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MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ  
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ  
SİYASET BİLİMİ VE ULUSLARARASI  
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PROGRAMI

**A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE  
REPRESENTATION OF ISLAMISM THROUGH  
“BİLGİ VE HİKMET”**

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

MERVE İSMAIL

İSTANBUL, 2022

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## ABSTRACT

### A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE REPRESENTATION OF ISLAMISM THROUGH “BİLGİ VE HİKMET”

Islamism is a modern phenomenon despite its tense relationship with modernity. Even though its answers have differentiated under the historical context, Islamism has emerged against the questions and problems came along with modernity. The post-Cold War context has marked a new period for Islamism like for lots of phenomena. The institutions of modernity have spread around the world thanks to globalization process. However, the rigidity of modernity based on the classical modernization understanding has been eroded with this new period. In the new understanding that has gained currency thanks to multiple or alternative modernities paradigm, Islam no more has represented a sharp contrast to modernity. Some developments such as the disappointment that stems from Iran Revolution, the rise of “green” capital, the adaptation of the new consume forms by Muslims more than ever, the gaining more prominence of some concepts such as democracy, pluralism, coextience, the inclusion of Islamists in politics have indicated the new period for Islamism, as well. This thesis examines how Islamist discourse was shaped in this historical context through the magazine named “Bilgi ve Hikmet”. Discourses of Islamists will be analysed by focusing on the concepts of democracy, Islamic state and women issue. By doing so, the conceptual framework named “discursive tradition” proposed by Talal Asad will be used.

**Keywords:** Islamism, Islamist discourse, critical discourse analysis, Talal Asad, discursive tradition, bilgi ve Hikmet

## ÖZ

### BİL VE HİKMET DERGİSİ ÜZERİNDEN İSLAMCILIĞIN TEMSİLİNİN ELEŞTİREL SÖYLEM ANALİZİ

Moderniteyle olan gerilimli ilişkisine rağmen İslamcılık modern bir olgudur. Cevapları tarihsel bağlamda değişse de, İslamcılık moderniteyle birlikte gelen sorulara ve problemlere karşı ortaya çıkmıştır. Soğuk Savaş sonrası dünyanın ve Türkiye'nin değişen tarihsel bağlamı, pek çok olgu gibi İslamcılık içinde yeni bir döneme işaret ediyordu. Küreselleşmeyle birlikte modernite ve unsurları tüm dünyada daha fazla yayıldı. Ancak klasik modernizm anlayışı bu yeni dönemle birlikte aşınmaya uğradı. Alternatif ya da çoklu moderniteler paradigmasıyla gündeme gelen yeni anlayışa göre İslam, artık modern olana karşı keskin bir zıtlığı ifade etmiyordu. İran devriminin getirdiği hayalkırıklığı, “yeşil” sermayenin yükselmesi, Müslümanlar tarafından tüketim biçimlerinin gün geçtikçe daha fazla benimsenmesi, demokrasi, çoğulculuk, birarada yaşama gibi kavramların öne çıkması, İslamcılarının siyasi yarışa dahil olmaları gibi gelişmeler İslamcılık için de yeni bir döneme işaret ediyordu. Bu çalışma böyle bir tarihsel bağlamda İslamcı söylemin nasıl şekillendiğini Bilgi ve Hikmet dergisi aracılığıyla incelemektedir. İslamcılarının söylemleri, demokrasi, İslam devleti ve kadın meselesi üzerinden analiz edilmektedir. Bunu yaparken Talal Asad'ın “söylemsel gelenek” kavramsallaştırılması kullanılmaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** İslamcılık, İslamcı Söylem, Eleştirel Söylem Analizi, Talal Asad, Söylemsel Gelenek, Bilgi ve Hikmet

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Islam is a still factor that affects behaviours and thoughts of people in this lands. The relationship between the state and Islam is still a source of tension. Thereby, Islamism and Islamist discourse with all paradoxes are still a worthy-studying topics.

I feel honoured to express my gratitude to professor İsmail Kara who is devoted himself to understand and explain Islamism and Islamist discourse in Turkey. I decided to write my thesis on Islamism, especially in his seminal master class on religious and politics in Turkey during my graduate education at İstanbul Şehir University. The topic of my thesis specifically emerged as a result of our discussions during this process. In fact, I started to think about Islamism after the class on Islamic political thought lectured by Ateş Uslu in my undergraduate education at Istanbul University Faculty of Political Sciences. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to him for arousing my first affection for this topic.

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

CDA: Critical Discourse Analysis

CUP: The Committee of Union and Progress (the Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti)

DP: Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti)

RPP: Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)

NSP: National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi)

NOP: The National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi)

MP: Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi)

MÜSİAD: The Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association

TÜSİAD: Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association

# **A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE REPRESENTATION OF ISLAMISM THROUGH “BİLGİ VE HİKMET”**

## **CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1 Setting Problem**

The new phase that was experienced in the world was questioned in academic and non-academic debates with the end of the Cold-war. While “the end of the history” proclaimed the triumph of liberalized West, arguments such as “the clash of civilizations” or the increased “Muslim Rage” revived the attention to Islam and its relationship with this “victorious” liberalized world.

According to Giddens, this process that has been experienced in non-West has reflected higher modernity in terms of the proliferation of the institutions of modernity thanks to globalization rather than reflecting a post-modern period.<sup>1</sup> The globalization tendencies that enabled the spread of the institutions of modernity in non-West have caused disorganization, in other words, the loosening of modernity’s rigidity based on the classical modernization understanding. Besides that, it has transformed the relationships between Islam and modernity. Furthermore, the relationship of a Muslim with Islam has entered into a transformation. This context has indicated to changing religiosity. A veiled woman in jean and converse could go to a concert of their favourite singer. A pious man could spend his weekend holiday in luxury hotels. Also, these pious women and men could spend their time together in alcohol-free cafes. These new images has been considered as indicators of the changing religiosity. As such, the changing context and practices in daily life has referred to a new phase for Islamism, as well. The old-fashion dichotomies like tradition and modern have blurred. Islamist discourse has been “floating” in new environments, universities, and printed media. Multiple modernities as an alternative paradigm and its reflections in Muslim societies –post-Islamism as an alternative Islamism– has been brought to the agenda in such a context.

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<sup>1</sup> Anthony Giddens (1990) “The Consequences of Modernity”, Cambridge: Polity Press. p.175

The Post-cold war context has been a unique period not only for the world but also for Turkey that experiencing the liberalization process of the Turkish economy and the institutionalization process of free-market capitalism under the Motherland Party policies. On the other hand, the visibility of the new actors, new trends, and new mentalities have increased in this period with the effect of the multiple modernities paradigm.

The relationship between religion and politics has fictionalized in the establishment of the Turkey Republic as the control over religion rather than the separation, unlike Western secularism. Therefore, Islam and Islamic have always been one of the crucial objects of authoritarian modernization interventions. (i.e the abolition of the caliphate and Islamic law, the radical interventions on religious education, religious orders- tarikats-, veiling etc.) Kemalism as a founding ideology of the new nation-state has represented republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, statism and revolutionism (or reformism)<sup>2</sup> and has perceived that modernization is identical with Westernization.<sup>3</sup> Taha Parla distinguishes political Kemalism from cultural Kemalism and defines it as *“a type of historical political ideology and regime that cannot be defended as democratic and progressive due to its authoritarianism, statism, single-partisanship and “chieftism” while affirming cultural Kemalism.”*<sup>4</sup> Whereas, Islam or Islamic has always been in a respondent position against the cultural Kemalism since it organizes daily life. Salman Said uses Kemalism as a metaphor to describe secularist, nationalist and modernizing political movements that came to power in Muslim societies in the post-colonial period. Islam represents a side of antagonism against the West in the Kemalist modernization process and represents a side of the tradition, primitivism, and anti-modernity in Kemalist understanding.<sup>5</sup> In Said’s opinion, the abolishment of the caliphate caused the decentralization of Islam and caused the breakdown of the sedimented and the rooted relationship between Islam and state authority.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, Kemalism politicized Islam by removing it from the center of the political order. Hence, Islamism emerged as opposition against Kemalism. On the other hand, Kemalism as a founding ideology undertook a mission

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<sup>2</sup> Erik Jan Zürcher, (2004) “Turkey: A Modern History”, London and New York: I. B. Tauris. p.181

<sup>3</sup> See Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri (Atatürk’s speeches and lectures), available at <https://atam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/S%C3%96YLEV-ORJ%C4%B0NAL.pdf>

<sup>4</sup> Taha Parla, (2009) “Ziya Gökalp, Kemalizm ve Türkiye’de Korporatizm”, Deniz Yayınları, İstanbul. p.10

<sup>5</sup> Bobby S. Sayyid (1997) “A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism”, London & New York : Zed Books p.73

