of the EP for its candidate status in the upcoming Helsinki Summit. Thus, Turkey was declared a candidate country at the 1999 Helsinki Summit despite the 1997 Luxembourg Summit and the Greek attempts to block Turkey's EU membership prospects (Lindgaard et al., 2018, pp. 1–2). Thereby, the accession negotiations of Turkey were seriously seen on the horizon, and thus its potential full membership got closer to becoming a reality in a critical political environment. To be more precise about this environment, the Cold War had already ended, the EU was optimistic about enlargement, the Balkans were in trouble, and a Huntingtonian sense of security- and identity-related anxieties about Islam known as the "clash of civilizations" became prominent in the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks in the USA (Lindgaard et al., 2018, p. 4). In this conjuncture, the debate on Turkey's

“Europeanness” was more directly linked to the issue of European identity and led the EP to examine how far Europe’s borders can extend (Kastoryano, 2006, p. 275). For these reasons, after the 1999 Helsinki Summit, the identity dimension of the Turkish accession and Turkey’s compatibility with the European identity seriously gained more importance in the EP, and in this context, radical changes among the MEPs from inclusive to exclusive understanding of European identity were more widely observed (Levin, 2011, p. 187).

The EP resolution of 15 December 2004 is also crucial in the history of the relations between the EP and Turkey since it sparked a debate with its note on the accession negotiation process with Turkey as “an open-ended process the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed in advance.” It also recalled “the European Union’s capacity to cope with enlargement as a prerequisite, as part of the Copenhagen criteria,” which intensified the criticisms of the real intention of MEPs on the Turkish accession. On 28 September 2005, the Parliament voted in favor of Turkey. It adopted a new resolution stating “that the Commission and the Council take the view that Turkey has formally fulfilled the last conditions for starting the accession negotiations,” which initiated the accession negotiation of Turkey on 3 October 2005. Nevertheless, both these resolutions and many of the following ones still refer to some common problems that maintain their current importance in the relations. They are basically on the criticisms of the EP of fundamental rights and freedoms in Turkey, including the Cyprus issue, which has been more and more complex with the EU membership of Cyprus as well as the failure of the Annan Plan, the Armenian issue, the role of women in social, economic, and political life in Turkey, and the Kurdish problem. Therefore, the relations between the EP and Turkey can be regarded as different from other EU institutions because of the transparent and public nature of the EP, composed of directly elected, freely, and harshly criticizing MEPs rather than other EU institutions whose members are appointed.

The most instrumental tools of the EP to convey its views and comments on Turkey are the EP resolutions for the manner of the EP as an institution and the EP debates for the MEPs’ own opinions as political figures and identities. A parliamentary debate as a formal discussion is depicted as an exchange of opinion in order to facilitate the chamber’s informed collective decision-making on specific issues chosen by MPs in the framework of an institutional set of rules (Ilie, 2015, p. 4). A debate contributes “to hold[ing] the government to account by enabling focused discussion and by eliciting

clarifications about government policies,” which is spontaneously intervened in only the British type of debate during other MPs’ speeches (Ilie, 2015, p. 4).

Since the parliamentary proceeding is broadcasted live on TV or the web, parliamentary debates and speeches have become more transparent and are more subject to public scrutiny. While resolutions are supposed to be prepared and examined regarding their content and language, this is not exactly possible for debates because of their argumentative nature. Parliamentary debates are inclined towards a more spontaneous process even though they are also seriously considered and prepared beforehand. This spontaneous nature of debates is believed to reflect more MEPs’ hidden and real views and tendencies on specific topics such as Turkey and Turkish identity in this study. Discourse analysts try to elucidate indirect language in debates, especially when topics are ethical-racial issues, which sometimes leads minority groups, antiracists, or liberals to show angry reactions with accusations of bias, racism, or xenophobia (van Dijk, 1997, p. 35). These debates can be dangerous since MPs have the power to shape public opinion by reaching wider society via media dissemination.

Resolutions of the EP are examined and written in a formal, institutional, ambiguous, matter-of-fact, and indirect language with distinctive purposes as the reflection of the EP’s views, while the plenary debates on Turkey or the issues concerning Turkey let MEPs directly convey their opinions on Turkey, Turkish identity, and Turkish accession as they are. Resolutions are not of argumentative nature as strong as debates. As a negative example, the EP witnessed an extreme-right Greek MEP who referred to Turks as “dirty and polluted” and “like wild dogs” during an EP debate in 2016 and was thus thrown out of the EP because of his unacceptable and racist remarks (Euronews, 11 March 2016). In other words, debates can be uncontrolled and even violate EU norms and values, which can never be experienced in resolutions.

Within the scope of this study, both the EP debates and the EP resolutions whose titles include either the word “Turkey” or the word “Enlargement” between the years 2007 and 2015 have been reviewed. It has been observed that resolutions are ready-made and carefully designed texts produced by the decision-makers in the EP, and they are approved in the EP, although they do not directly reflect the views and opinions of the MEPs and, in turn, the European citizens. Therefore, aspects related to identity are underrepresented in the EP resolutions compared to the EP debates. Nevertheless, the MEPs construct and direct the EP debates according to their political identities and aims,

which makes the debates open-ended. While the resolutions are of a clear-cut structure, debates let MEPs uncover their hidden agendas, ideologies, tactics, and biases on Turkey and Turkish identity despite violating the institutional set of rules. For this reason, this study focuses on EP debates in detail to disclose MEPs' argumentative strategies and justifications for their perceptions and representations of Turkey.

3. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND DISCOURSE-HISTORICAL APPROACH

3.1 Theoretical Framework: Social Constructivism

In this theoretical and methodological chapter of the study, the theory of social constructivism and its interaction with identity and discourse, as well as Wodak's discourse-historical approach (DHA) as the method, are reviewed in order to benefit from them for the analysis in the following chapter. As a meta-theory about the nature of the social world, constructivism has been a substantial theory of international relations (IR), especially since the 1990s. In terms of social theory, constructivism is based on the social construction of reality (Jackson & Sorensen, 2006, p. 164). As regards IR, it is regarded as an empirical approach in the sense that it is based on intersubjective ideas to define IR (Jackson & Sorensen, 2006, p. 166). Accordingly, it is asserted that the most important aspect of IR is social rather than material, which necessitates the study of IR based on ideas, beliefs, and the shared understandings among actors on the international scene (Jackson & Sorensen, 2006, p. 162).

Risse (2004, p. 160) also emphasizes that constructivism “is based on social ontology, which insists that human agents do not exist independently from their social environment and its collectively shared systems of meanings (‘culture’ in a broad sense).” In the same vein, Ruggie (1998, pp. 878-879) states that “constructivism concerns the issue of human consciousness: the role it plays in international relations, and the implications for the logic and methods of social inquiry of taking it seriously.” In other words, as a subjectivist view of knowledge, constructivism assumes that knowledge and reality are constructed within individuals. There are three main propositions of constructivism, namely that “normative and ideational structures are as important as material structures; nonmaterial structures, which are firstly actions and then interests, condition actors’ identities; and agents and structures are mutually constituted.” In this regard, its main achievement is “the substantial re-evaluation of state-centered concepts” in IR (Wendt, 1994). With constructivism, IR scholarship has also gained a return to a more sociological, historical, normative, and practice-oriented form, which has provided for the development of IR theory and analysis (Reus-Smit, 2001, p. 227).

The best-known and most repeated phrase in constructivism is the argument from Wendt that “anarchy is what states make of it” (1992, p. 391). This argument points out that the system itself, which is referred to as anarchy for the world of IR, can change when people and states can start thinking differently and, in turn, create new norms different from old ones due to the nature of the system consisting of ideas and beliefs (Jackson & Sorensen, 2006, p. 162). Coined and introduced by Nicholas Onuf in the 1980s, constructivism became increasingly an important approach, firstly in North American IR. Nevertheless, the articles and books of Alexander Wendt in 1987, 1992, 1994, 1995, and 1999 provided an essential contribution to the development of the theory with his famous argument mentioned above.

Reus-Smit (2001, p. 216) states that the rise of constructivism can be explained by four factors, namely the heuristic power of the nonrationalist perspective, alternative explanatory attempts at reshaping global order after the end of the Cold War, a new generation of young scholars desiring the potential for innovation in the conceptual elaboration, and the advance of the new constructivist perspective. He defines three forms of constructivism: the systemic constructivism of Wendt, the unit-level constructivism of Katzenstein, and the holistic constructivism of Ruggie and Kratochwil (Reus-Smit, 2001, p. 216). In addition, he also explains the discontents with constructivism, namely the

disputes among constructivists over the structure of the theory, its relationship with rationalism as a complementary theory, the question of appropriate methodology, and the type of contribution it makes to a critical theory of IR (Reus-Smit, 2001, p. 216). In the 2009 volume of the same book, he states that the first discontent has been dissipated while the other three discontents maintain their focus on the lack of “innovative constructivist response to the post-9/11 world” (Reus-Smit, 2009, pp. 208–209).

What differentiates constructivism from neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism is its social ontology against rationalist and materialist ones with refusing one-sided material focus based on military and economic forces for the balance of power among states. Accordingly, actors are affected by ideas, norms, beliefs, and identities rather than acting to maximize their material benefits and minimize costs. What they believe as right or correct to do affects their actions, necessitating examining how their actions strengthen these beliefs, thus causing the broader ideational social and cultural environment for other actors. In other words, constructivism believes that the “appropriateness” of the behavior leads actors rather than the rational cost/benefit “consequences” of their actions.

According to constructivists, the international reality is something that does not merely exist (Ruggie, 1998, p.879). Instead, it is constantly reconstructed and renegotiated among actors. Constructivists also assert that “ideational factors have normative as well as instrumental dimensions and that they express not only individual but also collective intentions” (MacMillan, 2007, p. 26). In this regard, it should also be added as a constructivist belief that “the meaning and significance of ideational factors are not independent of time and place,” which shows the importance of history (Ruggie, 1998, p.879). The theory of constructivism was introduced to the study of European integration in the 1990s to diversify the integration theory “beyond the traditional debate between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism/neofunctionalism” (Christiansen et al., 1999, p. 537). Accordingly, crucial aspects of the European integration process, namely polity formation through rules and norms, the transformation of identities, and the role of ideas and language, led to the rise of the constructivists’ perspectives in the research on European integration (Christiansen et al., 1999, p. 537). When constructivists’ perspectives are examined in this respect, it is observed that they are generally based on issues such as the implications of EU norms on member states and candidate countries and the effects of states’ social interaction in the international arena. In this study, social

constructivism, as one of two main schools of constructivism along with theoretical constructivism, is discussed below, especially in regard to identity and discourse.

3.1.1 Identity and Constructivism

Identity is the essence of an entity. It shows traits of an individual, a group, or a nation, which differentiates it from others. Identity is an unignorable phenomenon in politics and is commonly used by different social science disciplines. In IR, identity is taken into consideration since it affects the relations among states. Risse (2004, p. 270) identifies a clear connection between identity and a functioning political order, and political scientists and practitioners generally approve of it. He explains this connection as follows:

Accordingly, a democratic polity requires the diffuse support of the citizens in order to be legitimate. Identification with a political order is seen as a source of diffuse support and thus, of legitimacy. The higher the sense of loyalty toward a political community among the citizens, the more they are prepared to accept inconvenient decisions and policies of their governments, that is, to pay a price for their identity.

Triandafyllidou and Wodak (2003, p. 210) state that identity has two meanings, namely sameness and distinctiveness from others, based on consistency and continuity over time. Wodak (2009a) adds that identity is a relational term based on sameness and otherness, which makes it not static or material since it is involved in a process. In this respect, the concepts of “the Self” and “the Other” are frequently used in IR when exploring the question of identity. Criss (2008, p. 67) asserts that these concepts have received significant attention in various disciplines such as history as well as IR after Claude Lévi-Strauss, who introduced the term *l'égo et l'autre* (the ego and the other) as a social anthropologist. This term is based on demonstrating and categorizing opposites and thus defining the Self.

Diez (2004, p. 321) believes that it is not possible to think of identity without constructing its Other and states that “it would make no sense to say ‘I am European’ if this did not imply a difference from being ‘Asian,’ ‘African,’ or ‘American’.” This difference makes that identity as it is. In other words, the Other is examined in order to

clarify how the Self is constructed since the Other's image signifies the meaning of the Self (Levin, 2011, p. 26). In this respect, the Self's relations with the Other construct and reconstruct identity (Tekin, 2010, p. 12). Neumann (1999, p. 37) adds that "analyses of self/other nexuses hold out the promise of a better understanding of who 'the actors' are, how they were constituted, how they maintain themselves, and under which preconditions they may thrive." Hall (2002, p. 104) also explains the importance of examination of the Other:

Thus if the Other is an 'infidel,' then 'we' are 'the faithful.' If the Other is an 'barbarian,' then 'we' must be 'civilized.' If the Other is a 'sick man,' then 'we' have 'healthy' and 'robust' regimes and societies. If the Other is 'backward,' 'despotic' or 'a laggard,' then we are 'modern,' 'liberal' and 'progressive.' If the Other is 'Asiatic' and 'Eastern,' then we are 'European' and 'Western.'

This relationship between the Self and the Other makes them dependent upon each other. In a new circumstance with its Other, this dependence leads an identity to highlight its existing characteristics or adapt itself through changing or evolving (Johansson-Nogués & Jonasson, 2011, p. 8). In other words, the Other can also cause a change in identity. This does not let an identity remain fixed, rigid, integral, or stable during its relationship with the Other. Identity is constantly in the process of transformation and change (Hall, 1996, p. 4).

The Other is generally used as different, unlike and opposite in a negative, unfavorable and foreign way. Levin (2011, p. 25) claims that the only path to emancipation of the Other is the complete assimilation and even destruction of the Other's separate identity. Nevertheless, Wendt (1994, pp. 384–396), Rumelili (2004, pp. 27–47), and Tekin (2010, p. 176), in their liberal constructivist works, brought a new dimension to the understanding of the Other. Accordingly, the Other should not always be perceived as a dangerous entity since the concepts of the Self and Other have the nature of contingency and transformability. Thus, the Self and the Other categories are not fixed as well. Based on the contingent structure, Billig (1995, p. 65) states that there are varieties of Others, and these various Others can have specific features and different interactions with the Self, as well as different proximities to the Self. For example, Rumelili (2004, pp. 32–37) states that the Other can be constructed as "less rather than anti-self," which

shows the dominance of the Self over the Other. Nonetheless, this proximity can be so close that the Other can be an extension of the Self eventually, and its negative identification can turn to be positive.

In this regard, Tekin (2010, p. 177) gives Turkey as an example of transformation in identification from negative to positive in terms of the demise of the Ottoman Empire and the foundation of the Turkish Republic. Earlier constructivists also state that the Other's constitutive role does not depend on the attribution of absolute negativity (Tekin, 2010, p. 14). Nevertheless, the formation of collective identities is based on the absolute or radical difference of the Other. In this study, the Other is constructed on two perceptions, which are, firstly, the Other as anti-Self based on its negative identification, and secondly, the Other as less based on its insufficient perception and the superiority of the European Self. Although absolute negativity of the Turkish identity cannot be reached and the effect of the contingent structure is clearly seen in its perception in the analysis of this study, the absolute difference of the Turkish identity and thus Turkey is highlighted as a country "marked by a different religion, different lifestyles, and differences concerning historical conditions and state-society relations" and strengthened with the chosen period's challenges, which is known as the "de-Europeanization process" (Nas, 2002, p. 222). In this respect, Levin (2011, p. 26) prefers to use two kinds of attributions for the Other in his book, namely the inclusive Self (European or Christian) identity necessitating assimilation and the exclusive Self (European or Christian) identity requiring distance and difference. He claims that the tension between these two Self-identities causes the current indecisive manner toward the Turkish accession to the EU (Levin, 2011, p. 26).

Unlike the scholars above, who prefer two variations of Other, Diez (2005, pp. 628–629) prefers four main types of Othering: Other as an existential threat, Other as inferior, Other as violating universal principles, and Other as different. Accordingly, Other can be securitized through a speech act of securitization within the context of the Copenhagen School in the case of Other as an existential threat (Diez, 2005, pp. 628–629). In the sense of the Other as inferior, the Self is represented as superior to the Other, while the standards of the Self are represented as both superior and universally valid, with the Other as violating universal principles (Diez, 2005, pp. 628–629). The last categorization, the Other as different, is the least disadvantageous type of Other without explicit value judgment compared to the types of Other above (Diez, 2005, pp. 628–629).

Moreover, Manners (2006, pp. 177–178) offers a fifth type of Othering to the categorization of Diez (2005, pp. 628–629), namely “self of Other.” Zarakol (2011b) makes another suggestion as to the sixth type of Othering and claims that Other can also be recognized as superior.

To grasp the identity problem in EU-Turkey relations, it is crucial to examine Turkish identity in Self and Other relationships in Europe. The European Self and its Other have always caught the attention, and various scholars have studied them. The Other’s role in achieving the EU’s unity and self-definition and constructing European identity¹¹ concerning various Others is commonly accepted. Nevertheless, there is not a commonly recognized Other of Europe in cultural, geographical, or historical terms, which makes the Other of Europe a contested issue. Waever (1998) and Diez (2004) state that the Other of Europe is its own past, while Risse (2010, pp. 53–54) constructs the Others of Europe as Europe’s own past, racism, and xenophobia as well as Islam and immigrants outside Europe. Other scholars construct the USA as the Other of European identity (von Benda-Beckmann & Verkuyten, 1995, p. 82). While western Europeans accepted the USA as “us” more than eastern Europe during the Cold War, the foreign policy preferences in the post-Cold War era changed this differentiation. The disappearance of the communist threat from its eastern border made eastern Europe “us” more than the USA. In other words, new circumstances and conditions changed the Other of Europe.

The construction of the East as Europe’s Other has a long-standing background, which even predates both Christianity and Islam and traces ancient Greece. Neumann (1999, p. 207) states that the primary Others of Europe have been notably Russia and Turkey. The issue of Turkish identity with respect to the European Self necessitates special attention since the nature of this identity has always been contested in European studies such as Beck (1987), Daniel (1997), Matar (1999), Neumann (1999), Schwoebel (1967) and Shaw and Heywood (1972). In history, the first intense contact of the

¹¹ There are different approaches to the meaning of the concept of European identity “as a national, supranational, or even post-national collective identity,” and thus, it is “not clearly defined or stable” (Wodak & Boukala, 2015, p. 92). In this respect, see, for example, Krzyżanowski (2010), Boukala (2013), and Smith (1995). Nevertheless, all researchers agree that “the discursive forms of inclusion and exclusion have significant importance for the cultivation of European identity/ies, since they define the ‘Europeans’ and create an ‘imaged community’ of ‘Us’ who exclude ‘Others’” (Wodak, 2007, p. 651; Wodak & Boukala, 2015, p. 92).

Europeans with Turks was through the Ottoman Empire, and the perception of Turkish identity was initially constructed through this state.

The Empire itself and the religion of the Turks in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries made Turkish identity as the Other of the European Self, as explained in detail in the previous section. Although the Ottoman Empire was accepted as a “European state” by the Treaty of Paris in 1856, Turkish identity could only become one of its Others from its primary Other (Ongur, 2011, p. 261). The Turkish Other remained the same during the Turkish War of Independence between 1918 and 1922, whose ultimate aim was to found a new Turkish Republic based on the Western ideals of democracy, the sovereignty of the nation, and secularism. İnalçık (2006, p. 11) states that “the Turks were fighting there with Western ideals against the West itself” in this war. The new Turkish Republic, whose official foreign policy was based on participation in the European integration process, made the first application for joining the European Economic Community (ECC) in 1959, and it signed the Ankara Agreement on September 12, 1963, with the ECC. As mentioned before, this changed the status of Turkey as Europe’s positive Other and made Turkey explicitly exposed to the mainly elite-driven Europeanization process (van Ham, 2001, p. 73). In this process, the construction of both the European identity and the Turkish identity was increasingly affected by each other’s elite discourses.

The issue of identity became popular with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of ethnic nationalism, which gave rise to a constructivist turn in IR theory. Wendt (1999, pp. 169–170) accuses the rationalist theories such as realism and liberalism of neglecting identity, which caused this turn. Walt (1998, p. 30) states that realism and liberalism, as well as their neo-forms, have failed. That is because they could not predict and explain the end of the Cold War, which has created a paramount effect in legitimizing constructivist theories. According to constructivism in the study of IR, identity is continuously constructed, negotiated, and contested among political actors (Rumelili, 2008, p. 2). In this sense, one of three ontological propositions of the constructivist base is that “understanding how nonmaterial structures condition actors’ identities is important because identities inform interests and, in turn, actions” (Reus-Smit, 2001, p. 217).

In regard to state identity, a similar approach is also applied. As a leading constructivist scholar, Wendt (1994, pp. 384–386) states that “interaction at the systemic level changes state identities and interests,” which is quite crucial since state identities and interests expressed through the discourses of key decision-makers define state

behavior. Constructivists believe that “state identities are not given, but reconstructed through complex, historical overlapping (often contradictory) practices – and therefore variable, unstable, constantly changing” (Knutsen, 1997, pp. 281–282). In terms of social constructivism, Hopf (1998, pp. 176–177) states that social structures, which are historical, political, cultural, and social contexts, substantially constitute states’ identities and interests. In this regard, Levin (2011, p. 20) asserts that societies create collective autobiographical narratives of histories, which contributes to the construction of collective identities. In other words, he implies that the writing of history is important for societal identity construction processes, which is also underlined by the constructivist view of language and history through narration and interpretation. For this reason, Levin (2011, p. 21) claims that “history is thus socially reconstructed in the context of present needs” without reducing it to fiction. In this sense, he points out that “the interpretation and writing of history takes place in a societal context that is itself the product of history and is, therefore, neither independent of it nor prior to it” (Levin, 2011, p. 21).

3.1.2 Identity, Social Constructivism, and European Studies

In European studies, the discussions on the enlargement of the EU increasingly necessitated the importance of defining Europe and European identity. In this regard, through the publication of the *Journal of European Public Policy* special issue of Christiansen et al. in 1999, social constructivism as a branch of constructivism became the leading approach to the study of European integration in order to look at the question of European identity, as a spillover from IR. Social constructivism is regarded as the middle ground in juxtaposing rationalism and reflectivism to European integration (Christiansen et al., 1999, p. 528). Accordingly, actors’ identities are created as a result of social interaction rather than being given (Rosamond, 2000, p. 198). As mentioned above, their identities and interests are conditioned by nonmaterial structures– in other words, normative or ideational structures such as systems of shared ideas, beliefs, and values (Reus-Smit, 2001, p. 198). From a social constructivist perspective, identity cannot be entirely separated from features such as ethnicity, religion, history, or culture (Rumelili, 2008, p. 99).

Understanding how actors’ identities are conditioned is of great importance since interests and then actions are informed by identities (Reus-Smit, 2001, p. 198). In other

words, “identities are the basis of interests,” in the words of Wendt (1992, p. 398). Hobson (2000, pp. 146–174) also states that state policies are changed by the interests of the states, and the interests of these states are changed by identities constructed by norms. In this regard, the accession of central and eastern European Countries (CEECs) to the EU is given as an example. In terms of identity formation, constructivist researchers make three categories and also import them to the study of European integration (Christiansen et al., 1999, p. 540). They are, firstly, the research into the nature of a potential “European identity;” secondly, the research into the nature of the reconstruction of national identities under the influence of the integration process; and thirdly, the research informed by the results of both of the above. With respect to the ways of shaping identities and interests, Reus-Smit (2001, p. 198) describes three mechanisms of normative and ideational structures: imagination, communication, and constraint. The section below is based on the influence of discourse in order to make this communication for the purpose of influencing identities.

3.1.3 Discourse and Social Constructivism

Discourse is important for European integration since the success of the European project is ascribed to the distinctive interpretation that each nation can extract from the discourses on Europe (Christiansen et al., 1999, p. 541). As a trendy method for the study of Europe, constructivism gained more and more ground when the debates of the European project evoked the terms “deliberation,” “norm,” “persuasion,” “socialization,” and “arguing” as well as “identity” (Checkel, 2006, p. 4). In this regard, the usage of language and discourse also becomes indispensable for the functioning of these terms.

Discourse is shaped and limited by social structures such as “historical, political, cultural, and social contexts,” while it is also socially constitutive (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 258). In other words, discourse both represents the world and contributes to the construction of social identities (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 258). With regard to the importance of historical background for discourse, Hardy et al. (2004, p. 19) state that “[d]iscourses have no inherent meaning in themselves and to understand their constructive effects, researchers must locate them historically and socially.”

Discourse is at the center of constructing the world (Christiansen et al., 1999, p. 543). Through the act of speaking, actors structure discourse, and thus discourse leads to

subsequent action, which makes actors the starter of the chain. Discourse employed as a legitimation for policymaking is at the root of political debates, a coherent political sphere, and a political system, while it also sustains the formation of political ground on which normative manifestations and institutions accordingly act (Çakmak, 2019, p. 2). Likewise, the usage of discourse is also an essential instrument for the policymaking of the EU since a specific discourse can be strategically utilized as “a purposeful action by agents who thus contribute to a specific direction of the integration process” (Christiansen et al., 1999, p. 542). As an example, discourse on subsidiarity is seen as an important discourse that provides meaning and direction to the integration process. Discourses such as the “democratic deficit” or the “partnership principle” are also regarded as other examples of the structural policy of the EU (Christiansen et al., 1999, p. 541). As such, both in a broad sense referring to European integration and a narrow sense meaning particular policy areas, there is a significant development of a specific language of integration in the EU, which binds European actors together and leads to the construction of a European political class. For this reason, discourse analysis provides an efficient method for constructivist research because of the abundance of target discourses in European integration.

Christiansen et al. (1999, p. 541) state that discourse becomes significant for constructivism when the identity formations become crucial, as mentioned above. In the same vein, Wendt (1999, p. 341) points out that social constructivism lets agents reproduce a particular conception of who they are since agents are accepted as mutually constitutive in constructivism. During this communication, agents take part in the constitution of their identities and counter-identities. In other words, identities are socially constructed through this reciprocal interaction of agents, which necessitates discourse. As a result, agents can change their understanding of the Self and, in turn, affect the perception of the Other, which shows the importance of discourse in social constructivism.

3.2 Wodak’s Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) as a Branch of CDA

As the methodology for analyzing the EP debates in this study, Wodak’s discourse-historical analysis (DHA) is known as an interpretative methodology of qualitative text analysis within critical discourse analysis (CDA). The first CDA studies

started with the journal of van Dijk on *Discourse and Society* in 1990 and then a small conference in the Netherlands aiming at discussing the theories and methods of CDA in 1991. Additionally, it was affected by other critical theorists such as Foucault, Gramsci, Pecheux, and Habermas. CDA is not only a method of discourse analysis but also a theory that aims to uncover the “relations between discourse and social and cultural developments in different social domains” (Aydın-Düzgit, 2016, p. 48). As a qualitative in-depth discourse analysis, CDA asserts that discourse always contains power and ideologies, and thus opaque relationships among discursive practices, texts, and events can be uncovered by discourse.

CDA claims that power is not based on an explicit top-down relationship. Power and dominance are of a subtle and indirect structure. They are produced when dominated groups accept that dominance is natural, which legitimizes it (van Dijk, 1993, p. 250). Van Dijk (1993, p. 254) states that “one crucial presupposition of adequate CDA is understanding the nature of social power and dominance” with the aim of clarifying views on the roles of discourse to their recreation. Social power signifies “privileged access to socially valued sources, including wealth, income, status, position, education, force, and group membership,” which provides one group’s domination over another concerning freedom and even minds of the weak group. (van Dijk, 1993, p. 254).

Within this framework, talk and text are fundamentally used to check and govern the mind and perception of others by the strong group. For that reason, discourse and CDA meet to disclose how this strong group designs or manipulates the weak masses in society. Dominance signifies a hierarchy of power since some members or “power elites” of the strong groups are of a substantial impact on “decision-making, planning, and control over the processes and relations of the enactment of power” (van Dijk, 1993, p. 255). These elites are of special access to discussion, and precisely, they have most to “say” (van Dijk, 1993, p. 255). Several forms of dominance, i.e., rich over poor, white over black, and male dominance over women, are repeated. This repetition makes them look ordinary in society until they are questioned and challenged. Therefore, CDA is predominantly employed to disclose and avoid power abuse leading to injustice and inequality in society, together with the breach of laws, rules, and principles of democracy by those holding power. Furthermore, CDA asserts that between discourse access and social power, a special relationship significantly influencing each other exists. The reason is that “the more discourse genres, contexts, participants, audience, scope, and text

characteristics they (may) actively control or influence, the more powerful social groups, institutions, and elites are” (van Dijk, 1993, p. 256).

There are several schools and approaches of CDA, which differ in their genealogy and methods. They include systemic-functional approaches, including the dialectical-relational approach of Fairclough and the multimodal approach of van Leeuwen, van Dijk’s sociocognitive approach, Wodak’s discourse-historical approach (DHA) and critical discourse and dispositive analysis and social-psychological approach. By focusing on the interdisciplinary and eclectic nature of CDA, DHA was created by Wodak and her colleagues from the Vienna School of Discourse Analysis.

DHA focuses its efforts on the field of politics, in which it attempts to form conceptual frameworks for political discourse. In this scope of DHA, three main researches are undertaken. They are based on, firstly, the investigation of language in institutional settings, secondly, the study of sexism, racism, and anti-Semitism, and lastly, the examination of identity constructions and changes of identities at national and transnational levels. In this respect, the DHA study of Vienna School investigations contributed to the analysis of the discursive construction of difference, which caused the political and social exclusion of particular outgroups in Austria. In this respect, one of DHA’s aims is to “demystify the hegemony of specific discourses by deciphering the ideologies that establish, perpetuate, or fight dominance” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p. 88). For these reasons, discourses on Turkey’s de-Europeanization process, which leads Turkey to political and social exclusion, can be best analyzed through DHA.

In studying the European perception of Turkish identity within this study, mentioning the relation of identity and discourse with CDA and DHA is essential for this study. Identity construction is provided through discourse since only our words based on our interests can define our identity, knowledge, values, and beliefs (Cervera et al., 2006, pp. 9–10). Yaka (2016, p. 162) and Hall (1996, p. 4) state that the identity constitution as “an act of power” is based on “a constant discursive, strategic, and political construction in the course of history” while “using the resources of history, language, and culture in the process of becoming rather than being.”

Vasquez (1995, p. 223) also points to the relationship between the discursive constitution of identity and the concept of power since those who “control identity” can dictate their identity visions and defame other alternative identity versions in society. This

makes the discourses of state officials powerful in state identity construction as our representatives thanks to accessing power through the state, their constitutional legitimacy, and media (Aydın-Düzgüt, 2018, p. 23; Weldes et al., 1999, pp. 17–18). As mentioned above, discourse is both socially constitutive and socially shaped (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 258). Jaworski and Coupland (1999, p. 3) define discourse as “language use relative to social political and cultural formations – it is language reflecting social order but also language shaping social order, and shaping individuals’ interaction with society.” In this respect, CDA also accepts discursive practices as a significant part of social practice, which substantially contributes to “the social world, including social identities and social relations” (Aydın-Düzgüt, 2012, p. 20).

The role of language in power relations, processes of identity building, inequality, and exclusion is examined in CDA as a result of the impact of the Frankfurt School based on Habermas’s notion of self-reflectivity (Aydın-Düzgüt, 2012, p. 20). According to the Vienna School, one of the priorities of CDA is the study of identity constructions and changes in identities at national and transnational levels. Within this framework, DHA is responsible for analyzing national identities and increasingly the construction of European identities among the other various types of CDA. The main focus of DHA on identity construction necessitates the discursive construction of “in” and “out” groups (Wodak, 2001, p. 73). In other words, the DHA of the Vienna School shows how Self and Other are represented through discourse in identity formation. It arises from the distinction between Self and Other, which means the discursive construction of “us” and “them” is indispensable in the construction of identities, which is frequently observed, especially in the Eurosceptic discourses and populist remarks (Wodak, 2001, p. 73).

The employment of DHA necessitates a three-dimensional approach. Firstly, “discourse topics,” in other words, the main thematic areas or contents of a specific discourse, are identified. Secondly, “discursive strategies”¹² are examined for this analysis, as seen below in the table of Wodak (2001, p. 73). As the last step of DHA, the “linguistic means (as types) and the specific, context-dependent linguistic realizations (as tokens)” are revealed (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 44). Krzyżanowski (2010, p. 81) prefers to use these three steps in two groups. Firstly, he applies entry-level examination as a

¹² Discursive strategies can be employed for the construction of an ingroup and outgroup, which makes the distinction between “Us” and “Them” or “non-European,” and thus the EU can reformulate its connection with the “Other” in context-dependent ways (van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999; Wodak, 2012; Wodak & Boukala, 2015, p. 93).

thematic analysis in which discourse topics are formed (Krzyżanowski, 2010, p. 81). Secondly, in-depth analysis is conducted through argumentation (*topoi*) and other linguistic features (Krzyżanowski, 2010, p. 81).

For the aim of revealing DHA, Reisigl and Wodak (2001, p. 44) direct the following five empirical questions to the texts: “How are persons named and referred to linguistically? What traits, characteristics, qualities, and features are attributed to them? By means of what arguments and argumentation schemes do specific persons, or social groups, try to justify and legitimize the exclusion, discrimination, suppression, and exploitation of others? From what perspective or point of view are these namings, attributions, and arguments expressed? Are the respective discriminating utterances articulated overtly, are they even intensified, or are they mitigated?”

Table 5

Discursive Strategies of DHA

Strategy	Objectives	Devices
Referential/ Nomination	Construction of in-groups and out-groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Membership categorization devices and deictics • Tropes such as metaphors¹³, metonymies and synecdoches • Verbs and nouns used to denote processes and actions
Predication	Labelling social actors more or less positively, or negatively, deprecatorily or appreciatively	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits • Implicit and explicit predicates • Explicit comparisons, similes, metaphors and other rhetorical figures (including metonymies, litotes and euphemisms) • Allusions, evocations, and presuppositions/implicatures
Argumentation	Justification of positive or negative attributions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Topoi</i>, fallacies, and counterfactuals used to justify inclusion or exclusion, discrimination, or preferential treatment

¹³ Frequently together with *topoi*, metaphors can be employed to display inclusion, exclusion and the discursive construction of in-groups and out-groups (Wodak & Boukala, 2015, p. 96).

Perspectivation, framing, or discourse representation	Expressing involvement, positioning speaker's point of view	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reporting, description, narration, or quotation of (discriminatory) events and utterances • Deictics • Direct, indirect, or free indirect speech • Quotation marks, discourse markers/particles • Animating prosody
Intensification, mitigation	Modifying the epistemic status of a proposition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of (discriminatory) utterances • Diminutives or augmentatives • (Modal) particles, tag questions, and use of the subjunctive • Hesitations and vague expressions • Hyperboles and litotes • Indirect speech acts (such as question instead of assertion) • Verbs of saying, feeling, and thinking

Sources: Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p. 104; Wodak, 2001, p. 73

In order to answer the questions above, discursive strategies mentioned within the second step should be utilized, which functions to discursively construct positive self-representation and negative other representation (Bennet, 2015, p. 118). There are various discursive strategies in the construction of national sameness or difference leading to social exclusion. In this respect, referential and nomination strategies aim to construct social actors and identify them positively or negatively through naming, while Reisigl and Wodak (2001, p. 45) define predicational strategies as specific types of referential strategies through deprecatory or appreciative labeling. In this respect, flag words and stigma words as rhetorical devices can be accepted as implicit predicates in discourse within predicational strategies (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 24; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 55).

While flag words such as “freedom,” “multiculturalism,” “integration,” and “democracy” possess positive associations, stigma words such as “anti-semitism” and “racism” have negative connotations (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 24; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001,

p. 55). Argumentation strategies are formed by *topoi*¹⁴, fallacies, or counterfactuals so as to justify positive or negative attributions in various ways. As one of these ways, the form of “*topos*” is identified as “parts of argumentation that belong to the obligatory, either explicit or inferable premises in the shape of content-related warrants that connect the arguments with the conclusion” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 74). For example, one of the most common “*topoi*”¹⁵ in the discursive construction of national identities is the “*topos*” of culture and history.

Perspectivation, framing, or discourse representation shows the speaker’s or author’s involvement in discourse while intensification and mitigation strategies change and restrict through adjectives, adverbs, and modal verbs. Moreover, DHA also shows the “intertextuality” and “interdiscursivity” with other related texts and discourses. In order to make them clear, intertextuality refers to texts that are explicitly or implicitly connected to other texts in the past and present “through continued reference to a topic or main actors; through reference to the same events or by the transfer of main arguments from one text into the next,” on the one hand (Wodak, 2007, p. 206). On the other hand, interdiscursivity bears upon the discourses linked to one another and can be labeled as the conceptualization of discourse as “patterns and commonalities of knowledge and structure” (Wodak, 2007, p. 207).

¹⁴ It is claimed that the concept of *topos* is prominent in “the analysis of sometimes fallacious and sometimes reasonable arguments that are widely adopted in prejudiced and discriminatory discourses” (Wodak & Boukala, 2015, p. 94).

¹⁵ The usage of *topoi* can be understood through conditional or causal explanations such as “if x, then y” or “y because x” in the text (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p. 110).

4. THE DHA ANALYSIS OF THE EP DISCOURSES ON TURKEY BETWEEN 2007 AND 2015

This chapter is the empirical analysis part of the study based on the discourse topics under which different representations of Turkish identity are discursively constructed in EP discourses, and thus various patterns of Europe are also revealed. For this aim, only the discourses of MEPs during the official EP debates whose titles include either the words “Turkey” or “enlargement” between 2007 and 2015 have been analyzed in detail to limit the scope of the research. In this regard, there have been 30 EP debates meeting these criteria, as shown in the Appendix II, out of 315 EP debates. This period is preferred because of many dynamic changes in the EU, Turkey, the international arena, and EU-Turkey relations affecting the discursive construction of Turkish identity and European identity in the EP, as mentioned in explaining the de-Europeanization process in Turkey.

The analyzed data are only based on the discourses of MEPs as the representatives of the citizens of Europe and thus a wide array of views, while the discourses of the President, Members of the Council, and Members of the Commission representing the European Union have not been taken into consideration. The analysis is organized around discourse topics, in which discursive strategies and the linguistic means used in the mentioned discursive topics are presented below through the selected excerpts from the EP debates¹⁶. The excerpts mentioned in this study and analyzed in detail are preferred because of their frequent and similar usages for the relevant discursive strategies and linguistic means used in the EP debates to systematically specify the same discourse topics. For this reason, these excerpts are regarded as “typical discourse fragments” in the construction of Turkish identity and, thereby, European identity in the EP through the analysis of EP debates (Jäger & Maier, 2009, p. 54).

This structure of representation of the analyzed data has been strengthened with additional categories of the analysis. These additions include primary events that have happened and been referred to in the debates, the EP groups and countries of the relevant MEP as the speaker, intertextuality/interdiscursivity, logical fallacies and representations of Turkey, and resulting representations of Europe. Divergence within the EP groups and countries, comparison to the 1997–2007 period, and general evaluation have also been categorized. These categories, which equate to 12 tables in total, with these additional ones for each year beginning from 2007 until 2015, aim to answer the research questions of this study. For these categories, it has also been necessary to determine the country of each MEP speaker. Only the language of the speeches mentioned in the transcribed verbatim is a limitation in this research.

Another limitation is the lack of translation of the speeches in 2013, 2014, and 2015. For these years, the translation into English of the verbatim report of proceedings is not on the official EP website since the EP decided to drop it on 20.11.2012 through the Amendment of Rule 181 on verbatim reports and Rule 182 on audiovisual recording of proceedings (European Parliament, 2012). With this decision, the EP aims to make savings from the budget on translation and interpretation. Nevertheless, each relevant

¹⁶ These debates transcribed verbatim as Word documents were retrieved through the archives website of the EP through the official EP website <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/debates-video.html>.

debate in 2013, 2014, and 2015 has been noted through listening to their videos on its website¹⁷. Therefore, their translation into English had to be personally provided.

This chapter is divided into four main discourse topics under which different Turkish and European identities are discursively constructed in the EP debates. However, it is not possible to completely separate these four categories from each other because of the intricate nature of the topics. These topics are indicated in the conceptualization of Turkey in the European security community, European democratic values, European political project, and European cultural space, which was already framed according to, and thus inspired by the analysis of Aydın-Düzgit in 2012. Nevertheless, this study's analysis differs in comparing repeated discourse topics in MEPs' articulations in the 2007–2015 period with those between 1997 and 2007 within the political context with lots of dynamic changes. Therefore, it brings out the divergence from, or convergence with, those in the 1997–2007 period. Moreover, the categories, equal to 12 tables in total, with the additional ones for each year, also reveal the difference in this analysis.

Within the image of the European security community, the construction of Turkey as a strategic partner and a security threat in the region is elaborated. In terms of European democratic values, images of Turkey in a difficult process of democratic transformation and Turkey as increasingly turning away from European norms and values are addressed. The constructions of Turkey as having a place in multireligious and multicultural Europe and Turkey as a non-European threat to European cultural structure with its Islamization agenda are analyzed within the representation of European cultural space. Finally, in the context of the European political/economic project, the discursive construction of Turkey as indispensable for the European political/economic project and Turkey as incompatible with the European political/economic project are displayed. In this framework drawn for Turkish identity, it should be noted that there are some additional positive or negative subgroups.

Furthermore, it is observed that arguments for/against Turkey's place in the EU political/economic project are largely determined or influenced by the strategic/normative/civilizational arguments outlined below in the sections entitled "Turkey in the European security community," "Turkey in terms of European democratic

¹⁷ This is because of the decision of the European Parliament in 2012 in the same Amendment, which is: "The proceedings of Parliament in the languages in which they are conducted, as well as the multilingual soundtrack from all active interpretation booths, shall be broadcast in real-time on its website" (European Parliament, 2012).

values,” and “Turkey in the European cultural space.” These sections largely seem to correspond to strategic (pragmatic), normative (moral), and ethical-political arguments in Habermas’s distinction among these types of arguments within the theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1993, pp. 1–17)¹⁸.

4.1 Turkey in the European Security Community

Security is discussed in the EP in a multidimensional way, including in the foreign policy, the defense policy, migration, the neighborhood policy of the EU, and interrelated economic, political, social, and environmental factors. In such a broad context, the EP frequently discusses Turkey’s crucial roles integrated with its NATO membership, candidate status, potential membership of the EU, and its (geo)strategic importance, which constitutes a critical and integral part of Turkey’s potential implications for European security. In this analysis, the discursive continuity of Europe as a security community as a discourse topic mentioned by Aydın-Düzgüt (2012, pp. 30–65) is seen in the parliamentary debates between 2007 and 2015.

Especially after the Arab uprisings in the early 2010s, the following immigration of masses to Europe, growing frictions because of oil and gas reserves in the eastern Mediterranean, and the war against the self-proclaimed Islamic State, attention to security intensified in the EP debates. Moreover, the peak of deaths from terrorism in 2015 as a single year since 2000 in Turkey and some EU member states, including Denmark, France, Germany, and Sweden, according to the Global Terrorism Index (2016, p. 17), highlighted the continued importance of European security, which was reflected as 12 debates on terrorism in the EP between 2007 and 2015¹⁹. As a result, the roles of Turkey

¹⁸ Within Jürgen Habermas’s theory of communicative action, there is an analytical distinction among three different categories of argument leading to “argumentatively achieved consensus”: pragmatic arguments, ethical-political arguments, and moral arguments (Habermas, 1993, pp. 1–17). The pragmatic argument is based on means-ends rationality and is evaluated with the logic of consequence (Sjursen, 2002, p. 494). The other two arguments are related to the logic of appropriateness since ethical-political arguments rely on the collective “us” with the values of a specific community and moral arguments depend on universal standards of justice (Sjursen, 2002, p. 494).

¹⁹ These debates are “External dimension of the fight against terrorism” on 14 February 2007, “Prüm Treaty: cross-border cooperation in combating terrorism and cross-border crime – Visa Information System (VIS) – Consultation of the Visa Information System (VIS) – Protection of personal data” on 06 June 2007, “Fight against terrorism” on 05 September 2007, “The factors favoring support for terrorism and the recruitment of terrorists” on 18 February 2008, “Cross-border cooperation to combat terrorism and cross-border crime” on 21 April 2008, “Combating terrorism – Protection of personal data on 23 September 2008, “Problem of profiling, notably on the basis of ethnicity and race, in counter-terrorism, law enforcement, immigration, customs and border control” on 23 April 2009, “European Action on victims of terrorism” on 15 December 2009, “Body scanners – Operation of intelligence services in the context of counter-terrorism strategies” on 10 February 2010, “Anti-terrorism measures” on 28 January 2015, “Protection of victims of terrorism” on 14 December 2015, and “Persecution of Christians around the world, in relation to the killing of students in Kenya by terror group Al-Shabaab” on 29 April 2015. These debates can be retrieved through the

for the interests of the European security community have attracted attention in all discursive spheres even when its membership of the EU has not been explicitly supported or discussed. Under the discursive construction of Europe as a security community, two opposite and prevailing representations of Turkey are presented as subtopics in this study. These prevailing representations are Turkey as a strategic partner and as a security threat in the region.

4.1.1 Turkey as a Strategic Partner in the Region

The importance of Turkey for Europe's interests in the region is one of the most repeated discourse topics in the EP debates. The concept of a strategic partnership between the EU and Turkey is frequently underlined in terms of its importance. This concept signifies long-term relationships and is mainly associated with realist assumptions on the structure of the international system, especially in the context of the end of the Cold War with common interests and common security issues while there are also other scholars who evaluate the practice of a strategic partnership as a social construction (Şahin, 2019, pp. 28–33). Turkey as a strategic partner for the security in the region, including the Black Sea, the Middle Eastern countries, the southern Caucasus, central Asia, and Africa, is often underlined in almost every debate in the EP between 2007 and 2015. In this analysis, it is observed that Turkey's role as a strategic partner for security is discussed with many topics such as energy, migration, and conflicts in the Middle Eastern countries, especially in the center-right EPP-ED/EPP/PPE discourse, as well as other groups in the EP even if its accession to the EU is not supported in all the excerpts:

For us, it is strategically important to have a reliable ally, neighbor and partner in the face of the Republic of Turkey. Regional and global challenges highlight the clear need to enhance cooperation on priority themes such as energy security and diversification of supplies, stability in the Middle East and the fight against irregular migration, which is particularly relevant in the context of discussing a new EU solidarity migration policy.

(Andrei Kovachev, PPE, 20 May 2015)

Turkey is a strategic partner of the European Union on security and defence issues, on energy security, on economic issues and on foreign policy as well. It is of outstanding strategic importance to the EU in addressing challenges and threats in Europe's eastern and southern neighbourhood.

(Doru-Claudian Frunzuliță, S&D, 20 May 2015)

As in the excerpts above, its strategically crucial role in Europe's security is discussed in different aspects. Besides these dimensions, it is necessary to mention that Turkey's geopolitical role and military capabilities within its strategic position for regional security are also mentioned in the EP as its assets and security opportunity for the sake of European security, which is not covered in the following subtopics. In this respect, its exclusion is found to be problematic and even risky by some MEPs because of its military ability to influence the EU, including European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), civilian CFSP missions such as the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL) and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), as well as its veto power in the NATO Council, which accordingly makes the issue of its candidacy to the EU vital²⁰. In this context, Turkey's regional importance is always underlined and praised as a strategic partner of Europe for the sake of Europe's security, which is elaborated below under the images of Turkey as a bridge between civilizations, a model for the Mediterranean and the Middle East, an alternative route for European energy security, and a host for refugees.

4.1.1.1 Turkey as a Bridge Between Civilizations

The discourses on Turkey's role as a bridge between civilizations are frequently observed in the EP debates between 2007 and 2015. In this regard, the continuity of the representations of "Turkey as a panacea for the clash of civilizations" revealed by Aydın-Düzgüt (2012, pp. 30–65) and "Turkey as one of the instruments to prevent the 'clash of

²⁰ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Marios Matsakis from the ALDE on 24 October 2007, Alexander Lambsdorff from the ALDE on 21 May 2008, Czesław Adam Siekierski from the PPE on 8 March 2011, Ria Oomen-Ruijten from the PPE on 28 March 2012, Renate Sommer from the PPE on 17 April 2013, Eduard Kukan from the PPE on 20 May 2015, and Doru-Claudian Frunzuliță from the S&D on 20 May 2015.

civilizations” emphasized by Öner (2009, p. 251) is recognized. Other researchers also reference this thesis while studying Turkish identity in the EP between 1997 and 2007. Türkeş-Kılıç (2020, p. 40) finds references to the clash of civilizations thesis in the representation of Turkey as a privileged partner. Levin (2011, p. 4) mentions this thesis in regard to whether Turkey is a European country in the introduction of his study. Lindgaard et al. (2018, p. 5) clarify the first driver of European identity-based representation of Turkey after 1999 with “the domestic debates on integration, security, religion, and identity in Europe, especially in the post-9/11 era of the clash of civilizations.” Alpan (2016, pp. 16–19) states that this thesis is also mentioned even in the AKP discourse to make Europe appear as “the embodiment of a harmony between the local and the global” for the annulment of the clash of civilizations thesis with Turkey through the promotion of an “alliance of civilizations.”

This section discursively analyzes diverse discourses from various EP groups on Turkey’s role between civilizations. In this respect, the concept of the clash of civilizations created and clarified by Samuel Huntington (1993, p. 146), which reappears after September 11, gains importance. According to this thesis, the main cultural dividing lines become apparent after the Cold War and “the paramount axis of world politics” and “a central focus of conflict for the immediate future” will be “between the West and several Islamic-Confucian states” (Bottici & Challand, 2006, pp. 315–316). Aydın-Düzgit (2012, p. 30) states that Huntington’s thesis defines “cultures and civilizations as essential and static, identified through certain geographic constellations,” while Said (2003, p. 69) prefers to use “monolithic” and “homogeneous” for the understanding of civilization in this concept as well as its “unchanging character of duality between us and them.” In this analysis, as in the study of Aydın-Düzgit (2012, p. 31), the center-right EPP-ED/PPE/EPP discourse is observed as being attached to its own opinions on Turkey’s geostrategic importance as a potential member, which is advocated through the clash of civilizations thesis:

I am sure we all agree that Turkey needs to make considerable efforts and that freedom of religion, freedom of expression and freedom of the press go without saying. However, I think it also needs to be stated that the negotiations with Turkey are not just negotiations with the state or nation of Turkey, but that Turkey also represents a kind of key or a bridge to the whole region. We therefore need to bear in mind that the EU’s relations with the region will deteriorate considerably if the door were to be closed again.

(Alf Svensson, PPE, 10 February 2010)

Sixthly, foreign policy. We Europeans are in favour of Turkey playing an active role in the region. Having said that, I would point out that Turkey will only be able to play a bridging role in that respect as long as the pillar of that bridge remains firmly anchored on the European side of the Bosphorus, too.

(Ria Oomen-Ruijten, PPE, 8 March 2011)

Turkey is predicated as a “bridge” to the region in the speeches above. Accordingly, this bridge can contribute to the EU only if Turkey is firmly kept close to the EU. In this respect, Europe is constructed as a security community that tries to save its influence in the region through Turkey even though it has problems with fundamental rights and freedoms. Through the referential strategy of collectivization (Pascual, 2008, p. 61), the “we” pronouns as deictic expressions above construct “Europeans” as a bounded and homogeneous group and as a whole with the duty of keeping Turkey close to the EU for the “EU’s relations with the region.” In this respect, a binary opposition is seen between the EU and Turkey in both excerpts above. Therefore, an apparent demarcation between Europeans and Turkey and a power relationship in favor of Europe are also constructed, while Turkey’s predication as a “bridge” between Europe and the region supports this distance of Turkey to Europe.

In the EP debates, it is seen that metaphors are used for “the construction of our knowledge about the world” rather than “just describing pre-established similarities between two subjects, and objectively mediating between them” (Drulak, 2006, p. 503). In this sense, the use of the “bridge” metaphor is essential since a bridge connects two items (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 32). Nevertheless, a bridge does not become a part of any part. These two sides of the bridge metaphor here refer to Europe and the region in constructing a binary opposition while this region is specified as the Middle East and Asia below:

Turkey is a bridge between Europe, the Middle East and Asia: a country strong both economically and militarily, and the sole NATO member close to the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus. The European Union needs Turkey and Turkey needs the European Union. All the issues with Turkey can be settled in the process of negotiating Turkey’s accession to the European Union.

(Doru-Claudian Frunzuliță, S&D, 20 May 2015)

While we are open to cooperation in relation to the Middle East and on mutual security challenges, we strongly condemn the abuse of anti-terrorism laws. It is, after all, NATO's second largest army, but a significant portion of this army's leadership now faces the most serious charges of committing terrorist activities or of plotting a coup. It is essential for Turkey, its role in NATO and its relations with the EU that both process and outcomes of these trials are fairly conducted and that suspects get a due process.

(Marietje Schaake, ALDE, 28 March 2012)

An intense interdiscursivity with the clash of civilizations discourse is intensified with the Arab uprisings after 2010. Similar discourses of the center left and liberals are also observed in the security-related arguments about Turkey. In the first extract from the S&D, Turkey's accession is directly associated with Europe's security interests with the predication of Turkey as not only "a bridge between Europe, the Middle East, and Asia" but also "the sole NATO member close to the Middle East, central Asia and the Caucasus." At the same time, the second speech also predicates Turkey as "NATO's second-largest army." In this respect, the second excerpt implicitly regards various charges directed to "a significant portion of this army's leadership" in Turkey within the domestic developments as a possible matter for the European security community. Thus, Turkey as a bridge is also considered for militarily sustaining European security in the liberal narrative.

I firmly believe that the process of convergence of civilisations will be complicated and lengthy and it will be simple neither for us nor for Turkish society. I therefore think that in this case, we must arm ourselves with patience and we must be prepared for long negotiations but, in these negotiations, we must act correctly and honourably and speak openly about all of the problems. It is in our interests and also in the interests of the Turkish people, and when this problem is sorted out and brought to a successful conclusion, it will be an achievement both for Europe and for Turkey.

(Jaroslav Paška, EFD, 10 February 2010)

Finally, I would not like us to forget some of the fundamental reasons which advocate this country's accession to the European Union. Turkey is clearly a member of the European family and is an important partner in the dialogue between civilisations. Bringing a secular,

democratic and modern Turkey closer to the European Union is certainly an asset for our community.

(Cristian Dan Preda, PPE, 10 February 2010)

Europe/the EU is discursively constructed as a superior civilization in the excerpts above from center-right to extreme right-wing political groups, which implies intertextuality with the clash of civilizations discourse. The terms “the process of convergence of civilizations” and “the dialogue between civilizations” through Turkey reinforce the underlying tenets of the clash of civilizations thesis. In both speeches, through the referential strategy of collectivization (Pascual, 2008, p. 61) of the “we” pronoun as a deictic expression and the relationalization (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 53) through the word “family,” a clear demarcation between civilizations as monolithic, coherent, bounded, and homogeneous cultural blocs is discursively accepted since their convergence is targeted through dialogue sustained by Turkey.

Both excerpts directly construct Turkey’s accession to the EU as a matter of interest and an asset for European security. It is also essential to add that in the EP’s discourse, Turkey’s role between civilizations is not mentioned anymore after the first years of the Arab uprisings because of Turkey’s severe setbacks with its democracy. Intertextuality and interdiscursivity with the clash of civilizations discourse are also used to refute Turkey’s accession. Accordingly, Turkey is seen as a civilization apart from Europe. It is even accused of imposing on Europe its choice of civilization because of its problems in regard to fundamental rights, the rule of law, and democracy, especially after 2013²¹.

Finally, I also want to draw attention to a point that we have discussed repeatedly, the expression of support for the initiative by the Spanish Prime Minister, Mr Zapatero, and his Turkish counterpart, Mr Erdoğan, on what they call the Alliance of Civilizations. We hope that Parliament will eventually support our amendments on that today.

(Jan Marinus Wiersma, PSE, 21 May 2008)

²¹ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Mark Demesmaeker from the Verts/ALE on 12 June 2013, Morten Messerschmidt from the ECR on 17 December 2014, Nikolaos Salavrakos from the EFD on 11 March 2014, William (the Earl of) Dartmouth from the EFD on 11 March 2014, Edouard Ferrand from the ENF on 20 May 2015, Angel Djambazkifrom the ECR on 10 June 2015, and James Carver from the EFDD on 7 October 2015.

That is why my Group has tabled two amendments to congratulate Turkey as co-sponsor, along with Spain, of the official UN Alliance of Civilizations project. This should not be forgotten, since it is through this project that Turkey shows its commitment to assist with relations between the West and the Arab-Islamic world.

(Emilio Menéndez del Valle, PSE, 21 May 2008)

Some attempts that paradoxically approve the clash of civilizations thesis are observed in the debates to invalidate this thesis. In both excerpts above, the “Alliance of Civilizations” initiative²² is mentioned. Nevertheless, this initiative to refute the clash of civilizations discourse still reinforces the key assumption of the clash of civilizations discourse as Aydın-Düzgüt (2012, p. 34) has already found out. It implicitly accepts that separate civilizations, namely the Eastern and Western worlds, are juxtaposed against one another, and thus the establishment of close contact between these cultures is necessary. While this initiative itself contains intertextuality and interdiscursivity with the clash of civilizations discourse, the second extract above also underlines two monolithic and disparate worlds as “the West and the Arab-Islamic world.”

As the referential strategy of culturalization, the word “Arab” is used for the ethnification of one side above, while the word “Islamic” is employed for religionization (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 50). Therefore, an entity is homogenized by determining religion and ethnicity, which helps construct a binary opposition as a classic feature of the clash of civilizations “between the West and the Arab-Islamic world.” In the same way, Keyman (2016, p. 2281) points out similar results based on his analysis of global academic and public debates on Turkey at the beginning of the 2010s. Accordingly, Turkey is “an alternative to the clash of civilizations thesis” as in the Inter-Civilization Dialogue Project of the United Nations (UN)²³ and its “significant historical experience” from which the Muslim world, and especially the Arab world, could benefit for the sake of their democratization attempts.

²² See Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s “A Call for Respect and Calm” in the International Herald Tribune on 5 February 2006 (retrieved on 17.04.2021 from <https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/05/opinion/a-call-for-respect-and-calm.html>).

²³ According to d’Orville, the inter-civilizational dialogue is complementary to the Alliance of Civilizations initiative to maximize their complementary roles. See his article “What the UN Can Do to Promote Dialogue among Civilizations” accessible at <https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/what-un-can-do-promote-dialogue-among-civilizations>.

In sum, the representation of Turkey as a bridge between civilizations based on Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis is popular among the main center-right, center-left, liberal, and extreme right-wing political groups between 2007 and 2015. Turkey is discursively constructed as a bridge between civilizations for the dialogue between the European/Western and Arab/Islamic worlds, which underlines interdiscursivity with the clash of civilizations thesis. This representation depends on and, in turn, regenerates Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis in which two homogeneous and monolithic civilizations of Europe/the West and Arab/Islamic worlds are juxtaposed against one another. Furthermore, the "Alliance of Civilizations" initiative also contributes to the reproduction of this thesis in the discourses of the center left.

4.1.1.2 Turkey as a Model for the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern Countries

Discourses on Turkey's role among civilizations are intensified, especially after the Arab uprisings, in the EP debates. It is observed that this gives way to discursively constructing Turkey as a model for these civilizations besides its bridge function mentioned above. In this context, this section discursively and critically analyzes diverse discourses from various EP groups that draw Turkey as a model for the southern neighborhood countries. The discourse on Turkey as a model country for the Mediterranean and the Middle Eastern countries as the Muslim world is not new rhetoric, although it is not articulated in the EP. It was already used in Europe after September 11 and the Iraq War as a reflection of "deeper legacies of colonialism and neo-orientalism produced in Europe's own history with the Mediterranean," according to Aydın-Düzgüt et al. (2020, p. 741). They state that Turkish accession to the EU is defended since Turkey, as a democratic Muslim model, would become "a successful model to emulate for the countries" in the Mediterranean and the Middle East through its religious affinity, which would reduce security threats to Europe (Aydın-Düzgüt et al., 2020, p. 760).

In their article, whose data cover an EP debate on Turkey in March 2011, Aydın-Düzgüt et al. (2020, pp. 742–745) explain that Turkey as a model for the Mediterranean holds the discursive marks of Europe's colonial past as a historical legacy, which re-emerges in the contemporary construction of the image. In the same vein, this analysis shows that with the Arab uprisings, MEPs, especially from the center-right, center-left, liberal, and green political groups, as the vast majority of the EP begin to defend a closer

relationship with Turkey and re-energize Turkey's accession talks with the EU (Aydın-Düzgüt et al., 2020, p. 747). They advocate that a democratic, Muslim Turkey, with its accession to the EU, would become a successful role model for Arab and Middle Eastern countries (Aydın-Düzgüt et al., 2020, p. 748). In this regard, the discursive continuity of the representations of Turkey as a model to be copied revealed by Aydın-Düzgüt (2012, p. 51) and as a model for the Muslim world emphasized by Öner (2009, p. 257) is distinguished, while Lindgaard et al. (2018, p. 2) also underline Turkey as a model secular democracy for the Arab Spring countries in 2011.

In this discursive continuity, the critical factor is identified as the recognition of Islam “as the primary political identity over the diverse geography of North Africa and the Middle East, which enables the use of Islam as an instrument of subordination and control” (Aydın-Düzgüt et al., 2020, p. 743). Accordingly, in terms of subordination, the EU is constructed as a secular-liberal, superior, and consolidated democracy (Aydın-Düzgüt et al., 2020, p. 743). Nevertheless, the southern Mediterranean and the Middle East, which are ascribed Islam as their primal identity, are constructed as a homogeneous political space with compromised, tenuous, and contested democratizing efforts (Aydın-Düzgüt et al., 2020, p. 743). The term “control” for the ascription of Islam as the primal identity is preferred to maintain the European influence in this region and control “political identities around the secular-religious divide” (Aydın-Düzgüt et al., 2020, p. 743). In this framework, the predication of Turkey as a role model Muslim country in the wake of the Arab uprisings known as the “Arab Spring” is interpreted as the preservation of this Eurocentric, neo-orientalist, and neocolonial structure of subordination and control through democracy promotion in Muslim-dominated countries (Aydın-Düzgüt et al., 2020, pp. 743–745).

Aydın-Düzgüt et al. (2020, p. 745) mention that in the EU's discourse on Turkey, the “model” rhetoric for the Islamic world is frequently embraced with Eurocentric and neo-orientalist assumptions, especially in the first years of the Arab uprisings as follows:

Also, by accepting Turkey, the EU would encourage that country to play a positive role in the democratisation of north Africa. Turkey represents a model, to which most Arab countries aspire, while turning their back on Iran. A greater contribution to the fight against the threat of terrorism can hardly be imagined. Fellow Members, it is in this context that we must look again at Turkish membership of the EU without any prejudices.

(Boris Zala, S&D, 21 November 2012)

Turkey is undoubtedly an essential partner of the European Union, with whom we share mutual strategic interests. I think it is right that we are continuing developments with Turkey that make it clear that Turkey is in the European and transatlantic camp. You only have to look at the map to know that it is in the European interest as well as in the interest of Turkey if it wants to secure and expand its level of development in the long term, and not only in the economic area, where it has been successful is. But I also think that Turkey can be an effective factor in stability and a role model in the region, and I am pleased that relations between Israel and Turkey seem to be getting better again. It should be encouraged accordingly, so as to set stability in its region.

(Elmar Brok, PPE, 17 April 2013)

However, it should be remembered that Turkey remains the leader of democratic transformations in the region, thus being a model for other Muslim countries. Its geostrategic position, role in the North Atlantic Alliance and contribution to the economic development of Europe are attributes to which we should pay special attention in mutual political relations.

(Adam Bielan, ECR, 12 June 2013)

The speeches above contain the predication of Turkey as a “model” country for the countries of the Middle East and the Mediterranean for the stability and democratic transformations in the region. In general, it is observed in the EP that the parliamentarians from the center-right, center-left, liberal, green, and extreme-right political groups, constituting the majority of the EP, utilize the model discourse in the EP with the Arab uprisings. They justify Turkey’s engagement with those countries on the basis of its significance as a model in the region and thus its contribution to the EU. In the “model” rhetoric, colonial and Eurocentric dispositions attract attention. The Mediterranean and the Middle East are distanced with the choice of the Turkish democracy as a model rather than a Western model democracy in the hierarchy of democracy, as Aydın-Düzgit et al. (2020, p. 748) mention. This choice is based on the belief that “religious/cultural affinity around the shared Islamic identity would lead to a policy of imitation” (Aydın-Düzgit et al., 2020, p. 748). Thus, it is discursively constructed that a superior Europe that guides a Muslim country presumed to be culturally affiliated to the Middle East contributes to the

democratization processes in this region, which reinstates the “subordination of the Mediterranean and the Middle East to the West” (Aydın-Düzgit et al., 2020, p. 749).

Turkey’s contribution as a model to most Arab countries is predicated as “the fight against the threat of terrorism,” while Turkey’s exclusion from Europe causing security threats from the south is also implied in the first extract. Therefore, this excerpt securitizes the southern neighborhood, which is already not new in the EU discourse²⁴. Securitization is an extreme version of politicization and a speech act in which the actor securitizing an issue and the audience accepting the claim create together a security issue (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 23–34). In this respect, securitization discourse is not seen as an innocent act. The reason is that this discourse hides a given community’s unique, historical, and thus controversial character through constructing security as an objective and dehistoricized demand while utilizing its politically powerful identity (Hansen, 2006, pp. 34–35). Moreover, the term “Arab” in the second excerpt shows the ethnification of one side through culturalization as the referential strategy (Pascual, 2008, p. 63), which also contributes to the construction of a binary opposition between the EU and the Arab countries as in the clash of civilizations thesis.

The second excerpt explicitly constructs a realist perspective through a conventional metaphor of equilibrium, namely “mutual strategic interests” of both Turkey and the EU, while predicating Turkey as a model for the region’s stability (Drulak, 2006, p. 512). Nevertheless, the repetitive use of the “we” pronoun referring to Europeans in this extract underlines the exclusion of Turkey, although “continuing developments with Turkey” positions Turkey in “the European and transatlantic camp,” which depends on the state and course of “mutual strategic interests.” Moreover, the “map” reference for geography here is vital since the critical political geographers claim that “geography supports increasingly uncertain sociocultural and political spheres” in which “geographical imaginings are constructed as an attempt to denote territory as well as identity concretely” (Pace, 2006, p. 163). Therefore, further legitimation of the model rhetoric as an identity construction for Turkey is sustained through geography in the first excerpt. This speech also repeatedly employs a political flag word, “stability,” to justify

²⁴ In this regard, the discussions of Pace (2006, pp. 101–111) are exemplified because of his analysis of the in-depth securitization of the Mediterranean in the official discourse of the EU and the discourse of the member states. Accordingly, the official EU discourse enlarged the frame of the Mediterranean after the 2003 Iraq War in order to involve the southern neighbors of Turkey, namely Syria, Iraq, and Iran.

Turkey as a role model through positive deontic-evaluative meanings (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 55).

Within the “model” rhetoric in the third speech above from the ECR, Turkey and “other Muslim countries” are considered similar since as an encompassing, monolithic, and binding identity for this region, Islam is under the neo-orientalist and Eurocentric construction together with an unchanging and static Muslim-majority population. Nevertheless, Western or European countries are not described with any “distinguishing religion,” including Christianity, which accordingly provides European superiority, and the positive representation of the European Self served as a benchmark. In this respect, Keyder (2005, p. 2) states that Islam is accepted as being “expressive of the presumed totality of the civilization that the West wished to communicate with.” According to the underlying neo-orientalist assumption, Europe has overridden the effect of the religion of Christianity while the Muslim world is stuck in Islam as its unchanging characteristics (Aydın-Düzgüt et al., 2020, p. 749; Said, 1981, p. 10). This is because modern arguments depict Islam as an obstacle to women’s rights and democracy because of the presumed conflict between Islam and secularism (Hurd, 2006, pp. 401–418).

The current crisis reconfirms the strategic dimension of relations between the European Union and Turkey. Refugees, Syria, energy, our access to the Muslim world in general can be greatly improved if we are aware of the importance of this relationship. For many years, I have been a supporter of strengthening this strategic relationship between Turkey and the European Union, but today I am also worried. Turkey is going through a political crisis, the result of an economic slowdown, after years of substantial economic progress, but also as a result of President Erdoğan’s systematic effort to turn Turkey out of a parliamentary democracy into an autocratic presidential regime.

(Victor Boştinaru, S&D, 7 October 2015)

Mr President, for decades Turkey was the great democratic success story in the Muslim world. When the Arab Spring risings happened you heard the same sentiment expressed all across the region, from Morocco to Jordan. People would say: ‘We want to be like Turkey. We want to be a free-market, pluralist, multiparty, secular Muslim democracy.’ That places a particular burden on our Turkish allies to hold themselves to a higher standard.

(Daniel Hannan, ECR, 15 January 2015)

In the EP's discourse on Turkey, the model rhetoric for the Muslim world is not preferred anymore after the first years of the Arab uprisings because of Turkey's severe setbacks with its democracy and economy referred to in the excerpts above from the S&D and the ECR. In the first extract above, through *synecdochising personalization*, the responsibility of "an autocratic presidential regime" is reduced to Erdoğan as the reason for this regime (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 111). Moreover, Turkey is portrayed as being in a de-Europeanization process, including economy and democracy, which harms the "strategic relationship" between Turkey and the EU and accordingly affects "our access to the Muslim world" through Turkey as a once-model country for this world. Besides the rise of authoritarianism as in the first excerpt above and the increasing violation of human rights and freedom, Aydın-Düzgit and Dandashly (2021, pp. 1–2) add that Turkey's unstable foreign policy behavior is generally incompatible with the EU and the US also gave rise to destroying this model rhetoric in the West. Nevertheless, the model discourse already used before for September 11 and the Iraq War may re-emerge when political conditions and context fundamentally change.

In the second extract from the ECR, the use of the past tense creates the impression that this representation of Turkey as a model for the Muslim world is no longer valid. Through the argumentation strategy of hasty generalization with "the same sentiment expressed all across the region" and the construction of the EU as a representative that speaks for people "from Morocco to Jordan," a hyperbolic construction of reality is achieved here. In this reality, the representation of Turkey as "a free-market, pluralist multiparty" and "secular Muslim democracy" as "a higher standard" for it loads "a particular burden" on Turkey, which implies that the model rhetoric is not suitable for Turkey anymore. Moreover, the term "Muslim world" in both excerpts is used as the referential strategy of regionalization (Pascual, 2008, p. 64). Therefore, it discursively homogenizes this "world" with a distinguishing religion.

In summary, the predication of Turkey as a role model Muslim country in the wake of the Arab uprisings is seen as the preservation of the Eurocentric, orientalist, and neocolonial structure of subordination and control through democracy promotion in Muslim-dominated countries. In the model rhetoric, Islam is regarded as an encompassing, monolithic, and binding identity for this region under the neo-orientalist and Eurocentric construction. Moreover, a realist perspective with "mutual strategic interests" of the EU and Turkey is also underlined here within this model image. Nevertheless, after the first years of the Arab uprisings, the model rhetoric for the Muslim

world is not used anymore because of Turkey's problems with its democracy and economy.

4.1.1.3 Turkey as an Alternative Route for European Energy Security

Energy security is a crucial part of the EU's global actorness (Göral, 2011, p. 3). It is one of "five mutually reinforcing and closely interrelated *dimensions*" within "A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy," published in 2015 (European Commission, 2015, p. 4). Nevertheless, the internal energy resources in the EU are both limited and have a high marginal cost of production, which makes energy supply a crucial issue for the EU in order to keep its global role (Göral, 2011, p. 3). Furthermore, the Energy Security Strategy set out by the EC in 2014 underlines the vulnerability of the EU to external energy shocks (European Commission, 2015, p. 4). This is because of problems in the diversification of energy suppliers to the EU member states (Göral, 2011, p. 4). In this respect, the EC aims to restrict the number of imports from non-EU states, including limiting Russia as the leading gas supplier of Europe, currently at around "45% of the total gas supply, to a maximum of 30% of the total energy supply in order to increase energy security" in the EU (Göral, 2011, p. 4).

In this regard, Turkey's strategic role in energy security as one of the alternative ways of providing the diversification of energy suppliers is one of the most repeated, crucial, and underlined topics in the EP debates. Even though Turkey does not make the production of natural gas or oil, Keyman (2016, p. 2282) mentions Turkey's crucial strategic role in the "transmission of natural gas between the Middle East, the post-Soviet republics, and Europe," which is also mentioned in the EP debates in this way. With regard to the discursive continuity, the previous studies focusing on the 1997–2007 period do not mention this image of Turkey as an alternative route for European energy security. However, there are references to energy security in the studies of Aydın-Düzgit (2012, p. 41) and Türkeş-Kılıç (2018, p. 39).

The events of summer 2008 highlighted Turkey's strategic role, including in the energy sector. In the area of regional cooperation, the constructive role which Turkey played in its relations with neighbouring countries and in the Middle East through active diplomacy was noted. The developments in the Caucasus highlighted Turkey's strategic importance for the

EU's energy security, especially through the diversification of transport routes. The document emphasises the importance of close cooperation in the energy sector between the EU and Turkey, with the Nabucco project being a key element in this respect.

(Nicolae Vlad Popa, PPE-DE, 11 March 2009)

I think it is good that Mrs Oomen-Ruijten's report talks about the opening of new negotiation chapters, such as 15, on energy. It seems to me that cooperation between Turkey and the Union in energy matters is very relevant indeed. We Europeans need to diversify our sources of supply and also the routes through which energy supplies flow. Turkey, because of its geographical location, occupies a strategic place in the necessary diversification.

(Francisco José Millán Mon, PPE, 17 April 2013)

In the first speech above, the construction of Europe as an energy security community is realized through the term "the EU's energy security," which includes "security" as a political flag word (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 191). Furthermore, Turkey's strategic importance for energy security is underlined through "the diversification of transport routes" since, accordingly, Turkey's cooperation is useful for providing alternative routes for energy supply, such as Turkey's Nabucco project ending in the territory of Austria (Göral, 2011, pp. 100–162).

The second excerpt also explains the reason for Turkey's strategic importance for energy matters in Europe. Through the *topos* of usefulness, Turkey's usefulness is clarified with its function of providing necessary diversification of European energy supply thanks to its geographical location, which affects the progress at the opening of the energy chapter. Therefore, the second extract above ties the cooperation of Turkey with the EU for providing an alternative way to its accession process. Nevertheless, it is observed that none of the MEPs in the center-right group keep this tie²⁵. Additionally, this excerpt uses a conventional metaphor of equilibrium, namely "cooperation" between Turkey and the Union, to construct an understanding of Europe as an "interaction between fixed units that continuously seek mutual trade-offs" with embedding an influential realist metaphorical expression (Drulak, 2006, p. 512). Moreover, in the second extract above, ethnification of one side as a referential strategy of culturalization is also realized through

²⁵ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Elena Băsescu from the PPE on 20 September 2010, Elena Băsescu from the PPE on 18 April 2013, Andrei Kovachev from the PPE on 20 May 2015, and Francisco José Millán Mon from the PPE on 20 May 2015.

the use of the word “Europeans” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 50), while this word used with the deictic “we” contributes to the binary division between “us,” namely “we Europeans,” and “Turkey.”

Remember that Turkey is the EU’s sixth largest trading partner. And it will also play an important role in the construction of energy routes for the transport of gas and oil, which Europe necessarily needs from neighboring countries towards Europe.

(Oldrich Vlasak, ECR, 17 April 2013)

I believe that both the Commission and the European Parliament have overestimated the importance of Turkey in the energy sector. Turkey does not produce energy. Turkey is an exceptional channel for energy networks. It does not resolve any particular problems for us; there are other networks via which energy can be transmitted. We should be realistic and we should see that, in the energy sector, everything we are discussing (Nabucco and so forth) are exercises on paper, because the country itself cannot supply us with energy. On the contrary, it is a country with a great deal of industry which needs energy and it is from this angle that we should be examining it.

(Niki Tzavela, EFD, 20 September 2010)

The MEP from the ECR utilizes one of the most repeated predications of Turkey in the EU debates as a “trading partner” while it also accepts Turkey’s importance for “energy routes for the transport of gas and oil,” which affects Europe’s dependence on Turkey. Nevertheless, Turkey is also predicated as one of the “neighboring countries towards Europe,” discursively making Turkey an outsider. In other words, Turkey is not perceived as a potential EU member state in the first excerpt, contrary to some MEPs from the EPP-ED/EPP/PPE mentioned before. The second extract above is exemplary of the general acceptance of Turkey’s perception as an alternative route for energy supply in the EP through Turkey’s predication as “an exceptional channel for energy networks” even if its importance is found to be “overestimated” and other networks are also mentioned. Therefore, it is observed that in the extreme right-wing discourse, Turkey is constructed as an alternative route for energy supply in order to ensure energy security in Europe, even though this rhetoric is not necessarily connected to the Turkish accession process all the time.

We have a choice between pushing Turkey into Russia's arms or keeping Turkey in institutionalized cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic world. From this perspective, I suggest three important directions: 1) cooperation in the humanitarian field, where Turkey is already making a significant contribution to taking in the largest number of refugees from Syria; 2) cooperation in the field of foreign policy in the fight against terrorism, in stopping funding for terrorist groups as well as in stopping arms trafficking, identifying and isolating foreign combatants; 3) conclude by supporting the importance of opening Chapter XV in the field of energy, the only one that will allow us to reduce dependence on gas imports from a single supplier, namely Russia.

(Victor Boştinaru, S&D, 6 February 2015)

Mr. President, in this Parliament we speak very often, every time, at every session about the problems of migration, refugees, energy problems of the European Union. Turkey is our ally in these. Turkey is our ally when we talk about 2 million refugees and when we talk about what the possibility of a different energy supply means. And because it is our partner, we have the right to talk about the problems that exist for Turkey to move towards the European Union and joining the European Union. Because these problems exist, because we are allies, we must make it clear that until there is appropriate democratic change and reform in Turkey, it cannot become part of the European Union. But that is why I think that the negotiation process and openness to partners in Turkey, taking everything into account, is a very important moment in order to create regional peace in that part of Europe, that is, the world.

(Ivan Jakovcic, ALDE, 20 May 2015)

Although it is not as widespread as the right-wing politicians, the issue of Turkey as an alternative energy route is also mentioned in left-wing and liberal groups. In the first speech from the S&D, Russia is constructed as a negative other vis-à-vis the “Euro-Atlantic world.” For this reason, “directions” to keep Turkey close to “the Euro-Atlantic world,” including NATO and the USA, are described, which shows the security dimension of this remark²⁶. In this excerpt, one of the alleged directions is about the opening of the energy chapter in the negotiation process, which is widespread in the EP

²⁶ There are also other MEPs from various groups who position Russia against the EU, and thus Turkey is discursively constructed as an alternative route, mainly to Russia. See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Traian Ungureanu from the PPE on 10 February 2010, Adam Bielan from the ECR on 17 April 2013, Birgit Schnieber-Jastram from the PPE on 17 April 2013, Victor Boştinaru from the S&D on 20 May 2015, Geoffrey Van Orden from the ECR on 20 May 2015, and Jan Zahradil from the ECR on 7 October 2015.

debates except for the discourses of the Greek and Cypriot MEPs from various groups because of the Cyprus issue²⁷. Regardless of the EP groups, many Greek and Cypriot MEPs explicitly object to the opening of the energy chapter. Nevertheless, even the smaller Eurosceptic and extreme-right factions in the EP against the Turkish accession mentioned above are not in direct opposition to the opening of this chapter. This shows that their national interests in the Cyprus issue prevail over Europe's interests regarding energy security.

Furthermore, in this excerpt, an interdiscursivity with the discourse of Europe as a “civilian power” is employed since the need for cooperation and nonmilitary instruments such as “stopping funding for terrorist groups,” “stopping arms trafficking,” and “identifying and isolating foreign combatants” are referred to rather than “hard-power solutions” including military operations (Maull, 1990, pp. 92–93). Moreover, the *topos* of danger is employed with the post-9/11 war rhetoric “the fight against terrorism” in which Turkey's geopolitical significance is contextualized (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 37). This rhetoric shows a convergence with the finding of Aydın-Düzgit (2012, p. 34) in the 1997–2007 period. Nevertheless, there is also a divergence from the study of Aydın-Düzgit (2012, p. 37) in the 1997–2007 period. It is observed that not only the center-left and liberal groups but also the right-wing groups, including the PPE and the ECR in the period between 2007 and 2015, construct Europe as a security community in the competition for power and hegemony against Russia²⁸.

In the second excerpt above, Turkey is predicated as a “partner,” an “ally,” and “a different energy supply means,” which entails the construction of Turkey as an alternative route for energy. This extract also ties the cooperation of Turkey with the EU for providing “different energy supply means” to its accession process. While the metaphoric expression of “to create regional peace” discursively sustains the construction of Europe as a security community, other metaphoric expressions of “appropriate democratic

²⁷ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Adamos Adamou from the GUE/NGL on 11 March 2009, Takis Hatzigeorgiou from the GUE/NGL on 25 November 2009, Takis Hadjigeorgiou from the GUE/NGL on 10 February 2010, Antigoni Papadopoulou from the S&D on 27 September 2011, Kyriacos Triantaphyllidis from the GUE/NGL on 12 June 2013, Antigoni Papadopoulou from the S&D on 11 March 2014, George Epitheus from the NI on 20 May 2015, Neoklis Sylikiotis from the GUE/NGL on 20 May 2015, and Manolis Kefaloyiannis from the PPE on 20 May 2015.

²⁸ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Traian Ungureanu from the PPE on 10 February 2010, Adam Bielan from the ECR on 17 April 2013, Birgit Schnieber-Jastram from the PPE on 17 April 2013, Geoffrey Van Orden from the ECR on 20 May 2015, Jan Zahradil from the ECR on 7 October 2015, Lefteris Christoforou from the PPE on 2 December 2015, Charles Tannock from the ECR on 7 October 2015, and Charles Tannock from the ECR on 20 May 2015.

change and reform in Turkey” contribute to positive self-representation of the EU as a normative power that can ensure democratic change and reform in countries, which is the convergence with the 1997–2007 term.

In sum, it is concluded that Turkey’s strategic importance for energy security is discursively constructed in the EP through the alternative route rhetoric for the diversification of transport routes, especially with the Nabucco pipeline. In many center-right discourses, the cooperation of Turkey with the EU for providing an alternative way is tied to its accession process. Even in the minor Eurosceptic and extreme-right factions in the EP against Turkish accession, Turkey’s image as an alternative route for energy supply is accepted even if its importance is found to be exaggerated. The liberal and left-wing groups also predicate Turkey as an alternative energy route, while an interdiscursivity with the discourse of Europe as a “civilian power” is also observed in an excerpt from these groups. Both the center-left and liberal groups and the right-wing groups, including the PPE and the ECR, construct Europe as a security community in the competition for power and hegemony against Russia, while in the 1997–2007 period, only the center-left and liberal groups had this tendency. Moreover, “the fight against terrorism” as the post-9/11 war rhetoric and the positive self-representation of the EU as a normative power in the extracts are findings converging with the study of the 1997–2007 period.

4.1.1.4 Turkey as a Host for Refugees

Various scholars, including Doty (1998, pp. 80–81), Bigo (2006, pp. 394–400), Huysmans (2006, p. 81), and Kaya (2009, p. 11), state how national debates concerning immigrants and migration discursively construct them as a *problematique* for national security, especially in the aftermath of 9/11. Securitization of migration is also typical in the EP debates. In this respect, it is observed that debates over the refugee problem after the conflict in Syria have become prominent in the EP since 2012. For this reason, there is no continuity of the representation of Turkey in this role in the 1997–2007 period. Instead, Turkey was then discursively constructed as a potential security threat for Europe with the fear of uncontrolled migration from Turkish people in the studies of Levin (2011, pp. 191–193) and Aydın-Düzgüt (2012, p. 55). As “waves of refugees to the gates of Europe,” the refugee problem is considered a result of the disintegration of Syria and the unraveling of Iraq (Keyman, 2016, p. 2276). Turkey is considered an effective and

affected actor in this landscape, with 2.5 million refugees residing within its borders and major cities (Keyman, 2016, p. 2280).

Within this framework, a strategic rapprochement between the EU and Turkey was observed as a result of the massive flow of Syrian refugees to Europe in 2015 and the lack of European response to this flow, according to Saatçioğlu (2020, p. 174). In this context, the EU preferred to externalize the management of this problem to Turkey through the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan in October 2015, which is the basis of the EU-Turkey Statements of 29 November 2015 and 18 March 2016 (Saatçioğlu, 2020, p. 174). Therefore, Turkey is assured of EU financial aid for hosted refugees, accession talks re-energized with the EU, and the provisional possibility of Schengen visa liberalization for Turkish citizens on the condition of hindering the refugee flow to Europe and hosting them in Turkey, which is evaluated as “the EU’s deviation from conditionality in 2015 and 2016 as a key illustration of its functionalism vis-à-vis Turkey” (Saatçioğlu, 2020, p. 174).

Some MEPs agree with the above argument. They accuse the EU of making a “dirty deal,” “whitewashing of the political situation in Turkey,” giving Turkey “privileges to make it self-evident,” “turning a blind eye on human rights,” “outsourcing our problems” while also blaming Turkey for politicizing and instrumentalizing the refugee issue as “a weapon in its diplomacy,” “slave trading,” “a means of exerting pressure on the EU” and others in the discourses of some MEPs from center-left, center-right, Eurosceptic, extreme-right, and Liberal/Green EFA groups²⁹. Nevertheless, it is dominant in the EP debates that Turkey’s attitude to the refugees is frequently welcomed and even appreciated, even though it does not necessarily refer to Turkey’s inclusion as a potential EU member state because of criticisms of its problems regarding the rule of law, human rights, and democracy:

Turkey is a positive and active partner of the European Union that has introduced numerous reforms; it is a loyal firm ally of the West within the Atlantic Alliance, where it took risks due to the invasion of Kuwait; it is a strategic country in the passage of the Black Sea hydrocarbons; and it is a country that plays an important role in the "Arab Spring" conflict

²⁹ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Ska Keller from the Verts / ALE on 7 October 2015, Franz Obermayr from the NI on 7 October 2015, Lefteris Christoforou from the PPE on 2 December 2015, Ska Keller from the Verts / ALE on 2 December 2015, Miltiadis Kyrkos from the S&D on 7 October 2015, Notis Marias from the ECR on 7 October 2015, Renate Sommer from the PPE on 7 October 2015, and Guy Verhofstadt from the ALDE on 2 December 2015.

and has hosted more than 400,000 Syrian refugees. Therefore, Mrs Ashton, we cannot afford a European Union-prompted destabilization of the situation in Turkey.

(José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra, PPE, 12 June 2013)

At a time when we ourselves are having intensive discussions in the EU – and indeed this morning in this Chamber – about how adequate protection can be given to refugees, we commend and praise all the efforts made by the Turkish Government in hosting more refugees than any other country in the world today. If we want to make sure that those in need of protection can find a safe haven in the region, we need to step up our efforts actively to assist Turkey in providing adequate shelter, healthcare and education for refugees and their children.

(Kati Piri, S&D, 20 May 2015)

Nevertheless, let us be honest with this country, which is to be treated with respect! We need help from Turkey, for that Turkey needs our help. We can offer visa facilitation, we can offer more money, we can offer better infrastructural support in the refugee camps, we can do a lot of pragmatic things to address the real challenges. But let's be honest: Turkey is a strategic partner, it is an important neighbor, but the fact that this enlargement process can be revived is pure rhetoric, it has nothing to do with honesty. We must not remain silent in the face of the violation of the fundamental values there. Many Turkish friends are writing to us these days. And at the same time: this country needs our cooperation, and we need its cooperation if we are to master the situation in Syria and Iraq. This is exactly what is needed to stop the flow of refugees that are moving across the European continent.

(Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, ALDE, 7 October 2015)

In the first and second extracts above, Turkey is explicitly predicated as a hosting state for refugees, while more support for “the refugee camps” implicitly predicating Turkey as a host is demanded in the third excerpt. In the first excerpt, stabilization of the situation in Turkey is supported through the *topos* of numbers, where an absolute number is preferred to gain reliability and an intense sense of urgency towards a possible migration threat to Europe. Turkey is predicated as a positive and active partner and “a loyal firm ally” of the West within the Atlantic Alliance, in other words NATO, which contributes in many matters to the European security community. In the second speech, there is an explicit comparison between Turkey and “any other country in the world” regarding hosting refugees. Comparison, employed for equating predication and

argumentation strategies as a rhetorical technique, aims at persuasion and serves to minimize or exaggerate (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 109). With this comparison, Turkey is equated with a haven, and thus its efforts are exaggerated for refugees as a part of intensifying strategies.

In the third excerpt, Turkey is not envisaged as a part of the EU enlargement process, although it is discursively constructed as a state “needed to stop the flow of refugees” with various support from Europe to protect “the European continent” from refugees. In this respect, the construction of Europe as a responsible and democratic entity is juxtaposed against a backward Syria and Iraq as well as an undemocratic Turkey in the binary dichotomy, which shows interdiscursivity with the clash of civilizations discourse. Nevertheless, Turkey is also predicated as a strategic partner and a critical neighbor without “fundamental values,” which implicitly portrays Turkey as an in-between and even a buffer state where refugees are hosted in camps. In this respect, when Keyman (2016, pp. 2275–2283) checks the global academic and public debates on Turkey at the beginning of the 2010s, he also states that Turkey’s expected foreign policy identity is mainly framed as a buffer state to provide security and stability in the region because of the refugee problem and the war against the self-proclaimed Islamic State, which has severe impacts on Europe and the globe. This approach of the West is evaluated as “increased prioritization of security over democracy, economy, mediation, and humanitarianism,” which is exemplified by the “attempt to frame the revitalization of EU-Turkey relations around Turkey’s capacity and utility to address security and economic fallout from the refugee crisis” (Keyman, 2016, p. 2283).