<sup>6</sup> ibid p.63

to keep its eye not only on Islam and Islamic but also on the Turkish politics, civil society, and ethnic, leftist groups since its establishment. However, the 1980s and the 1990s has witnessed a simultaneity that indicates the economic liberalization process and the emergence of the politics of identity including the resurgence of Islam, the Kurdish question, and the liberal claims to rights and freedoms.<sup>7</sup> This period that is described as the post-Kemalist period by İlker Aytürk indicates a set of thoughts that have been propounded at the beginning of 1980s by a couple of crucial scholars who have contributed to Turkish academia such as Mete Tunçay, Erik Jan Zürcher, Şerif Mardin, Nilüfer Göle, Büşra Ersanlı-Behar, Taha Parla, Levent Köker and that developed by intellectuals, publishers, journalists, think-tanks during 1990s and 2000s.<sup>8</sup> This set of thoughts include criticisms of Kemalism because of its authoritarian, totalitarian, guardian, top-down, Jacobin, and elitist nature. Besides, this period witnessed some demands such as the reformation of the totalitarian and authoritarian state, the amendment of the current constitution, the reformation of the relationship between religion and state, the removal of the military's tutelage and the decentralization of the centralist bureaucratic state by attacking the First Republic and Kemalism in Second Republic debates.<sup>9</sup> The criticisms on Kemalism and its authoritarian modernization process have manifested and adopted not only by Islamist but also by Kurdish, Alevis, communists and leftists, in a word, all groups that were marginalized by first Republic in these debates. Menderes Çınar in the Post-Kemalism debates that dominate again recently the agenda notes that the end of the Cold War and, thereby, victorious liberal democracy revealed the lacuna between Kemalist practice and the contemporary world on democracy norms to explain the context that enabled the resurgence at stake.<sup>10</sup> On the other hand, Mücahit Bilici explains this process with the crisis of Kemalist hegemony. Kemalist ideology that was organized in the nation-state modal was not able to regenerate itself against the globalization process in which the nation-state weakened. Therefore, the crisis of Kemalism has created the opportunity for Islamism.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, it was obvious that globalization (that indicates both the

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<sup>7</sup> E. Fuat Keyman, and Berrin Koyuncu, (2005). "Globalization, Alternative Modernities and the Political Economy of Turkey." *Review of International Political Economy* 12(1): 105–28.

<sup>8</sup> İlker Aytürk, (2015) "Post-post Kemalizm: Yeni bir paradigmayı beklerken", *Birikim*, 319. pp. 34-48  
[https://www.academia.edu/19569728/Post\\_post\\_Kemalizm\\_Yeni\\_Bir\\_Paradigmay%C4%B1\\_Beklerken](https://www.academia.edu/19569728/Post_post_Kemalizm_Yeni_Bir_Paradigmay%C4%B1_Beklerken)

<sup>9</sup> "Yeni Arayışlar, Yeni Yönelimler, 2.Cumhuriyet Tartışmaları", (Ağustos 1993) edited by Metin Sever, Cem Dizdar, Başak Yayınları, Ankara. pp.8-11

<sup>10</sup> Menderes Çınar, (2020) "Kemalizm, post-Kemalizm, reel-Kemalizm, post-reel Kemalizm", *Birikim*-371.

<sup>11</sup> Mücahit Bilici, (2005) "Küreselleşme ve Post-modernizmin İslamcılık Üzerindeki Etkileri", ( *The effects of Globalization and Post-modernism on Islamism*) *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşünce: İslamcılık C: 6*, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, pp. 799-803.

higher modernity with the moderation of its rigidity and alternative modernities paradigm were in favour of Islamism. Turkish economy has witnessed the rise of Islamist capital and Turkish politics witnessed the rise of Welfare Party on the other hand. In such a context, Islamist discourse found the more visible and poised place for itself everywhere. However, it was also a context in which determinative Kemalist modernization has been not only questioned and the understanding of modernity has been not only transformed but also Islamism and Islamist discourse has transformed in terms of its contradictory and unsteady relationship with modernity and its concepts.

## **1.2 Research Questions**

The fundamental question of the research is: How Islamists' discourse in Turkey was shaped in the historical context? In order to answer this question, the following (sub) questions should be addressed as well:

- In this context, How Islamist discourse was influenced in *Bilgi ve Hikmet* as an Islamist magazine? How did Islamists consider modernity in the new phase of the world? What demands were articulated by them? What solutions were presented? Which concepts became prominent? Are they functional to tackle the major premises of modernity? What methods were being used? Can we really consider these demands, solutions, concepts in accordance with the new phase of Islamism?
- What were Islamists Intellectuals' opinions on the Islamic state? What were the opinions on democracy; pluralism and also the women issue? How did they associate their opinions with Islam in Talal Asad's conceptualization?
- Was there any effect of globalization? What are the effects of the Motherland party period, Özal's policies and the rise of the Islamist middle class and Welfare party in Turkey? Was there any effect of the disappointment to Iran revolution and Islamic State?

## **1.3 Importance of the Research**

Discourse is much more than a discourse. It is a product of the present. It is not independent from its historical context. For that reason, this research will examine Islamist discourse in the historical context. On the other hand, discourse includes past and future. The main characteristic of Islamism has been

basically related to the modernity and its concepts since 19<sup>th</sup> century. The questions and answers have differentiated in the confrontation in accordance with the historical context. However, the “sore in consciousness” that was opened by modernity still remains. Therefore, tracing Islamist discourse is also to trace sore and its deepness in the consciousness.

The main feature of this research is analysing Islamist discourse within the conceptual framework proposed by Talal Asad. Some concepts are brought to forefront by referencing the founding texts and Islamic history and some concepts are thrown background out of focus within discursive tradition in the historical context. However, it cannot be the same thing that the reality of a concept in a discourse with the reality of the concept out of a discourse.<sup>12</sup> Thanks to tracing Islamist discourse through orthodoxy concept in discursive tradition, which I will particularly illustrate it below, it is possible to grasp “the closure and coherence of Islamic meanings and truths”<sup>13</sup> in the historical context. Therefore, the orthodoxy concept in discursive tradition enables to grasp multiple Islamic truths in coherent and systematic framework.

The one of the reasons that makes Islamists’ discourse worth-examining during 1990s was the remarkable and dramatic change in socio-culture in this period. The beginning of the 1990s was remarkable in terms of the contemporary Islamism's dramatic relationship with modernity. In Göle’s words, “*Islamist engineers rose to power within the ranks of the Motherland Party, veiled women became visible on modern university campuses in big cities, and Islamist periodicals, newspapers and books shifted the intellectual debate in Turkey away from the dominance of leftist intellectuals to that of the Islamists in this period.*”<sup>14</sup> Even though the quotation is important regarding taking into the visibility of Muslims in public space consideration, however, the definition of Islamism/the Islamist is problematical. This is a question of debate in itself in the literature. This research aims to frame these debates and present risks on the reductionist definition of Islamism or the definition of Islamist in broad meaning that includes of an ordinary Muslims on the other hand.

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<sup>12</sup> İsmail Kara, (2016) “Cumhuriyet Türkiye’si’nde Bir Mesele Olarak İslam 1”, (Islam as an issue in Republican Turkey I) İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, p.379

<sup>13</sup> Mohammed Sulaiman (2018) “Between text and discourse: Re-theorizing Islamic orthodoxy”, ReOrient Vol. 3, No. 2 (Spring 2018), pp. 140-162

<sup>14</sup> Nilüfer Göle, (Winter, 1997), “Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter-Elites”, Middle East Journal, Vol. 51, No. 1 pp. 46-58 p.54

Besides, some developments enabled to rethink over modernity not only in Turkey but also in the world in the same period thanks to the rise of multiple modernities paradigm. In addition, Islamic state was the centre stage as a failure; post-Islamism, democracy, pluralism, toleration were discussed with the effect of globalization by Muslim intellectuals around the world.

Another crucial reason that I believe Islamists' opinions are worth-examining is my belief that revealing paradoxes of the Islamists' discourses in this period can help to understand paradoxes of today's Islamism and its paradoxical understanding of secularism, democracy, capitalism, Kemalism and the figure of Atatürk. Today's Islamism's paradoxes have their origins in this period. On the other hand, when we think about the effects and importance of Islam leading people and their behaviours not only in daily life but also in politics, economics etc., desiring to understand Islamism, which is basically a kind of perception of Islam, and Islamist discourse is a crucial reason in itself.

#### **1.4 Scope of the Research**

The main aim of this research is to critically analyse Islamists' discourse and examine the demands, solutions and the prominent concepts by taking the context that feeds it into account. Especially, Islamist discourse on the democracy, thereby pluralism, Islamic state and women issue will be analysed. In doing so, critical discourse analysis will be adopted as a qualitative research method. The dependent variable of this research is Islamist discourse. For that reason, Talal Asad's conceptualization of Islam as a discursive tradition will be used since it enables to trace Islamist discourse more coherently. From this point of view, some conceptions, interpretations and re-readings of Islam in the context at stake like The Medina Document<sup>15</sup> will be more analysable.

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<sup>15</sup> "Constitution of Medina, document from early Islamic history based upon two agreements concluded between the clans of Medina and the Prophet Muhammad soon after the Hijrah (Latin: Hegira), or emigration, to Medina in AD 622. The agreements established the muhājirūn, i.e., the early Muslims who followed Muhammad, on a par with the eight clans of Medina (called the anṣār, or "helpers"); collectively, the nine tribes formed the first Muslim community (ummah). The agreements also regulated the relations of the Muslims with the Jews of Medina." <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Constitution-of-Medina>

Data will be collected from an Islamist magazine named Bilgi ve Hikmet (Knowledge and Wisdom) that was published between 1993 and 1995 as a twelve issues in order to analyse Islamist discourse. Islamist magazines have been crucial tools to constitute, develop and convey Islamic thought since the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Sırat-ı Müstakim, Sebilürreşad, Hareket, Büyük Doğu, Diriliş, Maveria, Hilal, Düşünce, Şura, Tevhid, Akıncı have been the magazines that enable to trace discursive tradition that represents Muslim discourse that addresses itself to conceptions of the Islamic past and future, regarding a particular Islamic practice in the present. Searching magazines provides not only to see the questions of the period, and the reflections on the Islamist discourse of the prominent concepts in historical context but also analyse the conceptualization of Islam within the discursive tradition, which I will illustrate it below in detail. The reason why Bilgi ve Hikmet was selected is that Bilgi ve Hikmet is a magazine that we can both define it as Islamist and grasp the traces of the new phase of Islamism in the post-cold war context on which the research especially aims to focus.