Nevertheless, he states that this revitalization does not aim for Turkey’s inclusion and proceeding in complete accession negotiations as an enlargement country (Keyman, 2016, p. 2283). Furthermore, he indicates that this buffer identity causes the end of Turkey’s proactive and multidimensional foreign policy, which was accordingly well balanced in order to reinforce Turkey’s reaction to security and discursive risk based on the clash of civilizations thesis associating terror with Islam in the post-9/11 world (Keyman, 2016, p. 2280). Keyman (2016, p. 2280) states that the idea of Turkey as a buffer state based on security concerns and its geographical location is not new since it had already been used in the Cold War era between two superpowers in a structure explained by bipolarity and balance of power. This argument shows that the perception of identity is influenced by the political context.

Madam President, as Mr Schmit mentioned earlier, we discussed three months ago about Turkey in Parliament when we adopted the resolution on the progress report on this country and - I was saying then - I reiterate this now: it is necessary a deepening of dialogue and cooperation with Turkey. The current crisis of refugees, which has happened, especially in recent months, shows better than anything else the need to work with our Turkish partners to manage the wave of refugees. Without Turkey we cannot solve this problem, I find it obvious.

(Cristian Dan Preda, PPE, 7 October 2015)

Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, I believe that the agreement with Turkey is a chance for everyone, but it is certainly not a blank check. We Socialists and Democrats have not changed our position, the future of Turkey for us will be in the European Union, so it is good that negotiations are resumed and that we begin to seriously discuss visa liberalization. Turkey needs Europe, because the link with the European Union is the embankment, for Turkey, to avoid authoritarian temptations and an erosion of democracy and we also need Turkey because Ankara is a force of stability and without the cooperation of our Turkish friends will not be possible to manage the refugee crisis.

(Gianni Pittella, S&D, 2 December 2015)

There are two indispensable players in any solution to this crisis: the EU and Turkey. In Europe, understanding has grown that without Turkey's support no solution to the refugee crisis is possible. There is currently little that the EU can bring to the table without its strategic partner, despite some of the good intentions in the report on Turkey. Turkey has harboured 2.5 million refugees, providing all their immediate requirements and needs. The EU is only now facing these problems. The worsening security environment and the migrants' problems are a wake-up call for action. This time, the EU cannot simply pour in money to make this go away. It has to act swiftly if waves of refugees are to be prevented. We urgently need a united European position, a long-term and improved strategy – which includes Turkey – and strong action and solidarity to achieve real results. Turkey has already shown responsibility: now it is the EU's turn.

(Nedzhmi Ali, ALDE, 7 October 2015)

In the excerpts above, Turkey's strategic partnership or cooperation with the EU as an essential element in successfully managing the "refugee crisis" is underlined frequently as in the other discourses of the center right (the PPE), center left (the S&D), liberals, and democrats (the ALDE) between 2007 and 2015. The usage of the term

“refugee crisis” in these extracts demonstrates that immigration is characterized as a security threat and even criminalizes immigrants. In this regard, through the *topos* of threat, refugees or immigrants represented in hyperbolic numbers such as “2.5 million” and expressions such as “wave” are securitized in these excerpts and also discursively constructed as the dominant Other from which Turkey as a strategic partner of Europe must defend it.

In the first excerpt above, collectivization through the word “we” to construct Europe as a homogeneous and bounded group and politicization through the word “refugees” to differentiate between classes of people as a part of Europe’s outgroup within referential strategies are used for the construction of a clear-cut binary division between Europeans and refugees. At the same time, the reiterated emphasis on a deepening of dialogue and cooperation with Turkey shows the indispensability of Turkey for Europe to “solve this problem” and accordingly save Europe from these people (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, pp. 48–52). In the second extract, it is observed that relationalization (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 53) through the word “friends” as a referential strategy is employed to show that Turkey is close to Europe’s ingroup. Moreover, it is also underlined here that the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan in October 2015, predicated as “a chance for everyone,” is not a blank check, which shows the mutual interest in this issue within the realist understanding (Drulak, 2006, p. 512). Furthermore, Turkish authority is also metonymically referred to as “Ankara,” which functions here to keep actors or politicians involved or affected in the semantic background to attract less attention to these actors in this excerpt (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, pp. 48–58).

The MEP from ALDE, in the third speech, explicitly securitizes migration as a threat through “a wake-up call for action.” This call catalyzes “emergency measures” in which activities “outside the normal bounds of political procedure” are justified against migrants as existential threats (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 24–25). In this respect, the *topos* of responsibility is employed to bestow a duty upon Europe to unite, improve strategy, and achieve accurate results in the face of “the refugee crisis.” At the same time, Turkey already performs its hosting duty by harboring “2.5 million refugees, providing for all their immediate requirements and needs.” Therefore, in these excerpts, Europe is discursively constructed as a security community protected from “refugees” thanks to Turkey, which hosts them as a strategic partner of Europe.

In brief, Turkey is predicated as a host for refugees thanks to its attitude to the refugees who are frequently welcomed and even appreciated, even though this does not necessarily refer to Turkish accession to the EU. These discourses above can also be regarded as the footsteps of the EU-Turkey statement on March 18, 2016, which offers a significant opportunity both for immigration and bilateral relations. Within this representation, Turkey is also predicated as a strategic partner and a critical neighbor without fundamental values, which implicitly portrays Turkey as an in-between and even a buffer state where refugees are hosted in camps. In some excerpts above, re-energizing accession talks with Turkey is also on the agenda because of the refugee problem, which is regarded by some MEPs as not only the EU's deviation from conditionality but also the increased prioritization of security over fundamental values such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Accordingly, migration is discursively constructed as a security threat to Europe that can be saved by a deepening dialogue and cooperation with Turkey.

To sum up the perception of Turkish and European identity in the section of Turkey as a strategic partner of the EU in the region, the aforementioned excerpts and others in the EP debates between 2007 and 2015 discursively construct Turkey as a bridge between civilizations, a model for the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries, an alternative route in European energy security, and a host for refugees, which ensures the construction of Europe as a security community. Contrary to these relatively positive representations, Turkey is not regarded all the time as a candidate country or within the EU's enlargement policy, although progress in bilateral relations is supported, which does not necessarily mean approving Turkish accession. Instead, Turkey is positioned as an outsider cooperating with the EU on specific security-related issues such as migration, energy, and conflicts in the Middle East.

In general, the positive representations of Turkey in the 1997–2007 period converging with those in the 2007–2015 period are Turkey as a bridge between civilizations and Turkey as a model for the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries. Nevertheless, the images of Turkey as an alternative route for European energy security and Turkey as a host for refugees diverge from those between 1997 and 2007. The reason is the radical changes in the political context of energy and migration issues affecting EU-Turkey relations and thus the perception of the EP of Turkish identity and therewith of Europe. While Turkey was discursively constructed as a security threat by referring to the migration of Turkish people from Turkey to Europe in the 1997–2007 period, it is no

longer a security threat in terms of migration. Instead, Turkey's new image regarding migration is discursively constructed as a host for refugees due to the conflict in Syria and Iraq. To be more precise, MEPs have had to discursively construct Turkey with this new representation because of migrants at the gates of European states, making Turkey an indispensable strategic partner.

In regard to energy, while Turkey was generally evaluated in a positive context in the 1997–2007 period, the fact that there are pipeline projects such as the Nabucco pipeline that will pass through Turkey has led to the image of Turkey as an alternative route for energy security, especially to Russia. Nevertheless, all of these positive representations do not entirely justify the inclusion of Turkey as a full member. Instead, the regional and global actorness of the EU, as well as its interests, are focused. In some of these narratives, security is more underlined than fundamental values such as the democracy, the rule of law, and human rights necessary for Turkish accession to the EU. As regards the articulations of Turkish parliamentarians after 2007, they are completely distinct from those of MEPs in the 2007–2015 period. This results from the effect of othering, which has intensified under the political context that de-Europeanized Turkey. The only representation where the Turkish discourses converge is the image of Turkey as a bridge between civilizations for the annulment of the clash of civilizations thesis by promoting an alliance of civilizations.

Last but not least, in this relatively positive context for the perception of Turkish identity, there are some discourses in which MEPs from the same group or country are divided. There are some MEPs from the center-left under the S&D³⁰ and the mainstream liberal and centrist parties under the ALDE³¹ who have been divided concerning the representation of Turkey as a model for the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries. Furthermore, some MEPs from the traditional center-right under the EPP/EPP-ED/PPE³² and some MEPs from Cyprus³³ and Italy³⁴ have also been divided in their views concerning Turkey's role as a safe country for refugees, especially in 2015. Moreover, as

³⁰ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Richard Howitt from the S&D on 8 March 2011 and Maria Eleni Koppa from the S&D on 27 September 2011.

³¹ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Marietje Schaake from the ALDE on 27 September 2011 and Jelko Kacin from the ALDE on 8 March 2011.

³² See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Anna Maria Corazza Bildt from the PPE on 7 October 2015 and Renate Sommer from the PPE on 7 October 2015.

³³ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Lefteris Christoforou from the PPE on 2 December 2015 and Eleni Theocharous from the PPE on 20 May 2015.

³⁴ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Gianni Pittella from the S&D on 2 December 2015 and Mario Borghezio from the ENF on 2 December 2015.

mentioned before, the discourses of the Greek and Cypriot MEPs, regardless of the EP groups, have been essentially the same in terms of explicit objection to the opening of the energy chapter as an essential part of Turkish accession because of the Cyprus issue, which causes their division from their groups.

4.1.2 Turkey as a Security Threat in the Region

The discursive construction of Europe as a security community basically relies on Turkey's role in terms of the clash of civilizations thesis. This role of Turkey has been constructed to prevent this assumed clash until this part of the analysis. Nevertheless, the clash of civilizations discourse by its nature can also justify the exclusion of Turkey in the security-related arguments about Turkey, which is provided for here through its borders and foreign policy. In this part, the discourses that construct Europe as a security community through oppositely representing Turkey as a security threat to this community are analyzed. In this respect, the discursive continuity of the representations of Turkey as a potential security threat to Europe in the study of Aydın-Düzgit (2012, p. 30) and Turkey as a security threat as mentioned by Türkeş-Kılıç (2019, pp. 40–44) is significant. Among the other studies in the 1997–2007 period, Levin (2011, pp. 191–193) also states that Turkish identity is “the other as a threat” in terms of security. However, this representation is based on fears of uncontrolled immigration (Levin, 2011, pp. 191–193).

It is analyzed that MEPs from the center-right, center-left, liberal, Eurosceptic, extreme-right, and extreme-left factions preferred Turkey's negative representation in terms of the security of Europe between 2007 and 2015. This is because the political context mired with the Arab uprisings, the following immigration of masses to Europe, growing frictions because of oil and gas reserves in the eastern Mediterranean, and the war against the self-proclaimed Islamic State affecting EU-Turkey relations and, in turn, its aspirations for EU membership. This political context, especially regarding the conflicts in the Middle East and thus the migration problem, seems to have influenced the perception of the EP of Turkish identity as its negative other representation:

Commissioner, we and the vast majority of the European citizens we represent have run out of patience. We have had enough. The governing regime in Turkey has proven itself totally incapable and unwilling to get its country into the state of a 21st-century civilisation.

Commissioner, the carrot technique has failed gloriously and you have to admit it. The time has now come to use the stick.

(Marios Matsakis, ALDE, 21 May 2008)

Baroness Ashton, Commissioner, Turkey is, I fear, trying to foster controlled tension in the area in order, among other things, to acquire the status of regional force and *locum tenens* which it has constantly sought in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, the dividing line between controlled and uncontrolled tension is extraordinarily fine. Turkey is literally playing with fire. Turkey is more a security consumer than a security provider in the Eastern Mediterranean.

(Georgios Koumoutsakos, PPE, 27 September 2011)

In the first excerpt above, the interdiscursivity with the clash of civilizations is the first outstanding finding. In the first extract, Europe is predicated as a twenty-first-century civilization. In this context, Europe is referred to as the up-to-date one with which Turkey is incompatible. In other words, the fundamental assumptions of this thesis are reinforced by accepting that Turkey cannot be a part of Europe as a separate essential modern civilization. Nevertheless, the self-representation of Europe in a positive sense as a normative actor is jeopardized by a military power represented by the metaphor of the “stick.” Besides the referential strategy of politicization with the words “citizens” and “governing regime,” the argumentum ad populum as one of the pragmatic fallacies is also employed because of the impatience of “the vast majority” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 72).

Turkey is accused of “trying to foster controlled tension in the area” to become a regional force in the second excerpt, supporting the central assumptions of the clash of civilizations discourse. Moreover, macro-mitigation of “I fear” is also observed for the illocutionary force of a negative utterance (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 84). In this extract, the *topos* of danger is employed to warn of a possible “uncontrolled tension” caused by Turkey “literally playing with fire” as metaphorical expressions within referential strategies. Accordingly, the EU should take measures to prevent Turkey from consuming security in the eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, the securitization of Turkey in the EP discourse is observed. In this framework, the civilizational exclusion of Turkey from the European security community is analyzed in terms of Turkey’s foreign policy and borders

in the following sections. In other words, under the image of Turkey as a security threat in the region, Turkey, whose foreign policy may be incompatible with the EU and Turkey as a frontline state to the conflictual regions are examined below.

4.1.2.1 Turkey whose Foreign Policy May Be Incompatible with the EU

Changes in Turkish foreign policy orientations incompatible with the EU after 2007 are already accepted in both policy circles and academia (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 54). They have been grounded on the zero-problem approach and the need to become more proactive in its broader neighborhood. In this regard, there is no continuity of this representation when studies focused on the 1997–2007 period are examined. Nevertheless, the representation of Turkey as a security threat in terms of its foreign policy as anti-European and anti-Western is recognized in the EP debates beginning in 2009. Furthermore, Lindgaard et al. (2018, p. 23) approve of the fact that Turkish representations of Europe have been subject to some changes because of its foreign policy turns “ending up with a proactive support for conservative Sunni Muslim population groups in the region.”

Madam President, Baroness Ashton, Commissioner, the use of threats, including military threats, has always marked Turkey’s foreign policy. Turkey resorts easily to threats when things do not develop in line with its geostrategic ambitions, regardless of whether or not such developments are legal under international law or international practices. This is also confirmed by the escalation in the reaction and threats by Ankara to the exercise of the legal, sovereign right of the Republic of Cyprus to explore its exclusive economic zone in accordance with the Law of the Sea.

(Georgios Koumoutsakos, PPE, 27 September 2011)

In foreign policy terms, this undemocracy is reflected in the continued support for Islamic State - financial, military and logistical; the ongoing occupation of Cyprus; the ongoing provocations against the state of Israel; in the ongoing trafficking of migrants against Greece and Bulgaria, which threatens their economy and national security. The inadmissible interference of the Turkish government in the internal affairs of a sovereign member state of the European Union, such as Bulgaria, also continues.

(Angel Djambazki, ECR, 20 May 2015)

In the first extract, the Turkish central authority metonymically referred to as “Ankara” is portrayed as threatening in its foreign policy, marked with “the use of threats, including military threats.” In this respect, the *topos* of danger is underlined to represent Turkey as a security threat and a perpetual violator of international law and practices through the example of Cyprus. In the second excerpt, the same image of Turkey as a perpetual violator is consolidated with its “undemocracy,” which allegedly affects all its foreign policy practices. In addition, it is also accused of having a more interventionist role in the EU member states due to being proactive in its larger neighborhood through the *topos* of danger³⁵, which discursively constructs Turkey as a security threat to Europe. Furthermore, the alleged support for the self-proclaimed Islamic State and the increasing problems with Israel, Cyprus, Greece, and Bulgaria, as well as its “undemocracy,” imply an implicit denunciation of Islamization in Turkey as a threat to the European security community, which shows the continuity of this perception about Turkish identity in the 1997–2007 period.

Madam President, it makes me very sad to see that solidarity with Cyprus and our brothers and sisters there is currently being set aside. This is one of our Member States that is being attacked by a foreign power, and the seriousness of this cannot be emphasised enough. At the same time, the security of us all is being threatened by the Turkish aggression that is increasing by the day. In these circumstances, we need to unite and speak with one voice. It is totally unacceptable that laws and regulations are not being respected and, in this regard, every one of us has a responsibility to stand up and defend our brothers and sisters in one of our Member States.

(Cecilia Wikström, ALDE, 27 September 2011)

Madam President, the leadership of the European Union is proving to be inferior, as it is constantly succumbing to Turkey’s blackmail. A Turkey that silences the DAES and smuggles oil with the jihadists. A Turkey that organizes the slave trade of transporting thousands of refugees from Syria to the Aegean islands with a profit of over twelve billion euros. A Turkey that continues to violate the airspace of Greece. Finally, gentlemen of the European Union, you have put the wolf in charge of the sheep, and not only that: you are also

³⁵ Nikolaos Salavrakos, as an MEP from the EFD, even accused Turkey of planning a new type of Ottoman commonwealth because of its foreign policy practices that are incompatible with the EU in the debates on 20 January 2010 and 10 February 2010.

giving Ankara three billion euros. Mr Weber, Greece was flooded with thousands of refugees because Mrs Merkel invited them to come to Germany. Mr Weber, Greece is a sovereign country and does not accept co-management of its external borders. Mr Weber, decide, the borders of Greece are Greek and will continue to be protected by the Greeks and not German troops, as you dream, because this has ended historically and irrevocably for seventy years.

(Notis Marias, ECR, 2 December 2015)

It is observed that some MEPs associate the Cyprus issue and Turkey's problems with Greece and Armenia as a part of Turkey's foreign policy that is incompatible with the security of Europe³⁶. In this regard, an MEP from the liberals securitizes Turkey predicated as "a foreign power" because of the Cyprus issue in the first excerpt. This issue is constructed as a matter of "the security of us" through the *topoi* of threat and responsibility. Relational identifications with the words "brothers" and "sisters" as referential strategies and the predication of Cyprus as "one of our member states" help construct ingroup and the negative other presentation directed against Turkey as "a foreign power" – in other words, a dichotomous world of "them" and "us."

In the second extract, nationalist voices on behalf of Greece are recognized while representing Turkey negatively with its foreign policy practices. The *topos* of threat is combined with the *topos* of (Greek) borders in denoting Greece as a sovereign entity against "German troops," historically implying the events in World War II. The use of the "sheep" and "wolf" metaphors is significant in this context in order to show the unreliability of Turkey in foreign policy matters and especially the migration crisis in this case, while the EU is portrayed as being incapable of opposing "Turkey's blackmail." Besides relations with Cyprus, Greece, and Armenia, the foreign policy of Turkey regarding Turkey's military operations to Iraq because of the PKK camps in northern Iraq in 2008 and the self-proclaimed Islamic State after 2011 is also intensively criticized and

³⁶ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Adamos Adamou from the GUE/NGL on 11 March 2009, Nikolaos Chountis from the GUE/NGL on 25 November 2009, Kyriakos Mavronikolas from the S&D on 25 November 2009, Bogusław Rogalski from the UEN on 11 March 2009, Nikolaos Salavrakos from the EFD on 20 January 2010, Charalampos Angourakis from the GUE/NGL on 10 February 2010, Nikolaos Salavrakos from the EFD on 8 March 2011, Charles Tannock from the ECR on 8 March 2011, Niki Tzavela from the EFD on 8 March 2011, Angelika Werthmann from the NI on 8 March 2011, Kyriakos Mavronikolas from the S&D on 27 September 2011, Miroslav Mikolášik from the PPE on 8 March 2011, Hannes Swoboda from S&D on 27 September 2011, Notis Marias from ECR on 17 December 2014, and Sophia Sakorapha from the GUE/NGL on 20 May 2015.

helps justify Turkey's exclusion, especially in the discourse of the right wing and extreme right in the EP³⁷:

Thanks to the mandate, the Kurdish issue is being seen in a new light. The potential invasion of northern Iraq is an issue that should be of serious concern to the EU. Such a move must not be permitted, because the need, on which we are all agreed, to combat terrorism should never be used as a pretext for creating a *fait accompli* of occupied territory in northern Iraq, as happened in Cyprus.

(Giorgos Dimitrakopoulos, PPE-DE, 24 October 2007)

Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, we will abstain on this resolution, especially in view of the way the Kurdish issue is side-stepped. In particular, I do not believe that Turkey's actions in northern Iraq can be described merely as 'disproportionate military operations'; instead we should assert that this is an open violation of international law.

(Vittorio Agnoletto, GUE/NGL, 21 May 2008)

In the EP debates, Turkey's military operation in Iraq is directly related to the Kurdish issue, which is scrutinized further in the following parts of this thesis. Nevertheless, it is also necessary to analyze the security dimension of this operation in the region. In the first speech above from the center right, Turkey is accused of using the war against terrorism for its hidden invasion intentions, as in Cyprus, which makes Turkey a security threat in the region. Turkey is negatively predicated as an invader. Turkey's military operation is predicated as "the potential invasion," although it is agreed that Turkey is needed to combat terrorism. Turkey is portrayed as an unreliable country since it allegedly uses its influence for invasion. In this context, the logical fallacy of a false analogy is detected. This is because the Cyprus issue is offered as being analogous to the military operations of Turkey against the PKK despite the absence of a marked similarity between these two.

³⁷ Some MEPs describe its military power within its foreign policy as a security threat mainly because of Turkey's military operations in northern Iraq against the PKK. See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Philip Claeys from ITS on 24 October 2007, Werner Langen from the PPE-ED on 24 October 2007, Carlos Carnero González from the PSE on 24 October 2007, Andreas Mölzer from the ITS on 24 October 2007, Feleknas Uca from the GUE/NGL on 24 October 2007, Marco Cappato from the ALDE on 24 October 2007, Jan Marinus Wiersma from the PSE on 24 October 2007, Werner Langen from the PPE-ED on 24 October 2007, Feleknas Uca from the GUE/NGL on 21 May 2008, Miroslav Mikolášik from the PPE on 8 March 2011, and Georgios Koumoutsakos from the PPE on 27 September 2011.

In the second excerpt from the GUE/NGL group, as extreme left, Turkey is accused of disproportionate military operations in northern Iraq and violation of international law while, accordingly, the Kurdish issue is underrated. Turkey is portrayed as a state preferring hard-power solutions such as military force disproportionately, while it is also represented as an open violator of international law. As regards Turkey's position in the intertwined and multifaceted conflicts in Iraq and Syria, including the Syrian Civil War and the self-proclaimed Islamic State, known as ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), ISIL (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), or its Arabic acronym Daesh, the following remarks of the MEPs stand out:

Having firmly supported Turkey's European perspective, I would like to express my concern about this development, which is a sign of back pedaling, violates human rights and the rule of law. Last year we had the violent breakdown on the demonstrations in the center of Istanbul, most recently we met the Turkish government's ambiguous attitude towards the struggle of the international fight against the ISIS jihadists, just last month we condemned the violation of the sovereignty of Cyprus, by the Turkish armed forces and again today, in yet another plenary, we are discussing a new attack to the freedom of the press in Turkey. Unfortunately, all this is evidence that Erdoğan leads Turkey away from the principles and values of the European Union.

(Nikos Androulakis, S&D, 17 December 2014)

There is no one to question the suspicious and insidious role played by Turkey, even in creating the refugee. And, really, I wonder: what has Turkey actually done for the refugees so far? What is its role in the region? I still do not understand if Turkey is really fighting ISIS and terrorism when in fact it is fighting against the Kurds and shooting down the Russian plane that was fighting terrorism, at a time when it is violating the airspace of EU member states without reacting itself!

(Lefteris Christoforou, PPE, 2 December 2015)

Madam President, after a year of parliamentary presence, I have come to the conclusion that many colleagues deliberately imply, because of their interests, that they are not taught by history. Wrong, because history teaches and warns. They do not remember, for example, what the Macedonia of Alexander the Great is in ancient Greece. They do not remember the past of Turkey and its transformation into a so-called Republic. The Ottoman Empire of the six centuries offered nothing to humanity, as did the empire of Alexander the Great, the Roman Empire and the Byzantine Empire. Only massacres, looting, appropriation of foreign

cultures and genocides of thousands of Pontians, Armenians and others. Is it historically possible for these six centuries to launch a neo-Ottoman state with other authorities? Do not be deceived. Turkey is trying to use the Union and the US, to its advantage, to hit the Kurds, divide Cyprus, strengthen its position in the Middle East and change the status quo in the Aegean, with Merkel's blessings. Through the joint search-and-rescue operation with Greece, ignoring the consequences that lead to the channeling of jihadists on European soil, with the simultaneous Islamization of Europe. Rest assured that history will write your names for your decisions. It will be your choice if they are written in black.

(Eleftherios Synadinos, NI, 2 December 2015)

In the EP debates, it is observed that Turkey is criticized for not fighting enough against the self-proclaimed Islamic State because of its alleged strange relations with "ISIS" in an ambiguous attitude. Turkey is even frequently accused of supporting it when the words "ISIS" or "Jihadists" are preferred to refer to this state. Nevertheless, the necessity of Turkey is underlined when it is called "Daesh." This usage is widespread in the discourses of the center-right, extreme-right, Eurosceptic, center-left, and extreme-left factions present in smaller political groups and the nonattached members of Parliament who are not a member of any political group³⁸. The excerpts above exemplify these usages of the words "ISIS" or "Jihadists" in the same way. No academic research concerning the reason for this discursive difference above regarding the use of different names for the same illegal organization has been found, indicating the need for further studies on this topic. However, considering the frequent references of this organization to "jihad" as a term in Islam, it can be related to the reference to religion in the name "ISIS," which has been objected to by some leading politicians³⁹.

³⁸ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Charles Tannock from the ECR on 17 December 2014, Angel Djambazki from the ECR on 17 December 2014, Franz Obermayr from the NI on 7 October 2015, Nigel Farage from the EFDD on 2 December 2015, Notis Marias from the ECR on 7 October 2015, James Carver from the EFDD on 7 October 2015, Eleftherios Synadinos from the NI on 2 December 2015, Kostas Chrysogonos from the GUE/NGL on 7 October 2015, Notis Marias from the ECR on 2 December 2015, Lefteris Christoforou from the PPE on 2 December 2015, Charles Tannock from the ECR on 20 May 2015, Victor Boștinariu from the S&D on 20 May 2015, Victor Boștinariu from the S&D on 7 October 2015, Fabio Massimo Castaldo from the EFDD on 7 October 2015, Andi Cristea from the S&D on 7 October 2015, and Victor Boștinariu from the S&D on 2 December 2015.

³⁹ As a politician objecting to using "ISIS," "IS" or "ISIL" including the name "Islamic State," the United States President Barack Obama claimed in his speech in 2014 that it was neither "Islamic" because of "the killing of innocents" nor a "state" recognized by any government (The White House, 2014). In the same way, France's Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius also stated that he opposed this usage because of blurring "the lines between Islam, Muslims and Islamists" and therefore preferred the term "Daesh" used by the Arabs (France24, 17 September 2014). However, when a resolution of the EP in 2016 is examined, it can be seen that the EP officially accepts both "ISIS" and "Daesh" with the usage of "ISIS/Daesh" (European Parliament, 2016).

In the first extract above, *synecdochising personalization* through the word “Erdoğan” as the current President of Turkey is observed ⁴⁰. At the same time, Turkey is discursively constructed as democratically backward and a security threat because of its foreign policy towards “the ISIS Jihadists” and Cyprus through the *topos* of threat. Turkey's role in the region is called “suspicious and insidious” through rhetorical questions, while its fight against “ISIS” is also not found to be real in the second excerpt above. Nevertheless, self-criticism is also observed on behalf of the EU implicitly because of the Cyprus issue to invoke the national interest, which is widespread among Greek and Cypriot MEPs.

The third extract above uses the *topos of historia magistra vitae* – in other words, “history as a teacher” – in order to construct a historically unified Europe, to emphasize Turkey’s otherness, to demarcate clear boundaries between Turkey and Europe, and thus to justify Turkey’s exclusion from Europe (Bernhard, 2014, p. 19). In this regard, Turkey’s foreign policy, which is incompatible with the EU, is interpreted as a threat to European security concerns through “Islamization of Europe” and “the channeling of Jihadists on European soil,” in which there is a case of intertextuality with Anthony N. Celso’s “Jihadist” wave of terrorism. In his work, Celso (2015, p. 251) highlights the rise of the self-proclaimed Islamic State and Boko Haram as the evidence of modern terror’s fifth wave with Jihadist movements “driven by belief in mystical prophetic forces,” which is also observed in the first excerpt above⁴¹. In this regard, it is observed that the term “Jihadist” is adopted by the EU member states considering the majority of verdicts in these states about “Jihadist terrorism,” especially in 2015 (Europol, 2019, p. 22).

The negative other representation of Turkey in the third speech above is realized via the argumentation strategy of *hasty generalization* by referring to “only massacres, looting, appropriation of foreign cultures, and genocides of thousands of Pontians, Armenians, and others.” At the same time, the European Self for humanity is positively represented by “the empire of Alexander the Great, the Roman Empire, and the Byzantine Empire” in contrast to this negative Turkish Other. Moreover, the *topos of pro bono*

⁴⁰ The case of *synecdochising personalization* is observed since the “responsibility of groups of individuals is reduced to the responsibility of one or few persons who replace the whole as a part” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 111).

⁴¹ Celso (2015, p. 249) states that Jihadist groups, including the Islamic State, comply with Jeffrey Kaplan’s fifth wave of terror theory, which refines David Rappaport’s four-wave theory of modern terrorism. Celso (2015, p. 252) states that Rappaport’s four-wave theory covers anarchist, colonial, left-revolutionary, and Islamist terrorist waves. Accordingly, these waves are short-lived since they disappear with “internal weakness, generational change, and external pressures” (Celso, 2015, p. 252).

eorum – in other words, the advantage of “them” – is used to attribute further unreliableness to Turkey through allegedly taking advantage of the EU and the US due to its foreign policy being incompatible with the EU (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 75).

In sum, the representation of Turkey, whose foreign policy may be incompatible with the EU, is new rhetoric compared to the 1997–2007 period. It results from Turkey's foreign policy turns after 2007 with its zero-problem approach and becoming more proactive in its broader neighborhood. In this framework, it is observed that the Cyprus issue and the problems with Greece and Armenia, as a part of Turkey's incompatible foreign policy, are associated with the security of Europe. Furthermore, its military power as a part of its foreign policy is described as a security threat mainly because of Turkey's military operations in northern Iraq against the PKK. Lastly, Turkey is criticized for not fighting enough against “ISIS” and is even frequently accused of supporting it. However, the significance of Turkey is underlined when the self-proclaimed Islamic State is called “Daesh.”

4.1.2.2 Turkey as a Frontline State to the Conflictual Regions

Turkey's geography is frequently discussed in the EP since “geography supports increasingly uncertain sociocultural and political spheres” where “geographical imaginings are constructed as an attempt to denote territory as well as identity concretely” (Pace, 2006, p. 163). Turkey's negative representation because of its geographic borders and specifically its southern borders as a potential security threat is widespread in the discourses of the center right, extreme right, extreme left, nonattached MEPs, and additionally the center left. In this respect, the discursive continuity of this representation in the findings of Aydın-Düzgüt (2012, pp. 52–53), Türkeş-Kılıç (2019, pp. 40–47), Lindgaard et al. (2018, p. 4), and Levin (2011, p. 26) for the 1997–2007 period is evident.

The critical situation along the Syrian border highlights the additional dangers associated with Turkish accession. When the European Coal and Steel Community was founded exactly 60 years ago in 1952, its founders' main aim was to achieve lasting peace in Europe. We simply have to recognise that, as is quite apparent from the present situation, accession by Turkey, which has a border to Syria and is a front-line state in the Middle East conflict, would mean bringing ongoing military conflicts into the heart of the European Union.

(Franz Obermayr, NI, 21 November 2012)

Mr President, this afternoon part of the town of Palmyra in Syria fell to Islamic State. Palmyra is around the same distance from the border of Turkey as Strasbourg is from Frankfurt. Should Turkey become a Member State, all the EU Member States – and especially the UK, which I represent – would all have borders with Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Let us be clear. The British Liberal Democrats, the British Labour Party, and especially the British Conservatives, who should all be ashamed of themselves, are all cheerleaders for Turkey to become a Member State of the European Union. I urge these parties, and people over there, in their own national interest, and in the interest of all Member States, to consider that, whatever their rationalisation may have been to have this pro-Turkish policy when it was formulated, the facts on the ground have changed. Turkey is no longer a credible candidate to be a Member State of the European Union. Further – and this is a separate point, because our security would be at risk – Turkey is a persistent and systematic violator of the human rights of its own people.

(William Dartmouth, EFDD, 20 May 2015)

In the first speech, Turkey is explicitly predicated as “a frontline state in the Middle East conflict,” while in the second excerpt above, Turkey’s southern borders are securitized. The first excerpt more directly focuses on the border issue with Turkish accession and Turkey’s border with Syria while engaging in the demarcation of clear boundaries between Europe and the Middle East, contributing to the clash of civilizations thesis. The *topos* of borders, which is crucial to identity (re)production, provides here a homogeneous identity both for peaceful Europe and for the conflictual Middle East. The *topos* of border in this extract can be paraphrased as follows: If Turkey becomes a member state of the EU, it will cause the end of lasting peace in Europe because of its border with Syria and bring ongoing military conflicts of the Middle East into the EU with a fallacious *trajectio im alium*, as a victim-victimizer-reversal (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 134). Though the victimizer is not Turkey, the speech strategically changes the victimizer and attributes the reasons for possible military conflicts in the EU to the Turkish accession. In this regard, securitization of Turkish accession provides construction of identity through geography, which is generally through the concept of security as an existential threat.

In the second excerpt, a similar relationship between Palmyra and Turkey, on the one hand, and Strasbourg and Frankfurt, on the other, is formed to securitize the Turkish accession because of its southern border. In this respect, the logical fallacy of a false

analogy is also observed. Accordingly, the distance between the city of Palmyra and the country of Turkey is offered as being analogous to the distance between the city of Strasbourg and the city of Frankfurt despite the absence of a marked similarity between these two.

The first of these is its visa policy for third country nationals. Speaking two years ago in Parliament, I expressed my surprise that Turkey did not bring this policy into line with that of the European Union. According to the European Commission's 2011 Progress Report, Turkey has recently signed visa waiver agreements with Sudan and Yemen. I have also been informed that Iranian, Libyan, Lebanese and Syrian nationals do not require visas either. Last week, a very widely read Spanish newspaper claimed that Turkey's visa exemption for some countries, together with its land border, which runs for thousands of kilometres, make the country a corridor of choice for organised crime.

(Francisco José Millán Mon, PPE, 28 March 2012)

But I'm interested in something else. Namely, the connection between the European Union and Turkey carries certain responsibilities for both sides. I will highlight just one, and that is the problem of smuggling drugs, especially heroin from Afghanistan. Croatia is located on the so-called "Balkan route" of drug trafficking, whose vein is represented by Turkey. Although Turkey seizes large quantities of drugs every year, this is clearly not enough, so I prioritize making additional efforts to neutralize this route and thus make a big step forward in the fight against drugs.

(Ruza Tomasic, ECR, 11 March 2014)

In both extracts above, drug smuggling and organized crime through Turkey are underlined. Originating from its southeastern border, Turkey is identified as a transit country for crime, which discursively constitutes a threat to the European security community. In the first excerpt, the predication of Turkey as "a corridor of choice for organized crime" is observed while otherness is also ascribed to Turkey's neighbors such as Iran and Syria. Moreover, the possible immigrating activity of individuals to Europe is implicitly mentioned because of Turkey's visa waiver agreements for third-country nationals, which are incompatible with the relevant Schengen visa policies of the EU. These discursively external threats through Turkey, such as migration and organized crime, construct Europe as a bounded area that should be saved from these threats. In the

second excerpt, the *topos* of responsibility bestows a duty upon both the EU and Turkey to fight against drugs while also predicating Turkey as a “vein” in this drug trafficking.

Therefore, both excerpts construct drug smuggling and organized crime as transnational security problems, and they also show a high degree of securitization of Turkey’s borders through reference to drug smuggling, organized crime, and implicitly illegal immigration. In short, the representation of Turkey as a frontline state to the conflictual regions is the continuity of a similar image in the 1997–2007 period. Because of engaging in the demarcation of clear boundaries between Europe and the Middle East, this representation contributes to the clash of civilizations thesis. Furthermore, in this representation, drug smuggling and organized crime through Turkey are underlined, and thus the construction of Turkey as a transit country for crime is seen because of its southeastern border.

To summarize Turkey as a security threat in the region, the discourses that construct Europe as a security community through negatively representing Turkey have been analyzed in this section. The representation of Turkey as a security threat is seen in the center-right, extreme-right, Eurosceptic, center-left, extreme-left, and liberal groups in the period between 2007 and 2015. In terms of discursive continuity, the representation of Turkey, whose foreign policy may be incompatible with the EU, is new as a result of Turkey's foreign policy turns after 2007. Nevertheless, Turkey's negative representation based on its geographic borders with its southern neighbors in the 2007–2015 period was already widespread between 1997 and 2007. In other words, MEPs' articulations on Turkey, whose foreign policy may be incompatible with the EU, have diverged from those in the 1997–2007 period, although their remarks on Turkey as a frontline state to the conflictual regions have converged. This is because the perception of the EP of Turkish identity has been influenced by the changes in its foreign policy affecting EU-Turkey relations as the political context. In this negative context for the perception of Turkish identity, discourses that MEPs from the same group or country are divided have not been detected.

Overall, there is both convergence with, and divergence from, the findings of the period 1997–2007 in terms of the representation of European identity and Turkish identity. The *topos* of danger is frequently employed in the excerpts as well as the post-9/11 war rhetoric “the fight against terrorism,” in which Turkey’s geopolitical significance is contextualized. This rhetoric shows a convergence with the findings in the

1997–2007 period. Nevertheless, there is also a divergence from the 1997–2007 period. It is observed that not only the center-left and liberal groups but also the right-wing groups, including the PPE and the ECR in the period between 2007 and 2015, construct Europe as a security community in the competition for power and hegemony against Russia.

4.2 Turkey in Terms of European Democratic Values

With the end of the Cold War in 1989, the importance of ideological rivalries and security concerns decreased. This change gave way to the questioning of Turkey's European identity within the scope of the fundamental values of the EU because of its EU candidacy. Upon the approval of Turkey's fulfillment of the Copenhagen political criteria⁴² in the European Commission's Progress Report for Turkey in 2004, these values, including human rights, protection of minorities, the rule of law, and democracy, became an indispensable part of Turkish accession since the Copenhagen political criteria represent essential guidance for the translation of the values of European integration through “consolidation of a democratic system respectful of human and minority rights” (Nas, 2010, pp. 24–28). For this reason, the state of Turkish democracy constitutes one of the essential topics that form the EP discourse on Turkey.

Upon the opening of accession negotiations in 2005, the issue of democratization in Turkey became more suspicious with references to specific events in Turkey such as constitutional reform, judicial reforms, and elections “rather than general discussions on whether Turkey is sufficiently democratic in terms of ‘European’ standards” (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 66). In this regard, Giannakopoulos and Maras (2005, pp. 3–25) also assert in their qualitative analysis of EP debates between 1996 and 2004 that references to specific events in the debates on Turkish democracy are widespread. Accordingly, the deficiencies of Turkish democracy are discussed in such a broad area that it covers democratic rights and freedoms, the supervision of the police and other various state offices, minority rights, including the Kurdish people and non-Muslim minorities, the rule of law, good neighborly relations with Armenia and Greece, recognition of the Armenian genocide, “troubled relations between the military establishment and the political system,” and “Turkey’s intransigent Cyprus policy” (Giannakopoulos & Maras, 2005, pp.

⁴² The Copenhagen political criteria are also integrated into the Negotiation Framework Document adopted in 2005, which makes these criteria indispensable for Turkey’s EU membership perspective.

3–25). They assert that these defects are acknowledged by all EP parties and seen as the core obstacle to the EU aspirations regarding Turkey (Giannakopoulos & Maras, 2005, pp. 4–14). Additionally, Aydın-Düzgit (2012, pp. 66–72) also lists similar topics regarding the defects of Turkish democracy discussed among the MEPs in her analysis.

After the launch of the accession negotiations in 2005, the analysis in this Ph.D. thesis shows that the intense debates on Turkish democracy in the 2007–2015 period took the most challenging form ever experienced until then. Turkey was increasingly called an undemocratic and even authoritarian state in the EP in this period. As in the previous period, the debates on democratization in Turkey include references to specific domestic events in Turkey, including elections, judicial reform, the Cyprus issue, the good neighborly relations with Greece and Armenia, the recognition of the Armenian genocide, the closure trial of the ruling AKP in 2008, problems with women's rights and the Kurdish issue, the democratic opening initiative process in Turkey in 2009, the closure of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) in 2010, the Turkish constitutional referendum in 2010, the Fazıl Say and the Ergenekon cases, the Gezi Park events in 2013, the democratization package in 2013, and other events associated with justice and fundamental rights and freedoms within Chapters 23 and 24 of the *acquis communautaire*. In other words, as in the pre-2007 period studied by Giannakopoulos and Maras (2005, pp. 3–25) and Aydın-Düzgit (2012, pp. 66–72) as a discursive continuity, the EP frequently keeps on sharing its concerns regarding similar areas related to Turkish democracy and the democratization issue in Turkey in the 2007–2015 period with references about the adoption of these values as “European values⁴³,”— in other words, in terms of European democratic values. Nevertheless, it is also apparent in the discourses

⁴³ For the MEPs who use “European values,” see, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Mogens Camre from the UEN on 21 May 2008, Gunnar Hökmark from the PPE-DE on 21 May 2008, Hanne Dahl from the IND/DEM on 11 March 2009, Pál Schmitt from the PPE-DE on 11 March 2009, Antonios Trakatellis from the PPE-DE on 11 March 2009, Călin Cătălin Chiriță from the PPE-DE on 11 March 2009, Franz Obermayr from the NI on 20 January 2010, Alexander Graf Lambsdorff from the ALDE on 10 February 2010, Gunnar Hökmark from the PPE-DE on 10 February 2010, Marietta Giannakou from the PPE on 10 February 2010, Justas Vincas Paleckis from the S&D on 10 February 2010, Zoltán Balczó from the NI on 10 February 2010, Theodor Dumitru Stolojan from the PPE on 28 March 2012, Andrew Duff from the ALDE on 6 February 2013, Mark Demesmaeker from the Verts/ALE on 6 February 2013, Hannes Swoboda from the S&D on 12 June 2013, Guy Verhofstadt from the ALDE on 12 June 2013, Dimitar Stoyanov from the NI on 12 June 2013, Mark Demesmaeker from the Verts/ALE on 11 March 2014, Mitro Repo from the S&D on 12 March 2014, Kati Piri from the S&D on 17 December 2014, Ignazio Corrao from the EFDD on 17 December 2014, Jeroen Lenaers from the PPE on 17 December 2014, Nikos Androulakis from the S&D on 20 May 2015, Dubravka Šuica from the PPE on 20 May 2015, Angel Djambazki from the ECR on 20 May 2015, Esther de Lange from the PPE on 20 May 2015, Bendt Bendtsen from the PPE on 20 May 2015, Renate Sommer from the PPE on 7 October 2015, and Eugen Freund from the S&D on 7 October 2015.

of the EP that the rhetoric against Turkey has hardened with the increasing interdiscursivity to hard power, including the carrot-and-stick approach, the military way, and economic sanctions.

In this regard, eight⁴⁴ out of 29 EP debates analyzed in this study are directly on problems of democratization in Turkey in the fields of the Cyprus issue, the Kurdish problem, human rights, and fundamental rights and freedoms, including women's rights and freedom of expression in Turkey, while other EP debates in this period also address these issues in order to justify or reject Turkish accession. In this context, there are two opposite representations of Turkey in terms of European democratic values, which are analyzed below. They are the representation of Turkey in a difficult process of democratic transformation and the representation of Turkey as increasingly turning away from European norms and values.

4.2.1 Turkey in a Difficult Process of Democratic Transformation

For Turkish accession to the EU, the democratic performances of Turkey are evaluated relatively in favorable terms with references to specific domestic events by some MEPs, especially from the left and liberal groups. While Turkey is predominantly and increasingly represented as undemocratic and authoritarian in the period between 2007 and 2015, in some cases, its democracy is mentioned in a struggle for progress and even praised as “a model secular democracy to the Arab Spring countries in 2011” (Lindgaard et al., 2018, p. 2). During the Arab uprisings, some MEPs described it as “an inspirer of the democratic changes in North Africa ...and... model of a secular democratic state”⁴⁵ and “our most valuable, obvious and persuasive example of a functioning democracy in the Arab world⁴⁶,” which was until the Gezi Park protests in 2013 in Turkey in this period. Additionally, some other MEPs also define Turkey as “a democracy with

⁴⁴ These eight debates are “Women in Turkey” on 12 February 2007, “Democratic process in Turkey” on 5 May 2009, “Democratization in Turkey” on 20 January 2010, “Tensions between Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus” on 27 September 2011, “A 2020 perspective for women in Turkey” on 21 May 2012, “Dialogue for a peaceful solution of the Kurdish issue in Turkey” on 6 February 2013, “Freedom of Expression in Turkey: Recent Arrests of Journalists, Media Executives, and Systematic Pressure against Media” on 17 December 2014, and “Freedom of Expression in Turkey: Recent Arrests of Journalists, Media Executives, and Systematic Pressure against Media” on 15 January 2015. They can be reached as Word documents through the official EP website: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/debates-video.html>.