#### **1.4.1 Defining Islamism and the Islamist**

Defining Islamism and Islamist is an obligation while analysing Islamist discourse. There are a various understanding to define Islamism and the Islamist in literature and academic circle. This causes crucial incomprehensibility. For that reason, this research will hold to a comprehensive definition of Islamism proposed by İsmail Kara. Kara defines Islamism as *“a movement including all the political, intellectual and scientific studies, researches, proposals and solutions dominated by activist, modernist and eclectic aspects in an effort to re-establish in the 19th and 20th centuries the dominance of Islam as a whole (belief, worship, morality, philosophy, politics, education ...) and to liberate Muslims and the Islamic world from Western exploitation, cruel governors, slavery and imitation and to ensure their civilization, unification and development”*<sup>16</sup>. In obedience to this definition, I will define intellectuals following these goals at stake as Islamists in the research.

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<sup>16</sup> İsmail Kara, (1986) “Türkiye’de İslamcılık Düşüncesi, Risale Yayınları”, İstanbul, p.8  
p.s. Translation belongs to Ahmet Yasir Eren, used in “A Critique of Political Islam: The Turkish Model Case”  
available at [https://www.academia.edu/36291388/A\\_Critique\\_of\\_Political\\_Islam\\_The\\_Turkish\\_Model\\_Case](https://www.academia.edu/36291388/A_Critique_of_Political_Islam_The_Turkish_Model_Case)

The crucial incomprehensibility about Islamist discourse basically stems from the reduction of Islamism to political aims in the literature. From Kara's perspective of view, Islamism cannot be considered just by focusing on its political aims. Even though the political sphere is the most prominent in Islamism, it cannot be reduced to the political sphere. Islamism represents and offers a new, bold, holistic, and modern, even modernist, interpretation and practice of Islam.<sup>17</sup> All spheres of Islamism are interwoven and interactive. On the other hand, the fact that "*the ongoing activity of negotiations and confrontations in daily life through which hierarchies of power, political agency, and subjectivity are constructed*"<sup>18</sup> cannot be ignored by labelling it as unpolitic. According to Ali Kaya, Muhammed Mercan, and Salwa Ismail which I will thoroughly explain their criticisms on this reductionist understanding below, Islamism refers to the ongoing process of the creation of Muslim subjectivity. It includes various actors pursuing different modes of action and various understandings and strategies for this purpose. Islamists reposition themselves to take advantage of changing political opportunities. Therefore, Islamist goals and objectives is redefined in accordance with the historical context.<sup>19</sup>

On the other hand, an ordinary Muslim that has not these aims that was determined above cannot be described as an Islamist.

This research aims to take these risks and criticism into account in the process of analysing Islamist discourse.

## **1.5 Methodology**

In order to achieve the aim of the research and answer the research questions, critical discourse analysis has been selected as a qualitative scientific method. Talal Asad's conceptualization of Islam as discursive tradition has also been used, which is inspired by Foucault, to analyse Islamist discourse.

I have specifically focused on these concepts in Islamist discourses; Islamist state, democracy; pluralism and women issue. The reason why I limited the scope of the research with these concepts is that I believe

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<sup>17</sup> Islam and Islamism in Turkey: A Conversation with İsmail Kara, by Maydan Editors on October, 24, 2017

<sup>18</sup> Alev Çınar, (2005) "Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey: Bodies, Places, and Time" the University of Minnesota Press p.33

<sup>19</sup> Salwa Ismail, (Winter, 2001), "The Paradox of Islamist Politics", Middle East Report, No. 221 pp. 34-39 p.39

that they are nodal points to grasp the new phase of Islamism this research mainly aims to focus on. In my view, the problematic relationship of Islamism with modernity is blurred in particular through these concepts in the post- Cold war period. For this purpose, data has been collected from an Islamist magazine named “Bilgi ve Hikmet” published between 1993 and 1995 as twelve issues.

### **1.5.1 Definition, aims, principles of CDA**

Van Dijk defines critical discourse analysis (CDA) as “*a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context.*”<sup>20</sup>

Wodak points out that CDA is much more than focusing on “text” with these words: “*CDA focus not only on texts, spoken or written, as objects of inquiry. A fully “critical” account of discourse would thus require a theorization and description of both the social processes and structures which give rise to the production of a text, and of the social structures and processes within which individuals or groups as social historical subjects, create meanings in their interaction with texts.*”<sup>21</sup>

Critical discourse analysis sees discourse in a different way. Discourse represents much more than the common sense of discourse in that sense. According to CDA, discourse is both socially constitutive and socially shaped. It is constitutive in the way that power relations, social identities, inequalities are (re)produced. It is also situated in a historical and social context. CDA aims to reveal these veiled aspects of discourse as a social practice.<sup>22</sup> Hence, discourse is not independent of social structure, and also it is created in social interaction.

### **Fairclough and Wodak summarize the main principles of CDA as follows:<sup>23</sup>**

1. CDA addresses social problems

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<sup>20</sup> Teun A. van Dijk, *Critical Discourse Analysis*, (2001) in “*The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*”, Edited by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001, p.352

<sup>21</sup> “*Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*”, Edited by. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer. SAGE Publications. London,2001 pp.2-3

<sup>22</sup> Fairclough, N. L. and Wodak, R. (2011). “*Critical discourse analysis*”. in T. A. van Dijk (ed.), *Discourse Studies. A Multidisciplinary Introduction*, Vol. 2. Discourse as Social Interaction (pp. 357-358). SAGE Publications.

<sup>23</sup> Teun A. van Dijk, “*Critical Discourse Analysis*” (2001) in “*The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*”, Edited by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, p.353

2. Power relations are discursive
3. Discourse constitutes society and culture
4. Discourse does ideological work
5. Discourse is historical
6. The link between text and society is mediated
7. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory
8. Discourse is a form of social action.

## **1.6 Thesis Layout**

The thesis is composed of four chapters and a conclusion.

**The first chapter** basically aims to set the framework of the research with the setting of problem, research questions and methodology.

**The second chapter** focuses on the conceptualization of Islam through the discursive tradition proposed by Talal Asad to analyse Islamist discourse in the coherent and systematic way. Then, a guideline is framed to analyse it with reference to the article of İsmail Kara named “*İslamcı Söylemin Kaynakları ve Gerçeklik Değeri Üzerine Birkaç Not*” (*A Few Notes on Sources of Islamist Discourse and Its Truth Value*). Besides, the section named “Islamism in the social, political and intellectual context of post-cold war period: trends, debates, concepts” wishes to outline the major political and intellectual debates and arguments in the literature and academic circles about the relation of Islamism with modernity and politics within the liberalized contexts of the post-Cold War period.

**The third chapter** focuses on the background of Islamism in Turkey. The history of Islamism begins from the end of 19<sup>th</sup> century in this research not to ignore Islamist discourses about the salvation of the state and religion against the rising modern West. Even though it is a fact that Islamism could succeed in differentiating itself, especially from nationalism and conservatism with the end of the 1960s, the formation of Kemalist hegemony in Turkey and its radical implementations have been especially emphasized on the purpose of showing the venture of politicization of Islam. Since Islamism as dynamic

movement that “is conditioned by political opportunities, changing social and political configurations and contingent identities”<sup>24</sup>, the changing contexts in the history of Turkish political life have been considered important and particularly emphasized. However, the major focus of this thesis on the Islamist discourse in the post-Cold war context in which liberalized West announced its victory, the effects of globalization spread, the politics of identity/recognition increased, some concepts such as political participation, freedom, toleration, human rights, identity, pluralism and equality dominated discourses. For that reason, the post-coup period on 12 September 1980 in Turkey is outlined in terms of its effects on Islamism.

**The fourth chapter** finally focuses on Islamist discourse on Islamic state, democracy; pluralism and women issue through an Islamist magazine named *Bilgi ve Hikmet*. These concepts will be examined through Talal Asad’s conceptualization of Islam, discursive tradition and orthodoxy concept.

Finally, The Islamist discourse that analysed during fourth chapter will be evaluated in the framework of the research questions outlined before in conclusion section.

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<sup>24</sup> Salwa Ismail, (Winter, 2001), “The Paradox of Islamist Politics”, Middle East Report, No. 221pp. 34-39 p.36

## CHAPTER II

### THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF ISLAM

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)'s methodology is in the hermeneutic rather than in the analytical-deductive tradition. It is based on the interpretive and deconstructing reading. CDA does not present a single theoretical and methodological way. It does not propound a specific method for collecting and analysing data.<sup>25</sup> It depends on the research topic.<sup>26</sup> For that reason, Talal Asad's conceptualization of Islam and Ismail Kara's guideline have also been adopted to analyse Islamist discourse.

#### 2.1 Islam as a “discursive tradition”

This research wishes to analyse Islamist discourse as the dependent variable. For that reason, it is not adequate to use critical discourse analysis as the methodology since Islamic discourse creates a sui generis truth regime that is not possible to ignore its conceptualization. For that reason, the research uses the proposition of constructing Islam as a discursive tradition proposed by Talal Asad.