⁴⁵ See the parliamentary speech of Metin Kazak from the ALDE on 28 March 2012.

⁴⁶ See the parliamentary speech of Jelko Kacin from the ALDE on 8 March 2011.

a pivotal role at the interface between West and East”⁴⁷ and “a democracy that desires closer European integration while it builds its relationships in the Middle East and central Asia as well⁴⁸.” Since these representations are more targeted at European security interests, Turkey's role in the Mediterranean and the Middle Eastern countries is analyzed in this study under the heading of Turkey as a security partner in the region, which shows the intertwined structure of discourses.

The representation of Turkey, which needs Europe's assistance for its complex and challenging transformation to democracy, is widespread in the EP groups, which shows the discursive continuity of “Turkey as capable of democratic change” and “Europe as an upholder of democratic values” in the 1997-2007 period. Some MEPs do not evaluate problems in Turkish democracy as an inherent incompatibility between Europe and Turkey, which leads the EU to become “a driving force for democratic change in Turkey”⁴⁹ and “a benchmark for reforms in the country”⁵⁰. Thus the help of the EU as the embodiment of fundamental democratic values and the motivation for Turkey to be an EU member state is seen as necessary, especially in the left-wing and liberal EP groups for the democratization process in Turkey in this difficult transformation process:

This is, in my view, a wake-up call for Mr Erdoğan and the AKP. Turkey can either take the road to more democracy and Europe or can slip into the chaos which is, unfortunately, developing in the Middle East. Turkey needs a new constitution, not because of the EU, but in the interests of democracy and the development of Turkish society and the Turkish economy. This process of creating a new constitution should involve not only the ruling party but also the opposition, civil society, journalists, lawyers and anybody who is willing to take part. Turkey needs our help in this process also because if we let this very important country slide down on this slippery slope, it will have terrible consequences for us.

(Libor Rouček, S&D, 12 June 2013)

In the speech above, “democracy” as a positively connoted flag word is associated with Europe, which contributes to the positive representation of the European Self, while

⁴⁷ See the parliamentary speech of Geoffrey Van Orden from the ECR on 8 March 2011.

⁴⁸ See the parliamentary speech of Charles Tannock from the ECR on 17 April 2013.

⁴⁹ See the parliamentary speech of Róza, Gräfin von Thun Und Hohenstein from the PPE on 20 January 2010.

⁵⁰ See the parliamentary speech of Kati Piri from the S&D on 15 January 2015.

Turkey, in the process of “creating a new constitution,” is represented as democratically insufficient (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 55). In this respect, Turkey is described as being at a crossroads where it will either “take the road to more democracy and Europe or slip into chaos.” In other words, Europe is introduced as the only solution for its democratization. For this aim, the terms “slippery slope” and “chaos” are used as metaphors to describe Turkey's difficult situation because of the Gezi Park protests⁵¹. In this speech, the *topos* of threat and an interdiscursivity with the slippery slope argument⁵² in the political rhetoric are explicitly seen, while the fallacy of the slippery slope is also identified (Pfau, 2017, pp. 254–255; van der Burg, 1991, pp. 42–45; Walton, 2015, p. 297). This informal fallacy as a rhetorical device with its causal argumentation and future-oriented nature of the argument utilizes fears and prejudices for “a bright line that can be placed into the gray zone to stop the slippery slope from moving forward” (Lafollette, 2005, pp. 489–490; Walton, 2015, p. 302). Moreover, there is a hyperbolic extreme-case formulation to refer to Europe's future without helping Turkey through the phrase “terrible consequences for us.” Therefore, Europe is equated with democracy itself in this speech, while Turkey is described as being in a difficult process of democratic transformation, which can only be overcome with the help of the EU.

Mr President, Turkey is an important country for political, economic, military and cultural reasons, and it is therefore important to the EU. Realising this, the EU has decided to commence accession negotiations. The path towards accession has not been very smooth, but it has helped initiate a much-needed democratic reform programme in Turkey... Turkey is undergoing a difficult period right now, and the use by the EU of more carrot and less stick is presently the appropriate way to proceed.

(Marios Matsakis, ALDE, 24 October 2007)

The MEP above from the ALDE constructs the accession negotiations for “EU enlargement as a tool that allows the EU to construct its identity as a normative power⁵³”

⁵¹ The Gezi Park protests are known as widespread protests that occurred in Turkey in 2013, which turned into a mass civil movement from small environmental protests against the building of a shopping mall on Gezi Park in Taksim as one of the central squares in Istanbul (Yardımcı-Geyikçi, 2014, p. 445).

⁵² Corner et al (2011, p. 135) state that there are four components of this argument, namely “an initial proposal for action, an undesirable outcome, a belief that allowing the action will lead to a re-evaluation of the undesirable outcome in the future, and the rejection of the initial action proposed, based on this belief.”

⁵³ Normative power is based on ideas and norms rather than economic or military power (Manners, 2002, pp. 257–58). In this regard, see also the parliamentary speeches of Charles Tannock from the ECR on 9 July 2008, Véronique Mathieu from the PPE-DE on 9 July 2008, Barbara Matera from the PPE on 20 January 2010, Kristiina Ojuland from the ALDE on 10 February 2010, Czesław Adam Siekierski from the

based on its normative dimensions of the rule of law, democracy, and human rights. The sentence “it has helped initiate a much-needed democratic reform program in Turkey” sustains the positive self-representation of the EU as a normative external actor, although an interdiscursivity with the carrots and sticks as instruments within the EU’s conditionality policy is also preferred (Akçay & Kanat, 2018, p. 1; Zalewski, 2014, p. 3). In other words, the normative power of the EU is linked to its hard power through the carrot and stick approach in this extract. This is because of “a difficult period” that “Turkey is undergoing,” which refers implicitly to the Kurdish issue, then the terrorist attacks of the PKK on the border between Iraq and Turkey, and thus Turkey's threat of military operations in the northern part of Iraq⁵⁴ which were frequently mentioned by other MEPs in 2007.

Many problems still remain unsolved in Turkey – press freedom, minority rights (especially those of transgender people and homosexuals), the environment and the Kurdish question, to mention just a few – and also in Cyprus, where a sustainable settlement needs to be reached and the isolation of the northern part brought to an end. Solving these issues will be very beneficial for Turkey and its citizens... Our most important tool for change and reform is the accession negotiations. It is incomprehensible why we deprive ourselves of this tool by not opening the chapters on justice and fundamental rights as well as on home affairs, in which a lot of the problems I just mentioned – and a lot of the concerns raised in this House – are included. We should open them as soon as possible. We should be sincere in our wish to help Turkey solve those problems.

(Franziska Keller, Verts/ALE, 28 March 2012)

PPE on 8 March 2011, Ana Gomes from the S&D on 28 March 2012, George Sabin Cutaş from the S&D on 21 November 2012, Birgit Collin-Langen from the PPE on 12 June 2013, Krzysztof Lisek from the PPE on 11 March 2014, Francisco José Millán Mon from the PPE on 11 March 2014, Emine Bozkurt from the S&D on 11 March 2014, Kati Piri from the S&D on 17 December 2014, Marietje Schaake from the ALDE on 17 December 2014, Gunnar Hökmark from the PPE-DE on 17 December 2014, Sven Schulze from the PPE on 17 December 2014, Josef Weidenholzer from the S&D on 17 December 2014, Ska Keller from the Verts/ALE on 20 May 2015, Francisco José Millán Mon from the PPE on 20 May 2015, Andrei Kovachev from the PPE on 20 May 2015, Nikos Androulakis from the S&D on 20 May 2015, Eduard Kukan from the PPE on 20 May 2015, Bendt Bendtsen from the PPE on 20 May 2015, and Ilhan Kuchjuk from the ALDE on 7 October 2015.

⁵⁴ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Sebastiano (Nello) Musumeci from the UEN on 24 October 2007, Hannes Swoboda from the S&D on 24 October 2007, Philip Claeys from the ITS on 24 October 2007, Jan Marinus Wiersma from the PSE on 24 October 2007, Alexander Lambsdorff from the ALDE on 24 October 2007, Joost Lagendijk from the Verts / ALE on 24 October 2007, Werner Langen from the PPE-ED on 24 October 2007, Jan Marinus Wiersma from the PSE on 24 October 2007, Marco Cappato from the ALDE on 24 October 2007, Felekna Uca from the GUE/NGL on 24 October 2007, Andreas Mölzer from the NI on 24 October 2007, Ioannis Kasoulides from the PPE-DE on 24 October 2007, Mario Borghezio from the UEN on 24 October 2007, Giorgos Dimitrakopoulos from the PPE-DE on 24 October 2007, Richard Howitt from the S&D on 24 October 2007, and Carlos Carnero González from the PSE on 24 October 2007.

In the extract above from the Verts/ALE, various reasons for Turkey's difficult transformation, such as the Kurdish issue, problems in fundamental rights and freedoms, and the Cyprus problem, are listed, while there are also MEPs who add the deep state⁵⁵, the Turkish army,⁵⁶ and the Gezi Park protests, as in the extract above, to the reasons for its difficult transformation. The accession negotiations as “carrots” are expressed as the instrument of change and reform in Turkey, which again underlines the conditionality principle in the EU (Akçay & Kanat, 2018, pp. 7–9). In this speech, self-reflexivity on “not opening the chapters on justice and fundamental rights as well as on home affairs” in the EU is observed, while the normative power discourse is displayed through the “tool” of the accession negotiations in the hands of the EU for democratic change and reform in Turkey. In this regard, in contrast to the 1997–2007 period, in the discussions over Turkey, it is determined that there are more MEPs⁵⁷ in this period whose narratives sustain self-reflexivity in terms of questioning the normative superiority of the EU as well as the sufficiency of European assistance for democratic change in Turkey and thus the Turkish accession.

Madam President, we all know that the main obstacle to Turkish progress towards democracy is the Turkish army, an army that not only controls millions of soldiers and their dependants, but also controls political parties and processes, the police and secret service, much of the judiciary (including the supreme and constitutional courts), as well as the religious, educational, social and economic affairs of the country...Recently, the prospect of EU

⁵⁵ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Marios Matsakis from the ALDE on 12 February 2007, Ioannis Kasoulides from the PPE-DE on 21 May 2008, H el ene Flautre from the Verts / ALE on 10 February 2010, Graham Watson from the ALDE on 8 March 2011, Hannes Swoboda from the S&D on 12 June 2013, and Richard Howitt from the S&D on 12 June 2013.

⁵⁶ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Marios Matsakis from the ALDE on 12 February 2007, Yiannakis Matsis from the PPE-DE on 24 October 2007, Marios Matsakis from the ALDE on 21 May 2008, Zbigniew Zaleski from the PPE-DE on 21 May 2008, Panayiotis Demetriou from the PPE-DE on 21 May 2008, Bart Staes from the Verts / ALE on 11 March 2009, H el ene Flautre from the Verts / ALE on 25 November 2009, Jan Zahradil from the ECR on 20 January 2010, Maria Eleni Koppa from the S&D on 20 January 2010, Frieda Brepoels from the Verts / ALE on 20 January 2010, Cristian Dan Preda from the PPE on 10 February 2010, Kader Arif from the S&D on 20 September 2010, and Sarah Ludford from the ALDE on 6 February 2013.

⁵⁷ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Sebastiano (Nello) Musumeci from the UEN on 12 February 2007, Marco Cappato from the ALDE on 24 October 2007, Istv an Szent-Iv anyi from the ALDE on 21 May 2008, Philip Claeys from the NI on 21 May 2008, Vural  ger from the PSE on 21 May 2008, Vural  ger from the PSE on 5 May 2009, Emine Bozkurt from the S&D on 8 March 2011, Geoffrey Van Orden from the ECR on 28 March 2012, Ska Keller from the Verts / ALE on 17 December 2014, Ivo Vajgl from the ALDE on 17 December 2014, Geoffrey Van Orden from the ECR on 20 May 2015, Ska Keller from the Verts / ALE on 20 May 2015, and Anna Maria Corazza Bildt from the PPE on 20 May 2015.

accession has given the opportunity for some brave people like the leaders of the AKP party to challenge the army supremacy. We have a duty to help these people not just with words, but in deeds. The army derives most of its strength from the support of the West. Billions of euros in direct aid and in lucrative joint defence ventures are given by the USA, Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain. These countries and others, including Russia and China, have a duty to cease all such economic support to the Turkish army until and unless true democracy is securely established in the country.

(Marios Matsakis, ALDE, 21 May 2008)

The extract above uses the *topos* of history to construct a militarist Turkey historically while justifying the Turkish army as “a militarionym”⁵⁸ within the linguistic means is represented as a challenge against “true democracy” in Turkey (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, pp. 48–157). In this way, collectivization and militarization as referential strategies through the term “Turkish army,” which is allegedly associated with the deep state in Turkey, the Ergenekon trial, and the Cyprus problem as the most crucial obstacles to Turkish accession according to the EP debates, are employed to otherize it (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, pp. 48–53). Furthermore, the army's alleged ability to control various parties, processes, courts, services, and affairs in the country shows its personifications or anthropomorphizations, which “are rhetorically used to give a human form or to humanize inanimate objects, abstract entities, phenomena, and ideas” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 58).

In this extract, the normative power of the EU to give “the opportunity for some brave people like the leaders of the AKP party to challenge the army supremacy” is underlined again for the positive European self-representation. Moreover, the phrase “duty to help these people not just with words” in the speech brings to mind a parent-child analogy based on the one being dependent on the other as in the relationship between the parent and the child. This “duty” also shows the discursive continuity of Turkey as a troublesome child in terms of the political criteria in the study of Levin (2011, pp. 195–196) since there are also MEPs who state that “we must encourage Turkey to continue this reform process...”⁵⁹, “many of us were extremely disappointed by Turkey's

⁵⁸ Militarionym is a linguistic mean used for the referential strategy of militarization, which targets “social actors’ exclusion from, or inclusion in, linguistic representations” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, pp. 48–157).

⁵⁹ The parliamentary speech of Vural Öger from the PSE on 24 October 2007.

refusal...⁶⁰,” “we expect from the Turkish government...⁶¹,” “we get the impression that Turkey is moving away from Europe...⁶²” or “otherwise there can be no real democratisation in Turkey...⁶³” as in the repertoire of reactions between teachers/parents and students/children. Therefore, an asymmetric role-relationship between Turkey and the EU with a paternalistic dimension is displayed to construct a normatively more powerful European Self and a Turkish other on the road to “true democracy” with the help of the EU. Especially regarding the Kurdish issue and relatedly the democratic opening initiative⁶⁴, this paternalistic manner in discourse through praising or criticizing Turkey's efforts is apparent in all EP groups as below:

I should like to congratulate Turkey emphatically on all the efforts it has already made in this field, including with regard to the Kurdish issue. After all, who would have thought 10 years ago, five years ago even, that there would now be television programmes in Kurdish? When, in mid-2009, Turkey launched what it called the 'democratic opening' initiative, this produced an unprecedented debate – not only a debate in the parliament, but also an unprecedented debate in the media. At that time, I hoped that debate would produce very tangible, firmly rooted rights for all Turkish citizens at long last. In October, I congratulated all my Turkish counterparts on daring to hold that debate in spite of public opposition...Following all the positive energy that had been put into this, however, Turkey's dark side then reared its head again, as the ruling of the Turkish Constitutional Court brought renewed terrorist attacks. There was a wave of arrests of Democratic Society Party (DTP) members, and the threat of arrest still hangs over members of the Turkish Parliament. This also threatens to put an end to this opening and I have a nasty feeling about this. Whilst I regret the decision of the Constitutional Court, I understand that the same Court is calling for the implementation of the recommendations of the Venice Commission...After all, only dialogue within Turkish society and legally guaranteed sustainable rights can bring peace, security and prosperity for Turkish citizens, and will also be of great benefit to us.

(Ria Oomen-Ruijten, PPE, 20 January 2010)

⁶⁰ The parliamentary speech of Charles Tannock from the ECR on 17 April 2013.

⁶¹ The parliamentary speech of Ria Oomen-Ruijten from the PPE on 24 October 2007.

⁶² The parliamentary speech of Elena Valenciano from the S&D on 17 December 2014.

⁶³ The parliamentary speech of Feleknas Uca from the GUE/NGL on 5 May 2009.

⁶⁴ Many democratic opening initiatives were started in 2009 by the AKP government “to tackle the Kurdish question, the Alevi question, the Roma question, and the minorities question” and thus “to strengthen the social unity and cohesion of Turkey through democratic deliberation” (Keyman, 2010, p.92).

With regard to the issue of democratization raised in the extract above, the Kurdish issue is cited among certain aspects of democratization with sharing observations and evaluative descriptions, while the sensitivity of this issue through “daring to hold that debate in spite of public opposition” is underlined. With a rhetorical question, a mental process, which is “to think,” is used to imply that the democratic opening initiative, whose launch is found to be surprising, touches sensitive points in society. In this regard, emotionalization through emotional connotations such as “regret,” “emphatically,” “hope,” and “a nasty feeling” as a nonargumentative compulsion under conditions of suspended rationality is also seen, which underlines the difficult democratic transformation process of Turkey (El Nakkouzi, 2017, p. 87; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 70). Moreover, political flag words such as “democracy,” “peace,” “security,” and “prosperity” are employed to convey a positive deontic-evaluative meaning for the progress (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 55). Through praising Turkey's efforts, the parent-child dichotomy in which Turkey is constructed as a subject child in need of guidance from the EU as a parent object is situated. A personification in order “to give a human form or to humanize inanimate objects, abstract entities, phenomena, and ideas” is detected in “Turkey's dark side,” which “then reared its head” through the *topos* of threat (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 58).

Mr. President, I would like to express the support of our parliamentary group for the process of dialogue that has been opened in Turkey for a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question. It is probably the most difficult and complex challenge presented in Turkey's process of modernization and democratization. It has very powerful and determined adversaries, both inside and outside of Turkey... Then there is a path, which will be complex and difficult, of political reforms, to deal with the Kurdish question in Turkey. I once read an article by a historian who said that, assuming that national problems were ever solved in the world, the last to be solved would be the Kurdish problem. I hope it's not like that! But in any case it is a problem of great complexity.

(Raimon Obiols, S&D, 6 February 2013)

In this speech from the S&D, the Kurdish issue is defined as “the most difficult and complex challenge presented in Turkey's process of modernization and democratization” through the *topos* of definition, which underlines Turkey's difficult

democratic transformation. Moreover, the Kurdish problem is presented as indispensable for democratic stability. Although the solution of the Kurdish problem is favored in this speech, the repetition, overemphasis, and hyperbole on the difficulty and complexity of the problem and even the claim that “the last to be solved would be the Kurdish problem” according to “a historian” through the fallacy of the *argumentum ad verecundiam*, in other words, fallacious appeal to authority creates the perception that the problem cannot and will not be solved at all (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 72).

The common feature of the last two and other similar excerpts⁶⁵ from all the EP groups, especially in the debate on “Dialogue for a peaceful solution of the Kurdish issue in Turkey” on 6 February 2013, is that the Kurdish issue is positioned at the center or implied as one of the core elements of Turkey's democratization and modernization process towards its accession to the EU. For this reason, any development in the Kurdish issue positively contributes to the perception of democracy in Turkey and is seen as a sign of democratization among MEPs. Furthermore, macro-mitigation is also used through the modal verb and verb of expressing, which is “I would like to express...” (Reisigl &

⁶⁵See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Feleknas Uca from the GUE/NGL on 24 October 2007, Vittorio Agnoletto from the GUE/NGL on 21 May 2008, Roberta Angelilli from the UEN on 21 May 2008, Mario Borghesio from the UEN on 21 May 2008, Tunne Kelam from the PPE-DE on 21 May 2008, Csaba Sógor from the PPE-DE on 21 May 2008, Feleknas Uca from the GUE/NGL on 21 May 2008, Joost Lagendijk from the Verts / ALE on 11 March 2009, Adamos Adamou from the GUE / NGL on 11 March 2009, Emine Bozkurt from the S&D on 11 March 2009, Bart Staes from the Verts / ALE on 11 March 2009, Călin Cătălin Chiriță from the PPE-DE on 11 March 2009, Vural Öger from the PSE on 5 May 2009, Joost Lagendijk from the Verts / ALE on 5 May 2009, Feleknas Uca from the GUE/NGL on 5 May 2009, Roberto Fiore from the NI on 5 May 2009, Metin Kazak from the ALDE on 5 May 2009, Vittorio Agnoletto from the GUE/NGL on 5 May 2009, Hélène Flautre from the Verts / ALE on 25 November 2009, Ria Oomen-Ruijten from the PPE on 20 January 2010, Richard Howitt from the S&D on 20 January 2010, Hélène Flautre from the Verts / ALE on 20 January 2010, Charles Tannock from the ECR on 20 January 2010, Takis Hadjigeorgiou from the GUE/NGL on 20 January 2010, Barbara Matera from the PPE on 20 January 2010, Raimon Obiols from the S&D on 20 January 2010, Sarah Ludford from the ALDE on 20 January 2010, Anna Maria Corazza Bildt from the PPE on 20 January 2010, Maria Eleni Koppa from the S&D on 20 January 2010, Jürgen Klute from the GUE/NGL on 20 January 2010, Sari Essayah from the PPE on 20 January 2010, Emine Bozkurt from the S&D on 20 January 2010, Frieda Brepoels from the Verts / ALE on 20 January 2010, Róża, Gräfin von Thun Und Hohenstein from the PPE on 20 January 2010, Jarosław Leszek Wałęsa from the PPE on 20 January 2010, Bogusław Sonik from the PPE on 20 January 2010, Franz Obermayr from the NI on 20 January 2010, Andreas Mölzer from the NI on 20 September 2010, Hélène Flautre from the Verts / ALE on 28 March 2012, Raimon Obiols from the S&D on 6 February 2013, Hélène Flautre from the Verts / ALE on 6 February 2013, Charles Tannock from the ECR on 6 February 2013, Maria-Eleni Koppa from the S&D on 6 February 2013, György Schöpflin from the PPE on 6 February 2013, Mark Demesmaeker from the Verts/ALE on 6 February 2013, Sarah Ludford from the ALDE on 6 February 2013, Marietta Giannakou from the PPE on 6 February 2013, Emine Bozkurt from the S&D on 6 February 2013, Ana Gomes from the S&D on 6 February 2013, Hélène Flautre from the Verts / ALE on 17 April 2013, Sophocles Sophocleous from the S&D on 17 April 2013, Mitro Repo from the S&D on 18 April 2013, Andrzej Grzyb from the PPE on 11 March 2014, Takis Hadjigeorgiou from the GUE/NGL on 17 December 2014, Nicola Caputo from the S&D on 17 December 2014, Marco Affronte from the EFDD on 20 May 2015, Ernest Maragall from the Verts / ALE on 10 June 2015, Alexander Graf Lambsdorff from the ALDE on 7 October 2015, and Ernest Maragall from the Verts / ALE on 7 October 2015.

Wodak, 2001, p. 84). In this regard, it is also observed that the more the severity and intensity of the criticism against Turkey regarding democratization, including the Kurdish problem, increases, the more some MEPs, especially from the left and the liberal groups as well as the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR), began to be afraid of possibly losing Turkey, especially in the 2010s before it completed its complex democratic transformation:

Many of my fellow Members have raised today the discussion of the fundamental rights issue. However, I would like to ask why this report does not call on the Council to initiate negotiations on the justice and fundamental rights chapter. This chapter is blocked by the Council, even though it is the most important in terms of Turkey meeting EU democratic standards. Fellow Members, tomorrow we must vote for the amendment requesting this chapter to be opened up. Otherwise, the European Parliament will send negative signals to Turkey, which will affect our credibility.

(Ioan Enciu, S&D, 8 March 2011)

The excerpt above demonstrates the paradox in which the justice and fundamental rights chapter is blocked while Turkey is required to meet “EU democratic standards.” Despite underlining these EU democratic standards, the limited self-reflexivity is apparent, which problematizes the “negative signals” that the EP will send to Turkey upon the continuing block on this chapter and thus its “credibility.” Turkey is still predicated as not fully democratic because of this block while its potential is implied. Despite this self-reflection, positive European self-representation and superiority are maintained by predicating these standards as “EU democratic standards.” The *topos* of threat of sending negative signals to Turkey and thus damaging the credibility of the EU in this speech are combined with the *topos* of responsibility of the EU to support Turkey in its already difficult democratization through opening this chapter. In this and similar excerpts⁶⁶, the MEPs are seen to be fearful of losing Turkey⁶⁷. Moreover, macro-mitigation is also used

⁶⁶ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Danuta Jazłowiecka from the PPE on 20 September 2010, Geoffrey Van Orden from the ECR on 8 March 2011, Andrew Duff from the ALDE on 8 March 2011, Graham Watson from the ALDE on 8 March 2011, Geoffrey Van Orden from the ECR on 28 March 2012, Geoffrey Van Orden from the ECR on 12 June 2013, and Tonino Picula from the S&D on 11 March 2014.

⁶⁷ In this context, Levin’s article (2018, pp.152-173) confirms such a loss and reveals the reasons of this loss both from Turkish and European sides in this context.

through the modal verb and verb of asking, which is “I would like to ask...” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 84).

In brief, the perception of Turkish identity in this section through the speeches above and others in the EP between 2007 and 2015 discursively constructs Turkey in a difficult process of democratic transformation for various reasons, such as the deep state, the Turkish army, the Gezi Park protests, the Cyprus problem, the Kurdish issue, which is associated with the PKK's terrorist attacks on the border between Turkey and Iraq and thus Turkey's threat of military operations in the northern part of Iraq, and lastly the problems with fundamental rights and freedoms in Turkey. This relatively positive representation of Turkey in the 2007–2015 period appears as the discursive continuity with the representation of Turkey as being capable of democratic change through the guidance of the EU in the 1997–2007 period. Under this representation of Turkey, an interdiscursivity with the discourse on Europe as a normative power to make a democratic transformation in Turkey, which is in such a complex and difficult process, is frequently used. The other interdiscursivities in this section are with arguments about the slippery slope and carrots and sticks as instruments within the EU's conditionality policy.

Similarly, the representation of Europe is also still in the direction of the image of “Europe as an upholder of democratic values” in the 1997–2007 period. In some cases, Europe is equated with democracy, human rights, and other values that it defends, which brings forth the frequently used phrase “European democratic values” in the excerpts. The parent-child dichotomy is apparent in constructing Europe as the superior entity and the embodiment of fundamental democratic values that Turkey needs to comply with. This necessary guidance of the EU for Turkey in its challenging and complex democratic transformation converges with the image of Turkey as a troublesome child in terms of the political criteria in the study of Levin (2011, pp. 195–196). Nevertheless, in the 2007–2015 period, more MEPs sustain self-reflexivity in terms of questioning the normative superiority of the EU as well as the sufficiency of European assistance for democratic change in Turkey and thus Turkish accession, which is a divergence from the 1997–2007 period.

Last but not least, in this relatively positive context for the perception of Turkish identity, there are some discourses in which MEPs from the same group or country are divided. There are some MEPs from the traditional center-right under the EPP/EPP-

ED/PPE⁶⁸ and Germany⁶⁹ who are divided concerning the limits of Turkey's reform capacity. Some MEPs state that the limits of reform capacity in Turkey have been reached, while others believe that Turkey should be called to maintain continuing improvements of its own accord, and thus the pressure must be kept on concerning all the changes that are required to be made in Turkey in 2008. Moreover, in 2009, some MEPs from Germany⁷⁰ and the Netherlands⁷¹ claimed too little progress and setbacks in the pace of reforms in Turkey, while some other German and Dutch MEPs praised the remarkable progress and significant steps in Turkey as a success of the accession process. In the years 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015, some MEPs from the ALDE⁷², the EPP/EPP-ED/PPE⁷³, and the PSE/PS/S&D⁷⁴ seemed divided regarding opening Chapters 23 and 24 on rights, freedoms, and justice for Turkey and thus Turkish accession to the EU while the same

⁶⁸ See the parliamentary speeches of Elmar Brok from the PPE-DE on 21 May 2008 and Gunnar Hökmark from the PPE-DE on 21 May 2008.

⁶⁹ See the parliamentary speeches of Elmar Brok from the PPE-DE on 21 May 2008 and Alexander Lambsdorff from the ALDE on 21 May 2008.

⁷⁰ See the parliamentary speeches of Alexander Graf Lambsdorff from the ALDE on 11 March 2009 and Franziska Keller from the Verts/ALE on 25 November 2009.

⁷¹ See the parliamentary speeches of Jan Marinus Wiersma from the PSE on 11 March 2009 and Emine Bozkurt from the S&D on 25 November 2009.

⁷² See the parliamentary speeches of Alexander Graf Lambsdorff from the ALDE on 12 June 2013, Metin Kazak from the ALDE on 17 April 2013, and Jelko Kacin from the ALDE on 6 February 2013.

⁷³ See the parliamentary speeches of Markus Pieper from the PPE on 18 April 2013, Arnaud Danjean from the PPE on 17 April 2013, Renate Sommer from the PPE on 17 April 2013, Birgit Schnieber-Jastram from the PPE on 17 April 2013, Krzysztof Lisek from the PPE on 17 April 2013, Alojz Peterle from the PPE on 17 April 2013, Francisco José Millán Mon from the PPE on 11 March 2014, Cristian Dan Preda from the PPE on 17 December 2014, Artis Pabriks from the PPE on 17 December 2014, Arnaud Danjean from the PPE on 11 March 2014, Sven Schulze from the PPE on 17 December 2014, Eleni Theocharous from the PPE on 17 December 2014, Renate Sommer from the PPE on 20 May 2015, Manolis Kefaloyiannis from the PPE on 20 May 2015, Lefteris Christoforou from the PPE on 2 December 2015, Cristian Dan Preda from the PPE on 20 May 2015, Anna Maria Corazza Bildt from the PPE on 20 May 2015, Esther de Lange from the PPE on 20 May 2015, Cristian-Silviu Buşoi from the PPE on 7 October 2015, and Elmar Brok from the PPE on 2 December 2015.

⁷⁴ See the parliamentary speeches of Sophocles Sophocleous from the S&D on 12 June 2013, Emine Bozkurt from the S&D on 12 June 2013, Ana Gomes from the S&D on 12 June 2013, Hannes Swoboda from the S&D on 12 June 2013, Libor Rouček from the S&D on 12 June 2013, Raimon Obiols from the S&D on 17 April 2013, Sophocles Sophocleous from the S&D on 11 March 2014, Antigoni Papadopoulou from the S&D on 11 March 2014, and Tonino Picula from the S&D on 11 March 2014.

division is observed among MEPs from Austria⁷⁵, Bulgaria⁷⁶, France⁷⁷, Germany⁷⁸, the Netherlands⁷⁹, and the United Kingdom⁸⁰.

4.2.2 Turkey as Increasingly Turning Away from European Norms and Values

The 2007–2015 period was the most challenging in EU-Turkey relations that had ever experienced. Within this period, also called Turkey's “de-Europeanization,” the perception of MEPs in terms of Turkish democracy is observed as quite hardened and sharpened in the negative sense when the discourses of the MEPs are analyzed, which affects the articulations of the Turkish identity and in turn the European identity. Except for the discourses on Turkey as a model democracy to the Arab Spring countries because of the European security concerns, MEPs are mainly focused on the representation of Turkey as increasingly turning away from European norms and values⁸¹, while there are relatively fewer MEPs mentioned above who discursively construct Turkey in a difficult process of democratic transformation. In other words, the term between 2007 and 2015 is overwhelmingly based on sharing observations and, in turn, evaluations of the MEPs on Turkey as increasingly turning away from European norms and values through the representations of Turkey as a violator of fundamental rights and freedoms with pseudo-reforms, an undemocratic and authoritarian state governed by Erdoğan, an occupier in Cyprus as an EU member state, and lastly a reluctant neighbor far from normalizing relations, which are analyzed below. In this respect, it is observed that there is a clear

⁷⁵ See the parliamentary speeches of Hannes Swoboda from the S&D on 12 June 2013, Andreas Mölzer from the NI on 12 June 2013, Ewald Stadler from the NI on 18 April 2013, and Ewald Stadler from the NI on 6 February 2013.

⁷⁶ See the parliamentary speeches of Metin Kazak from the ALDE on 17 April 2013 and Dimitar Stoyanov from the NI on 12 June 2013.

⁷⁷ See the parliamentary speeches of Arnaud Danjean from the EPP on 17 April 2013, H el ene Flautre from the Verts / ALE on 12 June 2013, and H el ene Flautre from the Verts / ALE on 17 April 2013.

⁷⁸ See the parliamentary speeches of Renate Sommer from the PPE on 20 May 2015, Markus Pieper from the PPE on 10 June 2015, Knut Fleckenstein from the S&D on 2 December 2015, Elmar Brok from the S&D on 2 December 2015, and Ska Keller from the Verts / ALE on 20 May 2015.

⁷⁹ See the parliamentary speeches of Emine Bozkurt from the S&D on 12 June 2013, Laurence J.A.J. Stassen from the NI on 12 June 2013, Marcel de Graaff from the NI on 20 May 2015, and Kati Piri from the S&D on 2 December 2015.

⁸⁰ See the parliamentary speeches of Andrew Henry William Brons from the NI on 12 June 2013 and Geoffrey Van Orden from the ECR on 12 June 2013.

⁸¹ In this respect, as mentioned before, Article 5 of the the Negotiation Framework Document adopted in 2005 lets the suspension of negotiations “in the case of a serious and persistent breach in Turkey of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.”

discursive continuity of Turkey as statically undemocratic and, therefore, Europe as an upholder of democratic values, which is increasingly intensified and hardened in the 2007–2015 period.

4.2.2.1 Turkey as a Violator of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms with Pseudo-Reforms

The violations of fundamental rights and freedoms seen as a result of the democratic deficit in Turkey are among the most frequently discussed topics about Turkey in the 2007–2015 period. In this context, the EP organized particular debates within the scope of the problems with the fundamental rights and freedoms in Turkey, namely “Women in Turkey” on 12 February 2007, “A 2020 Perspective for Women in Turkey” on 21 May 2012, “Dialogue for a Peaceful Solution of the Kurdish issue in Turkey” on 6 February 2013, and “Freedom of Expression in Turkey: Recent Arrests of Journalists, Media Executives, and Systematic Pressure against Media” on 17 December 2014 and 15 January 2015. In all the EP groups during the debates on Turkey's democratization between 2007 and 2015, Turkey is discursively constructed as a violator of fundamental rights and freedoms with pseudo-reforms, which makes it an undemocratic state statically resistant to change. As the discursive continuity, this representation is also in the same line with the image of Turkish identity as the dangerous other in terms of human rights abuses already analyzed by Levin (2011, pp. 189–191) within the exclusive understanding of the European identity in the 1997–2007 period. In the speeches below and others, there are many samples of these constructions of Turkey evaluated within “European democratic values” through various discursive strategies that make Europe an upholder and an embodiment of fundamental democratic values as in the 1997–2007 period:

The greatest problems in Turkey are still in the areas of democracy and human rights. It would appear that the reforms introduced by the government of Prime Minister Erdoğan are primarily cosmetic in nature, and intended to deflect external criticism. Measures to protect the rights of women and ethnic minorities are still insufficient. In addition, there is no real understanding of the past in Turkey, and many legal proposals that have been adopted have not been implemented. If it fails to resolve its historical disputes with neighbours and ethnic minorities, Turkey will find it hard to create a successful future.

(Czesław Adam Siekierski, PPE, 28 March 2012)

In the speech above from the PPE, the reforms in Turkey are not reflected as inherent changes applied in society and are only “cosmetic in nature” since they allegedly only aim “to deflect external criticism,” which further distances Turkey and Europe from each other. As stated by Levin (2011, p. 194) for the 1997–2007 period, the general problem in the implementation of the reforms, the proposals, and the Copenhagen criteria is underlined again in the 2007–2015 period as in the extract above, which is a challenge for Turkey's domestic affairs as well as its foreign relations through the *topos* of threat of not creating “a successful future” in Turkey. This application problem in Turkey again recalls the image of Turkey as a troublesome child. Moreover, the image of Turkish identity as the dangerous other mistreating women revealed in the 1997–2007 period is also maintained in the 2007–2015 period as in the speech above and other excerpts, especially in the EP debates entitled “Women in Turkey” on 12 February 2007 and “A 2020 Perspective for Women in Turkey” on 21 May 2012. In this regard, “measures to protect the rights of women and ethnic minorities” are still evaluated as “insufficient” as in the relationship between teachers/parents and students/children, which consolidates the image of Europe as an upholder of fundamental democratic rights.

I have said too many times that we would like a democratic neighbor, progressive and modern, who protect - if it has so much power as Turkey - all small peoples around. Sadly, however, Turkey wants to join the European Union in its own terms and to tame the European Union itself. That is why it does not proceed to democratic processes and changes that allow us to feel safe. If you feel safe with this Turkey, which does not even respect its own people and violates fundamental rights, then what can I say? I have nothing more to say. Yes! We would like a democratic Turkey in the European Union to feel better and safer.

(Eleni Theocharous, PPE, 20 May 2015)

In the speech above from the PPE, there is a distancing made between Turkey and the EU in terms of the conceptualization of democracy, which resembles the essentialization of the notion of democracy in the 1997–2007 period in order to reduce various aspects of a group to a very few features as its essence. In this excerpt, the notion of democracy in Turkey is seen as different from the notion of democracy in the EU, which sustains the exclusion of any alternative democratic progress in Turkey. In this regard, the discursive continuity of the essentialization

of the notion of democracy is apparent in the EP. With a rhetorical question to get the attention, Turkey is portrayed as a state that is disrespectful to its own people's fundamental rights, which allegedly affects the feeling of safety in the EU. It is also important to mention here that Turkey also allegedly tries to impose its understanding of democracy on the EU and “tame” it for this purpose while Turkish people are portrayed as victims of the violations of their fundamental rights, which makes the Turkish state a “violator.” Moreover, there is a nonargumentative compulsion in this extract, which is emotionalization through “sadly,” as well as a rhetorical question, “then what can I say?” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 70).

Madam President, I condemn the recent operation against press and increasing the internet control by the Turkish government. These practices affect the fundamental principles of freedom of speech but above all affect democracy itself. Having firmly supported Turkey's European perspective, I would like to express my concern about this development, which is a sign of backpedaling, violates human rights and the rule of law. Last year we had the violent breakdown on the demonstrations in the center of Istanbul • most recently, we met the Turkish government's ambiguous attitude towards the struggle of the international fight against the ISIS jihadists • just last month, we condemned the violation of the sovereignty of Cyprus, by the Turkish armed forces and again today, in yet another plenary, we are discussing a new attack to the freedom of the press in Turkey. Unfortunately, all this is evidence that Erdoğan leads Turkey away from the principles and values of the European Union.

(Nikos Androulakis, S&D, 17 December 2014)

The social democrat MEP above reduces the responsibility of “Turkey away from the principles and values of the European Union” to Erdoğan as the reason for the violations of the rule of law and human rights in Turkey through *synecdochising personalization* (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 111). The Turkish military presence in Cyprus, as well as the Turkish attitude towards the ISIS Jihadists as its foreign policy matters, are constructed as signs of Turkey moving away from the EU principles and values and, therefore, democracy within its domestic affairs, which also oversimplifies the resolution of complex conflicts in Cyprus and against the ISIS Jihadists. Turkey is negatively predicated as a violator of the rule of law and human rights within this framework, while the EU is associated with its “principles and values,” which “Erdoğan

leads Turkey away from.” Furthermore, macro-mitigation is also used through the modal verb and the verb of expressing, which is “I would like to express...” in this extract (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 84).

For your information, I will give you some facts. According to independent estimates, Turkey currently has the highest number of imprisoned journalists worldwide. Many of these journalists were detained on the basis of allegations of cooperation for the terrorist activities related to Kurdish separatism. The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights prepared a detailed report with a list of imprisoned journalists - in August 2012 there were 78, including 53 people directly related to the Kurdish issue. In a global context, these numbers are terrifying. Turkey is an infamous leader in this field, against Iran and China. Despite the recent constitutional reforms that allowed the release of some prisoners, the deteriorating trend of the lack of media freedom is clearly noticeable. One can get the impression that the authorities in Ankara, reforming the wrong law, are going in the wrong direction.

(Jarosław Leszek Wałęsa, PPE, 6 February 2013)

The excerpt above from the PPE associates the Kurdish issue with the problems in the freedom of the press in Turkey. In this regard, the *topoi* of numbers and reality are utilized to reveal “some facts” about media freedom in Turkey and prevent the arrest of journalists “on the basis of allegations of cooperation for the terrorist activities related to Kurdish separatism.” For this reason, “the authorities in Ankara, reforming the wrong law,” are warned about “the wrong direction” that they are going in and the systematically deteriorating situation “in the context of reforms and good intentions” through an implicit *topos* of danger. Furthermore, Turkey is compared to Iran and China through spatialization in terms of the number of imprisoned journalists, while this comparison is also a rhetorical technique and an illustrative example in this argumentation (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 109). In this regard, the speech above predicates Turkey as an infamous leader where “the deteriorating trend of the lack of media freedom is clearly noticeable.”

If the Council here at noon declares today that the European Union is still the anchor of political reform in Turkey, then I wonder: on which planet are you actually living? Turkey is reforming the way it would like to, in the direction they want to go, in the direction that the democratically elected government would like to lead the country. Unfortunately, this is one

direction that has little to do with the first Copenhagen criterion, the political criterion. We heard it from you, Madam President-in-Office. Freedom of the press is in serious danger, the independence of the judiciary is not guaranteed, the freedom of assembly is not guaranteed - these are vital criteria for the admission of a country into the European Union.

(Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, ALDE, 20 May 2015)

In the speech above, the essentialization of the notion of democracy is recognized again since there is a distancing made between Turkey and the EU in terms of the conceptualization of political reform and, in turn, democracy. The notion of political reform in Turkey is seen as different from that in the EU, which does not comply “with the first Copenhagen criterion,” which is the “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities” (European Council, 1993). In this regard, the greater emphasis on the Copenhagen political criteria already revealed by Levin (2011, pp. 196–197) is also underlined despite the approval of Turkey's fulfillment of the Copenhagen political criteria in the EC's Progress Report for Turkey in 2004, which shows the discursive continuity from the 1997–2007 period. It is implied here that the EU has lost its normative power against Turkey, which is reinforced with a rhetorical question of “on which planet are you actually living?” The *topos* of danger is frequently used in referring to problems in freedom of the press and indirectly the independence of the judiciary and the freedom of assembly, which accordingly endangers Turkey's admission to the EU.

Mr. Erdoğan, you cannot promote democracy in Syria but not do so at home. You cannot extinguish the memory of being made a political prisoner yourself by putting your own political opponents in jail today. You must recognize that if your media is silent, we cannot do the same. Prime Minister, apologies to the protestors. They are not the 'deep state' out to get you. These are young people, trade unionists, environmentalists and civil society groups, who strengthen democracy through their actions. I appeal to you to show statesmanship, not just by meeting them today, but by genuinely conciliating the demands of all who express legitimate opposition in your society.

(Richard Howitt, S&D, 12 June 2013)

The speaker above from the S&D, as the last one in this section, Erdoğan is directly addressed while referring to the protestors during the Gezi Park events in June 2013, which shows the effect of the domestic events in Turkey on EU-Turkey relations. It is observed that the more criticisms rise about Turkey in terms of violations of fundamental rights and freedoms, the more there are calls directly to the then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan through *synecdochising personalization*. In this excerpt, expressing the demand in the imperative form is preferred rather than asking a rhetorical question as in the previous excerpts, which recalls the relationship between the parent and the child and the image of Turkey as a troublesome child in this relationship.

To summarize, the representation of Turkey as a violator of fundamental rights and freedoms with pseudo-reforms is based on many speeches in the 2007–2015 period in the EP frequently underlying the violations of fundamental rights and freedoms in Turkey, including the minority rights, freedom of opinion, speech, media, expression, the press, journalists, and assembly basically through the Gezi Park events and the Kurdish issue and the problem of implementing reforms in Turkey. This representation includes the image of Turkey as a troublesome child of Levin (2011, pp. 193–198), the image of Turkish identity as the dangerous other mistreating women revealed by Levin (2011, p. 190), and the greater emphasis on the Copenhagen political criteria already revealed by Levin (2011, pp. 196–197), which show the discursive continuity. A distancing between Turkey and the EU in terms of the conceptualization of democracy is also frequently made since the notion of democracy in Turkey is seen as different from the notion of democracy in the EU. This causes the exclusion of any alternative democratic progress in Turkey. While through spatialization Turkey is compared to Iran and China in terms of the number of imprisoned journalists, the responsibility of this distancing is reduced to Erdoğan as the reason for these violations as described in the following section.