Foucault articulates *“Each society has its regime of truth, its “general politics” of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true”*<sup>27</sup>

From this point of view, I believe that while analysing discourses of people who produce Islamic truth in these magazines by describing themselves as Muslims or Islamists, a researcher cannot ignore that Islam produces its own regime of truth. Since Islam has its own “general politics” of truth, and the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements; the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth.

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<sup>25</sup> Teun A. van Dijk, (2001) Critical Discourse Analysis, “The Handbook of Discourse Analysis”, Edited by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, p.353

<sup>26</sup> Fairclough, N. L. and Wodak, R. (2011). Critical discourse analysis. In T. A. van Dijk (ed.), Discourse Studies. A Multidisciplinary Introduction, Vol. 2. Discourse as Social Interaction (p. 359). SAGE Publications.

<sup>27</sup> Paul Rabinow (editor) (1991) The Foucault Reader: An introduction to Foucault's thought, London, Penguin.

In order to analyse Islamist discourse, it is necessary to conceptualize Islam in that sense. Talal Asad's useful proposition makes this possible at this point. Between two different approaches that conceiving of Islam, that is, essentialist and anti-essentialist way, Asad conceptualizes Islam as a discursive tradition<sup>28</sup> by centralizing multiple Islams in a singular category. One of two approaches at stake, that is the Essentialist view, by ignoring the diversity of local Islams, sees Islam as fixed in every socio-historical context and as a universal category based on just foundational texts while the anti-Essentialist view pays its attention to only the heterogeneity of lived experiences of Islam.<sup>29</sup> At this point, against this problem that ignoring the diversity of lived experience of Islams in different socio-historical contexts by finding just a single Islam in scriptures and texts on one hand and making it difficult to conceptualize Islam because of its diversity on the other hand, Asad suggests the discursive tradition as a conceptualization that enables conceptualization of Islam. Asad explains tradition in this way:

*“A tradition consists essentially of discourses that seek to instruct practitioners regarding the correct form and purpose of a given practice that, precisely because it is established, has a history. These discourses relate conceptually to a past (when the practice was instituted, and from which the knowledge of its point and proper performance has been transmitted) and a future (how the point of that practice can best be secured in the short or long term, or why it should be modified or abandoned), through a present (how it is linked to other practices, institutions, and social conditions). An Islamic discursive tradition is simply a tradition of Muslim discourse that addresses itself to conceptions of the Islamic past and future, with reference to a particular Islamic practice in the present.”<sup>30</sup>*

Talal Asad propounds the concept of orthodoxy which is central to discursive tradition. He explains orthodoxy as “not a mere body of opinion but a distinctive relationship -a relationship of power to truth.”<sup>31</sup> He underlines the central position of orthodoxy, “*wherever Muslims have the power to regulate, uphold, require, or adjust correct practices, and to condemn, exclude, undermine, or replace incorrect ones, there is the domain of orthodoxy.*”<sup>32</sup> Asad suggests in that sense that “*one (who wants to study on Islam) should begin, as Muslims do, from the concept of a discursive tradition that includes and relates*

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<sup>28</sup> Talal Asad (2009) “The idea of an anthropology of Islam”, *Qui Parle*. 17 (2), 1–30

<sup>29</sup> Ovamir Anjum (2007) “Islam as a discursive tradition: Talal Asad and his interlocutors”, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*. 27 (3), 656–72

Mohammed Sulaiman (2018) “Between text and discourse: Re-theorizing Islamic orthodoxy”, *ReOrient* Vol. 3, No. 2 (Spring 2018), pp. 140-162

<sup>30</sup> Talal Asad (2009) “The idea of an anthropology of Islam”. *Qui Parle*. 17 (2), p.20

<sup>31</sup> *ibid* p.22

<sup>32</sup> *ibid* p.22

*itself to the founding texts of the Quran and Hadith.*"<sup>33</sup> However, that Asad underlines the importance the founding texts of Islam does not mean that he considers the textual Islam as fixed, monolithic, determinative, and essential as Essentialists do. That Asad's emphasis on the orthodoxy that centralizes the foundational text, that is Quran and Hadith, does not close the door to recognizing that orthodoxy is open to change.

Therefore, the relationship of a Muslim with the Quran and Hadith is not determinative but interpretive in his understanding.<sup>34</sup> Since Muslims' relationship with the foundational texts can differ under the different socio-historical contexts.

Ovimir Anjum clears up the matter,

*"This subject, a Muslim, by definition relates to these texts through interpretation, argument, and even manipulation but may authentically construct a variety of social and political understandings. While not everything said or done by Muslims is part of an authoritative Islamic discourse, it is not limited to the juristic or theological disputations among the specialists. Increasingly, especially with the coming of the printing press and now the Internet, ordinary Muslims contribute to the discourse about what is correct Islamic belief or practice."*<sup>35</sup> Therefore, Islamic traditions cannot be homogeneous, except for aspiring the coherence.<sup>36</sup>

However, I shall extend the scope of orthodoxy by following criticism voiced by Mohammed Sulaiman in my research. Sulaiman notes, "discourse is not reducible to the text, rather it includes textual and non-textual elements"<sup>37</sup> against the scope of orthodoxy limited with Qur'an and Hadith to determine discursive tradition. While Sulaiman accepts the exclusionary nature of a discourse that authorizes, regulates, and sanctions certain meanings, beliefs, and practices as true and Islamic and condemns and excludes others as false and un-Islamic (because there is a need for a base or, in his term, a nodal point to describe the discourse as Islamic), he highlights the event of the Divine Revelation as the founding

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<sup>33</sup> *ibid* p.20

<sup>34</sup> Ovimir Anjum (2007) "Islam as a discursive tradition: Talal Asad and his interlocutors", *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*. 27 (3), 656–72. p.667

<sup>35</sup> *ibid* p.667

<sup>36</sup> Talal Asad (2009), "The idea of an anthropology of Islam", *Qui Parle*. 17 (2), 1–30

<sup>37</sup> Mohammed Sulaiman, (2018), "Between text and discourse: Re-theorizing Islamic orthodoxy", *ReOrient*, 3(2), 140–162 p.146

moment of Islam that cannot be reduced to texts. However, in his opinion, this event is discursive and a nodal point of Islam that can be referenced as Islamic. *“as an event, it signifies the moment that inaugurates the Muslim collective community and which a Muslim is necessarily oriented toward and connected with. In other words, orientation toward the Divine Revelation does not strictly refer to direct textual engagement with the Quran and the Hadith.”*<sup>38</sup> In sum, while orthodoxy is necessary for *“capturing the process by which Islam is articulated in any given context through a complex set of discursive processes and hegemonic struggles,”*<sup>39</sup> However, it cannot be irreducible to only Qur’an and Hadith. From this point of view, for instance, it is possible to analyse referencing the Constitution of Madina within discursive tradition connected to the past. The Constitution of Madina is a document from Islamic history. There is no doubt about its reality since there are references to it in various sources.<sup>40</sup> Therefore, today, a discourse that referring to the constitution to prove that there is a pluralistic society case of Islam in history is an Islamic discourse at the same time. This means that it is possible to be Islamic even if it is not mentioned in Qur’an and Hadith.

## **2.2 A Guideline for Analysing Islamist Discourse**

While tracing discursive tradition by Talal Asad’s conceptualization, I believe that it is an obligation to underline risks articulated by İsmail Kara. The issue of this thesis is specifically Islamist discourse during the 1990s. Even if this period highlights the changing relationship of the modernity and Islamism as I will discuss below, Islamist discourse that encountered with modernity has some characteristics since the 19th century. The confrontation with modernity has created the changes both on the description and content of the concepts and the terms and on the hierarchies<sup>41</sup> of them while opening “sore in our consciousness” as I will illustrate in detail below. In such a psychology, while the Islamic discursive tradition that refers to address itself to conceptions of the Islamic past and future, regarding a particular Islamic practice in the present has been shaped in the historical context in reply to the existing issue, on

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<sup>38</sup> Mohammed Sulaiman, (2019),” Muslimness as a political formation: an inquiry into Muslim presence”, Social Identities, 1–17, p.8

<sup>39</sup> ibid p.157

<sup>40</sup> TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi- Turkish Religious Foundation Encyclopaedia of İslam <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/medine-vesikasi>

<sup>41</sup> İsmail Kara, (2015) “İçerdeki Öteki, Yakut Yabancılar İçerde” Sabah Ülkesi Dergisi, Sayı:42.

available at <https://www.sabahulkesi.com/2015/01/01/i/c3%a7erdeki-%c3%b6teki-yahut-yabanc%c4%b1lar-i/c3%a7erde/>

the one hand, the description, content, hierarchies of the concepts and the terms have been also changed in accordance the context on the other hand. A guideline outlined by İsmail Kara for Islamist discourse by considering risks is summarized as follows<sup>42</sup> (translation and emphasis mine)

1. Islamist discourse is modern –the connection with long historical process and tradition is weak–, modernizing (modernist), ideological (generalizing, reductionist, political), substantially a secular discourse in terms of both period and content as a natural consequence of being a product of modernization process.

2. The thing that makes Islamist discourse is trumpet-tongued towards its followers is that it expresses a resistance and emancipation movement; it heralds i’la-i kalimatullah, jihad against kufr, the struggle against nafs, the fight against usurpers and cruels, the aid and the cooperation with all Muslims and also shahada that is key to jannah.

3. While the one aspect of Islamist discourse is intended to answer, refuse, amend and correct Western claims and criticism towards Islam, the other aspect is directed towards Muslims and the existing conception of Islam.

Islamist discourse towards Western claims and criticism

- Islam already involves everything good, beautiful, and true; If there is a thing as good, beautiful, and true out of Islam, it cannot be thing Islam would refuse it.
- All values and qualifications that make Europe is victorious such as reason, science, technology, toleration, industriousness, democracy, justice, all things were inherited from Islam to Europe.
- Westerners sometimes knowingly or sometimes unknowingly confuse the image of Islam that is formed in time with true Islam, which is not a true way to understand it.
- It is a fact that Europe progressed in the material sense. However, in terms of moral values, it is broken down.

Islamist Discourse towards Muslims and the existing conception of Islam.

- The religion is fouled with superstitions, old wives’ tales, epics, Isra’iliyyat. The imperious political regime (authoritarian, totalitarian, and despotic) and an obedient and meek society in question

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<sup>42</sup> İsmail Kara, (ekim-aralık 2001) “İslamcı Söylemin Kaynakları ve Gerçeklik Değeri Üzerine Birkaç Not”(A Few Notes on Sources of Islamist Discourse and Its Truth Value) İslamiyat Dergisi, Sayı 4, Cilt 4, , s. 37-53

- A social structure and relationship forms that is unproductive, inactive, impassive, just focusing on afterlife
- A social life in which men and women, Muslim and non-Muslim, free and slave are not equal in terms of legal, politic and status
- A mentality and the way of life that highlighting tawakkul<sup>43</sup>, sabr<sup>44</sup>, qader<sup>45</sup>, qana'ah<sup>46</sup> that imply passiveness instead of endeavour, ijtihad<sup>47</sup>, irade
- Scientific and philosophical development aborted in 12th century; There is nothing but a sense of science based on scholiums, footnotes, replications, memorizations, imitations and an archaic pattern of education that is not able to reproduce itself, not able to impose new issues
  5. The understanding of religion and Islam of Islamist discourse is the uniform and unitary in accordance with the main principles of modernist thought.<sup>48</sup>
  6. Islamist discourse has still a defensive character. This shows that it in essence is conservative rather than being constructive in new situations.

## 2.3 Islamism in the Social, Political and Intellectual Context of the Post-Cold War

### Period: Trends, Debates, Concepts

Francis Fukuyama in his famous article, named "The End of History?" published in The National interest in 1989, explained the process starting with the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 with these words, *"What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."*<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Trust. See Tawakkul

The Oxford Dictionary of Islam", Edited by John L. Esposito, Published by Oxford University Press, 2003 p.316

<sup>44</sup> Patience, See Sabr ibid p.271

<sup>45</sup> Destiny. See Jabr ibid p.153

<sup>46</sup> Contentment

<sup>47</sup> independent reasoning ibid p.134

<sup>48</sup> See also; Thomas Bauer, (2011) "Die Kultur der Ambiguität: Eine andere Geschichte des Islams", Berlin: Verlag der Weltreligionen, In Turkish: Thomas Bauer, (2019) "Müphemlik Kültürü ve İslâm – Farklı Bir İslâm Tarihi Okuması", Çev. Tanıl Bora, İletişim, İstanbul.

<sup>49</sup> Francis Fukuyama, (Summer 1989) "The End of History?", The National Interest, No.16

“The end of the history” has indicated a “new world order”<sup>50</sup> in which free-market economy and Western liberal democracy proclaimed its victory around the world even though it has reflected ambiguity and disorder in terms of the effects of the new unipolar world, the higher globalization process, religious fundamentalism and ethnic conflicts.<sup>51</sup>

The other argument that dominated the post-cold war period was generated by Samuel Huntington. The article’s title “The Clash of Civilizations?”<sup>52</sup> was firstly used in Bernard Lewis’ article titled “The Roots of Muslim Rage”<sup>53</sup> published in 1990. In the article, Huntington argues that the qualification of conflicts in “this new phase” would be cultural rather than ideological or economic and the clash of civilizations would dominate global politics.<sup>54</sup> Huntington determines major civilizations by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion and ranging them as Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization.<sup>55</sup> The fault line between Islam and the West seems crucial within fault lines between civilizations in his argument. Huntington highlights the fault line this way “the West’s next confrontation going to come from the Muslim world” by quoting from M. J. Akbar. Huntington goes further and quotes from Bernard Lewis *“We are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations? The perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the world wide expansion of both.”*<sup>56</sup>

On the other hand, Lewis warns the West against “surge of Muslim hatred” that is ultimately against secularism and modernism in his article.<sup>57</sup> The Muslim world as a whole is constructed as the other of the West in both articles. The Muslim world as the other is defined based on the objection to Western hegemony and Western concepts such as secularism, individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets. In fact, the reductionist arguments and overgeneralizations constituted by Huntington and Lewis mirror more transparently that

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<sup>50</sup> The term is used by George H. W. Bush, President of the U.S.A. in a speech given to a joint session of the United States Congress, Washington D.C. on 11 September 1990 available at <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/2217> George Bush Presidential Library And Museum

<sup>51</sup> E. Fuat Keyman, (Bahar / Spring 2006), “Küreselleşme, Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Hegemonya”, Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations Vol. 3, No. 9, Özel Sayı: Küreselleşme / Special Issue: Globalization pp. 1-20

<sup>52</sup> Samuel P Huntington, (Summer 1993), “The Clash of Civilizations?”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, pp. 22–49.

<sup>53</sup> Bernard Lewis, (September 1990, “The Roots of Muslim Rage” Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 266, No. 3. pp. 47–60.

<sup>54</sup> Samuel P Huntington, (Summer 1993), “The Clash of Civilizations?”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, pp. 22–49. p.3

<sup>55</sup> ibid pp.5-6

<sup>56</sup> Bernard Lewis, (June 15,1992) "The Roots of Muslim Rage," The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 266, September 1990, p. 60; Time. pp. 24-28

<sup>57</sup> Bernard Lewis, (June 15,1992) "The Roots of Muslim Rage," The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 266, September 1990, p. 60; Time,

"Islamic threat" is the new "Red Scare" against Western hegemony and its Western concepts in this period.

While the theses that glorify Western modernity and its concepts dominate in academic circles, multiple modernities as a new paradigm emerged in the 1990s in the modernization studies to challenge prevailing modernization theory and its Western nature. According to classical modernization theories,<sup>58</sup> modernity has appeared in Europe. It assumes that modernization would create convergence by wiping out cultural, institutional, structural, and mental differences in all countries thanks to the modernization process.<sup>59</sup>

Tradition and religion intrinsically contrast with modernity in this classical understanding.<sup>60</sup> However, multiple modernities has emerged against the view that is imposed by classical theories of modernization asserting that Westernization and modernity are identical and modernization creates unification and convergence. Multiple modernities is basically to accept that there can be many modernities and the possibility of multiple ways of modernization.<sup>61</sup> Multiple modernities paradigm does not consider that secularism, free-market economy and representative liberal democratic institutions as the inevitable products of the process of modernization.<sup>62</sup> Contrary to the classical understanding that prioritizes reason over religion and perceives religion completely as dogmatic, irrational and archaic, the paradigm does not argue that secularization is the necessity for modernity and accepts the possibility of religious interpretations that enable the compatibility with modernity.<sup>63</sup>

While it is widespread that Islamism is considered as a divergence from the classical understanding of modernization theories, it has found a place and reconsidered by different scholars in this new paradigm. Nilüfer Göle, one of these scholars, notes in her article "*neither Islam nor modernity can be taken as a static project; on the contrary, they are ongoing processes scrutinized continuously by human*

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<sup>58</sup> Largely based on Marx, Durkheim, and Weber's studies.

<sup>59</sup> S. N. Eisenstadt, (Winter, 2000), "Multiple Modernities", *Daedalus*, Vol. 129, No. 1, *Multiple Modernities* pp. 1-29  
Sbrael N. Eisenstadt and Wolfgang Schluchter, (Summer, 1998), "Introduction: Paths to Early Modernities?" *A Comparative View*, *Daedalus*, Vol. 127, No. 3, *Early Modernities* pp. 1-18

<sup>60</sup> Anthony Giddens (1990) "The Consequences of Modernity". Cambridge: Polity Press. p.109

<sup>61</sup> Gerhard Preyer, (2007), "Introduction: The Paradigm of Multiple Modernities", *ProtoSociology* 27: 5-18.

<sup>62</sup> Oğuzhan Göksel (2015) "Assessing the Turkish Model: The Modernisation Trajectory of Turkey through the Lens of the Multiple Modernities Paradigm" Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: <http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/11191/>

<sup>63</sup> *ibid* p.89

*interpretation and agency.*<sup>64</sup> Göle aims to show the new momentary images of Islamism and its fragments in the social reality to show its hybridized relationship with modernity instead of focusing on the political discourse, the textualized ideal and the collective will of the actors. Göle briefly claims that the relationship between Islamists and modernity has hybridized and cross-fertilised by tracing the consumption patterns, market rationality, and “individually lived experiences.”