4.2.2.2 Turkey as an Undemocratic and Authoritarian State Governed by Erdoğan

While in the first half of the 2007-2015 period, Turkey was classified neither as a full-fledged democratic state nor totally anti-democratic as in the 1997–2007 period and the EP debates entitled “Democratic process in Turkey” on 5 May 2009 and “Democratization in Turkey” on 20 January 2010, in the second half of this period, the

Turkish democracy received the most severe criticism by MEPs, which discursively constructed Turkey as an undemocratic and authoritarian state. While this representation of Turkey is discursively constructed through the leadership of the then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, especially in the far-left, center-left, and nonattached groups in the Parliament, this image is grounded among extreme-right and center-right groups on the undemocratic applications of the Turkish decision-makers in the AKP and the Turkish government, which still implicitly includes Erdoğan. In terms of the discursive continuity from the 1997–2007 period, the representation of Turkey as a statically undemocratic country incapable of change analyzed by Aydın-Düzgit (2012, pp. 68–72), the emphasis on the Copenhagen criteria already revealed by Levin (2011, pp. 196–197), the image of Turkish identity as the dangerous other in terms of human rights abuses already analyzed by Levin (2011, pp. 189–191), and the representation of Turkey as a majoritarian and outright authoritarian country within a cultural conception of European identity studied by Lindgaard et al. (2018, p. 2) are employed in the 2007–2015 period.

It is not just a matter of this country still failing to fulfill the Copenhagen pre-accession criteria in any way. It is about massive interference in fundamental rights and freedoms, and of course we are addressing this in our resolution. Trampling on democratic principles and the rule of law is outrageous for a country that has been a candidate for more than fifteen years... And in this situation, I really have to say that I think it is wrong to demand the opening of new negotiating chapters. Because that would also support the AK party in the current election campaign. They would sell it as a reward for their anti-democratic policies.

(Renate Sommer, EPP, 20 May 2015)

The MEP above from the EPP constructs the negative-other representation of Turkey not meeting the expectations of the EU through various referential, predication, and argumentation strategies. In this respect, the *topos* of *pro bono eorum* (to the advantage of “them”) is employed while referring to “demand the opening of the new negotiating chapter” as wrong because the AKP is accused of selling “it as a reward for their anti-democratic policies” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 75). The *topos* of numbers as the years spent as a candidate is also used in referring to its problems in “democratic principles and the rule of law.” Furthermore, the argumentation strategy of “hasty generalization” as “a characteristic of such metaphorical negative other presentations” is

seen by referring to “still failing to fulfill the Copenhagen pre-accession criteria” and “trampling on democratic principles and the rule of law” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 78). In this regard, alternative democratic progress in Turkey is excluded from the narrative to represent Turkey as a state allegedly governed by the AK party's “anti-democratic policies.”

Nevertheless, the positive self-representation of Europe is apparent in this speech since the use of flag words such as “fundamental rights and freedoms,” “democratic principles,” and “the rule of law” is associated with the Turkish accession process to the EU. Through the usage of the “we” pronoun for Europe and the “they” pronoun for Turkey, further distancing of Europe from Turkey as two different entities is constructed, which marginalizes Turkey with its “anti-democratic principles.” Furthermore, the emphasis on the Copenhagen criteria already revealed by Levin (2011, pp. 196–197) for the 1997–2007 term is also employed in this excerpt, which shows the discursive continuity.

The arrests of journalists and the brutality that links with it show that the Turkish rule of law has a huge problem. Democratic states, after all, respect freedom of expression. In a previous life I was a passionate professional journalist. Clarifying the essence was a guarantee for objectivity and quality for me. That Turkish colleagues, under the guise of national security then, go into jail for this, that makes me angry! Freedom of the press is the immune system of a healthy society. But Ankara seems to be fundamentally following a different way and is slowly but surely adopting the undemocratic customs of authoritarian regimes. If democracy in Turkey is nothing more than a mask behind which the state and its leaders once again try to show their true face, then conclusions must be drawn.

(Mark Demesmaeker, ECR, 17 December 2014)

The MEP above from the ECR focuses on constructing the negative-other representation of Turkey associated with “arrest,” “brutality,” and “jail” as stigma words. Through the *topos* of definition, the freedom of the press is defined as “the immune system of a healthy society,” although Turkey is represented as following “a different way.” As a discursive strategy, the spatialization for “Ankara” representing the Turkish authorities is employed with the personification of Ankara in “following a different way” and “adopting the undemocratic customs of authoritarian regimes” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 48). Reisigl and Wodak (2001a, p. 14) state that an authoritarian character makes

a person inclined towards anti-democratic propaganda, which is also underlined in this excerpt through the phrase “the undemocratic customs of authoritarian regimes.”

By underlining his previous journalist identity as a perspectivation strategy, the MEP from the ECR expresses how he positions his point of view regarding Turkey's media freedom problem in this excerpt and shows his involvement in this issue. Therefore, he intensifies the illocutionary force of his utterance and tries to establish ingroup solidarity with “Turkish colleagues.” Moreover, he casts doubt on the scenario in which “democracy in Turkey is nothing more than a mask behind which the state and its leaders once again try to show their true face,” which shows increasing distrust towards the Turkish authorities. The usage of the “mask” metaphor, which serves the discursive construction of Turkey with alleged undemocratic and even authoritarian leanings, is particularly crucial in this context.

Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, with a blitz worthy of the typical authoritarian states, the Turkish police last Sunday arrested 24 journalists guilty of writing for newspapers not complacent with the Erdoğan government, which has denounced innumerable corruption cases in Turkey. It is a real raid in line with the decisions that have marked the actions of the former prime minister, current President of the Republic, who since 2002 has been fighting against internal dissent. In the 12 years he was at the head of the government, Erdoğan conducted a series of expropriations of many TV channels, radio, and newspapers that had financial problems and that in order to be saved they passed into the hands of family members of very government figures close to the President himself, who over the years has carried out a veritable clean-up among police and judiciary leaders, replacing those considered close to his greatest opponent, Gülen – without forgetting more recent provisions that temporarily banned some social networks, such as Twitter and YouTube, because they were considered means of spreading dissent during the protests of Gezi Park and Taksim Square. At the position taken by the European Union, which also supports Turkey, Erdoğan thought of answering arrogantly that the European Union should only do its business. This attitude clearly goes against European values and the standards that Turkey itself aspires to be a part of, being a candidate country. I agree with what the Cypriot colleague who spoke at the beginning said and left: The only way to put an end to these anti-democratic attitudes is through economic sanctions.

(Ignazio Corrao, EFDD, 17 December 2014)

The speech above from the EFDD is based on the problem with media freedom in Turkey in which anti-democratic practices “against European values and the standards” such as “arrested 24 journalists,” “expropriations of many TV channels, radio, and newspapers,” and “temporarily banned some social networks” are mentioned as “a blitz worthy of the typical authoritarian states.” These values result in the positive representation of the European Self, while Turkey is associated with “corruption,” “raid,” and “dissent” as stigma words for the negative other representation of Turkey. In this respect, Turkey is predicated as a typical authoritarian state under the Erdoğan leadership through *synecdochising personalization*.

Correspondingly, “to put an end to these anti-democratic attitudes,” “economic sanctions” are offered, which shows the interdiscursivity with “hard-power” strategies including “military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions,” and thus the hardening of the rhetoric against Turkey (Wilson, 2008, p. 114). As the MEP from the EFDD above mentions, the center-right and far-right discourse in the EP makes this severe criticism of democratization in Turkey. Nevertheless, the center-left, far-left, liberal, and non-attached members of the EP not belonging to any political group take a more harshly critical attitude towards Turkey and, in particular, the then-Prime Minister Erdoğan because of the violations of the fundamental rights and freedoms, especially after the 2013 Gezi Park events as in the excerpt below:

Mr President, the protracted protests in Istanbul and other cities in Turkey show that many in Turkey have lost patience with the authoritarian and repressive style of Prime Minister Erdoğan, sadly evidenced in his reaction to the peaceful demonstrators against the destruction of the Gezi Park. As President Gül said, democracy is more than elections. Democracies do not carry protesters, do not crack down on bulldozers or arrest journalists, and Turkey is, shamefully, as it has been said today, the largest jail of journalists in the world...The European Union, which, in addition to being a strategic partner of Turkey, has the strategic aim of integrating it as a member, must condemn unequivocally the violence and the inflammatory police declarations and retaliation of the Prime Minister and members of his Government.

(Ana Gomes, S&D, 12 June 2013)

The effect of domestic events such as the Gezi Park events in 2013 on EU-Turkey relations and, in turn, the process of Turkish accession to the EU is apparent in the speech

above from the S&D. In this excerpt, the *topos* of definition of democracy represented by then-President Abdullah Gül is utilized in constructing Turkey as an undemocratic state through various applications during these events while the use of the “jail” metaphor for Turkey as a referential strategy is also significant in this context in order to underline the violations in the media freedom in Turkey. In addition to media freedom, there are references to the freedom of assembly, which consolidates the image of Turkish identity as the dangerous other in terms of human rights abuses already analyzed by Levin (2011, pp.189-191).

Through *synecdochising personalization*, Erdoğan's governing style is predicated as authoritarian and repressive, which leads to calling the EU to condemn “the Prime Minister and members of his government” as a political organizationalization (Reisigl &Wodak, 2001a, p. 51). This attitude constructs further distancing between the Turkish government and the EU regarding democracy and human rights, although the Turkish people are separated from this image through their representation based on opposing Erdoğan and pursuing their fundamental rights and freedoms.

In Turkey in recent years we have seen a growing deterioration of the fundamentals of democracy. Look at the media for example. Hannes Swoboda has already given this as an example. I would call Turkey today, Mr Swoboda, the biggest prison for journalists in the world. In the Reporters Without Borders press freedom index, it was ranked 154th, just three places above the last dictatorship in Europe, Belarus. That is what is happening today in Turkey. In my opinion – and I did not hear this from the European Union in its message – what is happening in Turkey is constant abuse by an overbearing state. I call it a 'tyranny of a majority', in the words of John Stuart Mill, a system in which decisions taken by a majority are always more important than the rights of minorities and the rights of individual people. This trend goes beyond Turkey. Look at Mr Putin in Russia and even Mr Orbán in Hungary. Here we are talking about Turkey and Mr Erdoğan...What I am questioning – and what I am asking you to stand up against – is the deterioration of a democracy that is becoming more and more what I call a democratura. My group is a strong supporter of a European choice for Turkey, but, let me clear, not a Turkey that turns its back on European principles and values.

(Guy Verhofstadt, ALDE, 2 December 2013)

The MEP above from the ALDE prefers using the “prison” metaphor represented by Hannes Swoboda for Turkey as a referential strategy. Moreover, the metaphorical

expressions of “tyranny of a majority” cited by John Stuart Mill and “democratura,” which describes “an authoritarian regime disguised as a democracy” in a sarcastic way for “this democratizing, or pseudo-democratizing,” are also utilized (David, 2014, p. 11). The *topos* of numbers is used through the Reporters Without Borders press freedom index for the negative other representation of Turkey, on the one hand. In this respect, the *topos* of comparison exists while Belarus, Russia, and Hungary are compared to Turkey, which is the only country in the process of accession to the EU among them. Turkey is also predicated as “an overbearing state” where “constant abuse” is happening.

On the other hand, there is an emphasis on specific values and principles, including fundamental rights and freedoms, as Europe's own values and principles through the deictic “we” for positive self-representation of Europe. Therefore, Turkey is highly marginalized and excluded from the construction of Europe based on democratic values and principles. In terms of discursive continuity, the representation of Turkey as a majoritarian and outright authoritarian country within a cultural conception of European identity already studied by Lindgaard et al. (2018, p. 2) is apparent in this excerpt.

I believe that Turkey must receive a clear and hard message from the European Union and this only means sanctions for its behavior. They will not comprehend what they should do. They will just continue playing with us. If we do not agree on the sanctions, these discussions end the resolution that we may adopt afterwards and will go to the waste basket. We must be frank about their accession perspectives. We should try and rain their behaviour. We should stay against the caliphate of Mr Erdoğan.

(Takis Hadjigeorgiou, GUE / NGL, 17 December 2014)

The MEP from the GUE/NGL makes an interdiscursivity with “hard power” through “sanctions” as a clear and hard message from the EU while a hyperbolic construction of reality⁸² through “the caliphate of Mr. Erdoğan” is achieved (Wilson, 2008, p. 114). In this respect, the repetitive use of “we” and “they” further distances the two entities, namely Europe and Turkey, from each other since the “we” and “us”

⁸² For other examples of hyperbolic constructions of reality on Erdoğan: the parliamentary speeches of Antigoni Papadopoulou from the S&D on 12 June 2013 through the term ‘as a modern sultan,’ Marcel de Graaff from the NI on 20 May 2015 through the term ‘the sultan,’ Franz Obermayr from the NI on 20 May 2015 through the term ‘the country under Sultan Erdoğan,’ and Marcel de Graaff from the ENF on 2 December 2015 through the term ‘the sultan of Ankara.’

pronouns are exclusive of Turkey and the pronouns “they” and “their” contribute to the negative representation of a discursively distanced Turkey.

This excerpt also contains the fallacious *argumentum ad hominem* as a verbal attack on honesty through the call to be “frank about their accession perspectives” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 72). In this speech, dramatization and even provocation are targeted through the negatively connoted and hyperbolic phrase “continue playing with us” as a starkly exaggerated phrase (van Dijk, 2000a, p. 219). Furthermore, the *topos* of uselessness as a specific causal argumentation scheme helps construct here a Turkey against which “sanctions” are necessary not to let the resolution “go to the waste basket.”

Once a farmer, in the winter, found a frozen snake, he held it in his bosom. But this snake once gained conscious, it bits his benefactor. Silently, he said, "Well, let me down because I pitied the criminal!" The aforementioned tale is from Aesop's Myths. But it fully meets today's reality. Think of the European Union as a farmer and Turkey as a snake and think how ridiculous is the approach to Turkey and its integration into the European family. This country is a highly authoritarian country that does not respect the rights of people and states and ignores the decisions of international organizations!... You must understand that with the tolerance you display towards Turkish attitudes, you are provoking even more Turkish provocation and even more authoritarian.

(Eleftherios Synadinos, NI, 17 December 2014)

The MEP above from the NI, analyzed as the last one in this section, utilizes the *topos* of history that reconstructs “the Snake and the Farmer” myth as one of the well-known Aesop's Myths from Ancient Greece. This myth employed in showing “how ridiculous the approach to Turkey and its integration into the European family is.” In other words, it is seen that Turkey cannot be integrated into the European “family” as a metaphor that supplies the collectivization of Europe as a referential strategy (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 53). In this respect, Turkey is predicated as an undemocratic and highly authoritarian country that cannot side with Europe because of its “snake” nature, which shows an inherent incompatibility between Turkey and Europe.

To sum up, the representation of Turkey as an undemocratic and authoritarian state is a result of increasing criticisms of MEPs regarding the violations of fundamental rights

and freedoms and the rule of law in Turkey. In this regard, especially in the 2010s, the Turkish democracy received the most severe criticism from MEPs and thus direct criticism of Erdoğan as *synecdochising personalization* increased enormously, notably in the center-left, far-left, and non-attached groups. Through various metaphorical expressions such as “jail,” “prison,” “democratura,” and “tyranny of a majority,” as well as referential, predicational, and argumentation strategies, the construction of the negative other representation of Turkey and the positive self-representation of Europe are quite evident in the extracts above in order to further distance Europe from Turkey as two different entities.

In some speeches, there is also an interdiscursivity with hard-power strategies, including economic sanctions against Turkey, which shows the hardening of the rhetoric against Turkey. While the Turkish people are separated from this image, the Turkish decision-makers in the AKP, the Turkish government, and most frequently the then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, through hyperbolic constructions of reality in some cases, are accused of being undemocratic and authoritarian because of violations of the fundamental rights and freedoms and the rule of law in Turkey. Therefore, on the one hand, Turkey is highly marginalized and excluded from the construction of Europe based on democratic values and principles, which are seen as Europe's own values – in other words, European democratic values. On the other hand, Europe is constantly constructed as an upholder of European democratic values, and thus it is glorified in contrast to Turkey, which is repeatedly constructed as an undemocratic and authoritarian state.

4.2.2.3 Turkey as an Occupier in Cyprus as an EU Member State

The Cyprus issue is one of the crucial obstructive themes for EU-Turkey relations⁸³, especially following the accession of Cyprus to the EU in 2004. In the EP debates, it is observed that the Cyprus issue is intertwined with many issues, including energy, security, economy, and democracy in Europe. Nevertheless, it is seen between

⁸³ Although the UN had many unification attempts, including the “Annan Plan,” rejected by the Greek Cypriots in a referendum in 2004, Cyprus has remained a divided island between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots for almost five decades (Aydın-Düzgüt, 2012, p. 26). In this context, the European Council decided in 2006 not to open negotiations on eight chapters of the *acquis communautaire* and not to provisionally close any of the remaining chapters until Turkey opened its seaports and airspace to Greek Cyprus, which has made this issue one of the major obstacles to Turkish accession to the EU (European Council, 2006).

2007 and 2015 that this conflict takes place most discursively in the context of the democratic values of Europe and, to be more precise, Turkey's democratic deficiencies as in the 1997–2007 period, which shows the discursive continuity (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 71; Giannakopoulos & Maras, 2005, pp. 3–25). The argument that this issue is “seen as reflective of Turkey's lack of democracy and democratic culture” in the 1997–2007 period is also frequently expressed in almost all the EP debates between 2007 and 2015, which shows the argument of repetition (*ad nauseam*) as a logical fallacy in these debates (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 71; Tekin, 2010, p. 122).

In this context, the overwhelming majority⁸⁴ of those who raise this issue in this way are either Cypriot or Greek MEPs, although MEPs represent the interests of their groups rather than their national ideologies⁸⁵ in the EP. For this reason, it is observed that Cypriot or Greek MEPs try to put pressure on Turkey through building ingroup solidarity among the MEPs and revealing this issue as an occupation issue experienced by an EU member state from outside. In terms of the EP groups, this representation is especially present among far-left, center-left, center-right, and conservative political groups, as well as nonattached members of the Parliament.

Madam President, Commissioner, even if the very strong resolution in Turkey's favour is adopted today, this country will not stop demonstrating an important democratic deficit, blatantly infringing the human rights of millions of people and occupying the Republic of Cyprus, a Member State of the European Union. However, as far as Cyprus is concerned, there are many who insist on putting equal responsibility on the victim and the perpetrator. We cannot accept crime and armed violence and call on all the parties involved – call on them to do what? We cannot listen in the sanctuary of democracy, the European Parliament, to unseemly expressions such as Northern and Southern Cyprus and talk of elections for Northern Cyprus, where 70% of the so-called electoral body are illegal colonists. It is clear that, if the solution does not respect the human rights of the citizens of Cyprus, then the entire system of values of the European Union is at risk...As it is Turkey rather than any other country that we are evaluating, we call on Turkey to facilitate the process of talks by taking

⁸⁴ In the context of the representation of Turkey concerning the Cyprus issue as one of Turkey's democratic deficiencies, it is seen that 70 of the 110 excerpts identified in the 2007-2015 period belong to the Greek and Cypriot MEPs.

⁸⁵ In his research, Tekin (2018, p.186) also underlines the national interests frequently structuring EP debates while revealing the image of Turkey as the occupier of Cyprus expressed in these debates.

two self-evident steps: firstly, to immediately start withdrawing the occupying army and, secondly, to return the occupied town of Famagusta to its legal residents.

(Eleni Theocharous, PPE, 10 February 2010)

The MEP above from the PPE preserves the negative-other representations of Turkey as a violator of fundamental rights and freedoms mentioned earlier while discursively constructing the image as an occupier in Cyprus as an EU member. Turkey is accused of “occupying” the Republic of Cyprus, and the Cyprus issue is clearly associated with the democracy deficit in Turkey. In this context, Cyprus's EU membership is especially emphasized in order to make this problem an issue between the EU and Turkey rather than an issue between two countries. In order to describe the parties' role in this problem, the metaphors of “victim” for Cyprus and “perpetrator” for Turkey are used for the aim of victimization (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p.52).

The EP is predicated as “the sanctuary of democracy,” which contributes to the representation of the EU/Europe as the upholder of democratic values. Moreover, expressions such as “northern and southern Cyprus” are also discerned while stigma words such as “crime,” “violence,” and “colonist” through the *topos* of number are also utilized to refer to “northern Cyprus” in order to criticize Turkey's Cyprus policies implicitly. The *topos* of threat is used in constructing the unsolved Cyprus problem as a threat to “the entire system of values of the European Union.” Moreover, the Turkish accession to the EU is directly conditioned on the solution of the Cyprus issue only through “withdrawing the occupying army” and thus returning “the occupied town of Famagusta to its legal residents,” which shows the repeated emphasis on the word “occupy” in the speech to discursively reinforce the construction of Turkey as an occupier in Cyprus.

We agree that Turkey is an important partner of the European Union, but we must also demand that Turkey respect the European Union in practice. This is the precondition for being in the European family. We are talking about what it should have done to democratize the country but, more importantly, it is what Turkey did not do and should have done. Its participation is not “à la carte.” Human rights, as well as freedom of the press, are being suppressed and restricted. Journalists and Kurdish citizens fighting for democracy and freedom are imprisoned in summary proceedings. Gender equality for the time being is

unthinkable. And of course, the invasion and occupation of the territories of the Republic of Cyprus continues, every principle of law is violated. I recall the provocative and unacceptable statements made by Turkish officials, which they should now withdraw and apologize. On 23 November, 2011, President Gül referred to the Republic of Cyprus: “Half a country will be called upon to lead a miserable Union.” Really, are we miserable? Bağış states: “The Cyprus Presidency of the European Union does not exist.” Is this really the respect and recognition of a Member State? Respect for the Union? Would any of you accept such a thing for your country? In conclusion, as long as Turkey behaves, let me express myself, as a “crazy truck,” it has no future on its way to the European Union.

(Sophocles Sophocleous, S&D, 17 April 2013)

The speech from the S&D also grounds its arguments on the representation of Turkey as a violator of fundamental rights and freedoms analyzed earlier, which is followed by its representation as an occupier and even invader in Cyprus. Through the term “family” as a metaphor, the ingroup solidarity and the collectivization of Europe as a referential strategy are intended to be kept (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 53). While describing the indispensability of Turkey's democratization for its accession to the EU, there is an interdiscursivity with the term “*à la carte* Europe” of Prof. Ralf Dahrendorf in 1979 mentioned by Warleigh (2002, p. 11) in the academic literature, which refers to the EU as an institution where “rules and policies ... do not hold for all, but only for states that expressly agree to them” (Beck & Grande, 2007, p. 75). Rhetorical questions aiming to stir other MEPs up are used against “the provocative and unacceptable statements” of Turkish officials, namely President Abdullah Gül and Minister for EU Affairs Egemen Bağış, on Cyprus in order to portray Turkey as a disrespectful state to the EU and one of its members while with these disrespectful attitudes, Turkey is likened to “a crazy truck” as a *simile* within the predicational strategies (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 54).

Mr President, it is reassuring to hear the French Minister stating in essence that, in order for Turkey to prove its wish to proceed with its European aspirations, it must normalise its relations with Cyprus. It is indeed inconceivable and defies any sense of logic that the EU will continue accession negotiations with a country that continues not to recognise one of its Member States and continues to occupy part of that state. I understand that the carrot-and-stick policy must be used in the case of a country where democracy is constantly under attack by its military, but there are limits to our patience and to our tolerance... This is a good time for the Commission and Council to strongly impress on Turkey the need to show goodwill –

not only to Cyprus but to the EU in general – by urgently removing its occupation troops from the island of Cyprus and by immediately implementing the Ankara Protocol. Such moves will undoubtedly act as a catalyst to finding a solution to the Cyprus problem.

(Marios Matsakis, ALDE, 9 July 2008)

In the speech from the ALDE, the Turkish accession to the EU is again directly conditioned on the solution of the Cyprus issue only through recognizing it, removing its occupation troops from Cyprus, and implementing the Ankara Protocol as the alleged solution of the Cyprus issue, which sustains the representation of Turkey again as an occupier in Cyprus. There is an interdiscursivity with the carrot-and-stick approach as instruments within the EU's conditionality policy again when a personified military is portrayed as constantly attacking Turkish democracy (Akçay & Kanat, 2018, p. 1; Zalewski, 2014, p. 3). In this context, the *topos* of threat is utilized in pointing at the limits of “our patience and to our tolerance,” which implies a possible use of hard power as previously mentioned.

Madam President, I would like to begin by applauding the effort of the Turkish administration to approximate its political structures to a European value system. On the other hand, it is impossible to ignore persistent problems in the area of respect for human rights, especially the rights of minorities and women, and the suppression of freedom of religion. However, the most serious problem appears to be the fact that Turkey still occupies almost 50% of the territory of one of our Member States – Cyprus. The EU is therefore indirectly involved in a military conflict with Turkey. This conflict has cost many inhabitants of Cyprus their homes and so far, it offers no hope of a solution to this unlawful state of affairs.

(Jaroslav Paška, EFD, 8 March 2011)

In the extract from the EFD as the last one in this section, the issue is approached within “a European value system” first, and then the representation of Turkey as a violator of fundamental rights and freedoms is underlined again. In this context, the *topoi* of reality and numbers are used together to portray Turkey as an occupier in Cyprus whose EU membership is emphasized in order to associate “this unlawful state of affairs” as an issue of the EU as already done in the 1997–2007 period. With regard to the Cyprus issue, the

Cypriot MEPs began to resort to “Europeanness” with the accession of Cyprus to the EU in 2004 and then their representation in the EP through emphasizing Cyprus as an “occupied” nation and a “European” country, which shows the discursive continuity from the 1997–2007 period. In this regard, identity-based representation of international conflicts such as “Europeanness” is regarded as an important discursive action because of justifying the threat perception through oversimplifying them and hindering alternative narratives to its resolution (Rumelili, 2003, p. 232). In this speech, the EU is also positioned in “a military conflict with Turkey” in which "hard-power" strategies, including the military approach, can be needed, and thus the hardening of the rhetoric against Turkey is observed again (Wilson, 2008, p. 114).

As in the excerpts above, the representation of Turkey as an occupier in Cyprus as an EU member state is widespread in almost all EP debates. This issue is so dominant that there was also a special EP debate entitled “Tensions between Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus” on 27 September 2011, in which the course of this debate was in line with the Greek-Cypriot views, and the opposite opinion was hardly put forward. Additionally, the term “invasion” is used in the EP debates to refer to the landing of Turkish military forces in Cyprus in 1974, while the current situation in Cyprus is described as “the Turkish occupation” because of a significant part of its territory being under the control of the Turkish Cypriot community since 1974 (Spyrou, 2002, pp. 257–268). Accordingly, this makes Turkey an “occupier” as in the speeches above. In this context, since the accession of Cyprus to the EU in 2004 and then its representation in the EP, the Cyprus conflict has been posing a severe problem in both EU-Turkey relations and Turkey's EU adhesion.

All in all, the Cyprus issue is discussed in the EP between 2007 and 2015 with regard to Turkey's democratic deficiencies as in the 1997–2007 period, which shows the discursive continuity. More than 60% of those who address this issue in the Parliament in this way are Greek and Cypriot MEPs. It is observed that the representation of Turkey as an occupier in Cyprus as an EU member state is discursively constructed with references to the negative other representations of Turkey as a violator of fundamental rights and freedoms. The EP is predicated as “the sanctuary of democracy,” which contributes to the representation of Europe as the upholder of democratic values while constructing the unsolved Cyprus problem as a threat to “the entire system of values of the European Union.”

Through repeatedly emphasizing the EU membership of Cyprus, MEPs aim to build ingroup solidarity, and they also make the resolution of the Cyprus conflict only through Turkey's recognition of Cyprus, the removal of Turkey's "occupation troops" from Cyprus, and Turkey's implementation of the Ankara Protocol – indispensable for Turkey's democratization and thus its accession to the EU. In other words, there is a perception of Turkey as solely responsible for the Cyprus problem. Moreover, another discursive continuity is found since the EU membership of Cyprus is also highlighted in the EP in the 1997–2007 period. Furthermore, within this image of Turkey, there is also the usage of rhetorical questions, an interdiscursivity with the term "*à la carte* Europe" of Prof. Ralf Dahrendorf in 1979, another interdiscursivity with carrots and sticks as instruments within the EU's conditionality policy, and the implication of possible use of hard power of the EU and "hard-power" strategies including a military approach, which shows the hardening of the rhetoric against Turkey.

4.2.2.4 Turkey as a Reluctant Neighbor Far from Normalizing Relations

The representation of Turkey as a reluctant neighbor far from normalizing relations is significant since the issue of good neighborly relations, especially with Greece and Armenia, is discussed in the EP debates among the defects of Turkish democracy as in the 1997–2007 period, which shows the discursive continuity. In the EP debates, the issue of the recognition of the Armenian genocide⁸⁶ and the closed border between Turkey and

⁸⁶ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Sebastiano (Nello) Musumeci from the UEN on 24 October 2007, Kyriakos Triantaphyllides from the GUE/NGL on 24 October 2007, Andreas Mølzer from the ITS on 24 October 2007, Béatrice Patrie from the PSE on 24 October 2007, Mario Borghezio from the UEN on 24 October 2007, Charles Tannock from the PPE-DE on 24 October 2007, Giorgos Dimitrakopoulos from the PPE-DE on 24 October 2007, Sylwester Chruszcz from the NI on 21 May 2008, Jacques Toubon from the PPE-DE on 21 May 2008, Ioannis Kasoulides from the PPE-DE on 21 May 2008, Mario Borghezio from the UEN on 21 May 2008, Béatrice Patrie from the PSE on 21 May 2008, Pierre Pribetich from the PSE on 21 May 2008, Csaba Sógor from the PPE-DE on 21 May 2008, Adamos Adamou from the GUE/NGL on 11 March 2009, Toomas Savi from the ALDE on 11 March 2009, Takis Hadjigeorgiou from the GUE/NGL on 10 February 2010, Lorenzo Fontana from the EFD on 10 February 2010, Csaba Sándor Tabajdi from the S&D on 10 February 2010, Andreas Mølzer from the NI on 20 September 2010, Takis Hadjigeorgiou from the GUE/NGL on 8 March 2011, Zbigniew Ziobro from the ECR on 8 March 2011, Andreas Mølzer from the NI on 28 March 2012, Zbigniew Ziobro from the EFD on 28 March 2012, Ewald Stadler from the NI on 6 February 2013, Ewald Stadler from the NI on 17 April 2013, Andrew Henry William Brons from the NI on 17 April 2013, Ewald Stadler from the NI on 12 June 2013, Andreas Mølzer from the NI on 12 June 2013, Dimitar Stoyanov from the NI on 11 March 2014, Ewald Stadler from the NI on 12 March 2014, Matteo Salvini from the NI on 17 December 2014, Eleftherios Synadinos from the NI on 17 December 2014, Cristian Dan Preda from the PPE on 20 May 2015, Edouard Ferrand from the NI on 20 May 2015, Fabio Massimo Castaldo from the EFDD on 20 May 2015, Mario Borghezio from the NI on 20 May 2015, László Tőkés from the PPE on 20 May 2015, Charles Tannock

Armenia⁸⁷ resulting in grave economic costs to Armenia are frequently discussed, which harms Turkey-Armenia relations despite some developments to normalize relations between the two countries in 2009⁸⁸. The bilateral relations between Turkey and Greece are also problematic because of the alleged violations of the Flight Information Region – in other words, overflights over Greek territory in the Aegean Sea⁸⁹, which subsequently means *casus belli* against Greece as well as the refugee crisis in 2015 based on the thousands of illegal refugees from the Turkish coasts to the Greek islands⁹⁰. Furthermore, the problems with Cyprus are also evaluated within the good neighborly relations in the EP. As in the previous representation, a significant proportion of those who raise this issue in this way, which corresponds to almost half of them⁹¹, are either Cypriot or Greek MEPs because of the importance of this issue for their countries. In terms of the EP groups, this representation is most visible among the center-right, the conservative, the far-left, and the center-left political groups, as well as the nonattached members of the Parliament.

from the ECR on 20 May 2015, Bodil Valero from the Verts / ALE on 7 October 2015, and Eleftherios Synadinos from the NI on 7 October 2015.

⁸⁷ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Kyriakos Triantaphyllides from the GUE/NGL on 24 October 2007, Ria Oomen-Ruijten from the PPE-DE on 24 October 2007, Charles Tannock from the PPE-DE on 24 October 2007, Ioannis Kasoulides from the PPE-DE on 21 May 2008, Sylwester Chruszcz from the NI on 21 May 2008, Adamos Adamou from the GUE/NGL on 11 March 2009, Charles Tannock from the ECR on 25 November 2009, Charles Tannock from the ECR on 8 March 2011, Charles Tannock from the ECR on 28 March 2012, Ewald Stadler from the NI on 12 March 2014, and Charles Tannock from the ECR on 20 May 2015.

⁸⁸ In order to normalize Armenia-Turkey relations, the Zurich protocols as two bilateral protocols were signed by Turkey and Armenia in 2009, although these protocols could not be ratified in the parliaments of Turkey and Armenia for various reasons (Grigoryan et al., 2019, p. 28).

⁸⁹ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Giorgos Dimitrakopoulos from the PPE-DE on 21 May 2008, Giorgos Dimitrakopoulos from the PPE-DE on 11 March 2009, Nikolaos Salavrakos from the EFD on 20 January 2010, Charalampos Angourakis from the GUE/NGL on 20 January 2010, Nikolaos Salavrakos from the EFD on 10 February 2010, Georgios Koumoutsakos from the PPE on 10 February 2010, Charalampos Angourakis from the GUE/NGL on 10 February 2010, Maria Eleni Koppa from the S&D on 10 February 2010, Georgios Koumoutsakos from the PPE on 10 February 2010, Takis Hadjigeorgiou from the GUE/NGL on 8 March 2011, Nikolaos Salavrakos from the EFD on 8 March 2011, Georgios Koumoutsakos from the PPE on 8 March 2011, Kyriakos Mavronikolas from the S&D on 27 September 2011, Georgios Koumoutsakos from the PPE on 28 March 2012, Nicholas Salavrakos from the EFD on 17 April 2013, Maria-Eleni Koppa from the S&D on 17 April 2013, Nikolaos Salavrakos from the EFD on 11 March 2014, Takis Hadjigeorgiou from the GUE / NGL on 17 December 2014, Notis Marias from the ECR on 17 December 2014, Notis Marias from the ECR on 17 December 2014, Konstantinos Papadakis from the NI on 20 May 2015, Sophia Sakorapha from the GUE / NGL on 20 May 2015, Notis Marias from the ECR on 20 May 2015, Nikos Androulakis from the S&D on 20 May 2015, Notis Marias from the ECR on 10 June 2015, Eleftherios Synadinos from the NI on 7 October 2015, Kostas Chrysogonos from the GUE / NGL on 7 October 2015, Notis Marias from the ECR on 7 October 2015, Lefteris Christoforou from the PPE on 2 December 2015, and Notis Marias from the ECR on 2 December 2015.

⁹⁰ In the EP, the implications of the refugee crisis in Greece are discussed in the debates entitled “2014 Progress Report on Turkey” on 20 May 2015, “Situation in Turkey” on 7 October 2015 and “EU-Turkey Summit” on 2 December 2015.

⁹¹ In the context of the representation of Turkey concerning good neighborly relations as one of Turkey’s democratic deficiencies, it is seen that 43 of the 100 excerpts identified in the 2007-2015 period belong to the Greek and Cypriot MEPs.

Madam President, Minister, Commissioner, Turkey is a large country of strategic importance, but is it ready for Europe? No, not yet. Is Europe ready for Turkey? No, not yet. Has Turkey abandoned its aspirations to accession? No, no yet. Three questions and three answers, Commissioner, which realistically set out the critical turning point which Turkey has reached on its path towards accession. They also summarise the complicated relationship between Turkey and Europe. For historical, political and cultural reasons, this relationship has always oscillated between trust and suspicion, between attraction and repulsion. The political expression of this reality is Turkey's long and painful journey towards accession. Despite the noteworthy progress that Turkey is making, it is still giving cause for concern on human rights issues. It is still haggling over every tiny obligation towards the European Union. It refuses to normalise its relations with a Member State, the Republic of Cyprus; it maintains the threat of war against another Member State, Greece, and it refuses to recognise and apply the Convention on the Law of the Sea.

(Georgios Koumoutsakos, PPE, 8 March 2011)

With rhetorical questions, Turkey's readiness and aspirations for EU membership are questioned while this speech from the PPE above also draws attention to the sensitivity and complexity of the EU-Turkey relationship “between trust and suspicion, between attraction and repulsion” as an oxymoronic tension, which makes it a “long and painful journey towards accession” through the *topos* of reality. After implicitly recalling the representation of Turkey as a violator of fundamental rights and freedoms, a personified Turkey is portrayed as a difficult person to deal with because of “still haggling over every tiny obligation towards” “normalizing” its relations with Cyprus as an EU member, stopping the threat of war against Greece as another EU member, and recognizing the Convention on the Law of the Sea in the direction of Greece's national interests, which discursively constructs Turkey as a reluctant neighbor far from normalizing relations. In this context, the speaker makes both Cyprus's and Greece's bilateral problems with Turkey into issues between the EU and Turkey through invoking their membership of the EU.

The Turkish question has always been surrounded by misgivings and mistrust. There were always problems that went far beyond the need for fulfilling the strict criteria for accession. In that respect, it is enough to look at what kind of neighbourly relations Turkey maintains with other EU Member States such as Greece, Cyprus or with a country outside the EU like

Armenia. Furthermore, if we take into account that Turkey is the only state that considers the European Union to consist of only 26 Member States, it is strange that Turkey itself would wish to join and belong to this community in the future.

(Alexandra Dobolyi, PSE, 11 March 2009)

The MEP from the PSE associates Turkish accession with “misgivings and mistrust” as stigma words because of the alleged problems beyond “fulfilling the strict criteria for accession.” In this context, Turkey's neighborly relations with Greece, Cyprus, and Armenia are given as examples. By underlining the fact that Turkey wants to see the EU with 26 members rather than its 28 member states, the problems between countries are brought to the EU level, as mentioned before. This situation of the international conflicts with their European identity-based representation justifies the perception of threat from Turkey through the oversimplification of these conflicts and the prevention of alternative narratives as resolutions (Rumelili, 2003, p. 232). Nevertheless, this extract also includes Armenia in this problem by emphasizing it as “a country outside the EU” to underline Turkey's uncompromising bad neighborliness.

Mr. President, the conflict between supporters of the integration of Turkey and those favoring a special relationship between Turkey and the European Union illustrates the imperialist infighting within the European Union and the competition with the USA and other major powers. The progress reports on Turkey presented to the European Parliament are the result of the balances between these forces. They have nothing to do with the savage exploitation, repression and persecution suffered by workers in Turkey. Trade unionists are prosecuted and sentenced in sham trials. Political assassinations and violence by the prosecuting authorities continue. Political parties are being abolished purely and simply because they express the wishes of the Kurdish population... It is illegally occupying 40% of the Republic of Cyprus and scuppering every solution to the problem. It is threatening Greece with *casus belli* and putting forward territorial claims.

(Charalampos Angourakis, GUE/NGL, 20 January 2010)

The MEP from the GUE/NGL implies that encouragers of Turkish accession work for the imperialist aims of “the USA and other major powers” over Europe, which shows an interdiscursivity with the French oppositional political discourse (Tekin, 2010, p. 149). Accordingly, these hegemonic powers try to affect EU decision-making and enlargement

procedures and thus shape it “along an Anglo-Saxon worldview through political pressure,” which is seen as a threat to the EU and even makes Turkey “the Trojan Horse”⁹² of the world hegemon (USA) (Tekin, 2010, p. 149). For this reason, in addition to the image of Turkey as a reluctant neighbor far from normalizing relations, this speech also involves the image of Turkey as a potential threat for the European political project in the 1997–2007 period as the discursive continuity, which shows the nested structure of the representations of Turkey in the EP debates.

However, problems with fundamental rights and freedoms such as trade union rights and minority rights, and problems in the Turkish democracy such as violence and political assassinations and the abolished banned political parties, are evaluated outside of this context, which makes these inherent problems of Turkey as an undemocratic and authoritarian state as already mentioned. In this regard, the representation of Turkey as a reluctant neighbor far from normalizing relations is also added at the end of the excerpt because of “scuppering every solution to the problem” of Cyprus as well as “threatening Greece with *casus belli* and putting forward territorial claims.” As a result, this speech is a good example of the usage of various representations of Turkey at the same time in one excerpt.

Undoubtedly, Turkey is an important economic power and a country with an increased geopolitical role in the Middle East. However, this country is far from the European standards of democratic principles and values. As the rapporteur rightly points out in her report, the internal situation in Turkey is worrying, characterized by scandals, corruption, the adoption of laws that call into question the constitutional separation of powers and fundamental rights, such as the recent law on cyberbullying, censorship and increasing the powers of the national secret service. Turkey stubbornly refuses to sign international agreements, does not comply with the agreements with the European Union, has not implemented for the eighth consecutive year the provisions of the EU-Turkey Association Agreement and its Additional Protocol, does not recognize a Member State of the European Union, the threat of *casus belli* against Greece continues, the violations of the Greek territorial waters continue and it does not respect the sovereign rights of the member states of the Union.

(Nikolaos Salavrakos, EFD, 11 March 2014)

⁹² Although it is not always used in this context, the metaphor of “Trojan Horse” for Turkey is used in some speeches, which serves to represent Turkey as a potential threat to the European political project. See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Mara Bizzotto from the EFD on 20 September 2010, Mara Bizzotto from the EFD on 27 September 2011, and Eleni Theocharous from the PPE on 20 May 2015.

Although the extract above, as the last one in this section, starts with Turkey's geopolitical and economic importance, it emphasizes that democratic values are “European standards” and that Turkey is far from these standards. In this context, stigma words such as “scandal,” “corruption,” “cyberbullying,” and “censorship” are associated with Turkey for the construction of its negative other representation. In this extract, Turkey is constructed as a violator of democratic values and fundamental rights and freedoms, but Turkey is also personified as stubborn and incompatible with international agreements and agreements with the EU. In this context, Turkey's reluctance to implement the Additional Protocol, to recognize Cyprus, to end the “threat of *casus belli* against Greece,” and thus to “respect the sovereign rights of the member states of the Union” is highlighted again, which is seen as being necessary for normalizations of relations with these neighbors within the standards of these countries in many speeches, including the ones above.

In sum, the representation of Turkey as a reluctant neighbor far from normalizing relations debated within the defects of Turkish democracy as in the 1997–2007 period is related to the bilateral problems of Turkey with Greece, Armenia, and Cyprus, which shows how its problems in the issue of good neighborly relations⁹³ affect its EU accession. The fact that a highly significant proportion of those who raise this issue are Cypriot and Greek MEPs means that they bring their national problems to the fore in the EP, although they are organized in the EP by political affiliation rather than nationality. In the excerpts, the representation of Turkey as a violator of fundamental rights and freedoms, the image of Turkey as an undemocratic and authoritarian state, and the EU memberships of Greece and Cyprus in order to make their bilateral problems Europe's issues are frequently associated with this reluctant neighbor image. Meanwhile, Turkey being associated with stigma words such as “corruption,” “cyberbullying,” and “censorship” is personified as a problematic and stubborn person to deal with, which discursively constructs Turkey as a reluctant neighbor far from compromise in the standards of these countries for normalizing its bilateral relations. In this regard, the oversimplification of Turkey's conflicts with Greece and Cyprus through their European identity-based representation leads to the prevention of alternative narratives for their resolution. Nevertheless,

⁹³ The impact of this issue on the Turkish accession process to the EU had already been firmly demonstrated in 2004. In this regard, the Brussels European Council in 2004 announced a new accession condition for Turkey, namely good neighborly relations, besides Article 49 of the TEU and the Copenhagen Criteria as the accession criteria because of its border disputes with Greece and Cyprus (Tekin, 2018, pp. 176–177).

Armenia is also included in Turkey's problems regarding good neighborly relations here to underline Turkey's uncompromising bad neighborliness.

In short, within the representation of Turkey as increasingly turning away from European norms and values, the representations of Turkey as a violator of fundamental rights and freedoms with pseudo-reforms, Turkey as an undemocratic and authoritarian state governed by Erdogan, Turkey as an occupier in Cyprus as an EU member state, and lastly Turkey as a reluctant neighbor far from normalizing relations are discursively constructed. Nevertheless, Europe is still discursively kept as an upholder of democratic values as in the 1997–2007 period, and even the MEPs embrace these values and frequently accept them as their own “European democratic values.” In terms of the discursive continuity, the representations of Turkey as an undemocratic state statically resistant to change, as already revealed by Aydın-Düzgit (2012, p. 68), the greater emphasis on the Copenhagen political criteria studied by Levin (2011, pp. 196–197), the image of Turkish identity as the dangerous other in terms of human rights abuses analyzed by Levin (2011, pp. 189–191), the representation of Turkey as a majoritarian and outright authoritarian country studied by Lindgaard et al. (2018, p. 2), and lastly the Cypriot MEPs' usage of “Europeanness” after the accession of Cyprus to the EU in 2004 and then its representation in the EP through emphasizing Cyprus as an “occupied” nation and a “European” country in the 1997–2007 term were also employed in the 2007–2015 period.