The hybridised relationship of Muslim societies with modernity is also underlined in *Cultural Schizophrenia* written by Dariush Shayegan in 1989. While the book that is written at the beginning of the post-cold War period propounds incompatible arguments with multiple modernities paradigm in terms of adopting the idea that the West and its concepts are the yardsticks of the history on the one hand, it illuminates inventively the confrontation of non-West with the West by focusing on the mental distortions on the other hand. According to Shayegan, the Islamic World that is devoid of the qualitative discontinuities has a different paradigm from the West. In his opinion, “*the new ideas consequently find no natural point of attachment, they are crudely superimposed on a historically incompatible background which is quite unprepared to receive them, let alone incorporate them. This is the irremediable cause of the yawning gulf which constitutes a sort of open sore in our consciousness*”<sup>65</sup> as a result of not experiencing the historical discontinuities in non-West. Such a situation generates only patching and grafting in that sense. The grafting is worked through two ways that either a new modern discourse can be grafted onto an old content, which refers to Westernization, or an old traditional discourse can be grafted onto a new base, which refers to Islamization.<sup>66</sup> Hence, even though it seems as if Westernization and Islamization as two different operations are conflicting, in fact, they are the same thing. It is the distortion. The distortion basically refers to the disconnection with reality. The discourse is either modern or traditional. However, both of them do not accord with the reality. The base of both “grafted” discourse, indeed, is hybrid. This causes “mutilated outlook” in his view. On the other hand, Shayegan explicitly declares that modernity is a fact in the non-West, “*It is the purest fantasy to imagine that there remain any major cultural areas untouched by the successive waves of modernity. It is also the case that any thought of going back, any revival of fundamentalism in any form, is an illusion. Tradition, if it exists at all, cannot get back ontologically to its starting point in the pre-modern period: it is stuck for ever in post-modernity.*”<sup>67</sup> According to Shayegan, the disfigured modernity that is experienced in Muslim societies constitutes the fundamentalist form of Islam based on the idea that

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<sup>64</sup> Nilüfer Göle, (Winter, 2000), “Snapshots of Islamic Modernities”, *Daedalus*, Vol. 129, No. 1, *Multiple Modernities* pp. 91-117 p.94

<sup>65</sup> Dariush Shayegan, (1997) “*Cultural Schizophrenia: Islamic Societies Confronting the West*” Syracuse University Press” p.62

<sup>66</sup> *ibid* pp.76-77

<sup>67</sup> *ibid* pp.36-37

Islam is capable to organize everything. Instead, Shayegan offers that “*acquiring a measure of humility and free ourselves from the crazed egocentrism that lets us believe the world begins and ends with Islam.*”<sup>68</sup> This offer has indeed seemed consistent with the argument that Islamism in a new phase.

While discourses on “Islamic threat” have continued to dominate the Western academic circle and media in the post-Cold war period, on the one hand, the studies that examining Islam’s compatibility with modernity and its concepts and the arguments that claim Islamism has taken a new turn increased. Olivier Roy in his book named “The Failure of Political Islam” published in 1992 claims that there is an observable drift of political Islamism towards what he calls “neo-fundamentalism”.<sup>69</sup> Roy articulates that Islamism came to an end in terms of the failure of providing a comprehensive and consistent modal. He, foremost, undertakes to describe Islamism and explain its differences from both traditional fundamentalism and neo-fundamentalism in the book. Islamism, in his view, emerged as the manifestation of frustration of youth live in urban because of unemployment, poverty, uprootedness, crises in values and identities. It is basically an urbanized movement and a product of modern society. In his view, Islamism has emerged as the result of the manifestation of the frustration of youth living in urban because of unemployment, poverty, uprootedness, crises in values and identities. It is an urbanized movement and a product of modern society in this regard.<sup>70</sup> The adherers live with the values of the modern city-consumerism and upward social mobility.<sup>71</sup> They are educated in a “Westernized” environment<sup>72</sup> and re-socialised through the clubs, libraries, night classes, mutual aid, associations, and unions in these new urban spaces. Islamism is a modern movement in this regard. Furthermore, it approves the role of women in society and in the movement; women can appear in the public sphere with the invention of a new mode of dress (scarf, raincoat, gloves-basically a nunlike attire).<sup>73</sup> The implementation of sharia is not the sine qua non for Islamism differently from traditional and neo-fundamentalists.<sup>74</sup> On the other hand, Islamism is also modern in terms of the rejection of history and tradition. Islamists hold an understanding focusing on a single essence based on the age of the Prophet. Other Islamic experiences in history are considered as a deviation. Islam is considered as rational and capable to answer all the problems of the modern world in this understanding. Roy articulates this obsession “*All their literature insists on the rationality of religious prescriptions; this militant rationalism is a sign that modernity has worked its way into the very heart of Islamist discourse, which*

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<sup>68</sup> *ibid* p.29

<sup>69</sup> Olivier Roy, (1993) “The Failure of Political Islam”, translated by Carol Volk, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts p.75

<sup>70</sup> *ibid* p.53

<sup>71</sup> *ibid* p.3

<sup>72</sup> *ibid* p.21

<sup>73</sup> *ibid* pp.48-59

<sup>74</sup> *ibid* p.38

*is so rationalist that it ends up denying its own religious practices.*"<sup>75</sup> Roy underlines the paradoxical relationship of Islamism with modernity "*they borrow from the modernity the refusal to return to the real tradition in the name of an imaginary Tradition. They reject popular religious practice, the village, Sufism, philosophy. They themselves deny and undermine what is and was Muslim civilization and ensure the triumph of fast food (halal, of course-religiously correct), of jeans, Coke, and English. The urban culture (in the ethnological sense) of the Islamists strikingly resembles that of any modern Western suburb. And the reinvention of a vestimentary tradition that never existed (raincoats, gloves and scarves for women, beards and parkas for men) will not bring about a new authenticity. The Tehran of the mullahs has a very American look.*"<sup>76</sup> Islamism failed in this regard. It lost its old dazzling charm. However, this does not mean it cannot gain political victory. Olivier Roy articulates Islamism in this new phase at stake can has three strategies, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

It can entry into official political life; can reinvest in the social sphere, either on the level of mores and customs, or on the level of the economy; and can form the small groups either ultraorthodox religious movements or terrorist groups.<sup>77</sup> However, according to Roy, any Islamist political victory in a Muslim country would not invent new political forms but only superficial changes in customs and law.<sup>78</sup> Since it is basically based on "vicious circle." Roy illuminates, "*Islamic society exists only through politics, but the political institutions function only as a result of the virtue of those who run them, a virtue that can become widespread only if the society is Islamic beforehand.*"<sup>79</sup> In fact, what is important are virtuous Muslims. There is no sense of the Islamic state without virtuous Muslims. In addition to this fundamental reason, the other reasons why Islamism abandoned its political project are the loss of the Iranian model that struggling with economic problems and tribalism, the failure of terrorist or revolutionary efforts and the adoption by states of Islamic symbols, especially by Saudi Arabia that attempting to influence their activities and ideology in the direction of a more conservative neo-fundamentalism.<sup>80</sup> Islamism is in a phase towards neo-fundamentalism in that sense. Neo-fundamentalism, in Roy's understanding, differentiates from Islamism in terms of the aim for the political revolution, the insistence on the sharia, and the view on the women issue as a basis.<sup>81</sup> It focuses on filling daily life with morality and establishing the sharia rather than desiring for Islamic revolution. It denies the participation of women in political life. The discourse on the state gives its place to the

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<sup>75</sup> *ibid* p.21

<sup>76</sup> *ibid* pp.22-23

<sup>77</sup> *ibid* p.77

<sup>78</sup> *ibid* p. preface ix

<sup>79</sup> *ibid* p.60

<sup>80</sup> *ibid* p.76

<sup>81</sup> *ibid* p.36

discourse on society.<sup>82</sup> It is puritanical, preaching, populist, and conservative.<sup>83</sup> Neo-fundamentalism aims to create an authentically Muslim micro-society in society and to adapt the practices of Islam on daily life through preaching (da'wa) and the establishment of Islamized spaces, either in purely spatial terms (cities, neighborhoods) or in the practical considerations and networks (Islamic banks).<sup>84</sup> Therefore, while the desire for Islamic revolution is falling from power in this phase, Islamic symbols surround the society and the political discourse of the Muslims more than ever. The decline of political Islamism is synchronous with the rise of Islam as a social phenomenon.<sup>85</sup>

However, the failure of the political Islam thesis asserted by Roy is criticised by Salwa Ismail by the reason of equalising politics with only government and state. Shifting focus from the political project to the societal sphere does not mean that it is unpolitical in her view. The interventions in the public sphere on the grounds of morality are not independent of “political”.

In the contrary, according to her, “*Activism in the social sphere allows Islamists to consolidate power and to contest state power.*”<sup>86</sup> Instead, Ismail draws to attention the adaptability and resiliency of Islamism.<sup>87</sup> Islamism is not coherent and homogeneous. Islamist goals and objectives is redefined in accordance with historical context. It is cumulative and it does not vanish without a trace.<sup>88</sup> Furthermore, Ismail criticizes the declaration of the advent of post-Islamism from the thesis of the failure of Islamism. According to her, “Islamism as a process-and not just a project-remains a dynamic force.” She highlights the fact that Islamism is conditioned by political opportunities, changing social and political configurations and contingent identities does not mean the advent of post-Islamist period.