In the context of the perception of Turkish identity as increasingly turning away from European norms and values, some discourses in which the MEPs from the same group or country are divided into three issues have been detected. First of all, some MEPs from the center left under the S&D⁹⁴, Cyprus⁹⁵, and the UK⁹⁶ are divided concerning the solution to the Cyprus issue. While a group of MEPs defends a solution based on a two-zone, twin-community federation with political equality under the responsibility of all parties, the other group claims that Turkey holds the only solution, which is to recognize Cyprus in its current state. In regard to Turkish democracy, the MEPs from the ECR⁹⁷

⁹⁴ See the parliamentary speeches of Antigoni Papadopoulou from the S&D on 10 February 2010 and Boris Zala from the S&D on 21 November 2012.

⁹⁵ See the parliamentary speeches of Adamos Adamou from the GUE/NGL on 11 March 2009, Kyriakos Mavronikolas from the S&D on 25 November 2009, Takis Hatzigeorgiou from the GUE/NGL on 25 November 2009, and Antigoni Papadopoulou from the S&D on 10 February 2010.

⁹⁶ See the parliamentary speeches of Charles Tannock from the ECR on 28 March 2012 and Geoffrey Van Orden from the ECR on 28 March 2012.

⁹⁷ See the parliamentary speeches of Notis Marias from the ECR on 17 December 2014 and Geoffrey Van Orden from the ECR on 11 March 2014.

and Poland⁹⁸ are divided since some of them believe in anti-democratic or undemocratic Turkey, and some other MEPs mention Turkey as a democratic state. Lastly, the issue of not opening new chapters, especially Chapters 23 and 24 on fundamental rights, freedoms, justice, and human rights issues, reasonably divides MEPs. The MEPs from the traditional center-right under the EPP/EPP-ED/PPE⁹⁹, the center-left under the PSE/PS/S&D¹⁰⁰, France¹⁰¹, the Netherlands¹⁰², and Germany¹⁰³ disagree on allowing Chapters 23 and 24 to be opened. While some of them believe that the opening of these chapters is the best way to promote and influence Turkish democracy and reforms, other MEPs oppose the opening of these chapters on the basis that they can be understood as a reward or encouragement despite Turkey's mistakes.

Overall, there is a convergence with the findings of the period 1997–2007 in terms of the representation of European identity as an upholder and an embodiment of democratic values, while the MEPs mostly embrace these values and accept them as their own “European democratic values” in the 2007–2015 period. Nevertheless, there is also a divergence between the findings of the 1997–2007 period and the 2007–2015 period regarding the representation of Turkish identity since there is a hardening of the rhetoric against Turkey. This discursive hardening is apparent with hyperbolic constructions of reality on Erdoğan, Turkey's predication as a typical authoritarian state under the Erdoğan leadership through *synecdochising personalization*, and the increasing interdiscursivity with the hard-power strategies, including the carrot-and-stick approach, economic sanctions, and the military approach in the EP discourse on Turkey. Although the representations of Turkey in a difficult process of democratic transformation, Turkey as a violator of fundamental rights and freedoms with pseudo-reforms, Turkey as an

⁹⁸ See the parliamentary speeches of Bogusław Rogalski from the UEN on 11 March 2009 and Ryszard Antoni Legutko from the ECR on 25 November 2009.

⁹⁹ See the parliamentary speeches of Francisco José Millán Mon from the PPE on 11 March 2014, Cristian Dan Preda from the PPE on 17 December 2014, Artis Pabriks from the PPE on 17 December 2014, Arnaud Danjean from the PPE on 11 March 2014, Cristian Dan Preda from the PPE on 7 October 2015, Renate Sommer from the PPE on 20 May 2015, Manolis Kefaloyiannis from the PPE on 20 May 2015, Anna Maria Corazza Bildt from the PPE on 20 May 2015, Esther de Lange from the PPE on 20 May 2015, and Cristian Dan Preda from the PPE on 2 December 2015.

¹⁰⁰ See the parliamentary speeches of Sophocles Sophocleous from the S&D on 11 March 2014, Antigoni Papadopoulou from the S&D on 11 March 2014, and Tonino Picula from the S&D on 11 March 2014.

¹⁰¹ See the parliamentary speeches of Arnaud Danjean from the PPE on 17 April 2013, Hélène Flautre from the Verts / ALE on 12 June 2013, and Hélène Flautre from the Verts / ALE on 17 April 2013.

¹⁰² See the parliamentary speeches of Laurence J.A.J. Stassen from the NI on 12 June 2013, Emine Bozkurt from the S&D on 12 June 2013, Esther de Lange from the PPE on 20 May 2015, and Kati Piri from the S&D on 20 May 2015.

¹⁰³ See the parliamentary speeches of Renate Sommer from the PPE on 20 May 2015, Markus Pieper from the PPE on 10 June 2015, Knut Fleckenstein from the S&D on 2 December 2015, and Elmar Brok from the PPE on 2 December 2015.

occupier in Cyprus as an EU member state, and Turkey as a reluctant neighbor far from normalizing relations generally converge with the image of Turkey in the 1997–2007 period, the representation of Turkey as an undemocratic and authoritarian state governed by Erdoğan is a divergence from the 1997–2007 period as a result of the hardened rhetoric against Turkey in the 2007–2015 period, during which Turkey also de-Europeanized. Therefore, Turkey is discursively further removed from Europe, and thus its accession to the EU.

4.3 Turkey in the European Cultural Space

Turkey's cultural compatibility with Europe for its accession to the EU is one of the most controversial issues in the 2007–2015 period. The intense conflict about the extent to which Turkish cultural identity is European continues in this period as in the 1997–2007 period and even becomes more severe with the increasing emphasis on the religion of Islam. While the concept of culture is still closely connected to the discursive expression of European history and geography in the EP debates on Turkey's membership, the question of Islam in Turkey is also prominent in such a way as to distinguish the subject of religion from others within the framework of the perception of Turkish identity in both the culturally negative and positive senses. In this period, it is seen that the focus on certain internal events within the country resulted in inferences on the structure of Turkish society in the cultural sense, and therefore, the cultural differences regarding Turkey's membership continue in both positive and negative perceptions of Turkish identity. In this context, the image of Europe as a cultural space is discursively constructed through the representation of Turkey, which has a place in a multireligious and multicultural Europe, and the representation of Turkey as a non-European threat to the European Cultural Structure with its Islamization agenda.

4.3.1 Turkey as Having a Place in a Multireligious and Multicultural Europe

Within the inclusive multicultural and multireligious representation of Europe in line with the EU's official motto on culture, which is “unity in diversity”¹⁰⁴, and Article

¹⁰⁴ As the official motto of the EU used since 2000, this slogan indicates the construction of the EU “for peace and prosperity” in Europe better with “many different cultures, traditions and languages” (European Union, 2021). Some MEPs also make references to this motto in their speeches. In this regard, see, for

167¹⁰⁵ of the TFEU, there are MEPs predominantly from the left wing who portray Turkey as culturally compatible with it. In this context, Keyman (2016, p. 2282) also shares identical findings on Turkey as a unique case in European integration, which contributes to Europe becoming a multicultural and cosmopolitan model for deeper regional integration. In terms of the discursive continuity from the 1997–2007 period, the representation of Turkey, which has a place in a multireligious and multicultural Europe, is similar to the image of “Turkey as a contributor to cultural diversity in Europe” (Aydin-Düzgit, 2012, p. 131) and “Turkey as a nonviolent Muslim majority country,” especially after 9/11 (Lindgaard et al., 2018, p. 2). This representation of Turkey is generally widespread among the left, the green, and the liberal groups¹⁰⁶ while few MEPs from the right, the conservative, and the Eurosceptic groups¹⁰⁷ are against excluding Turkey with arguments based on religion, culture, geography, and history.

I do not think that Turkey is a non- European country. If you go to Istanbul you are in Constantinople, and Constantinople in my opinion was always part of Europe. Moreover, the Porte of the Ottoman Empire was always one of the allies of Europe. So for me it is not a question of religion. I think we are multi-cultural and multi-religious in Europe and there can be a place for Turkey in Europe if – and that is the point – if they apply European values and European principles, freedom of speech and a real democracy. That is the key issue. They are the Copenhagen criteria; not an old fashioned discussion about culture and languages. I know what I am talking about; I come from Belgium!

(Guy Verhofstadt, ALDE, 12 June 2013)

example, the parliamentary speeches of Richard Corbett from the PSE on 24 October 2007, Sepp Kusstatscher from the Verts/ALE on 11 March 2009, and Metin Kazak from the ALDE on 17 April 2013.

¹⁰⁵ This article uses the following expression regarding the cultural policies of the EU: “The Union shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the member states, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore” (Article 167 of the TFEU).

¹⁰⁶ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Marios Matsakis from the ALDE on 24 October 2007, Emilio Menéndez del Valle from the PSE on 21 May 2008, Joel Hasse Ferreira from the PSE on 21 May 2008, Pierre Pribetich from the PSE on 21 May 2008, Cem Özdemir from the Verts/ALE on 21 May 2008, Vural Öger from the PSE on 5 May 2009, Sarah Ludford from the ALDE on 20 January 2010, Pavel Poc from the S&D on 20 January 2010, Pavel Poc from the S&D on 20 January 2010, Michael Cashman from the S&D on 8 March 2011, Monika Flašíková Beňová from the S&D on 8 March 2011, Metin Kazak from the ALDE on 28 March 2012, Guy Verhofstadt from the ALDE on 12 June 2013, Andrew Duff from the ALDE on 12 June 2013, and Marietje Schaake from the ALDE on 12 June 2013.

¹⁰⁷ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Hanne Dahl from the IND/DEM on 11 March 2009, Cristian Dan Preda from the PPE on 10 February 2010, Oreste Rossi from the EFD on 20 September 2010, Eduard Kukan from the PPE on 12 June 2013, and Charles Tannock from the ECR on 20 May 2015.

The MEP from the ALDE starts with asserting Turkey as a European country through *litotes*¹⁰⁸ as a rhetorical figure of direct micro-mitigation strategy frequently used in political discourse, which functions here to construct Turkey's social representation in Europe's in-group (Tekin, 2010, p.195; van Dijk, 2000b, p. 100). Instead of discursively separating these names of the same city used in different historical periods with religious, cultural, or religious-based arguments, Istanbul is equated with Constantinople to sustain the ingroup solidarity with Turkey to underline its place in Europe, which is intensified with an adverb of frequency, "always." Further consolidation of this image is supported through appealing to collective memories and the *topos* of history in which the Ottoman Empire replaced by the Turkish Republic is declared as "always one of the allies of Europe." Therefore, the MEP discursively constructs Europe as the flag words of "multicultural and multireligious," which opens up a space for Turkey. Turkey is involved in the narrative of a multicultural and multireligious Europe on the condition that it applies "European values and European principles" equated with the Copenhagen criteria. At the end of the excerpt, the democrat MEP justifies his point of view regarding Turkey's inclusion in Europe through applying these values and principles with underlining his country "Belgium" and thus shows his personal involvement in this issue as a perspectivation strategy. In this image of a multicultural and multireligious Europe with its values and principles, including "freedom of speech and a real democracy," interdiscursivity with the multiculturalist ideology of the national realms¹⁰⁹ is also revealed, which is a discursive continuity of the 1997-2007 period.

Arguments against accession based on the pattern 'European countries' versus 'Islamic countries' are incorrect and wrong. Turkey's historic affiliation with Europe is undeniable. As a matter of fact, Turkey is today a member of the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. There is no religious yardstick to evaluate a candidate country; on the contrary, freedom of confession is one of Europe's principal values. That is why the sole and decisive criteria for Turkey's accession to the European Union must

¹⁰⁸ Among predicational strategies and direct micro-mitigation strategies, *litotes* as a form of understatement means affirmation stated through double negatives – in other words, the negation of the opposite, while it is also known as the converse of *hyperbole* (Geeraerts, 2010, p. 29; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 84, 2009, pp. 32, 104; Wodak & van Dijk, 1997, pp. 293–294).

¹⁰⁹ Rex (1986, p. 65) explains the multiculturalist ideology of the national realms as including the "nurturing of commonality" in the shape of shared laws and principles in the public sphere and "the ensuring of freedom" involving traditions of ethnic minorities in the private sphere.

be its compliance with the principles of the rule of law, legislative confirmation of civil and minority rights, and respect for all the Member States of the European Union.

(Pavel Poc, S&D, 20 January 2010)

In the extract from the S&D, there is an indirect contribution to the construction of a multireligious Europe since the polarization of “Islamic countries” against “European countries” is avoided with the synonymous words “incorrect” and “wrong” as linguistic markers of emphasis. Thus any discursive distance between Islamic and European countries is rejected. Moreover, in this speech, the usage of the terms “Islamic countries” and “European countries” in inverted commas is intentionally put forward to disclose the aim of other speakers targeted by this democrat MEP to homogenize a group of countries through referring to them with a specific adjective and therefore the purpose of constructing a clear binary opposition as a classic feature of the clash of civilizations between European and Islamic countries.

In the same excerpt, Turkish inclusion in Europe’s ingroup is targeted. For this purpose, “Turkey’s historic affiliation with Europe” and its ingroup membership in various institutions such as the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe are highlighted in order to show Turkey’s proximity to Europe. The place of religion in the EU is rejected in evaluating Turkey as “a candidate country” while the dimension of rights and freedoms in Turkey, which is “freedom of confession,” is underlined as “one of Europe’s principal values.” Therefore, the Turkish accession to the EU is only conditioned on its compliance with these values, including rights and freedoms, respect for EU members, and the rule of law, as examined in detail in the previous section, in order to indirectly remove implied religious, cultural, and historical differences with Turkey for the construction of a multicultural and multireligious Europe.

The current situation in Turkey is a sign of the need for much deeper democratization of the country. Demonstrations that have spread across the country in recent days are no longer just about the government’s arrogance and trees at Taksim Square, but about how Turkish society should work. If Turkey fails to reconcile secularism and democracy with Islam, much deeper problems can be expected. Not only in Turkey. Throughout the region. I believe that the principles of democracy are universal and can also work in Islamic society. Turkish experience confirms this.

(Eduard Kukan, PPE, 12 June 2013)

The Gezi Park events in 2013 are mentioned as the failure of Turkey “to reconcile secularism and democracy with Islam” in the speech above from the PPE, while the issue of democratization in Turkey is linked to specific domestic events as often seen in the previous section. For this reason, the expectation of “much deeper problems” than these demonstrations because of “the need for much deeper democratization” is underlined both for Turkey and the region through the *topos* of disadvantage, which implicitly refers to endangering the image of Turkey as a model secular democracy for the Arab and Middle Eastern countries. In this regard, the excerpt above does not assess the role of religion in Turkish society from the framework of laicism in which religion is eliminated from the public arena for reasons of modernity. In this excerpt, democracy and secularism in Turkey are seen as being at risk of failure through the *topos* of the aftermath if Turkey fails to reconcile them. Paradoxically, Turkey is cited as a successful example of compatibility between the principles of democracy and “Islamic society,” which sustains its democratization and thus Turkish accession to the EU. Therefore, it is understood in this extract that Islam¹¹⁰ can also be present in Europe, which is only possible in a multireligious Europe.

Madam President, I believe that Turkey should be a member of the EU. The criticism of Turkey is justified in many cases, but the excuses and the sitting on the fence must stop and a serious plan for Turkey joining the EU should be drawn up...Instead of a pseudo-debate on democracy in Turkey, we need a real and open discussion on the place that religion can and should play in the social debate. We need to create a form of European cooperation that is capable of meeting the challenge presented by a Europe made up of different religions. That is, we need to do this without losing sight of the central values and the inviolability of the person springing from the European values created in the melting pot of Jewish, Christian and Hellenistic culture in the centuries before and after the birth of Christ.

(Hanne Dahl, IND/DEM, 11 March 2009)

In the excerpt from the IND/DEM, the speaker begins her speech by clearly declaring her personal view, through “I believe” or *verbum putandi* as a stereotypic

¹¹⁰ In his research, Tekin (2018, p.186) also mentions some MEPs who regard Islam as a source of multiculturalism.

expression, on Turkey's EU candidacy with self-reflexivity to Europe on "the excuses and the sitting on the fence" as an idiomatic phrase for the doubt in the EU regarding Turkey (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 20). In contrast to the MEPs who focus on democracy in Turkey, which is constructed in a difficult process of democratic transformation in the previous section, the extract above focuses on where "religion can and should play in the social debate," which shows that the role of religion in Turkish society is not evaluated from the framework of laicism. In this sense, it predicates Europe as being "made up of different religions" – in other words, multireligious. Moreover, a version of departicularization¹¹¹ through choosing "Jewish, Christian, and Hellenistic culture" as the roots of "European values" is utilized with an interdiscursivity with the American "melting pot"¹¹² idea in discursively legitimating this mixture, which makes Europe multicultural.

In short, Turkey is discursively constructed as a country that has a place in a multireligious and multicultural Europe within the Turkish identity perception of MEPs, especially from the left, the greens, and the liberals, in the EP between 2007 and 2015 in terms of the European cultural space. In the speeches above, Turkey's representations in Europe's ingroup are apparent. At the same time, Europe is discursively constructed as multireligious and multicultural, which sustains a space for Turkey on the condition that it applies European values and principles equated with the Copenhagen criteria. In these excerpts, the role of religion in Turkey is not evaluated from the framework of laicism. Moreover, the principles of democracy are seen as being compatible with Turkey as an Islamic society, which provides for the inclusion of Islam in this multireligious Europe. Moreover, the place of religion in "the social debate" is encouraged. Interdiscursivities with the multiculturalist ideology of the national realms and the American melting pot idea are also found above as well as a version of departicularization through the selection of Jewish, Christian, and Hellenistic cultures as the roots of European values. Within this positive image of the perception of Turkish identity in terms of the European cultural space, divided discourses of MEPs from the same group or country are not detected.

¹¹¹ While departicularization is known as a process of homogenization, unification, and nationalization of "distinct and even opposed social movements, struggles, and projects" in nation state formation and thus discourses of national identities, it also refers to the usage of national cultural icons that are "appropriated, reinterpreted, and then offered up" for the construction of a unitary and homogeneous European history and culture (Alonso, 1988, p. 45; Foster, 1991, p. 242; Shore, 2000, p. 54).

¹¹² In a play of Israel Zangwill in 1908, the phrase "melting pot" for US society refers to the large-scale immigrant integration process in the USA in the early twentieth century (Smith, 2012, p.390; Lawton, 2013, p.111).

4.3.2 Turkey as a Non-European Threat to European Cultural Structure with its Islamization Agenda

The cultural incompatibility of Turkey with its membership of the EU is based on the essentialist understanding of European identity. In the 2007–2015 period, it is very often underlined with increasing frequency in the EP that Turkey is not European through arguments based on history¹¹³, geography¹¹⁴, religion¹¹⁵, and thus culture¹¹⁶ as inherent differences. Furthermore, the increasing importance of Islam and Islamization in Turkey is often argued in the EP in this period, which causes the perception of the threat¹¹⁷ of Islamization in Europe through neo-orientalist discourses. In this sense, unlike the

¹¹³ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Peter van Dalen from the ECR on 25 November 2009, Roberto Fiore from the NI on 5 May 2009, Bastiaan Belder from the IND/DEM on 5 May 2009, Barbara Matera from the PPE on 20 January 2010, Claudio Morganti from the EFD on 13 January 2013, Matteo Salvini from the EFD on 17 April 2013, Philip Claeys from the NI on 17 April 2013, Claudio Morganti from the EFD on 13 June 2013, Dominique Bilde from the NI on 20 May 2015, and Angel Djambazki from the ECR on 20 May 2015.

¹¹⁴ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Frank Vanhecke from the ITS on 12 February 2007, Lydia Schenardi from the ITS on 12 February 2007, Bernd Posselt from the PPE-DE on 11 March 2009, Peter van Dalen from the ECR on 25 November 2009, Carl Lang from the NI on 11 March 2009, Andreas Mölzer from the NI on 25 November 2009, Mario Borghezio from the UEN on 11 March 2009, Andreas Mölzer from the NI on 10 February 2010, Mara Bizzotto from the EFD on 10 February 2010, Lorenzo Fontana from the EFD on 10 February 2010, Magdi Cristiano Allam from the EFD on 28 March 2012, Andrew Henry William Brons from the NI on 17 April 2013, Matteo Salvini from the EFD on 17 April 2013, Dimitar Stoyanov from the NI on 12 June 2013, Laurence J.A.J. Stassen from the NI on 17 April 2013, and William (the Earl of) Dartmouth from the EFD on 11 March 2014.

¹¹⁵ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Urszula Krupa from the IND/DEM on 12 February 2007, Frank Vanhecke from the ITS on 12 February 2007, Jacques Toubon from the PPE-DE on 21 May 2008, Zbigniew Zaleski from the PPE-DE on 21 May 2008, Peter van Dalen from the ECR on 25 November 2009, Roberto Fiore from the NI on 5 May 2009, Mario Borghezio from the UEN on 11 March 2009, Barry Madlener from the NI on 25 November 2009, Philip Claeys from the NI on 25 November 2009, Barbara Matera from the PPE on 20 January 2010, Zoltán Balczó from the NI on 10 February 2010, Mara Bizzotto from the EFD on 10 February 2010, Mara Bizzotto from the EFD on 20 September 2010, Barry Madlener from the NI on 10 February 2010, Philip Claeys from the NI on 10 February 2010, Magdi Cristiano Allam from the EFD on 28 March 2012, Andrew Henry William Brons from the NI on 17 April 2013, Claudio Morganti from the EFD on 13 June 2013, Zoltán Balczó from the NI on 10 June 2015, and Mario Borghezio from the ENF on 10 June 2015.

¹¹⁶ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Urszula Krupa from the IND/DEM on 12 February 2007, Frank Vanhecke from the ITS on 12 February 2007, Jan Tadeusz Masiel from the UEN on 23 April 2007, Alexander Lambsdorff from the ALDE on 21 May 2008, Sylwester Chruszcz from the NI on 21 May 2008, Zbigniew Zaleski from the PPE-DE on 21 May 2008, Peter van Dalen from the ECR on 25 November 2009, Carl Lang from the NI on 11 March 2009, Andreas Mölzer from the NI on 25 November 2009, Andreas Mölzer from the NI on 10 February 2010, Mara Bizzotto from the EFD on 10 February 2010, Jaroslav Paška from the EFD on 20 September 2010, Barry Madlener from the NI on 8 March 2011, Andrew Henry William Brons from the NI on 17 April 2013, Claudio Morganti from the EFD on 13 June 2013, Franz Obermayr from the NI on 17 April 2013, Matteo Salvini from the EFD on 17 April 2013, Dimitar Stoyanov from the NI on 12 June 2013, Marcel de Graaff from the ENF on 2 December 2015, Dominique Bilde from the NI on 20 May 2015, Angel Djambazki from the ECR on 20 May 2015, Jonathan Arnott from the EFDD on 10 June 2015, and Zoltán Balczó from the NI on 10 June 2015.

¹¹⁷ Within this perception, it is observed that after the events of September 11 and the various terrorist attacks in Spain, Turkey, and England, there is increasing fear and prejudice about Islam in Europe since fundamental Islam and Islam are equated in the eyes of EU citizens (Mejri, 2004, pp. 282–298; Öner, 2009, p. 247).

positive representation of Turkish identity above, it is understood that multiculturalism policies in Europe are rejected within this negative perception of Turkey while the perception of a homogeneous, uniform, bordered European cultural structure constructed with a particular history¹¹⁸, geography¹¹⁹, and Christianity¹²⁰ is discursively also formed at the same time. As the discursive continuity, this representation is similar to the representation of “Turkey as a diluter of European cultural homogeneity” (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, pp. 131–138) and the culture-based representation of Turkey as an Other (Lindgaard et al., 2018, p.17) in the 1997–2007 period. The exclusionary negative representation of Turkey analyzed in this part is generally widespread among the right, far-right, conservative, Eurosceptic, and the nonattached groups, while there are also some MEPs from the left and the liberal groups sharing some similar views.

The mentality of the Turks has changed little since the times of Kemal Atatürk. Their religious tradition is directing them along their own specific course, which differs from that of us Europeans. Geographic proximity does not equate to cultural closeness. In addition, the unwritten social codes do not suggest that the Turkish people are gravitating towards a European identity. The question then arises as to whether Turkey wishes to change and adopt our sociopolitical model, because Article 301 seems to deny this...Through its amendments, the Socialist Group in the European Parliament wishes to impose an ideologically based solution on the Turkish people, but the latter are happy as they are...Are we to impose well-being on the nation by force, changing its identity, tradition and culture? In any case, is all this actually susceptible to change?

(Zbigniew Zaleski, PPE-DE, 21 May 2008)

¹¹⁸ In this regard, it is claimed that this kind of exclusive interpretation of European identity based on a selective history can empower a hierarchy of cultures within Europe and thus it can enhance the monolithic appearance of Europe (Arat-Koç, 2010, pp. 182–183).

¹¹⁹ Since the 1990s, geographic otherings have been more important in European identity constructions to “be more exclusive and antagonistic against out-groups” (Diez, 2004, pp. 320-331; Murphy, 2005, p. 586).

¹²⁰ Some MEPs construct Christianity not only as a belief system but also as a civilizational idea, a political culture, and even a lifestyle because of “the teachings of Christianity” as “the shared European values” as stated by Zoltán Balczó from the NI in the EP debate on 10 February 2010 (Ağcasulu & Ossewaarde, 2019, p. 363; Weiler, 2007, p. 143). According to this perception, others not sharing the Christian heritage cannot be integrated into European values and thus European societies (Yılmaz, 2007, pp. 298–299). In this regard, see, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Lydia Schenardi from the ITS on 12 February 2007, Hanne Dahl from the IND/DEM on 11 March 2009, Peter van Dalen from the ECR on 25 November 2009, Roberto Fiore from the NI on 5 May 2009, Zoltán Balczó from the NI on 10 February 2010, Mara Bizzotto from the EFD on 10 February 2010, Peter van Dalen from the ECR on 8 March 2011, Philip Claeys from the NI on 17 April 2013, Edouard Ferrand from the NI on 20 May 2015, and Zoltán Balczó from the NI on 10 June 2015.

The MEP from the PPE-DE above focuses on the discursive construction of Turkish people and thus Turkish identity as a cultural non-European other. For this purpose, “the mentality of the Turks” that “has changed little since the times of Kemal Atatürk,” frequently used as the symbol of the ideal Turkish modernity and secularism among MEPs¹²¹, is underlined to show the sameness and constancy of this mentality discursively and thus to construct a binary opposition between “Europeans” and “Turks” within the referential strategy of ethnification (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 50). Through the referential strategy of collectivization (Pascual, 2008, p. 61), the “us” and “their” pronouns as deictic expressions above construct “Europeans” as a bounded, similar, and homogenous group. The impact of geographic location on culture is denied, while Turkey’s geographical closeness to Europe is also approved. Nevertheless, Turkish cultural heritage, referred to with the phrase “unwritten social codes” in this excerpt, is seen as the reason for specific problems in Turkish society through the *topos* of culture. Thus, accordingly, it is “susceptible to change” and far away from “a European identity” and “our sociopolitical model” since Turkish people are referred to as being as “happy as they are.” Therefore, with essentialist attributions, imposing “an ideologically based solution on the Turkish people” and imposing “well-being on the nation by force, changing its identity, tradition, and culture,” are regarded as unsuitable.

We do not feel that Turkey’s membership is either realistic or opportune for many reasons. Firstly, because Turkey is not geographically located within Europe; secondly, because Turkey is becoming more and more Islamic and Ankara is actually a leading member of the largest international pan-Islamic organization, the OIC; thirdly, because religious minorities are persecuted and their inferiority is ingrained in society.

(Lorenzo Fontana, EFD, 10 February 2010)

¹²¹ In this context, see also, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Gerard Batten from the IND/DEM on 24 October 2007, Mogens Camre from the UEN on 21 May 2008, Bastiaan Belder from the IND/DEM on 5 May 2009, Charles Tannock from the ECR on 20 January 2010, Gerard Batten from the EFD on 20 January 2010, Andrey Kovatchev from the PPE on 8 March 2011, Magdi Cristiano Allam from the EFD on 28 March 2012, Bastiaan Belder from the EFD on 6 February 2013, Laurence J.A.J. Stassen from the NI on 17 April 2013, Boris Zala from the S&D on 12 June 2013, Geoffrey Van Orden from the ECR on 12 June 2013, Cristiana Muscardini from the ECR on 12 June 2013, James Carver from the EFDD on 17 December 2014, Marcel de Graaff from the NI on 20 May 2015, and Anders Primdahl Vistisen from the ECR on 20 May 2015.

In the extract from the EFD above, Turkey's exclusion from EU membership is justified for various reasons, including geography, religion, and freedom of religion in Turkey. First, in the geographical sense, Turkey is excluded from Europe, which is a macro-toponym referring to an indefinite small geographic entity. Despite being a continent, Europe is discursively fixed as a geographical entity with a definite, bounded, and limited geographical structure from which Turkey is omitted (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 81). Moreover, the growing importance of Islam in Turkey is underlined in this speech through "becoming more and more Islamic," and the discursively unacceptable and out-of-group membership of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) of the Turkish government referred to as "Ankara" within spatialization, which is implied as the indications of the threat of becoming more Islamic – in other words, Islamization¹²² in Turkey. As a related and subsequent cause, the problem of religious freedom¹²³ is also conveyed in this excerpt as the other indication of the threat of Islamization in Turkey, which is frequently mentioned in the EP debates.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, apart from being clear, this report by my fellow Member, Mrs. Bozkurt, has the great virtue of summarizing the sad reality of women's rights

¹²² For the usage of Islamization as a threat in the EP, see, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Frank Vanhecke from the ITS on 12 February 2007, Gerard Batten from the IND/DEM on 24 October 2007, Andreas Mölzer from the ITS on 24 October 2007, Mario Borghezio from the UEN on 21 May 2008, Jan Marinus Wiersma from the PSE on 11 March 2009, Charles Tannock from the ECR on 20 January 2010, Gerard Batten from the EFD on 20 January 2010, Lorenzo Fontana from the EFD on 10 February 2010, Andreas Mölzer from the NI on 8 March 2011, Mara Bizzotto from the EFD on 27 September 2011, Barry Madlener from the NI on 28 March 2012, Andreas Mölzer from the NI on 28 March 2012, Magdi Cristiano Allam from the EFD on 28 March 2012, Laurence J.A.J. Stassen from the NI on 12 June 2013, Andreas Mölzer from the NI on 12 June 2013, Boris Zala from the S&D on 12 June 2013, Eleftherios Synadinos from the NI on 7 October 2015, and Marcel de Graaff from the ENF on 2 December 2015.

¹²³ For the usage of problems in religious freedom in Turkey in the EP, see, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Jim Allister from the NI on 24 October 2007, Bastiaan Belder from the IND/DEM on 24 October 2007, Andreas Mölzer from the ITS on 24 October 2007, Charles Tannock from the PPE-DE on 24 October 2007, Alexander Lambsdorff from the ALDE on 21 May 2008, Konrad Szymański from the UEN on 21 May 2008, Bastiaan Belder from the IND/DEM on 21 May 2008, Tunne Kelam from the PPE-DE on 21 May 2008, Konrad Szymański from the UEN on 11 March 2009, Bastiaan Belder from the IND/DEM on 11 March 2009, Bogusław Sonik from the PPE on 20 January 2010, Bastiaan Belder from the EFD on 10 February 2010, Nikolaos Salavrakos from the EFD on 20 January 2010, Mara Bizzotto from the EFD on 20 September 2010, Sari Essayah from the PPE on 20 January 2010, Philip Claeys from the NI on 10 February 2010, Tunne Kelam from the PPE on 10 February 2010, Konrad Szymański from the ECR on 10 February 2010, Gerard Batten from the EFD on 20 January 2010, Lorenzo Fontana from the EFD on 10 February 2010, Andreas Mölzer from the NI on 8 March 2011, Elisabeth Jeggle from the PPE on 8 March 2011, Lorenzo Fontana from the EFD on 8 March 2011, Philip Claeys from the NI on 8 March 2011, Mara Bizzotto from the EFD on 27 September 2011, Bastiaan Belder from the EFD on 28 March 2012, Tunne Kelam from the PPE on 28 March 2012, Franz Obermayr from the NI on 17 April 2013, Matteo Salvini from the EFD on 17 April 2013, Peter van Dalen from the ECR on 17 April 2013, Andreas Mölzer from the NI on 12 June 2013, Bastiaan Belder from the EFD on 11 March 2014, Ewald Stadler from the NI on 12 March 2014, Edouard Ferrand from the NI on 20 May 2015, Bendt Bendtsen from the PPE on 20 May 2015, and Bas Belder from the ECR on 20 May 2015.

in Turkey. Indeed, despite all the declarations of intent from the Turkish authorities and the pseudo-reforms undertaken in the area of human rights, the reality is that domestic violence, honour crimes and forced marriages keep increasing, and that discrimination against women in the workplace and in education still goes on. However, this finding should not make us forget that, while it is true that these violations of women's rights are incompatible with the concept of human rights, as they are laid down, for example, in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the fact remains that Turkey is not European and that its future should not lie in the European Union. Indeed, even when it turns out that all the economic, legal and social criteria laid down at the Copenhagen Summit have been met, Turkey, 99% of whose population is made up of Muslims and 94% of whose territory is located in Asia, will still not share our values, which bear the stamp of Christianity and humanism.

(Lydia Schenardi, ITS, 12 February 2007)

In the speech from the ITS, the discursive construction of Turkish people and thus Turkish identity as a cultural other is highlighted through the *topos* of culture. For this aim, “the sad reality of women's rights in Turkey,” “domestic violence, honor crimes, and forced marriages” and “discrimination against women in the workplace and in education” are mentioned in order to show Turkish society's non-European identity and thus “its future” that “should not lie in the European Union.” This cultural incompatibility of Turkey in terms of the place of women in society is consolidated with arguments based on the religion of Turkey's population “made up of Muslims” and the geography of its territory largely “located in Asia” through the *topos* of numbers. Within these justifications, European values are differentiated as bearing “the stamp of Christianity and humanism,” which is the application of deparicularization in this excerpt. Therefore, Turkey is discursively constructed as non-European in the cultural sense, while Europe is defined as an exclusive, uniform, and homogeneous culture within a particular geographic area.

Madam President, we are talking about Turkey here, but Prime Minister Erdoğan would rather have a Turkish-Arabic Union. Turkey is a great friend of dictator Ahmadinejad. Turkey does not want to be a secular country any longer. Turkey continues to occupy Northern Cyprus and Turkey is no longer a friend of Israel. Instead, it has opted for the Muslim brotherhood of Hamas. Turkey is increasingly focusing on the Islamic world. Ladies and gentlemen, when are we going to stop this sham? Europe does not want Turkey and Europe does not want Islam. Mr Sarkozy has already said that. Mrs Merkel has already said that and

the majority of European citizens do not want Turkey as a member of the European Union, either. Turkey has been humiliating itself for years in exchange for money from the European Union and the promise of EU membership. However, a backward Islamic culture has no place in Europe. Prime Minister Erdoğan, are you a real man or a subservient coward? How much longer will you continue humiliating the Turkish people? Take the honourable way out and stop doing that.

(Barry Madlener, NI, 8 March 2011)

In order to show Turkey's cultural exclusion, the excerpt above from the NI firstly shows the impact of religion's increasing role and thus endangered secularism¹²⁴ in Turkey on its foreign relations with Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt as evidence of "increasingly focusing on the Islamic world" in Turkey. In this context, Turkey is even discursively equated with Islam with references to Sarkozy and Merkel as the leading decision-makers in the EU member states through the *topos* of authority, which is followed by labeling Turkey as "a backward Islamic culture" to underline its position exclusive of Europe. Therefore, Turkey is discursively constructed as an inferior religious non-European cultural entity, which discursively conveys a cultural superiority of Europe over Turkey. The speech also employs *argumentum ad hominem* described as a verbal attack on the antagonist's personality and character, which is here applied through labeling Erdoğan as "a real man or a subservient coward" within the predicational strategy and calling him to "[t]ake the honorable way out and stop doing that" (Wodak, 2009, p. 44). Moreover, there are appellative rhetorical questions combined with the fallacy of the *argumentum ad populum*¹²⁵, namely: "When are we going to stop this sham?" and "How much longer will you continue humiliating the Turkish people?" by highlighting the negative attitudes of the EU positioned against "the Turkish people" with self-reflexivity, in order to

¹²⁴ For the usage of problems in secularism or non-secularism in Turkey in the EP, see, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Marios Matsakis from the ALDE on 12 February 2007, Jacques Toubon from the PPE-DE on 21 May 2008, Bogusław Rogalski from the UEN on 11 March 2009, Bastiaan Belder from the IND/DEM on 5 May 2009, Charles Tannock from the ECR on 20 January 2010, Róza, Gräfin von Thun Und Hohenstein from the PPE on 20 January 2010, Elisabeth Jeggle from the PPE on 8 March 2011, Barry Madlener from the NI on 8 March 2011, Magdi Cristiano Allam from the EFD on 28 March 2012, Boris Zala from the S&D on 12 June 2013, Laurence J.A.J. Stassen from the NI on 17 April 2013, Daniël van der Stoep from the NI on 18 April 2013, Fiorello Provera from the EFD on 12 June 2013, Charles Tannock from the ECR on 17 December 2014, Slavi Binev from the EFD on 11 March 2014, James Carver from the EFDD on 17 December 2014, and Franz Obermayr from the NI on 20 May 2015.

¹²⁵ As a logical fallacy containing right-wing populist appeals to the crowds of people, the *argumentum ad populum* or pathetic fallacy is "the appeal to the prejudiced emotions, opinions, and convictions of a specific social group or to the *vox populi* instead of relevant arguments" (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 72; Wodak, 2009b, p.45).

emphatically get more attention from both MEPs and Turkish people for the justification and therefore legitimization of ending Turkey's EU journey.

In this context, neo-orientalism surfaces as interdiscursivity in this excerpt in which Turkey is predicated as a backward Islamic culture since Islam is treated in an orientalist way as a cultural matter, which is also observed in the 1997–2007 period as a discursive continuity. While the concept of Orientalism refers to a process reflecting a Western-centric worldview about the Muslim world portrayed as exotic and backward, neo-orientalism¹²⁶, undergoing a paradigmatic symbolic change after 9/11, is the “construction of Islam and the Muslim world as a social and existential threat to the Western world and civilization” from the perspectives of neoconservatives and right-wing actors (Kerboua, 2016, p. 8; Said, 1979, pp. 9–15). In this regard, the neoconservatives, influenced by Lewis (1990) and Huntington (1993, 1996), construct “a neo-orientalist image of contemporary Muslims not only as backward and inferior” within the oriental view but also more significantly as violent and threatening (Kerboua, 2016, p. 8). Therefore, the neo-Orientalist discourse¹²⁷, frequently involved in discussions on secularism in Turkey in the EP as seen in the speech above, is used to justify why Turkey should be culturally pushed out of the EU.

In this sense, the fact that European and American political thought and practice represent Islam as “nonsecular” more than any other religion or political tradition should also be added (Hurd, 2008, p. 43). Within this context, regardless of the historical, economic, political, ideological, and even religious differences in the region as well as often negative perceptions of the legacy of the Ottoman rule, the Middle East is discursively defined as anti-modern and theocratic by secularist political thought in

¹²⁶ Interestingly, neo-orientalism seems to have much in common with early European attitudes to the Ottoman empire, especially before the 18th century, which often viewed the Ottoman Empire as an existential threat (Bulliet, 2015, pp. 11–22; Çırakman, 2002, pp. 21–185; Cussen, 2020, pp. 149–162; Esposito, 1999, pp. 1–40; Feliciano, 2011, pp. 243–266; Housley, 2012; Kılıç, 2013, pp. 111–135; Pilat & Cristea, 2017; Pippidi, 2014; Stantchev, 2017, pp. 161–205).

¹²⁷ For other similar usages of interdiscursivity with neo-orientalism in the EP, see, for example, parliamentary speeches of Frank Vanhecke from the ITS on 12 February 2007, Marios Matsakis from the ALDE on 12 February 2007, Jacques Toubon from the PPE-DE on 21 May 2008, Mario Borghezio from the UEN on 21 May 2008, Roberto Fiore from the NI on 5 May 2009, Barry Madlener from the NI on 25 November 2009, Mara Bizzotto from the EFD on 20 September 2010, Barry Madlener from the NI on 8 March 2011, Mara Bizzotto from the EFD on 27 September 2011, Andreas Mölzer from the NI on 28 March 2012, Magdi Cristiano Allam from the EFD on 28 March 2012, Philip Claeys from the NI on 17 April 2013, Claudio Morganti from the EFD on 13 June 2013, and Marcel de Graaff from the ENF on 2 December 2015.

Europe since accordingly Western secularism is not possible in countries where Islam is the religion of the majority (Aydın-Düzgit et al., 2020, pp. 750–760; Pace, 2006).

Erdoğan wants a new Ottoman empire and the EU lets that happen. Cyprus was only a first step and Erdoğan said earlier: minarets are our bayonets, domes are our helmets, mosques are our barracks and believers are our soldiers. He said that democracy is not a goal, but only a means, that he is a servant of the Shari'a and that there is no moderate Islam. How clear do you want it to be? We must protect Western culture, democracy and freedom, not let ourselves be blackmailed, never be dependent on a dictator. Close the internal borders, that is the answer to the flow of migrants and to the Turkish invasion. That is why, Mr President, we must ensure, once and for all, that Turkey will never, and never will, become a member of the EU in not 100,000 years.

(Marcel de Graaff, ENF, 2 December 2015)

As the last extract analyzed in this excerpt, the MEP from the ENF above firstly concentrates on Erdoğan's desire for "a new Ottoman Empire," which implies his policies on a more interventionist and proactive role in its larger neighborhood implied with Cyprus as "only a first step" while the EU is accused of remaining passive. It is understood from the above speech that this interventionism is also perceived in a religious sense, which is in accordance with the neo-orientalist view of Islam as an existential threat to Europe. This excerpt contains references to several lines from Turkish nationalist poet Ziya Gökalp read by Erdoğan, then mayor of Istanbul, in December 1997 (Mecham, 2004, p. 345). It is clear that these lines, which had already put Erdoğan's political career in grave danger in the 1990s¹²⁸ in Turkey, are brought to the fore again in this excerpt to make Erdoğan and thus Turkey's EU candidacy process controversial in a religious and thus cultural context. This poem is also frequently seen on anti-Muslim websites as a speech by Erdoğan, which feeds the negative, stereotypical, and fantastical image of Muslims and the mosque as a symbol of militant Islam as profoundly rooted in orientalist representations of the Middle East through the *topos* of threat (Rizvi, 2014, pp. 47–48).

¹²⁸ Reading these lines at a political rally in Siirt caused the end of his mayorship of Istanbul, with a 10-month prison sentence in 1998 as a temporary ban from politics because of inciting religious hatred and even the threat of his permanent departure from politics before the establishment of the AKP in 2001 and its election as the ruling party on 3 November 2002 (Mecham, 2004, p.345).

Furthermore, the excerpt underlines populist appeals to the Muslim masses employed by Erdoğan since this poem utilizes the rhetorical figure *argumentum ad populum*. Thus, it is aimed to increase the perception of the threat of Turkey and, to be more precise, Muslims against “Western culture, democracy, and freedom.” In this respect, it is also observed that there are several references to Erdoğan¹²⁹ between 2007 and 2015 in the EP in terms of his increasing tendency towards Islam and less secular state governance, which is interpreted as an increasing Islamization threat to Turkey and thus to Europe.

Moreover, through the *topos* of authority, the extract underlines the views of Erdoğan in which Turkey’s democracy is positioned as “only a means” while accordingly he also predicates himself as “a servant of the Shari’a” within predicational strategies (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 72). Along with these expressions, his claim that “there is no moderate Islam” is used to demonstrate the claimed accuracy of the neo-orientalist view on Islam, which is consolidated with a rhetorical question. Therefore, “Western culture, democracy, and freedom” as progressive and democratic in a protective manner is juxtaposed against a backward and undemocratic Turkey, while Turkey is also portrayed as a blackmailing country governed by “a dictator” within predicational strategies for its negative presentation. Thus, the speech shows the existence of two uniform and contrasting cultures in a clear binary divide between them.

In line with the typical far-right discourse on Turkey in the EP, the far-right MEP in this excerpt also uses the argumentative fallacy of extreme case formulation and the *topos* of threat in referring to migrants as “flow” and “the Turkish invasion” as a metaphor of war, upon Turkish accession to the EU. For this reason, Turkish migrants are securitized, while with an apparent imperative demand to “close the internal borders” and the use of “we” pronoun, Europe is constructed as an enclosed space within rigid borders that needs to be protected from Turkish migrants as external threats in this speech. Thus, Turkish identity becomes a foreign, homogeneous, threatening, and cultural Other

¹²⁹ In this context, see, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Philip Claeys from the NI on 25 November 2009, Magdi Cristiano Allam from the EFD on 28 March 2012, Claudio Morganti from the EFD on 13 June 2013, Laurence J.A.J. Stassen from the NI on 12 June 2013, Philip Claeys from the NI on 12 June 2013, Boris Zala from the S&D on 12 June 2013, Claudio Morganti from the EFD on 13 June 2013, Fiorello Provera from the EFD on 12 June 2013, Elmar Brok from the PPE on 12 June 2013, Gerolf Annemans from the NI on 15 January 2015, and Angel Djambazki from the ECR on 20 May 2015.

through immigration with its negative genericization¹³⁰ and thus Turkey's EU membership is opposed even in 100,000 hyperbolic years with the adverb “never” as the direct micro-mitigation strategy.

To sum up, there are also MEPs who perceive Turkish identity as a non-European threat to the European cultural structure with its Islamization agenda in a relatively negative sense between 2007 and 2015, unlike the MEPs who discursively construct Turkey as a place in a multireligious and multicultural Europe. In the EP, the perception of Turkey's non-European cultural identity, which necessitates rejection of multicultural policies, is discursively grounded on the arguments based on history, geography, and religion, while in this context, a special emphasis is applied to Islam and in turn Islamization constructed as an existential threat to European culture through Turkey, which often creates interdiscursivity with neo-orientalist discourses. The excerpts above show that not only the Turkish state under the leadership of Erdoğan through the *topos* of authority but also Turkish society through the *topos* of culture is represented as a cultural other and non-European from an essentialist perspective.

Within this portrayal of Turkey, Europe is discursively constructed as a homogeneous, uniform, and bordered cultural space with a particular history, geography, and religion as the application of deparicularization, which creates a binary opposition between Turkey and Europe. The endangering of secularism in Turkey, because of Islam described as nonsecular more than any other religion or political tradition, is another prominent issue in the EP debates. In line with the neo-orientalist view of Islam as an existential threat to Europe, populist appeals to the Muslim masses employed by Erdogan as the rhetorical figure *argumentum ad populum* are underlined. In this context, neo-orientalist discourses seek to justify Turkey's exclusion by emphasizing Erdoğan's various statements suggesting that Turkey's democracy is positioned only as a means for the Shari'a, which can be seen as the self-fulfilling prophecy of neo-orientalism. In this context, the reference to migrants with the argumentative fallacy of extreme case formulation, the negative genericization, and the *topos* of threat are also detected, especially in the far-right discourse on Turkey.

¹³⁰ As one of the alternative aspects of representing social actors, genericization refers to generic reference, which is used in the plural without an article as in the expression of “migrants” in this excerpt (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 53).

In the context of the perception of Turkish identity as a non-European threat to European cultural structure, some discourses in which the MEPs from the same group or country are divided, are detected. First of all, some MEPs from the ECR¹³¹, Germany¹³², Bulgaria¹³³, and the Netherlands¹³⁴ do not share exactly the same view concerning the Turkish candidacy to the EU. While some MEPs defend Turkey's exclusion from EU membership in terms of culture, history, civilization, and most importantly Islam in Turkey, even referred to as an "Islamic dictatorship"¹³⁵ in this respect, other MEPs from the same group or countries encourage Turkey towards more reforms and thus more chapters.

Overall, there is a convergence with the findings of the period 1997–2007 in terms of the representation of European identity as a cultural space and the representation of Turkey, which has a place in a multireligious and multicultural Europe. Nevertheless, there is also a divergence between the findings of the 1997–2007 period and the 2007–2015 period regarding the representation of Turkish identity as a non-European threat to the European cultural structure with its Islamization agenda. It is because there is a hardening of the rhetoric against Turkey with regard to the increasing importance of Islam and, more specifically, Islamization both in the Turkish state and society as well as the endangered secularism in Turkey and the increasing emphasis on Erdoğan's words in this context, which is perceived as an existential and more serious threat than the 1997–2007 period against the European cultural area. Last but not least, both positive and negative perceptions of Turkey above converge regarding religion being more visible and powerful in Turkish society. In the positive view, Turkey's "religion" is seen as a contribution to cultural diversity, while Islam and Islamization in Turkey are seen as a threat to Europe in the negative view. In fact, both views seem to agree with each other about the growing role of religion in Turkey.

¹³¹ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Angel Djambazki from the ECR on 15 June 2015 and Geoffrey Van Orden from the ECR on 20 May 2015.

¹³² See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Andreas Mölzer from the ITS on 12 February 2007 and Alexander Lambsdorff from the ALDE on 24 October 2007.

¹³³ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Dimitar Stoyanov from the NI on 12 June 2013 and Metin Kazak from the ALDE on 17 April 2013.

¹³⁴ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Marcel de Graaff from the NI on 20 May 2015 and Kati Piri from the S&D on 20 May 2015.

¹³⁵ The parliamentary speech of Marcel de Graaff from the NI on 20 May 2015.

4.4 Turkey in the European Political/Economic Project

Various financial and economic crises in the EU brought some results and discussions that had severe effects on the EU between 2007 and 2015, as the time period in focus of this thesis. In this regard, the financial crisis¹³⁶ in 2008 and the Eurozone crisis in 2010 that severely damaged the European economy caused both the rise of EU-sceptic political ideologies¹³⁷ in Europe and the ratification of various austerity measures and immigration restrictions. These crises also brought their debates on Turkey-EU relations and, in turn, Turkish accession to the EU even necessitating a different European integration model¹³⁸ while these relations already had an economically and politically multifaceted and complex structure. Grounded on a high-volume trade relation formed between Turkey and the EU through the Customs Union in 1995, the bilateral economic and trade relations “are a matter of political significance too”¹³⁹. Despite turbulent and volatile political relations, they are seen as exceptionally important and gradually improved as widely accepted in the EP debate entitled “Trade and Economic Relations with Turkey” on 20 September 2010. This turbulence even turned to the stagnation of Turkey’s political integration into the EU in contrast to the growing economic ties between the EU and Turkey. In other words, during this period between 2007 and 2015, their political relations deteriorated while bilateral economic relations steadily developed.

This asymmetrical development mentioned above between political and economic relations is discursively evaluated and positioned differently by MEPs. In this context, the image of Europe as a political/economic project¹⁴⁰ is discursively constructed through

¹³⁶ With the financial crisis in 2008, more and more functionalization of “alleged or real threats to European security” is observed as “legitimation for drawing new borders between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, the ‘Europeans’ and ‘Others’,” in order to adopt “ever more restrictive measures to keep ‘Others’ out” (Wodak & Boukala, 2015, p. 89).

¹³⁷ This rise is also observed in the EP between 2007 and 2015 through the increase of the Eurosceptic groups from different political spectrums such as the ECR from the center right, the GUE/NGL from the far right, the IND/DEM, renamed the EFD, from the right wing, and the UEN as national-conservative.

¹³⁸ It is stated that based on the Conclusions of the European Council between 26 and 27 June 2014, there is a tendency “towards a multitier Europe founded on the principle of differentiated integration” as a relatively flexible integration model in which Turkey should gradually integrate with the EU in political and economic terms without full EU membership remaining a long-term objective (Turhan, 2015, p. 19).

¹³⁹ See the parliamentary speech of Ioan Mircea Pașcu from the S&D on 20 September 2010.

¹⁴⁰ For the usage of “project” referring to the EU, see, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Jacques Toubon from the PPE-DE on 21 May 2008, Gunnar Hökmark from the PPE-DE on 21 May 2008, Anna Ibrisagic from the PPE-DE on 9 July 2008, Hubert Pirker from the PPE-DE on 9 July 2008, Andrzej Jan Szejna from the PSE on 9 July 2008, Gabriele Albertini from the PPE on 25 November 2009, Ivo Vajgl from the ALDE on 25 November 2009, Geoffrey Van Orden from the ECR on 10 February 2010, Alojz Peterle from the PPE on 10 February 2010, Cristian Dan Preda from the PPE on 21 November 2012, and José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra from the PPE on 12 June 2013.

the representation of Turkey as being indispensable for the European political/economic project and the representation of Turkey as being incompatible with this project.

4.4.1 Turkey as Indispensable for the European Political/Economic Project

Within the representation of Europe as a political/economic project, there are MEPs¹⁴¹ who praise the Turkish economy, emphasize its importance to Europe, support economic and trade relations between the EU and Turkey, and thus defend its existence in this project. In this context, the findings of Keyman¹⁴² (2016, pp. 2281–2282) also share identical views on Turkey described in terms of “dynamic economic development, and a highly mobile, young, and entrepreneurial population” (Keyman, 2016, p. 2281). In regard to the discursive continuity from the 1997–2007 period, the representations of Turkey as an adaptable country to the European political project (Aydın-Düzgüt, 2012, pp. 110–112) and Turkey as a well-functioning market economy (Lindgaard et al., 2018, p. 2) are in the same line as this image of Turkey as being indispensable for the European political/economic project. In this context, there are MEPs, especially from the center left, who defend the indispensability of Turkey for the European political/economic project thanks to its complementary demographic structure standing out with its youth as follows:

Turkey is also a country which is at odds with Europe in that it has completely different demographic dynamics, is a young country, and one which first tackled the crisis and the challenging reforms which these dynamics required. So it is a complementary country because it is different to the European Union from many points of view and therefore there

¹⁴¹ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Gábor Harangozó from the PSE on 23 April 2007, Franziska Keller from the Verts/ALE on 20 September 2010, Georgios Koumoutsakos from the PPE on 20 September 2010, Jaroslav Paška from the EFD on 20 September 2010, Danuta Jazłowiecka from the PPE on 20 September 2010, Ioan Enciu from the S&D on 20 September 2010, Pino Arlacchi from the S&D on 28 March 2012, Czesław Adam Siekierski from the PPE on 28 March 2012, Charles Tannock from the ECR on 17 April 2013, Birgit Schnieber-Jastram from the PPE on 17 April 2013, Maria-Eleni Koppa from the S&D on 17 April 2013, Eija-Riitta Korhola from the PPE on 17 April 2013, Oldrich Vlasak from the ECR on 17 April 2013, Mitro Repo from the S&D on 18 April 2013, Libor Rouček from the S&D on 12 June 2013, Sean Kelly from the PPE on 13 June 2013, Zdravka Bušić from the PPE on 12 March 2014, and Tonino Picula from the S&D on 11 March 2014.

¹⁴² As an identity-based perception, Keyman (2016, pp. 2281–2282) also underlines Turkey’s attribute in the global and public debates as a trading state “with its successful economic performance, capacity to adapt to globalization and Europeanization, and increasing regional and global economic engagements, Turkey’s active globalization, and its proactive foreign policy.”

is a great degree of reciprocal potential: it is this that we must concentrate on. We must be careful not to waste this potential, but turn it into fruitful investments.

(Francesca Balzani, S&D, 20 September 2010)

The excerpt above from the S&D focuses on Turkey's demographic dynamics since the demography and economy of Turkey form two intertwined subjects in Turkey's accession process to the EU. Although Turkey is constructed as being "at odds with Europe" through formulating a binary division between the EU referred as "we" and Turkey in the sense of demography, the difference of Turkey is claimed to complement Europe, implied as having an elderly population, in order to "turn it into fruitful investments" – in other words, economic gains. Within this image, Turkey's necessity is underlined for Europe as the *topos* of "*pro bono publico*" – in other words, to the advantage of all – since its "completely different demographic dynamics" appear to contain a "great degree of reciprocal potential" (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 75). Furthermore, there is also the argumentation strategy of hasty generalization of Turkey with "completely different demographic dynamics" and the *topos* of reality as a tautological argumentation scheme by referring to Turkey as being "at odds with Europe" "from many points of view," which necessitates taking advantage of this potential rather than wasting it. Taking the basis from this perspective highlighting Turkey's economic importance, there are also MEPs connecting economic relations to improving political relations:

If we fail to overcome obstacles to mutual trade relations, we may yet lose Turkey, just as we lost Africa. We are slowly seeing signs that people are growing tired of the repeated postponement of the decision on Turkey's accession, and of ambiguous statements. Turkish society is losing interest in joining the European Union, as recent public opinion polls indicate. A full customs union could become a tool for establishing closer relations, and would create strong trade and economic ties, especially in view of the difficulty of defining a precise time frame for Turkey's accession to the European Union.

(Danuta Jazłowiecka, PPE, 20 September 2010)

As in the excerpt above from the PPE, some MEPs¹⁴³ from the right wing and center left differ in that they take their arguments about the importance of Turkish economic and bilateral trading relations a step further and thus link economic and trade relations with the political ones between the EU and Turkey. They discursively construct a representation of Turkey as an indispensable economy and trading partner, necessitating further political relations and even integration. In this regard, this excerpt utilizes the *topos* of threat of losing Turkey since Turkish society is portrayed as “losing interest in joining the European Union.” For this reason, “a full customs union” is suggested as “a tool for establishing closer relations” and in “defining a precise time frame for Turkey’s accession to the European Union” with interdiscursive references to the theory of political economy¹⁴⁴ because of sustaining the interrelationships between economic and political processes, which also provides a portrayal of Europe as a project intertwined with political and economic spheres. In addition, the fallacy of a false analogy is also detected since Africa as a continent is offered as analogous to Turkey as a candidate country to the EU despite the absence of a marked similarity between these two entities while “the repeated postponement of the decision on Turkey’s accession, and of ambiguous statements” is problematized with an explicit self-reflexivity on Europe because of its indecision about Turkey.

The economic development of Turkey over recent years has been truly remarkable, and its industry is becoming a significant partner of European firms in many areas. It is therefore important for these economic relations to be matched by corresponding political relations with the European Union, with a clear perspective on the future. If Turkey is genuinely interested in joining the EU, it cannot take steps such as those we have seen recently. I strongly support, for many reasons, the continuing process of Turkey’s approximation to the EU.

(Evžen Tošenovský, ECR, 8 March 2011)

¹⁴³ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Danuta Jazłowiecka from the PPE on 20 September 2010, Ioan Enciu from the S&D on 20 September 2010, Jaroslav Paška from the EFD on 20 September 2010, Evžen Tošenovský from the ECR on 8 March 2011, and Zdravka Bušić from the PPE on 12 March 2014.

¹⁴⁴ The term “political economy” was first introduced by the French writer and economist Antoine de Montchrestien in his book entitled *Traité de l'économie politique* (Treatise on Political Economy) in 1616 on how economics and politics are interrelated and entwined despite most studies on European political economy during the 1970s and early 1980s (Clark, 2016, p. 15; Hall, 1999, p. 138).

In the same line as the previous excerpt, the speech above from the ECR also focuses on developing EU-Turkey political relations since they are already mentioned as significant partners in terms of economic relations, which shows the intertwined and inseparable structure of economic and political relations for the EU. In this sense, the Turkish economy's performance is praised, and Turkey is regarded as an economic and industrial asset for Europe through the *topos* of usefulness in this extract, which accordingly necessitates "corresponding political relations with the European Union" and thus "the continuing process of Turkey's approximation to the EU" as interdiscursive references to the theory of political economy. Furthermore, Turkey is warned not to "take steps such as those we have seen recently" through the *topos* of threat and an implicit *argumentum ad baculum* as a logical fallacy of threatening with the stick of excluding Turkey from the EU membership. Additionally, the MEP also expresses his involvement in discourse through the words "I strongly support" and thus positions his point of view as a form of perspectivation in this speech.

In sum, Turkey is discursively constructed as being indispensable for the European political/economic project through underlining its economic and trading weight. As in the speeches above, a binary construction between the EU and Turkey is established because of different demographic structures, although this difference is used to complement Europe for economic gains through the *topoi* of "*pro bono publico*" and reality as well as the usage of the argumentation strategy of hasty generalization of Turkey. Moreover, the argument on the importance of the Turkish economy and bilateral trading relations is taken a step further in the extracts in order to interrelate economic and trade relations with the EU-Turkey political relations and even its accession process through some interdiscursive references to the theory of political economy, which sustains the image of Europe as a project with political and economic processes. For this aim, the *topoi* of threat and usefulness, the logical fallacies of a false analogy and *argumentum ad baculum*, an explicit self-reflexivity on Europe, and a form of perspectivation are utilized in these speeches. Within this positive image of the perception of Turkish identity in terms of the European political/economic project, there are some divided discourses of MEPs from Italy¹⁴⁵ regarding the effect of Turkey's different

¹⁴⁵ See the parliamentary speeches of Francesca Balzani from the S&D on 20 September 2010 and Roberto Fiore from the NI on 5 May 2009.

demographic dynamics on Europe. Moreover, some MEPs from the PPE/EPP-ED/EPP¹⁴⁶, the EFD / EFDD¹⁴⁷, and Poland¹⁴⁸ have entirely different opinions on furthering economic and trade relations between the EU and Turkey with the political relations.

4.4.2 Turkey as Incompatible with the European Political/Economic Project

The representation of Turkey as being incompatible with the European political/economic project is widely observed in the discourses of MEPs, especially from the center-right, far-right, conservative, and nonattached ones with the increasing problems in EU-Turkey relations within the period known as “Turkey’s de-Europeanization,” which is more dominant than the positive representation above as in the other negative images of Turkey. Within this exclusive understanding of the European identity, there are two other subimages of Turkey: “the representation of Turkey as an economic burden on the EU budget” and “the representation of Turkey only within economic and trade relations, excluding its political integration to the EU.”

Nevertheless, it should also be added that there are also MEPs who discursively stress Turkey as a nation-state in contrast to the pooled sovereignty in the EU¹⁴⁹, the potential Turkish accession as a threat to the nature of the EU project in terms of driving it towards undesired political integration¹⁵⁰, Turkey as a demographic threat to the balance in the EU institutions¹⁵¹, the capacity of the EU to absorb and integrate Turkey¹⁵² and the threat of Turkish migrations¹⁵³ to the EU, and especially the UK, with Turkish accession as frequently utilized during the Brexit campaigns within the image of Turkey

¹⁴⁶ See the parliamentary speeches of Renate Sommer from the PPE on 17 April 2013, Danuta Jazłowiecka from the PPE on 20 September 2010, and Zdravka Bušić from the PPE on 12 March 2014.

¹⁴⁷ See the parliamentary speeches of William (the Earl of) Dartmouth from the EFD on 17 April 2013, Zbigniew Ziobro from the EFD on 28 March 2012, Nikolaos Salavrakos from the EFD on 11 March 2014, William (the Earl of) Dartmouth from the EFDD on 20 May 2015, and Jaroslav Paška from the EFD on 20 September 2010.

¹⁴⁸ The parliamentary speeches of Zbigniew Ziobro from the EFD on 28 March 2012 and Danuta Jazłowiecka from the PPE on 20 September 2010.

¹⁴⁹ See the parliamentary speech of Jacques Toubon from the PPE-DE on 21 May 2008.

¹⁵⁰ See the parliamentary speech of Geoffrey Van Orden from the ECR on 10 February 2010.

¹⁵¹ See the parliamentary speech of Lorenzo Fontana from the EFD on 10 February 2010.

¹⁵² See the parliamentary speeches of Jan Tadeusz Masiel from the UEN on 23 April 2007, Ioannis Kasoulides from the PPE on 10 February 2010, Elmar Brok from the PPE on 8 March 2011, and Nigel Farage from the EFDD on 2 December 2015.

¹⁵³ See the parliamentary speeches of Gerard Batten from the IND/DEM on 24 October 2007, William (the Earl of) Dartmouth from the EFD on 6 February 2013, William (the Earl of) Dartmouth from the EFD on 17 April 2013, James Carver from the EFDD on 17 December 2014, William (the Earl of) Dartmouth from the EFD on 11 March 2014, Jonathan Arnott from the EFDD on 10 June 2015, and Marcel de Graaff from the ENF on 2 December 2015.

as being incompatible with the European political/economic project. As the discursive continuity, this representation is also in the same line as the image of Turkey as a potential threat to the European political project revealed by Aydın-Düzgit (2012, pp. 100–103) and the image of Turkey as a populous country studied by Türkeş-Kılıç (2019, pp. 40–44) in the 1997–2007 period while Diez (2004, p. 328) also points out that Turkey is a challenge against the European project because of its ambiguous representation in relation to Europe.

4.4.2.1 Turkey as an Economic Burden on the EU Budget

The representation of Turkey as an economic burden on the EU budget is increasingly apparent in the EP¹⁵⁴, especially among the discourses of the center right under the EPP-ED/EPP/PPE, the far right under the EFD/EFDD and the UEN and nonattached members of the Parliament considering the predicational and referential strategies utilized in the discussions of the EP on Turkey's economy. In this regard, the pre-accession assistance (IPA) to Turkey also frequently becomes the subject of debate, which accordingly has already damaged the budget of the EU, although Turkey does not fit into this project. While this representation is also observed within the 1997–2007 period, the difference with the 2007–2015 term is that this representation is highlighted more frequently and in an increasingly harsher tone, including even suggestions on economic sanctions against Turkey¹⁵⁵ with some interdiscursive references to hard-power strategies. In this context, there are MEPs who underline how the economic burden, which

¹⁵⁴ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Jan Tadeusz Masiel from the UEN on 23 April 2007, Markus Pieper from the PPE-DE on 23 April 2007, Valdis Dombrovskis from the PPE-DE on 23 April 2007, Antonio De Blasio from the PPE-DE on 23 April 2007, Jan Tadeusz Masiel from the UEN on 23 April 2007, Jim Allister from the NI on 24 October 2007, Markus Pieper from the PPE-DE on 12 February 2007, Jim Allister from the NI on 11 March 2009, Ioannis Kasoulides from the PPE on 10 February 2010, Robert Dušek from the S&D on 10 February 2010, Franz Obermayr from the NI on 20 January 2010, Peter van Dalen from the ECR on 8 March 2011, Franz Obermayr from the NI on 21 November 2012, Andreas Mölzer from the NI on 28 March 2012, Lorenzo Fontana from the EFD on 28 March 2012, Gerard Batten from the EFD on 17 April 2013, William (the Earl of) Dartmouth from the EFD on 17 April 2013, Franz Obermayr from the NI on 12 June 2013, Franz Obermayr from the NI on 17 April 2013, Markus Pieper from the PPE on 18 April 2013, Ewald Stadler from the NI on 18 April 2013, Nikolaos Salavrakos from the EFD on 11 March 2014, Eleni Theocharous from the PPE on 17 December 2014, Matteo Salvini from the NI on 17 December 2014, Kristina Winberg from the EFDD on 17 December 2014, Matteo Salvini from the NI on 17 December 2014, Charles Tannock from the ECR on 17 December 2014, Harald Vilimsky from the ENF on 2 December 2015, Franz Obermayr from the NI on 20 May 2015, and Dominique Bilde from the NI on 20 May 2015.

¹⁵⁵ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Antigoni Papadopoulou from the S&D on 28 March 2012, Charles Tannock from the ECR on 17 December 2014, Charles Tannock from the ECR on 7 October 2015, and Ignazio Corrao from the EFDD on 17 December 2014.

Turkey creates, on the EU will become inextricably linked with its membership, as seen in the excerpt below:

In a complete contrast with how things were in Western Europe 20 years ago, public budgets are currently very volatile, and we are being faced with new challenges, in the shape of the Western Balkans and – most especially – of Turkey. Never before has a country of Turkey's size, starting out from such a weak economic position and with such flagrant internal disparities, been integrated into the European Union. You see, then, that structural policy faces enormous challenges on account of the things it has to do and the condition under which it has to do them, while new Member States present it with growing financial need.

(Markus Pieper, PPE-DE, 23 April 2007)

The extract above from the PPE-DE explicitly compares “western Europe 20 years ago” with that of the present day on the one hand, and Turkey with other accession countries on the other, within the predicational strategies as a persuasive action and a rhetorical technique. In this regard, Turkey's EU accession process is marginalized by separating Turkey from all other countries through the phrase “never before has a country of Turkey's size.” Through the *topoi* of finances, comparison, threat, and burdening in discussing the negative consequences of Turkish accession to the EU, the “enormous challenges” foreseen in the structural policy that Turkey causes with its “size,” “weak economic position,” and “flagrant internal disparities” are highlighted. In other words, Turkey is described as an extra economic burden on the EU because of its economic backwardness, while the economic dimension of the EU is already portrayed as being in difficulty through the phrases “currently very volatile,” “being faced with new challenges,” and “growing financial need” demanded by the new member states, which is presented as a profound challenge to the EU as an economic project. In this regard, various comparisons are also made in the EP in order to illustrate the effect of the Turkish accession on the EU budget even by giving the percentage of the decrease in the GDP per capita of the EU with its membership to the EU:

[...]I am afraid that in the current crisis situation with the Common Agricultural Policy and, by implication, the European budget, we cannot permit an expansion involving a country in which 7 million of the inhabitants rely on agriculture for their livelihood (in the EU, the figure is 10.4 million). For the purposes of comparison: under current conditions, the expenditure for Turkey up to 2025 would be around EUR 10 billion, while for all 10 of the new Member States in the ‘eastern expansion’ it would be up to EUR 8 billion. Direct payments to Turkish farmers and payments for rural development and market support would, under the current legislative arrangements, spell doom for European agriculture and farmers. In view of the enormous size, number of inhabitants and economic situation of this candidate country, the accession of Turkey to the EU would impose an enormous burden on the budget together with a 9% decline in per capita GDP for the EU.

(Robert Dušek, S&D, 10 February 2010)

In the speech from the S&D, it is implied through the *topoi* of comparison and numbers to increase credibility that in the event of a current crisis with the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), Turkey's agricultural population, mentioned as almost equal to Europe's total agricultural population, will harm the CAP and thus the European integration upon its EU membership. In this context, Turkey is also compared with 10 new member states in the eastern enlargement through the *topoi* of finances and burden, and the expenditure burden that Turkey will cause is estimated to be very close to the sum of these countries. In this sense, the metaphor of “doom” as a negatively connoted stigma word is associated with “direct payments to Turkish farmers and payments for rural development and market support” for the damage that will be caused to European agriculture and farmers. It is stated that Turkey will be a burden not only on the CAP but also on the EU budget with a 9% decrease in the GDP per capita of the EU with its accession to the EU, which shows the *topos* of threat in the speech. Therefore, the *topoi* of comparison, numbers, threat, burdening, and finances appear in the excerpt above with the representation of Turkey as a financial burden on the EU budget, which endangers the economic and political cohesion of Europe. In this respect, there are also other speeches underlining the damage that Turkey will cause to the GDP of the EU with its accession and resorting to comparisons as follows:

The European Council's decision of April 2006 states that with regard to the accession of new Member States, the European Union must be in a position to maintain the momentum of

European integration. The report presently before us clearly shows that the Union is not ready for the accession of Turkey, for budgetary reasons also. I shall leave aside today the problem of culture shock and European citizens' reluctance. Turkey's accession would decrease the Union's GDP by 10.5% per capita. The Union is not capable of absorbing that. From an economic point of view, it would be easier for us to take in the whole of the Western Balkans, Ukraine and Belarus at once rather than to accept Turkey.

(Jan Tadeusz Masiel, UEN, 23 April 2007)

The excerpt from the UEN shows self-reflection on Europe by stating that the EU prioritizes focusing on its own integration before new memberships and that the budget is not ready for a new member, without attributing to the problems originating from Turkey, which underlines the importance of both political integration and the economic dimension in the EU project first. Nevertheless, the extract continues by highlighting the alleged harm that Turkey will cause to the GDP of the EU by positioning its economic problems as a priority over cultural problems and the opinions of European citizens. In order to show the extent of this damage and to increase the credibility of the argument, "the whole of the western Balkans, Ukraine, and Belarus" as a group of countries and Turkey are compared in terms of absorption within the economic terms, which is based on the fallacy of false analogy in order to persuade listeners because of the unequal comparison. Therefore, the *topoi* of finances, threat, and burdening through references to Turkey's budgetary impact on the EU are emphasized, which thus implicitly makes the importance of the economic dimension of the EU project more prominent in this speech. Emphasizing this dimension of the EU project, it is also possible to see some examples of MEP discourses against Turkey's EU membership that would be used during the Brexit period:

Madam President, I have never supported the admission of non-European Turkey into the EU, but the current economic downturn makes me more convinced than ever of that view. As a huge net contributor, the United Kingdom carries a disproportionate burden in funding the EU so, when it comes to the massive additional cost of enlargement to include Turkey, we would be burdened beyond what we could bear. With a reduced tax base, falling income and increased welfare outlay, and a crippling debt legacy in the future decades arising from the mismanagement of the Labour Government, we cannot go on taking out our diminishing

cheque book to pay for Turkish enlargement. Call that narrow, mercenary national interest if you will, but to me it is inescapable common and fiscal sense.

(Jim Allister, NI, 11 March 2009)

As the last extract of this section, the above speech begins with the perspectivation, in which he clearly expresses and positions his distance on the subject through the words “I have never supported.” In this excerpt, there is also the indirect way of prioritizing national interests over the EU, which is observed in many speeches, especially from the Greek and Cypriot members of the EP. When the arguments such as “a disproportionate burden in funding the EU” in this speech are examined, it is seen that an implicit interdiscursivity is established with the Eurosceptic discourses conducted during the official leave campaign for the Brexit referendum¹⁵⁶ (Zappettini, 2019, p. 410). In other words, it can be claimed that the discourses of the campaign, which emerged in 2016, were already in use long ago in the EP. In this context, it is implied that the UK carries the economic burden that the EU has already created and Turkey will possibly cause with its EU membership. It is seen that through personification, the UK is indirectly likened to a trader whose economic power, cited through the “checkbook” metaphor, is gradually decreasing with the threat of “a reduced tax base, falling income, and increased welfare outlay, and a crippling debt legacy” in the future. Therefore, the *topoi* of finances and threat are employed. The excerpt is finalized by giving a personal opinion on this subject as perspectivation again to show the speaker's determination and perseverance despite the possible criticism of calling it as “narrow, mercenary national interest” evidently represented to the listeners.

In brief, the discursive construction of Turkey as an economic burden on the EU budget is composed through the *topoi* of comparison, threat, finance, and burden, as seen frequently in the excerpts above. In this context, it is seen that the comparison is mainly made with the new member states, the EU's Eastern Partnership, or other candidate countries such as all 10 of the new member states in the eastern expansion, the whole of the western Balkans, Ukraine, and Belarus. In debating the negative consequences of Turkish accession to the EU, these *topoi* are sustained through terms such as “enormous

¹⁵⁶ In this regard, there are discourses of the Leave campaign in the Brexit referendum in 2016 that focus on strategies of delegitimation of the EU through representing Britain's economic power as restrained and controlled by the EU, which accordingly necessitates freeing Britain from the EU (Zappettini, 2019, p.410).

challenges” because of Turkey's weak economic position, the enormous burden that Turkey can cause on the EU budget, along with a 9% decline in per capita GDP for the EU, a decrease in the Union's GDP by 10.5% per capita, and the enormous additional cost of enlargement to involve Turkey. In other words, Turkey is predicated as a massive economic burden on the EU budget along with an alleged decline of around 10% in per capita GDP upon its accession to the EU. In this respect, it is also associated with a weak economic position, flagrant internal disparities, enormous size, and a large number of inhabitants, which implicitly emphasizes the economic dimension of the EU project. Moreover, usages of perspectivation within the strategies of self- and other presentation, an interdiscursivity with the Eurosceptic discourses conducted during the Brexit campaign, the prioritization of national interests over the EU, and personification are also observed in the extracts above.

4.4.2.2 Turkey only within Economic and Trade Relations Excluding its Political Integration to the EU

The representation of Turkey only within economic and trade relations, excluding its political integration into the EU, is prevalent in the EP, especially among right-wing groups¹⁵⁷, including the EPP-ED/EPP/PPE, the ECR, the EFD/ EFDD, and the nonattached members of the EP. Within this image, the cooperation with Turkey is discursively limited to trade and economic relations, such as the Customs Union. At the same time, its political integration leading Turkey to EU membership is explicitly rejected in some MEP discourses considering the course of Turkey in this period during which the EU struggled with economic and political crises, Turkey de-Europeanizes, and EU-Turkey relations are under the effect of these turbulences. In other words, in this image of Turkey, its relations with the EU are evidently confined to economic and commercial relations, while its political integration with the EU and thus its potential EU membership is quite firmly opposed. Within this representation, the EU project's primary economic and political duties towards its members are also implicitly underlined, while even EU

¹⁵⁷ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of William (the Earl of) Dartmouth from the EFD on 20 September 2010, Laurence J.A.J. Stassen from the NI on 20 September 2010, Zbigniew Ziobro from the EFD on 28 March 2012, Laurence J.A.J. Stassen from the NI on 17 April 2013, Renate Sommer from the PPE on 17 April 2013, Andreas Mölzer from the NI on 12 June 2013, William (the Earl of) Dartmouth from the EFD on 17 April 2013, Nikolaos Salavrakos from the EFD on 11 March 2014, Morten Messerschmidt from the ECR on 17 December 2014, Nikolaos Salavrakos from the EFD on 11 March 2014, and William (the Earl of) Dartmouth from the EFDD on 20 May 2015.

institutions, such as the EC, are also the target of criticism from MEPs in the matter of examining Turkey's candidacy criteria:

Mr President, the report seems to question, at least in part, the criteria for Turkey's candidacy, as indeed have other colleagues. I agree. As there are profound question marks over Turkey's candidacy, the logic is that pre-accession funding to Turkey, which will total EUR 4.8 billion for the period 2007-2013, should cease forthwith. Turkey is already in the EU's Customs Union. In consequence, EU Members, including the UK, are already getting all the benefits from trade with Turkey that we reasonably can. Turkey is also a member of NATO, which means that certain Members are in a military alliance with Turkey. The fact of the matter is that we do not need Turkey to be in a political union.

(William (The Earl of) Dartmouth, EFD, 17 April 2013)

In the excerpt from the EFD above, it is stated that the parliamentarians question Turkey's candidacy while criticizing the EC indirectly over its report through the adverbial phrases "at least in part" and "indeed" as direct micro-mitigation to mitigate the illocutionary force of the criticism against the EC. Furthermore, the assertion with "the logic" instead of the directive with "you" as an indirect micro-mitigation and a *non sequitur*¹⁵⁸ fallacy in which "profound question marks over Turkey's candidacy" are regarded as proof enough to cease "pre-accession funding to Turkey" immediately are observed in this speech. Moreover, with the usage of the *topos* of the advantage to/for us known as *topos pro bono nobis*, Turkey's existence in the Customs Union and NATO is regarded as "all the benefits from trade" and being "in a military alliance with Turkey" of which the EU member states can take advantage. Nevertheless, Turkey is excluded from being "in a political union" presented as "the fact of the matter" in which the *topos* of reality as a tautological argumentation scheme is found. Therefore, Turkey is positioned as a trading and military partner in this extract, although it is not included in the EU's political union, which discursively constructs Europe as both an economic and a political union. In this regard, Turkey's exclusion from this union is also indicated through blocking its further integration with the EU as stated below:

¹⁵⁸ Within this argumentation strategy, the connection is false because of not following from the arguments although tying arguments to a conclusion can be correct (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 74).

The Union and Turkey must remain economic partners, and for this reason we should aim to facilitate trade between EU Member States and Turkey and to construct joint infrastructure projects such as the Nabucco oil pipeline, for example, but they should remain separate legal entities without the possibility – or any need – for further integration.

(Zbigniew Ziobro, EFD, 28 March 2012)

The speech from the EFD above draws a precise line between the EU-Turkey economic partnerships and “further integration.” This line is portrayed so firmly that it rejects any need for, or possibility of, this integration. The usage of “integration” as a nominalization and a flag word refers to the EU as a bounded area into which Turkey can be brought from the outside, which is quite clearly rejected here. In this regard, it is expressed that the relationship between the EU and Turkey, predicated as “separate legal entities,” should be limited only to the economic field exemplified by “the Nabucco oil pipeline,” and this restriction should continue in the form of keeping Turkey out of “further integration” with the EU – in other words, its accession to the EU. As a result of this, Turkey is implicitly characterized as an outsider whose further integration with the EU is impossible, and thus it is excluded from EU membership.

Turkey moves further and further away from the EU. Turkey does not belong in the EU! Therefore, there is reason to look at alternatives, stop the accession negotiations on membership and focus on what is actually technical cooperation: Free trade cooperation as well as joint technical collaborations on trade, environment, exchange students, what do I know! But membership - it's obvious to everyone - it's completely unrealistic!

(Morten Messerschmidt, ECR, 17 December 2014)

It is implied in the extract from the ECR above that only Turkey is entirely responsible for its gradual distancing from the EU, and thus the EU cannot be charged at all in this regard. This utterance is applied through direct micro-mitigation with the lexical repeated adverb of “further” and the personification of Turkey within the referential strategies as if it is moving away from the EU just as if it has a human body. In this regard,

Turkey's potential membership of the EU is rejected on a culturalist-essentialist basis because of the usage of “belong,” meaning the inherent, given, and essential characteristics of Turkey that are unsuitable for the EU. With the *non-sequitur* fallacy, it is mentioned here by basing on these arguments or showing them as “reason” that the political integration process in the EU-Turkey relationship should be wholly disengaged, while the educational and, more importantly, economic interactions should be kept active. Under these circumstances, and accordingly “obvious to everyone” through hasty generalization, Turkey's membership is evaluated as “completely unrealistic” as an attribute for the construction of Turkey’s exclusion from the EU.

The Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) regards free trade as something to be welcomed, and we support the proposals for removing technical barriers to trade and bureaucratic obstacles. Free trade benefits all of us, both Turkey and the countries of Europe. At the same time, let it be clear that cooperation with Turkey is to be confined to trade relations. The PVV opposes the accession of the country to the European Union. Europe can do business with the whole world, with countries such as the United States, Israel and Japan, but that does not mean that these countries should also become members of the European Union. Free trade with Turkey is by no means to be regarded as a stepping stone to Turkish membership of the EU. The PVV has no objections whatsoever to Turkey being a trading partner of the European Union, but categorically rejects far-reaching European integration and Turkey’s membership of the EU.

(Laurence J.A.J. Stassen, NI, 20 September 2010)

The *topos* of “*pro bono publico*” – in other words, to the advantage of all – is exemplified in the above speech from the NI supporting the trade relations while explicitly restricting the EU's cooperation with Turkey to these relations in order to draw the imaginary boundaries of EU-Turkey relations. As the particularizing synecdoche in the form of a part standing for the whole, in other words, *pars pro toto* within the referential strategies, the parliamentarian who speaks on behalf of her party through expressions such as “the PVV opposes...” and “the PVV has no...” aims to construct a positive self-presentation through discursively constructing an image serving the EU’s commercial interests. The sentence “the PVV has no objections whatsoever to Turkey being a trading partner of the European Union, but...” as the “*apparent denials*” within the mitigation strategies against the derogatory or discriminatory discourses also

contributes to this aim. Within this context, in order to strengthen the discourse by showing that it is a party discourse, the “we” pronoun within the referential strategies is also utilized to show its ingroup, the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV)¹⁵⁹, which is frequently highlighted in this extract.

In this speech, the argumentation strategy of hasty generalization is utilized to represent free trade as helping Turkey to make progress towards its accession to the EU, while an analogy between free trade with Turkey and a stepping stone is drawn as an illustrative example in this argumentation. In the meantime, a hyperbolic construction of reality is also obvious since there are only seven states that are candidates or potential candidates for the EU among 78 countries that have Customs Unions, Free Trade Agreements, Economic Partnership Agreements, and others as different types of EU trade agreements¹⁶⁰. In this regard, based on the logical fallacy of a false analogy, the countries of the United States, Israel, and Japan are offered as being analogous to Turkey in terms of doing business despite the absence of a marked similarity between these countries and Turkey in terms of their relations with the EU, and especially being a candidate country negotiating its accession to the EU. Therefore, Turkey's exclusion from “far-reaching European integration” and, to be more precise, “Turkey's membership of the EU” is justified.

In sum, MEP discourses that construct Europe as a political/economic project by representing Turkey only within economic and trade relations, excluding its political integration into the EU, are analyzed in this section. In this regard, different forms of mitigation strategies such as the “*apparent denials*” and the direct micro-mitigations against the illocutionary force of the criticism are prominent. Furthermore, within the framework of argumentation strategies, the logical fallacies of *non-sequitur*, hasty generalization, and a false analogy, an analogy between free trade with Turkey and a

¹⁵⁹ Founded in 2006, the PVV, under the domination of Geert Wilders, is an exceptional party whose ideological category causes a national debate in the Netherlands and abroad because of Wilders' specific ideological development while it increasingly becomes influential with its members in the national parliament in the Netherlands, municipal and provincial councils, and the EP (Vossen, 2011, pp. 179–180). This specific ideological development is firmly based on “the need to protect Western liberal values against Islam” as Wilders' specific version of national populism, which is even regarded as a new promising ideological tendency for national populist parties and movements in Europe and the USA (Vossen, 2011, p. 180).

¹⁶⁰ On the official websites of the European Commission, the candidates, potential candidates, and EU trade agreements can be checked (European Commission, 2021b; European Commission, 2022a; European Commission, 2022b; European Commission, 2022c; European Commission, 2022d; European Commission, 2022e; European Commission, 2022f and European Commission, 2022g).

stepping stone and the *topoi* of the advantage of us, the advantage of all, and reality to draw the imaginary boundaries of EU-Turkey relations are utilized for this discursive construction of Turkey. Predicational strategies are realized in these extracts through a hyperbolic construction of reality and an attribute for the construction of Turkey's exclusion from the EU. Referential strategies are attained through the personification of Turkey, the particularizing synecdoche in the form of a part standing for the whole and the "we" pronoun to show the ingroup solidarity. Therefore, it is aimed to justify the discursive limitation of EU-Turkey relations within trade and economic relations by rejecting any possibility of further integration, including the political one leading Turkey towards EU membership, which is accordingly because of its gradual distancing from the Union.

Overall, there is both convergence and divergence in terms of the 1997–2007 period findings for the representation of Turkish identity and, in turn, European identity in this section. On the one hand, the representation of Europe as a political project converges with the findings of Aydın-Düzgüt (2012, pp. 99–130) and Levin (2011, p. 202) in the 1997–2007 period, although the addition of the economic dimension to this, ending up with the image of Europe as a political/economic project, shows a divergence from this period. On the other hand, the image of Turkey as being indispensable for the European political/economic project also converges with the studies of Aydın-Düzgüt (2012, pp. 110–112) and Lindgaard et al. (2018, p. 2) in this period. Nevertheless, the representations under the image of Turkey as incompatible with the European political/economic project include both convergence and divergence. The representation of Turkey as an economic burden on the EU budget converges with the analyses of Aydın-Düzgüt (2012, pp. 100–103) and Türkeş-Kılıç (2019, pp. 40–44) even though the representation of Turkey only within economic and trade relations, excluding its political integration into the EU, diverges from this period because of this new predication supported by the right wing in the EP in the 2007–2015 period. In this negative context for the perception of Turkish identity, discourses of MEPs from the EFD¹⁶¹ on the Turkish

¹⁶¹ See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of William (the Earl of) Dartmouth from the EFD on 20 September 2010, Nikolaos Salavrakos from the EFD on 28 March 2012, Matteo Salvini from the EFD on 17 April 2013, Bastiaan Belder from the EFD on 12 June 2013, Gerard Batten from the EFD on 17 April 2013, James Carver from the EFDD on 17 December 2014, and Nikolaos Salavrakos from the EFD on 11 March 2014.

economy and from the ECR¹⁶² on furthering relations with Turkey, including political integration, are detected as being divided.

¹⁶² See, for example, the parliamentary speeches of Evžen Tošenovský from the ECR on 8 March 2011 and Morten Messerschmidt from the ECR on 17 December 2014.

CONCLUSION

As in the Greek philosopher Heraclitus's doctrine of flux¹⁶³, the world is constantly and unavoidably changing, and so are people, their discourses, and, in turn, their perceptions. People's perceptions are changed and affected by many factors, such as beliefs, values, traditions, history, culture, economy, age, gender, and others, which are all meaningful within their contexts. While speaking about the same subjects, understanding and perceiving them might differ due to various factors. These perceptions construct a more inclusive or exclusive vision of the self and other identities. In the same vein, the role of perceptions in understanding and interacting with the self and other identities affecting politics and political legitimacy in the EU is undeniable, which affects the responses to the European project and thus the idea of a socially and culturally coherent Europe, especially during times of diverse crises, such as the COVID-19 epidemic, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and their impact on post-crisis European cohesion.

In this regard, this study is firstly based on revealing Turkish and then European identities with the impact of the conjuncture between 2007 and 2015, the period

¹⁶³ For further explanation of this doctrine, see the study of Emlyn-Jones (1976, p.89).

coinciding with Turkey's de-Europeanization process, on the perception of Turkish identity in the EP, and secondly, disclosing the changes in the articulations of MEPs on Turkish identity compared to those during its Europeanization process between 1997 and 2007. In other words, it covers a period of 10 years as the literature review part in this field and a period of nine years for the analysis of the discourses of MEPs on Turkey via the DHA, which equals a total of 19 years in the context of comparing the perception of Turkish identity in the EP during the Europeanization period in Turkey with its de-Europeanization period. Based on the theoretical assumptions of social constructivism and the methodological framework of the DHA, various Turkish and, in turn, European identities, which are transformed and added within the de-Europeanization process of Turkey, are revealed in this study.