This understanding that asserts the failure of Islamism is criticised also by Ali Kaya and M. Hüseyin Mercan by proposing to use the concept of political. Two scenarios assumed by Olivier Roy that has attributed to Islamism, that is, “the Islamisation of society is only possible via the state first, and second, that the state will automatically assume an Islamic identity in the event that society, defended by a reformist wing, becomes Islamised”<sup>89</sup> are mainly state-centred. According to Kaya and Mercan, “Roy

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<sup>82</sup> ibid p.76

<sup>83</sup> ibid p.25

<sup>84</sup> ibid pp.79-81

<sup>85</sup> ibid p.78

<sup>86</sup> Salwa Ismail, (Winter, 2001), “The Paradox of Islamist Politics”, Middle East Report, No. 221 pp. 34-39 p.36

<sup>87</sup> ibid p.34

<sup>88</sup> ibid p.39

<sup>89</sup> Ali Kaya and M. Hüseyin Mercan, (2016) “Rethinking Islamism through Political” “Transformation of the Muslim World in the 21st Century”, edited by Muhammed Hüseyin Mercan, Cambridge Scholars Publishing pp.1-13 p.5

fails to realise the ontological character of political and addresses politics within a certain institutional entity alone”.<sup>90</sup> Instead, they propose the concept of “the political” to understand Islamism. From this point of view, Islamism cannot be considered as only state-centred. It is a fact that the abolition of the caliphate has enlarged the political thinking space of Islamists, which it is a natural result of the world order. However, in the view that the political means the process of creating the subject, Islamism cannot be reduced to only one aim, that is, capturing the state. It is not possible to declare the end or the failure of Islamism as long as the questioning of the existing order and political forms continues in order to create a “Muslim subjectivity”.

Asef Bayat is the one of the scholars who take the changes in the societal sphere of Muslims seriously with his analysis. In the fall of 1996, Asef Bayat joined the debate with the article titled “The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society”.<sup>91</sup> Bayat starts his conversation with an argument that Olivier Roy’s “the failure of political Islam” does not mean the end of Islamist activism and discourse. Since Islam dominates politics and discussions more than ever. Politics in Muslim societies is still religious. In addition to that, the opposition to present governments is still shaped in an Islamic tone. However, Bayat shares the idea that Islamism is in a new phase. He calls this phase as post-Islamism. With the reference to the Iran case, before clarifying post-Islamism, Bayat defines Islamism as “*a systematic attempt from above to Islamicize society and the economy*”<sup>92</sup>. Islam represents the social, economic, political and moral system as a whole that is capable of solving all problems of the world. “True Muslims” have the right to determine true Islam. According to Bayat, the “monopolization of truth” does not enable the coexistence of competing views or systems. Islamism is exclusivist and intolerant of pluralism in that sense.<sup>93</sup> Nonetheless, Bayat points out that the end of the war in 1988 and the death of Khomeini in 1989 have caused a new phase in Islamism. After the article that underlines the emergence of new phase as post-Islamism focusing on just societal trends of Iran rather than governmental level, Bayat extends his thesis scope with exceeding Iran case in the book published in 2007. Asef Bayat defines post-Islamism as both a condition and a project in the book. Post-Islamism represents a condition in which Islamism is exhausted, even among its once-ardent supporters in this view. Islamists have realized that the system they have tried to constitute is neither capable of running nor comprehensive. In his words, “*Continuous trial and error makes the system susceptible to questions and criticisms. Eventually, pragmatic attempts to maintain the system reinforce abandoning its underlying principles. Islamism becomes compelled,*

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<sup>90</sup> ibid p.6

<sup>91</sup> Asef Bayat, (2016) “The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society,” Critique: Critical Middle East Studies 9, pp. 43-52

<sup>92</sup> ibid p.44

<sup>93</sup> ibid p.45

*both by its own internal contradictions and by societal pressure, to reinvent itself, but it does so at the cost of a qualitative shift.*"<sup>94</sup>

Post-Islamism is a project at the same time and refers to "*a conscious attempt to conceptualize and strategize the rationale and modalities of transcending Islamism in social, political, and intellectual domains.*"<sup>95</sup> According to Bayat, Post-Islamism does not mean that it is anti-Islamic, un-Islamic or secular. It constitutes divergence with the main principles of Islamism by paying its attention to "rights instead of duties, plurality in place of singular authoritative voice, historicity rather than fixed scripture, and the future instead of the past."<sup>96</sup> Religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, Islam and liberty can be thought at the same time in this new phase. "*Post-Islamism strives to marry Islam with individual choice and freedom, with democracy and modernity (something post-Islamists stress), to achieve what some scholars have termed an "alternative modernity."* Post-Islamism is expressed in acknowledging secular exigencies, in freedom from rigidity, in breaking down the monopoly of religious truth. In short, whereas Islamism is defined by the fusion of religion and responsibility, post-Islamism emphasizes religiosity and rights."<sup>97</sup>

In his view, the emergence of post-Islamism does not mean the historical end of Islamism. Instead, it means the rise of a different discourse and politics in comparison to Islamism. Bayat articulates that the emergence of post-Islamism has been derived from, foremost, the contradictions and the failure of the present Islamic state, secondly, from social changes such as increasing literacy, urbanization, and the economic shift that has mobilized actors like the increased educated middle classes, the youth, increasingly literate women, and intellectuals that press for social and political transformation. Lastly, he indicates the global context in which post-Islamism gained.<sup>98</sup> In addition to local factors in which the Soviet Union collapsed, Bayat underlines the global context. He highlights the remarkable effect of Liberalism and globalization, thereby, languages of civil society, pluralism, and human rights that proclaimed its victory on the new phase of Islamism.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> Asef Bayat, (2007) "Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn", Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. p.11

<sup>95</sup> *ibid* p.11

<sup>96</sup> *ibid* p.11

<sup>97</sup> *ibid* p.11

<sup>98</sup> *ibid* p.97

<sup>99</sup> *ibid* p.102

Gilles Kepel is one of the scholars that subscribes to the idea that Islamism in a new phase. According to him, at the very end of the twentieth century, Islamism is quite different from Islamism's beginnings of the 1970s. Even though Islamism of the 1970s based on modern misconceptions about democracy, Islamic democracy in the new phase predicated the admixture of culture, and political and economic modernity.<sup>100</sup> Kepel reminds that Islamism was not able to gain a "dazzling" success despite of the quarter-century of existence based on Iran, Algeria, Sudan, Afghanistan cases. After the generations of the 1970s that adhered to religious activism, Islamism is in a new position. He notes "*Islamist movements and parties at the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century are striving to reinvent themselves as democratic movements, to denounce the repression they feel they have been victim to. They now invoke the universal rights of man instead of critiquing them with their own substitute version, and they support the previously decried values of the impious West, like freedom of expression and women's liberties.*"<sup>101</sup>

Olivier Roy in "Globalized Islam" published in 2004 revised his arguments in "The Failure of Political Islam." Roy recapitulates in the book that Islamism in a phase that looking for a closed, scripturalist and conservative view of Islam by losing its energy as a revolutionary and political project. Furthermore, he examines post-Islamism and globalised Islam in the book in light of de-territorialisation. According to Roy, the failure of political Islam does not mean the end of religious revivalism. The failure is about the unwillingness to show interest in the state. However, Islamisation continues in different forms. Islamists have entered the political arena of the nation-states by the political logic, national interest as a form of re-Islamization. They became nationalists rather than Islamists in the nationalization of Islamism process. That Islamists entered the political game in nation-states contributed to taking the relationship between religion and politics for granted as two different autonomous spheres.<sup>102</sup> Post-Islamism refers basically to the privatization of re-Islamisation in this regard.<sup>103</sup> Roy underlines that post-Islamism neither means the decline of religion in society nor the emergence of secular society. Instead, it is basically to accept that politics and interests are determinant over religion and perceive fragmentation of religious identity and authority.<sup>104</sup> This non-political re-Islamisation is related to individual practices. There are the references to Islam everywhere. Veiled women are in the streets and concerts, bearded men are at universities, religious symbols are everywhere. However, this shows nothing but the individualization of religiosity. Instead of focusing on only the Islamic factors in the re-Islamization process, Roy remarks on the changing relationship of a Muslim with his/her own religion. About the

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<sup>100</sup> Gilles Kepel, (Summer 2000), "Islamism Reconsidered: A Running Dialogue with Modernity," Harvard International Review, 26, 22-27 p. 27

<sup>101</sup> *ibid* p.26

<sup>102</sup> Olivier Roy, (2004) "Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah", New York: Columbia University Press p.81

<sup>103</sup> *ibid* p.97

<sup>104</sup> *ibid* p.3

relationship between modernity and Islam, Roy asserts that old fashioned dichotomies like tradition vs. modernity, religion vs. secularisation blurred in this new phase. On the other hand, it is an obligation to add the criticism of Salwa Ismail to re-Islamization interpretation of Olivier Roy who considers it as a sign of failure of Islamism and the advent of the post-Islamism. According to Ismail, his interpretation of re-Islamization based on the Islamic symbols which are deployed in other spheres of social life without necessarily having an Islamic meaning and are becoming banal by sharing common consumption style entails the idea of static and timeless beliefs and practices.<sup>105</sup> Ismail writes, “If religion is conceived as social and historical, then it must also be subject to change and transformation. In its interaction with social institutions, it undergoes redefinition. This same premise applies to Islamism.”<sup>106</sup> From this point of view, it is a necessity to accept the religious symbols considered as the signs of the hybridization have multiple and constantly changing meanings. For instance, the veiled women in the colorful types of dress wearing jeans or tights cannot be only considered as an indicator of the hybridization of Islam. On the other hand, it can also contribute “de facto Islamization of public space.”<sup>107</sup> For that reason, Ismail proposes different understanding; *“Roy is wrong to reduce Islamism and re-Islamization to contradictory impulses. To say that Islamism is political and re-Islamization is apolitical may only serve to cloud the fundamental issues at stake: those of domination and resistance. Comprehending contemporary Islamist thought and activity does not consist merely in opposing quietism to militancy or distinguishing the political from the apolitical in social phenomena with an Islamic cast. Rather than relying on these oppositions, we should identify the multiple levels of action and identity formation coexisting within the same movement.”*<sup>108</sup>

In light of these debates in the literature, this research aims to examine Islamist discourses and grasp the changing Islamism in the historical context through an Islamists magazine by taking criticisms at stake into consideration. For that reason, specifically, the discourses of Islamist intellectuals on Islamic state, democracy, thereby pluralism and women issue will be analysed.