In this context, the main research question of this thesis was: How was the discourse on Turkey articulated in the EP between 2007-2015 in an attempt to support or reject Turkey's EU accession similar to or different from the EP's discursive constructions of Turkish identity in the 1997-2007 period? The sub-questions were: What kind of discourses on Turkey and, thus, Europe did the EP construct through the discourses on Turkey in the period between 2007 and 2015? Meanwhile, what kind of discourse topics, *topoi*, discursive strategies, fallacies, interdiscursivities, intertextualities, and other linguistic devices did MEPs employ for these discourses in the EP in the 2007-2015 period? What were the characteristics of the EP discourses on Turkey in this term? To what extent did MEPs' articulations of Turkish and, in turn, European identity in this period diverge from or converge with those in the 1997-2007 period?

The analysis has been organized around the discourse topics, in which discursive strategies and the linguistic means used in the aforementioned discourse topics are presented through selected excerpts from the EP debates. This structure of the analysis has been strengthened with additional categories to the analysis, comprising 12 tables for each year and 108 tables in total. Primary events that have happened and are referred to in the debates, the EP groups, and countries of the relevant MEP as the speaker, representations of Turkey and resulting representations of Europe, intertextuality/interdiscursivity, and fallacies are some of these additions. Divergence within the EP groups and countries, comparison to the 1997–2007 period, and general evaluation have also been categorized. In terms of its contribution, this study fills a gap in the academic research on how Turkey's de-Europeanization compared to its Europeanization period is perceived in the EP and on how this perception of MEPs affects

the articulations of the Turkish identity and, in turn, the European identity. The thesis also includes comparisons of these periods and other studies in previous years, which makes it different, innovative, and complementary to previous studies.

The historical background and the literature review on the perception of Turkish identity in the EP are presented in three subtitles divided into three periods, before 1997, between 1997 and 2007, and after 2007, by giving the definitions of Europeanization, EU-ization, and de-Europeanization as intertwined periods that Turkey has gone through. The events until 1997, which were full of ups and downs, caused the construction of not only the alive, *sui generis*, and dynamic but also the sensitive and conflictual nature of EU-Turkey relations. The reflections of these ups and downs on the European perception of Turkish identity resulted in three outstanding images of Turkey discursively constructed based on two competing understandings of Europe based on an examination of the EP debates until 1997. While the fact that the issue of Turkish accession raises the question of European identity is underlined, three representations of Turkey, namely Turkey as a dangerous other, as a threat, and as a troublesome student within the scope of inclusive and exclusive understandings of Europe, are identified from MEPs' narratives on Turkey in the EP. During the 1997–2007 period in which the EU had to carry out both deepening and enlargement, it was in the research of identity and transformation that this period unarguably became the most productive period for EU-Turkey relations and the Turkish accession process despite the opposition to the Turkish bid to join the EU. In this context, the representations of Turkey and, in turn, Europe in the EP are considerably diversified with the increasing number of EP debates on Turkey and domestic developments in Turkey, especially after its candidate status in 1999 and the opening of its accession negotiations in 2005.

Table 6

**Discourse Topics as a Result of the DHA Analysis of the EP Discourses on Turkey
Between 2007 and 2015**

Turkey	Europe
<p><u>(+) ¹⁶⁴ Turkey as a Strategic Partner in the Region</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Turkey as a Bridge Between Civilizations 2. Turkey as a Model for the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern Countries 3. Turkey as an Alternative Route for European Energy Security 4. Turkey as a Host for Refugees <p><u>(-) Turkey as a Security Threat in the Region</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Turkey whose Foreign Policy May Be Incompatible with the EU 2. Turkey as a Frontline State to the Conflictual Regions 	<p>European Security Community</p>
<p><u>(+) Turkey in a Difficult Process of Democratic Transformation</u></p> <p><u>(-) Turkey as Increasingly Turning Away from European Norms and Values</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Turkey as a Violator of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms with Pseudo-Reforms 2. Turkey as an Undemocratic and Authoritarian State Governed by Erdoğan 3. Turkey as an Occupier in Cyprus as an EU Member State 4. Turkey as a Reluctant Neighbor Far from Normalizing Relations 	<p>European Democratic Values</p>
<p><u>(+) Turkey as Having a Place in Multireligious and Multicultural Europe</u></p> <p><u>(-) Turkey as a Non-European Threat to European Cultural Structure with its Islamization Agenda</u></p>	<p>European Cultural Space</p>
<p><u>(+) Turkey as Indispensable for the European Political/Economic Project</u></p>	<p>European Political / Economic Project</p>

¹⁶⁴ The signs of (+) and (-) in this table stand for two competing European self-images, i.e., inclusive and exclusive understandings of European identity according to Levin's examination of the images of Turkey in the EU. While the sign of (+) represents the inclusive understanding of European identity, the (-) sign signifies the exclusive one (Levin, 2011, pp. 4–6).

<p><u>(-) Turkey as Incompatible with the European Political/Economic Project</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Turkey as an Economic Burden on the EU Budget 2. Turkey only within Economic and Trade Relations Excluding its Political Integration to the EU 	
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In terms of the findings of this analysis, abundant and varied results have been uncovered. Grounded on the fact that Turkey is one of the primary cases in examining diverse discursive constructions of European identity, the empirical analysis part identifies the discourse topics divided into macro-topics and related subtopics under which different representations of the Turkish identity are discursively constructed in the discourses of MEPs, as in the table above. Therefore, various patterns of Europe, i.e., the European security community, European democratic values, European cultural space, and European political/economic project, are disclosed. Within the image of the European security community, the constructions of Turkey as a strategic partner and a security threat in the region have been elaborated. In terms of the European democratic values, images of Turkey in a difficult process of democratic transformation and Turkey as increasingly turning away from European norms and values are addressed.

The constructions of Turkey as having a place in a multireligious and multicultural Europe and Turkey as a non-European threat to the European cultural structure with its Islamization agenda are revealed within the representation of the European cultural space. Finally, in the scope of the European political/economic project, the discursive construction of Turkey as being indispensable for the European political/economic project and Turkey as being incompatible with the European political/economic project are explained. In this framework drawn for Turkish identity, it should be noted that there are some additional positive or negative subgroups. The following table categorizes these representations of Turkish and, in turn, European identities concerning image types: continuing images from 1997 to 2007, new images emerging in the 2007–2015 period, and images undergoing some changes and additions in the 2007–2015 period:

Table 7

Representations of Turkish and European Identities Concerning Image Types

<i>IMAGE TYPES</i>	Representation of Turkish Identity	Representation of European Identity
<i>Continuing Images from 1997-2007</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Turkey as a Bridge Between Civilizations - Turkey as a Frontline State to the Conflictual Regions - Turkey in a Difficult Process of Democratic Transformation - Turkey as a Violator of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms with Pseudo-Reforms - Turkey as an Occupier in Cyprus as an EU Member State - Turkey as a Reluctant Neighbor Far from Normalizing Relations - Turkey as an Undemocratic and Authoritarian State Governed by Erdoğan - Turkey as Having a Place in a Multireligious and Multicultural Europe 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * European Security Community * European Democratic Values * European Cultural Space
<i>New Images Emerging in the 2007-2015 Period</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Turkey as a Model for the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern Countries - Turkey as an Alternative Route for European Energy Security - Turkey as a Host for Refugees - Turkey whose Foreign Policy May Be Incompatible with the EU - Turkey only within Economic and Trade Relations Excluding its Political Integration to the EU 	
<i>Images Undergoing Some Changes and Additions in the 2007-2015 Period</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Turkey as a Non-European Threat to European Cultural Structure with its Islamization Agenda - Turkey as an Economic Burden on the EU Budget 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * European Political/Economic Project

The analysis, comparing MEPs' discourses in the 1997–2007 period with those in the 2007–2015 period, discloses the representations of Turkish and, in turn, European identity, which can be evaluated in three different groups as in the table above. In this

table, it can be seen that the discourses during Turkey's Europeanization process continue to a significant extent, as well as the addition of new Turkish images in the 2007–2015 period, and changes and additions to some images from the previous period. Although more than half of the discourses seem to continue from the previous period, it is clear that the problems brought by the conjuncture bring new responsibilities to Turkey and thus to the Turkish identity. These responsibilities can be listed as becoming a model for the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries, being an alternative route for European energy security, and hosting refugees, while the effect of the de-Europeanization process of Turkey is also apparently revealed within the images of Turkey, whose foreign policy may be incompatible with the EU, Turkey as an undemocratic and authoritarian state governed by Erdoğan, and Turkey only within economic and trade relations excluding its political integration into the EU. This shows that changes in conjuncture, especially with crises, can bring an identity closer or further away depending on the position of the other identity, although some given features in the identity, such as religion, history, culture, and geography, discursively still hold their weight on the perception.

In this respect, there are also images undergoing some changes and additions in the 2007–2015 period, namely those of Turkey as a non-European threat to the European cultural structure with its Islamization agenda and Turkey as an economic burden on the EU budget. The change in the image of Turkey as a non-European threat is the particular emphasis on Islam and, in turn, Islamization constructed as an existential threat to European culture through Turkey as a result of rising populism in Europe in the 2007–2015 period, while excluding Turkey with arguments based on history, geography, and religion as in the 1997–2007 period is still valid within this representation. In this regard, the endangering of secularism in Turkey, because of Islam being described as nonsecular more than any other religion or political tradition, and populist appeals to Muslim masses allegedly employed by Erdoğan are perceived as a threat of Islamization in Turkey, and thus Europe, through migrants. While the representation of Turkey as an economic burden is also observed within the 1997–2007 period, the difference with the 2007–2015 period is that this image is highlighted more frequently and in an increasingly harsher tone, even including suggestions on economic sanctions against Turkey with some interdiscursive references to the hard-power strategies.

Furthermore, this study indicates that in regard to the characteristics of the EP discourses on Turkey in this period, the EP either approaches the Turkish identity within

the framework of empathy and inclusiveness or, more prominently, is exclusive and distant towards Turkey by justifying its exclusion from EU membership. In this regard, the impact of the EP on the perception of Turkish identity is identified as both reproductive and reinforcing. This is due to the significant discourse continuity on the one hand and, on the other hand, the fact that it is transformative in a specific direction, either constructive or, more dominantly in this context, destructive. Moreover, some negative and positive discourses, such as the representations of Turkey as a strategic partner and as a security threat in the region, contradict each other, which resembles a mutual conflict in the EP. In other words, parliamentarians are observed as being influenced by each other's discourses and sometimes produce discourses that are the opposite of the relevant discourse when the discourse topics above are examined. Furthermore, while discourses on the Turkish people, the Turkish government, and Erdoğan in the EP debates unite under some images as in discourse topics related to culture, they are separated in some representations related to democracy and security. In other words, the EP does not always put the Turkish people and the Turkish political decision-makers in the same category. Depending on the circumstances, it sometimes evaluates the people differently from the decision-makers, as in the case of the Gezi Park events. This shows that a monolithic and homogeneous Turkish identity could not be discursively constructed in the EP.

This research thus demonstrates that the discourses on Turkey articulated in the EP in the attempt to justify the inclusion or exclusion of Turkey in relation to its EU membership between 2007 and 2015 affected the construction of perceived Turkish identity in the EP in the 1997–2007 period. In the period between 2007 and 2015, during which Turkey de-Europeanized, a binary discursive opposition of Turkey and the EU negatively affected the construction of the perceived Turkish identity in the 1997–2007 period, which reinforced this dichotomy and even intensified its othering in the EP, as expected. The finding that the negative images of Turkey, including its othering, outweigh the positive ones within each European identity framework in the scope of European democratic values, cultural space, and a political/economic project, except for the European security community, can be regarded as the most significant indicator of this division. The representations of Turkey within the European security community do not comply with this result due to the critical and integral nature of Turkey's potential implications for European security and its crucial roles integrated with its NATO membership and its geostrategic importance. Moreover, the negative images of Turkey,

including its othering, outweighing the positive ones does not necessarily signify the perception of Turkish identity as a danger or threat, while MEPs also otherize Turkey by positioning Turkish identity as weak, as an economic burden on the EU budget, or as a troublesome child in need of the guidance of the EU as its parent.

Contrary to what is expected here, these overwhelming negative conceptualizations of Turkey do not contribute to the construction and perception of European identity. Instead, they are detrimental to its existence. During the EP debates on Turkey, interdiscursivities with the hard-power strategies such as economic sanctions that are part of right-wing populism are not actually in accord with Europe's democratic values, while even a different European integration model than the EU is demanded in discussing Turkish accession to the EU. Moreover, there is also the rise of self-reflexivity in terms of questioning the normative superiority of the EU, the sufficiency of European assistance for democratic change in Turkey, and even Eurosceptic discourses. In other words, in this process, between 2007 and 2015, not only was the perception of Turkish image affected and even challenged but also, to a lesser degree, that of European identity.

Table 8

Interdiscursivities, Intertextualities and Discourse Topics

	Interdiscursivity with...	Intertextuality with...
Discourse Topics under “Turkey in the European Security Community”	Clash of civilizations discourse, the discourse of Europe as a “civilian power”	Clash of civilizations thesis, Anthony N. Celso’s “Jihadist” wave of terrorism
Discourse Topics under “Turkey in terms of European Democratic Values”	Slippery slope argument, carrots and sticks as instruments within the EU’s conditionality policy, “hard-power” strategies, term “ <i>à la carte</i> Europe,” French oppositional political discourse	
Discourse Topics under “Turkey in the European Cultural Space”	multiculturalist ideology of the national realms, American “melting pot,” neo-orientalism	
Discourse Topics under “Turkey in the European Political/Economic Project”	theory of political economy, Eurosceptic discourses	

Meanwhile, MEPs employed various discourse topics, *topoi*, discursive strategies, fallacies, interdiscursivities, intertextualities, and other linguistic devices for these discourse topics in the 2007–2015 period. For these topics, interdiscursivities, and intertextualities are of significant importance for the discursive construction of Turkish and European identities analyzed through the DHA. As in the table above, in the scope of this study, two significant intertextualities are revealed. The first one is the references to Anthony N. Celso's "Jihadist" wave of terrorism, in which the rise of the self-proclaimed Islamic State and Boko Haram are highlighted as the evidence of modern terror's fifth wave with Jihadist movements. MEPs perceive a threat to European security concerns through the channeling of "Jihadists" on European soil, while the EU member states also adopt the term "Jihadist" considering the majority of verdicts in these states about "Jihadist terrorism," especially in 2015. The other case of intertextuality is based on Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis in which two civilizations of Europe/the West and the Arab/Islamic worlds are juxtaposed against one another, which was already frequently seen in the 1997–2007 period. It is clear that the thesis of Huntington still maintains its importance and validity among MEPs.

In terms of interdiscursivity, MEPs do not give up making implicit references to the clash of civilizations discourse again as in the 1997–2007 period through using its tenets such as juxtaposing Islam and the Muslim world against Europe and the West and the alleged failure in reconciling secularism and democracy with Islam, in order to oppose Turkey's accession to the EU under the image of the European security community. Under this representation of Europe, interdiscursivity with the discourse of Europe as a civilian power is also employed since the necessity of cooperation and nonmilitary instruments such as stopping funding for terrorist groups and arms trafficking are referred to rather than hard-power solutions such as military operations. However, an increasing interdiscursivity with hard power, including the carrot-and-stick approach, the military way, and economic sanctions, is observed under the image of the European democratic values, which seems like a contradiction.

Moreover, other interdiscursivities with the slippery slope argument in the political rhetoric, the instruments of the carrots and sticks within the EU's conditionality policy, the discourse on Europe as a normative power in order to make a democratic transformation in Turkey, the term "*à la carte* Europe," first proposed by Prof. Ralf

Dahrendorf in 1979, and the French oppositional political discourse alleging that Turkish accession serves the imperialist aims of the USA and other major powers over Europe are utilized under this image of Europe underlining democratic values. In terms of the interdiscursivities under the image of the European cultural space, references to the multiculturalist ideology of the national realms and neo-orientalist discourses are observed as in the 1997–2007 period as a discursive continuity while the idea of an American melting pot is also referred to in the 2007–2015 period for the large-scale immigrant integration process of Jewish, Christian, and Hellenistic cultures into Europe. The interdiscursivity with the Eurosceptic discourses conducted during the Brexit campaign representation is most visible in the right-wing discourse in the EP within the image of the European cultural space.

As in the Appendix III designed for four basic discourse topics in this research, many *topoi* and other devices for the discursive strategies of DHA are also employed for the aim of justifying arguments either excluding or including Turkey in relation to its EU membership. In terms of *topoi*, the *topoi* of usefulness, danger, numbers, threat, responsibility, borders, *historia magistra vitae* (history as a teacher), and *pro bono eorum* (the advantage of them) are utilized under the representation of the European security community while the *topoi* of threat, history, definition, responsibility, numbers, reality, danger, *pro bono eorum* (to the advantage of them), comparison and usefulness are discerned under discourse topics related to European democratic values. Under the representations of Turkey within the European cultural space, there are *topoi* of threat, authority, culture, history, disadvantage, the aftermath, culture and numbers. Lastly, under the European political/economic project, the *topoi* of *pro bono publico* (the advantage of all), reality, threat, usefulness, finances, comparison, burdening, comparison, numbers, burden and *pro bono nobis* (advantage to/for us) are used in referring to Turkey.

MEPs in their parliamentary speeches frequently resort to many fallacies about the consequences of Turkish accession. These fallacies are *trajectio in alium* (a victim-victimizer-reversal), false analogy, *argumentum ad populum* (appeal to people), slippery slope, *argumentum ad verecundiam* (appeal to authority), *argumentum ad hominem* (argument against the person), *ad nauseam* (argument from repetition), extreme case formulation, *non-sequitur* (illogical conclusion), hasty generalization and *argumentum ad baculum* (argument to the stick). As in this variety, all kinds of discursive strategies are also observed in the discourses of parliamentarians. In this regard, collectivization,

culturalization, regionalization, politicization, relationalization, militarization, metaphors, ethnification, the *particularizing synecdoche*, and personification under the referential strategies; *simile* under the predicational strategies; *hasty generalization* under the argumentation strategies; hyperboles under the intensifying strategies; *litotes* and *apparent denials* as rhetorical figures under the mitigations; and lastly, positioning point of view and thus showing personal involvement under perspectivation stand out as some of them.

Other linguistic devices for these discourse topics have also been identified. In this regard, the usage of synonymous words such as “incorrect” and “wrong” as linguistic markers of emphasis, flag words, stigma words, hyperbolic constructions of reality, the parent-child dichotomy in which Turkey is constructed as a subject child in need of guidance from the EU, spatialization, *synecdochising personalization*, ethnification, collectivization, comparisons, metaphors, hyperbolic constructions of reality and negative genericization as one of the alternative aspects of representing social actors are some of prominent devices.

MEPs’ articulations of Turkish identity converge in the 2007–2015 period with those in the 1997–2007 period in some respects and diverge in others. When the discourse topics are overviewed in general, the dominance of negative Turkish images in this period differs from the previous period. Such a perception orientation among MEPs can be expected as normal towards Turkey, which was already de-Europeanizing then. However, while some responsibilities such as being a bridge were expected in the previous period, Turkey is still attributed new responsibilities, such as being a model and hosting refugees, due to the problems brought by the conjuncture in the 2007–2015 term. In other words, MEPs’ approach to assigning responsibilities to Turkey in this term converges with the 1997–2007 period. Thus, Turkey still maintains its role in which some expectations are formed in the EP in the 2007–2015 period. However, while new responsibilities for Turkey caused a divergence from the 1997–2007 period, the responsibilities attributed to Turkey from the 1997–2007 period are preserved in the 2007–2015 period as a convergence with the previous period.

The representations of European identity in the 2007–2015 period also both diverge from, and converge with, those in the 1997–2007 period in different aspects. At first glance, the emphasis only on the economy dimension has increased within the image of the European political/economic project. Except for this image, the European identity

emerging from the discussions on Turkey is observed to be very close to that in the 1997–2007 period. Nevertheless, beyond this and between the lines, the hard-power strategies associated with the problems with Turkey, Eurosceptic discourses, and the rise of self-reflexivity questioning the normative superiority of the EU appear to affect the perception of European identity under the images of the European security community and European democratic values. Moreover, Islam and the Muslim world are also discursively constructed in terms of a social and existential threat of Islamization to Europe under the representation of the European cultural space, which is far from “unity in diversity,” the official motto of the EU, and “the flowering of the cultures” within Article 167 of the TFEU and thus affects the perception of European identity in the opposite direction than that discursively constructed by the EU.

Although it seems that Europe continues to see itself as a security community, an upholder of democratic values, a political project, and a cultural space that cannot be completely separated from each other because of the intricate nature of the topics, these visions of Europe uncovered according to an examination of MEP views on Turkish accession are open to change with shifting political conjunctures as well as the political and economic context of EU-Turkey relations and Turkey’s relations with EU member states. The stability and coherence of these images discursively constructed through MEP discourses can be challenged as in the case of the model discourse for Turkey in the 2007–2015 period. After the first years of the Arab uprisings, Turkey is not predicated as a role model Muslim country anymore under the image of the European security community because of Turkey’s problems with its democracy and economy, especially with the Gezi Park protests in 2013. Rather, it is seen as “a security threat” to Europe because of being “a frontline state to the conflictual regions.” In this context, it should also be noted that the model discourse had already been used before for September 11 and the Iraq War, which shows the re-emergence of this discourse when the political conditions and context fundamentally change. Thus, these identities can change and differ over time due to the fact that with the new conditions, new meanings can also be attributed to Turkish and, in turn, European identity, or can make them evolve or can consolidate their existing conceptualizations.

Divergence within the same group and country regarding their perspective towards Turkish accession to the EU is seen to be quite widespread. With respect to the representation of Turkey as a model for the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries under the title of “Turkey as a security partner,” some MEPs from the center left under

the S&D/PSE/PS and the mainstream centrist and liberal parties under the ALDE are divided, while MEPs from the traditional center right under the EPP/EPP-ED/PPE and some MEPs from Cyprus and Italy diverge concerning Turkey's role as a safe country for refugees, especially in 2015. Since the PSE/PS/S&D and the ALDE are known as supporters of Turkish accession, the division under this positive image of Turkey indicates that there may be some decreases in this support in these groups. The divergence in the EPP/EPP-ED/PPE is in parallel with its divided views on Turkey's EU bid between Christian Democrat parties and other conservatives.

Furthermore, the discourses of Greek and Cypriot MEPs in the 2007–2015 period, regardless of the EP groups, converge in terms of explicit objection to the opening of the energy chapter as an essential part of Turkish accession because of the Cyprus issue, which causes division from their own groups. Under the subimages of Turkey as a security threat in the region, discourses of MEPs from the same group or country are along the same line, which shows the power of these relatively negative discourses towards Turkey among parliamentarians, despite the divergence regarding subimages under the representation of Turkey as a security partner.

Under the representation of Turkey in a difficult process of democratic transformation, MEPs from the EPP/EPP-ED/PPE and Germany are divided concerning the limits of Turkey's reform capacity. Furthermore, in 2009, some MEPs from Germany and the Netherlands alleged setbacks and too little progress in the pace of reforms in Turkey, although some other German and Dutch MEPs congratulated remarkable progress and significant steps in Turkey as a success of the accession process. In the years 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015, there were MEPs from the ALDE, the EPP/EPP-ED/PPE, and the PSE/PS/S&D who were divided regarding opening Chapters 23 and 24 on rights, freedoms, and justice for Turkey and thus Turkish accession to the EU, while the same division was also observed among MEPs from Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. As the groups in favor of Turkey's EU membership, the division in the ALDE and the PSE/PS/S&D under this representation may also refer to a decline in their support for Turkey.

In the context of the perception of Turkish identity as increasingly turning away from European norms and values, MEPs from the PSE/PS/S&D, Cyprus, and the UK are divided concerning the solution to the Cyprus issue. One group of MEPs favors a solution based on a two-zone and twin-community federation with political equality under the

responsibility of all parties. Another group claims that Turkey holds the only solution, which is to recognize Cyprus in its current state. In terms of Turkish democracy, MEPs from the ECR and Poland are divided since some of them believe that Turkey is anti-democratic or undemocratic, and some other MEPs refer to Turkey as a democratic state. Furthermore, the issue of not opening new chapters, especially Chapters 23 and 24 on fundamental rights, freedoms, justice, and human rights issues, also reasonably divides MEPs from the EPP/EPP-ED/PPE, the PSE/PS/S&D, France, the Netherlands, and Germany. The fact that the PSE/PS/S&D take part in these discussions, in which Turkey is discursively constructed in a more negative way, can be interpreted as a serious crack in the support for Turkey in this group.

The only convergence is in the representation of Turkey as having a place in a multireligious and multicultural Europe since no division in the discourses of MEPs from the same group or country is found in it. Nevertheless, MEPs from the ECR, Germany, Bulgaria, and the Netherlands do not share exactly the same view concerning the Turkish candidacy to the EU in the scope of the perception of Turkish identity as a non-European threat to the European cultural structure. While some MEPs defend Turkey's exclusion from EU membership in terms of culture, history, civilization, and most importantly religion, other MEPs from the same group or country support Turkey carrying out more reforms and thus opening more chapters. The division in the ECR is also expected as in the EPP/EPP-ED/PPE since it is also already known as being divided concerning views on Turkish accession.

In terms of the representation of Turkey as being indispensable for the European political/economic project, there is a division in discourses of MEPs from Italy regarding the effect of Turkey's different demographic dynamics on Europe, while MEPs from the EPP-ED/EPP/PPE, the EFD/EFDD, and Poland also have entirely different opinions on furthering economic and trade relations between the EU and Turkey with political relations. In the representation of Turkey as being incompatible with the European political/economic project, discourses of MEPs from the EFD/EFDD on the Turkish economy and from the ECR on furthering relations with Turkey, including political integration, are divided. Under these images of Turkey concerning the European political/economic project, this divergence indicates that there may be a disagreement in the EFD/EFDD, which is usually known for opposing Turkey's EU membership.

When all these convergences and divergences are examined, the most divergent tendencies among the EP groups can be observed in the EPP-ED/EPP/PPE and the PSE/PS/S&D, which are the largest groups in the Parliament. As regards views on Turkish accession, these divergences in the EPP-ED/EPP/PPE are expected since this group is largely known as being divided between Christian Democrat parties, critical of Turkey's EU bid, and other conservatives, in favor of Turkish entry to the EU. However, the divergences in the PSE/PS/S&D in relation to Turkish accession are surprising since it is known as being a supporter of Turkey's EU membership. The division in the ALDE, the ECR, and the EFD/EFDD is relatively less than these two groups. The disagreement among MEPs from the ALDE and the EFD/EFDD is also unexpected since they are known for their certain stances in which the ALDE is in favor of Turkish accession and the EFD/EFDD is against this membership. However, the ECR is already divided on this issue, which makes its divergences mentioned above normal. As regards divergences among MEPs within the same countries, Germany and the Netherlands share the leadership in terms of the frequency and intensity of divided discourses among their parliamentarians, while relatively fewer divergences in discourses on Turkey are observed among MEPs from Cyprus, Italy, Austria, Bulgaria, France, the UK, and Poland.

All in all, the main argument of the thesis with its subarguments is that under the influence of the changes in the context, the perception of the EP of Turkish identity in the 2007–2015 period is predominantly inclined to discursive othering of Turkey and excluding Turkish accession through various fallacies and interdiscursivities, sometimes even by challenging “European democratic values,” which in turn reveals that MEPs are also more critical of European identity. In this context, the first subargument is that the perception of the EP on Turkish, and therefore European identity, comprised of MEP discourses, is influenced by EU-Turkey relations as the political and economic context. The second subargument is that during the 2007–2015 period, in which Turkey de-Europeanized, MEPs justified either Turkey's conditional inclusion based on the European values and principles equated with the Copenhagen political criteria or, more dominantly, a complete exclusion of Turkey from EU membership identified as the other of Europe.

When the main argument of the thesis above is measured, it is confirmed that MEPs' perception of Turkish identity in the 2007–2015 period is notably more directed to

discourse topics, othering, and representing Turkey in such a negative sense, frequently by employing fallacies and interdiscursivities with the hard-power strategies and Eurosceptic discourses as in the European populist styles by challenging European democratic values. Nevertheless, in this term, MEPs are also critical of European identity in a comparatively much softer way with increasing self-reflexivity in terms of questioning the normative superiority of the EU and the sufficiency of European assistance for democratic change in Turkey, and thus Turkish accession, which varies from the images in the 1997–2007 period. While this does not necessarily show that Europe is under the influence of populism, the effect of rising populism in Europe as a controversial issue still cannot be ignored. Therefore, the effect of the context can be seen on discourse and thus the perception of both the self and other identities, which makes the context a *sine qua non* for making sense of the identity representations. In terms of the subarguments, the influence of EU-Turkey relations as the political and economic context is thus also revealed while the findings also show the justifications of MEPs based on either Turkey's conditional inclusion based on the European values and principles equated with the Copenhagen political criteria or, more dominantly, a complete exclusion of Turkey from EU membership.

In this thesis, it is also seen as a new finding that it is still not possible to make a stark division between two distinct visions of Europe regarding Turkey's bid for EU membership, namely a Europe that favors Turkey's accession to the EU and a Europe that opposes it. This is because among MEPs arguing for and against Turkey's EU bid, there are also some discursive similarities, such as interdiscursivities with the clash of civilizations thesis and constructing a binary opposition between Europe/the EU and its others. Another finding is that Turkish and European parliamentarians resort to similar ways of, and even discursive strategies in, perceiving the other and othering. In other words, they exclude each other by using the same methods, ways, and even strategies, and thus they distance themselves from each other.

With regard to the EP groups, this study demonstrates that, except for the discourse topics related to security, the majority of positive representations of Turkey emanate from the left-wing and liberal EP groups as in the 1997–2007 period. Nevertheless, the majority of negative images of Turkey originate from the center right, far right, center left, far left, liberal, conservative, and even nonattached members of the EP not belonging to any political group, which makes these negative images more predominant than the positive ones. This dominance of the negative representations of

Turkey diverges from those in the 1997–2007 period. Furthermore, this finding cannot only be explained by negative and exclusive discourses relying on the same inherent differences of Turkey such as culture, religion, and geography as in the previous term, which also reveals the effect of changes in conjuncture and political context on perception.

Last but not least, the promotion of a “privileged partnership” instead of Turkey’s full membership by establishing interdiscursivities with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Nicholas Sarkozy, and Valery Giscard d’Estaing is also frequently seen in the 2007–2015 term among MEPs, which shows this argument’s ongoing validity in the EP. Nevertheless, the discussions on this offer are not analyzed in this study because these discussions are related to a proposal based on the assumption that Turkey already does not comply with any conceptualizations of Europe and will not be able to fulfill all its obligations for EU membership. As an alternative outcome, this special status offered to Turkey is designed for an unpredictable future, and thus it is seen as outside the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, the discourses of MEPs on this offer can be analyzed in further studies by utilizing the DHA. In this regard, there are also other issues discerned in this analysis that necessitate further studies, such as the disagreement of the Cypriot MEPs about the solution of the Cyprus problem, the reasons for the discursive difference between ISIS and DAESH in the discussions on Turkey in the EP, the division among MEPs from the same country or EP group, and others. These issues can also be examined within various project calls, as in those in the scope of Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions under Horizon Europe or ERASMUS+ Jean Monnet Actions as the EU’s funding programs.

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APPENDIX I. SUMMARIES OF THE BOOK AND ARTICLES USED IN THE LITERATURE REVIEW ON PERCEPTION OF TURKISH IDENTITY BETWEEN 1997 AND 2007 IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN THE THESIS

1. Levin, P. T. (2011). *Turkey and the European Union: Christian and secular images of Islam*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Turkey	Europe
1. The image of Turkish identity as the dangerous other “in terms of human rights abuses” + the <i>topos</i> of how Turks (mis)treat women	exclusive understanding of the European identity
2. Turkish identity is the other as a threat in terms of security and religion + fears of uncontrolled immigration” & “the supposed Islamization of Europe”	
3. Turkey as a troublesome child in terms of the political criteria + the greater emphasis on the Copenhagen political criteria & the need of control of these criteria’s application	
“Many (though certainly not all) proponents of an inclusive European identity are just as skeptical of Turkish membership as those who advocate an exclusive collective self-image, albeit for different reasons , chief among which are doubts that Turkey truly embraces these democratic ideals”. (Levin, 2011, p.7)	inclusive understanding of the European identity

2. Aydın-Düzgit, S. (2012). *Constructions of European identity: Debates and discourses on Turkey and the EU*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Turkey	Europe
<p>1.1.as a panacea for the clash of civilizations</p> <p>1.2.as a potential security threat for Europe (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 30).</p>	<p>as a security community</p>
<p>2.1.as a statically undemocratic country incapable of change</p> <p>2.2.as an undemocratic country capable of change under European assistance (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 67).</p>	<p>as an upholder of democratic values</p>
<p>3.1.as a potential threat to the European political project</p> <p>3.2.as an adaptable country to this project (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 99).</p>	<p>as a political project</p>
<p>4.1.as a diluter of European cultural homogeneity</p> <p>4.2.as a contributor to cultural diversity in Europe (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p. 131).</p>	<p>as a cultural space</p>

3. Lindgaard, J., Wessel, A. U., & Banke, C. F. S. (2018). FEUTURE Online Paper No.19 Turkey in European identity politics: Key drivers and future scenarios. *The future of EU–Turkey relations: Mapping dynamics and testing scenarios*. The FEUTURE Project (692976). https://www.feuture.uni-koeln.de/sites/feuture/user_upload/Online_Paper_No_19_D7.2.pdf (15 February 2019).

Turkey	Europe
as a model secular democracy to the Arab countries	a civic reference to European identity
a non-violent Muslim majority country especially after 9/11	
as a well-functioning market economy	
as a majoritarian and outright authoritarian country	A cultural conception of European identity
Turkey as an Other	

4. Tırkeş-Kılıç, S. (2019). Justifying privileged partnership with Turkey: An analysis of debates in the European Parliament. *Turkish Studies*, 21(1), 29–55. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14683849.2019.1565941> (18 May 2019).

Turkey as a privileged partner (as an alternative formula especially between 2005 and 2012)
<i>based on the images of Turkey as a constitutive other</i>
Turkey as a populous country
Turkey as a security threat

APPENDIX II. DEBATES ABOUT TURKEY AND ENLARGEMENT IN THE EP BETWEEN 2007 AND 2015

	Date	Title
1	12 February 2007	Women in Turkey
2	23 April 2007	Future enlargements and cohesion
3	24 October 2007	EU-Turkey relations
4	21 May 2008	Turkey's 2007 progress report
5	9 July 2008	The Commission's 2007 enlargement strategy paper
6	11 March 2009	Croatia: progress report 2008; Turkey: progress report 2008; Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: progress report 2008
7	5 May 2009	Democratic process in Turkey
8	25 November 2009	Enlargement strategy 2009 concerning the countries of the western Balkans, Iceland, and Turkey
9	20 January 2010	Democratization in Turkey

10	10 February 2010	2009 progress report on Croatia; 2009 progress report on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; 2009 progress report on Turkey
11	20 September 2010	Trade and economic relations with Turkey
12	8 March 2011	2010 progress report on Turkey
13	27 September 2011	Tensions between Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus
14	28 March 2012	Enlargement report for Turkey
15	21 November 2012	Enlargement: policies, criteria and the EU's strategic interests
16	21 May 2012	A 2020 perspective for women in Turkey
17	6 February 2013	Dialogue for a peaceful solution of the Kurdish issue in Turkey
18	17 April 2013	2012 progress report on Turkey
19	18 April 2013	2012 progress report on Turkey
20	12 June 2013	Situation in Turkey
21	13 June 2013	Situation in Turkey
22	11 March 2014	2013 progress report on Turkey
23	12 March 2014	2013 progress report on Turkey
24	17 December 2014	Freedom of expression in Turkey: Recent arrests of journalists, media executives and systematic pressure against media
25	15 January 2015	Freedom of expression in Turkey: Recent arrests of journalists, media executives and systematic pressure against media
26	20 May 2015	2014 progress report on Turkey
27	10 June 2015	2014 progress report on Turkey
28	21 June 2015	2014 progress report on Turkey
29	7 October 2015	Situation in Turkey
30	2 December 2015	EU-Turkey summit

Source: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/debates-video.html>

APPENDIX III. DISCURSIVE STRATEGIES OF DHA AND DISCOURSE TOPICS

1. Discursive Strategies of DHA and Discourse Topics under “Turkey in the European Security Community”

		Discourse Topics under “Turkey in the European Security Community”					
		Turkey as a Strategic Partner in the Region				Turkey as a Security Threat in the Region	
		Turkey as a Bridge Between Civilizations	Turkey as a Model for the Mediterranean and the Middle Eastern Countries	Turkey as an Alternative Route for European Energy Security	Turkey as a Host for Refugees	Turkey whose Foreign Policy May Be Incompatible with the EU	Turkey as a Frontline State to the Conflictual Regions
Discursive Strategies of DHA	Referential / Nomination	“we” pronouns as deictic expressions and collectivization, the “bridge” metaphor, the relationalization through “family,” “Arab” for the ethnification and the word “Islamic” for religionization	“Arab” as ethnification, a conventional metaphor of equilibrium, the “we” pronoun as deictic expressions and collectivization, <i>synecdochising personalization</i> and “Muslim world” as regionalization	A conventional metaphor of equilibrium, culturalization, the deictic “we” and the metaphoric expression of “creating regional peace”	collectivization through the word “we,” politicization through the word “refugees”, relationalization through the word “friends” and “Ankara” as metonymy	“Ankara” as metonymy, relational identifications with the words “brothers” and “sisters,” the “sheep” and “wolf” metaphors and <i>synecdochising personalization</i>	
	Predication	predication of Turkey as a “bridge”	predication of Turkey as a “model”, the predication of Turkey’s contribution as a model to most Arab countries as “the fight against the threat of terrorism,” , “stability” as a political flag word	“security” as a political flag word, predication of Turkey as one of the “neighboring countries towards Europe” and Turkey’s predication as “an exceptional channel for energy networks”	predication of Turkey as a hosting state for refugees, a loyal firm ally, strategic partner and a critical neighbor; comparison	predication of Turkey as “a foreign power” and an invader, the predication of Cyprus as “one of our member states,” predication of Turkey’s military operation as “the potential invasion”	predication of Turkey as “a frontline state in the Middle East conflict” and “a corridor of choice for organized crime”
	Argumentation		hasty generalization	<i>topoi</i> of usefulness and danger	<i>topoi</i> of numbers, threat and responsibility	<i>topoi</i> of threat, danger, responsibility, (Greek) borders, <i>historia magistra vitae</i> , and <i>pro bono eorum</i> ; the logical fallacy of a false analogy; hasty generalization	<i>topoi</i> of borders and responsibility, a <i>fallacious trajectio in alium</i> and the logical fallacy of a false analogy
	Perspectivation, framing, or discourse representation						

	Intensification, mitigation		a hyperbolic construction of reality		hyperbolic numbers	rhetorical questions	
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2. Discursive Strategies of DHA and Discourse Topics under “Turkey in terms of European Democratic Values”

		Discourse Topics under “Turkey in terms of European Democratic Values”				
		Turkey in a Difficult Process of Democratic Transformation	Turkey as Increasingly Turning Away from European Norms and Values			
			Turkey as a Violator of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms with Pseudo-Reforms	Turkey as an Undemocratic and Authoritarian State Governed by Erdogan	Turkey as an Occupier in Cyprus as an EU Member State	Turkey as a Reluctant Neighbor Far from Normalizing Relations
Discursive Strategies of DHA	Referential / Nomination	terms “slippery slope” and “chaos” as metaphors, “Turkish army” as a militarionym, collectivization, militarization, personification, emotionalization	emotionalization, <i>synecdochising personalization</i>	“we” and “they” pronouns as collectivization; spatialization and personification for “Ankara;” the “mask,” “jail,” “family,” and “prison” metaphors; <i>synecdochising personalization</i> ; political organizationalization, the metaphorical expressions of “tyranny of a majority”	metaphors of “victim” for Cyprus and “perpetrator” for Turkey, victimization, “family” as a metaphor and personified military	personified Turkey
	Predication	“democracy,” “peace,” “security,” and “prosperity” as positively connoted flag words, a parent-child analogy, predication of Turkey as not fully democratic country	predication of Turkey as a violator of the rule of law and human rights and an infamous leader, teachers/parents and students/children analogies, comparison	flag words such as “fundamental rights and freedoms,” “democratic principles,” and “the rule of law”; “arrest,” “brutality,” “jail,” “corruption,” “raid,” and “dissent” as stigma words; predication of Turkey as a typical authoritarian state under the Erdoğan, predication of Turkey as “an overbearing state”	predication of the EP as “the sanctuary of democracy;” stigma words such as “crime,” “violence,” and “colonist;” Turkey likened to “a crazy truck” as a <i>simile</i>	“misgivings,” “mistrust,” “scandal,” “corruption,” “cyberbullying,” and “censorship” as stigma words
	Argumentation	<i>topoi</i> of threat, history, definition, and responsibility; fallacy of the slippery slope; fallacy of the <i>argumentum ad verecundiam</i>	<i>topoi</i> of threat, danger, numbers, and reality	<i>topoi</i> of <i>pro bono eorum</i> , numbers, comparison, uselessness, history, and definition; hasty generalization; the fallacious <i>argumentum ad hominem</i>	<i>topoi</i> of number, threat, and reality	<i>topos</i> of reality

	Perspectivation, framing, or discourse representation			underlining a previous journalist identity as a perspectivation strategy		
	Intensification, mitigation	hyperbolic extreme-case formulation, a rhetorical question with verb of thinking, repetition, overemphasis, hyperbole and macro-mitigation	rhetorical questions	hyperbolic constructions of reality and negatively connoted and hyperbolic phrases	the repeated emphasis on the word “occupy” and rhetorical questions	rhetorical questions

3. Discursive Strategies of DHA and Discourse Topics under “Turkey in the European Cultural Space”

		Discourse Topics under “Turkey in the European Cultural Space”	
		Turkey as Having a Place in a Multireligious and Multicultural Europe	Turkey as a Non-European Threat to European Cultural Structure with its Islamization Agenda
Discursive Strategies of DHA	Referential / Nomination	predication of Europe as being “made up of different religions,” negative genericization	ethnification, collectivization, macro-toponym referring to an indefinite small geographic entity, “Ankara” within spatialization and the use of “we” pronoun
	Predication	flag words of “multicultural and multireligious”	labeling Erdoğan as “a real man or a subservient coward” within the predicational strategy, predication of Erdoğan as “a servant of the Shari’a” and “a dictator”
	Argumentation	<i>topoi</i> of history, disadvantage, and aftermath	<i>topoi</i> of culture, threat, numbers, and authority; <i>argumentum ad hominem</i> ; <i>argumentum ad populum</i> ; argumentative fallacy of extreme case formulation
	Perspectivation, framing, or discourse representation	underlining one’s country and thus showing his/her personal involvement	
	Intensification, mitigation	<i>litotes</i> as macro-mitigation, synonymous words “incorrect” and “wrong” in one sentence as linguistic markers of emphasis and <i>verbum putandi</i> with a verb of thinking	100,000 hyperbolic years, the adverb “never” as the direct micro-mitigation strategy

4. Discursive Strategies of DHA and Discourse Topics under “Turkey in the European Political/Economic Project”

		Discourse Topics under “Turkey in European Political / Economic Project”		
		Turkey as Indispensable for the European Political/Economic Project	Turkey Incompatible with the European Political/Economic Project	
			Turkey as an Economic Burden on the EU Budget	Turkey only within Economic and Trade Relations Excluding its Political Integration to the EU
Discursive Strategies of DHA	Referential / Nomination		metaphor of “doom,” personification, “checkbook” metaphor	nominalization, personification of Turkey, “we” pronoun for collectivization
	Predication		comparison, stigma word	flag word
	Argumentation	<i>topoi</i> of <i>pro bono public</i> , reality, and usefulness; hasty generalization, fallacy of a false analogy, <i>argumentum ad baculum</i>	<i>topoi</i> of finances, numbers, comparison, threat, and burdening; fallacy of false analogy	a <i>non sequitur</i> fallacy; <i>topoi</i> of the advantage to/for us, <i>pro bono public</i> , and reality; hasty generalization; logical fallacy of a false analogy
	Perspectivation, framing, or discourse representation	expressing one’s involvement in discourse through the words “I strongly support” and thus positions his/her point of view	expressing and positioning his/her distance on the subject through the words “I have never supported,” giving a personal opinion on a subject	
	Intensification, mitigation			“at least in part” and “indeed” as direct micro-mitigation, “you” as an indirect micro-mitigation, direct micro-mitigation with the lexical repeated adverb of “further,” “apparent denials” within the mitigation strategies, hyperbolic construction of reality