The first concept I will trace in this research is the Islamic state. It is crucial since lots of scholars who study on Islamism define it in terms of the desire for the Islamic State, as I already illustrated. Asef Bayat in his post-Islamism understanding predicates the secularization of the Islamic state while stressing the maintenance of religious ethics in society.<sup>109</sup> The failure of political Islam articulated by

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<sup>105</sup> Salwa Ismail (Winter, 2001), “The Paradox of Islamist Politics”, Middle East Report, No. 221 pp. 34-39 p.38

<sup>106</sup> *ibid* p.38

<sup>107</sup> *ibid* p.38

<sup>108</sup> *ibid* pp.38-39

<sup>109</sup> Asef Bayat, (1996) “The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society,” Critique: Critical Middle East Studies 9. p.12

Roy, in fact, means the end of the desire for the Islamic state. Unlike scholars like Mawdudi, Qutb, Shariati who think that Islam is capable to answer all problems of the modern world, the new phase declares the impossibility or inessentiality of Islamic state despite the increased Islamic symbols and religiosity. As I highlighted before, this research acknowledges that Islamism is a dynamic force that generates different understandings and strategies in accordance with the changing political opportunities of the historical context. From this point of view, grasping the approaches of Islamists to Islamic state is the one of the best way to understand Islamism and its new understandings and strategies of this historical context.

The other concept is democracy. It is in the centre of the debates about the new phase of Islamism. For instance, post-Islamism as a term that refers to the new phase of Islamism most explicitly has been discussed through the compatibility of Islam with democracy. Political participation, freedom, toleration, human rights, identity, pluralism and equality increased their popularities in the post-cold War period that proclaimed the triumph of the liberal democracy. According to Esposito and Voll, the 1990s has caused the interaction of Islamism with state structures and existing political systems.<sup>110</sup> “The processes of democratization and of religious resurgence are both parts of this historical context. The discourse of democracy has become, in most societies, the dominant discourse of politics.”<sup>111</sup> Therefore, it was not possible to stay Islamism out of the process. The historical context has caused to intertwine Islamic revivalism with democratization in this regard. Esposito and Voll describes this intertwined relationship during 1990s with these words, “*Islamic awareness and activism has grown among the lower and middle classes, the educated and uneducated, professionals, students, and laborers, young and old, women and men. The emergence of modern, educated but more Islamically oriented professionals in society offers a political and social alternative elite that challenges the Western, secular presuppositions and lifestyles of many in the establishment. Members of this alternative elite presented their criticisms and demands within the context of a call for greater democratization, political representation, and respect for human rights.*”<sup>112</sup>

On the other hand, Vali Nasr describes this phase as “Muslim democracy” that growing since the last fifteen years. He explains the rise of Muslim democracy with the withdrawal of military involvement from politics, the rise of the Islamist middle class and the multiparty system that forces parties to follow

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<sup>110</sup> J. Esposito and J. Voll, (1996) “Islam and Democracy”, New York: Oxford University Press, pp.8-9

<sup>111</sup> *ibid* p.13

<sup>112</sup> *ibid* p.190

moderate policies.<sup>113</sup> According to Nasr, *“the future of Muslim politics is likely to belong to those who can speak to Muslim values and ethics, but within the framework of political platforms fit to thrive in democratic settings.”*<sup>114</sup>

As it is seen, democracy became a determinant under the effect of historical context of post-Cold war period. Thereby, it is impossible to think that Islamism could not generate its own discourse on democracy. For that reason, grasping the approaching way of Islamists to democracy is the one of the aims of this research.

Similarly, the women issue is not independent of the phase of Islamism. Veiling is one of the most prominent indications of being Islamic in the modern time. It is also a tool to reproduce dualities such as religious vs. modern, obscurant vs. progressive. However, it is modern as well as religious. It represents the acceptance of a new modern public sphere as well as the opposition to the ideal women image of modernity. The visibility of veiled Muslim women in the public sphere, taking education in modern schools, adopting modern consumption styles in the effect of the historical context have contributed becoming the old-fashioned dualities blurred. According to Roy, *“It is a common mistake to interpret any public expression of re-Islamization as a traditionalist backlash or a sort of political statement. Even if mainstream Islamic revivalism is conservative (albeit in concert with Western conservative values), it may also disguise trends that are more secular in character. Re-Islamization may encompass a wide range of motivations and meanings, and occurs alongside various and complex personal and collective strategies. It could be pure window-dressing in order to indulge safely in consumerism or entertainment, a way of combining modern activities and traditional social values.”*<sup>115</sup>

In addition to Roy, Göle highlights the other side of the coin, *“Women's participation in Islamist movements has had undesired consequences. Islamic politics enables Muslim women to participate in public life, to organize meetings, to publish articles, to establish associations, to abandon the private domestic sphere and its traditionally defined roles. Islamism serves as the legitimization of their public participation both in practice and in ideology. In practice, it justifies women's visibility in politics and public life through their devotion and contribution to the “Islamic cause”.*<sup>116</sup> It is fact that 1980s increased the visibility of Muslim women in public sphere such as at schools, universities, cafes, cinemas, concerts. As I mentioned above, the visibility of Muslim women in the new looks is considered

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<sup>113</sup> Vali Nasr, (2005) “The Rise of Muslim Democracy,” *Journal of Democracy* 16, pp. 13–27 pp. 17-19

<sup>114</sup> *ibid* p.20

<sup>115</sup> Olivier Roy, (2004) “Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah”, New York: Columbia University Press p.81p.219

<sup>116</sup> Nilüfer Göle, (Winter, 2000), “Snapshots of Islamic Modernities”, *Daedalus*, Vol. 129, No. 1, Multiple Modernities pp. 91-117 p.99

as an indicator of the new phase of Islamism. As Salwa Ismail says, “Veiling is a sign with multiple and constantly changing meanings.”<sup>117</sup> It is not ahistorical. For that reason, grasping Islamists discourse on the multiple and constantly changing meanings of the veiling in this historical context is crucial for this research.

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<sup>117</sup> Salwa Ismail, (Winter, 2001), “The Paradox of Islamist Politics”, Middle East Report, No. 221 pp. 34-39 p.38

### CHAPTER III

#### ISLAMISM IN THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF TURKEY

This research shall follow the definition of Islamism that is propounded by İsmail Kara as I remarked before. In this regard, Islamism is “*a movement including all the political, intellectual and scientific studies, researches, proposals and solutions dominated by activist, modernist and eclectic aspects in an effort to re-establish in the 19th and 20th centuries the dominance of Islam as a whole (belief, worship, morality, philosophy, politics, education ...) and to liberate Muslims and the Islamic world from Western exploitation, cruel governors, slavery and imitation and to ensure their civilization, unification and development*”<sup>118</sup>.

The history of Islamism is not independent of the historical context. For that reason, every Islamist discourse in every historical context bears the stamp of the political, economic and social features of its period. There is no doubt that it can be talked about Islamism in Turkey as an independent ideology with the end of the 1960s since it can keep its distance from the other ideologies, especially from nationalism and conservatism, compared to the past. However, it is a vital obligation to emphasize the effects of the Kemalist hegemony to portray the history of Islamism. Since Kemalism as the official ideology of the new nation-state has been dominated all institutional, social, intellectual, cultural and political realms of Turkey.<sup>119</sup> Therefore, the emergence of Islamism is, in fact, directly related to the politicization of Islam under the domination of Kemalism in the new nation-state. For that reason, it will be emphasized on the Kemalism’s structural changes during the one-party period that have broken the rooted and sedimented relationship between Islam and the state even though Islamism seems eclectic with nationalism and conservatism rather than independent ideology because of the intensive repression during one-party period. Even though the conditions that have led to the politicization of Islam is our major interest, the traces of Islamist discourse can be taken backer to at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century since this century witnessed the recognition of the superiority of the West. Therefore, as might be expected, Islamism can be seen on the ideas that were produced for the salvation of state due to identification of the salvation of the state and the salvation of the religion. For that reason, this research starts with the history of Islamism at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, as İsmail Kara did.

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<sup>118</sup> İsmail Kara, (1986) “Türkiye’de İslamcılık Düşüncesi, Risale Yayınları”, İstanbul. p.8  
p.s. Translation belongs to Ahmet Yasir Eren, used in “A Critique of Political Islam: The Turkish Model Case”  
available at [https://www.academia.edu/36291388/A\\_Critique\\_of\\_Political\\_Islam\\_The\\_Turkish\\_Model\\_Case](https://www.academia.edu/36291388/A_Critique_of_Political_Islam_The_Turkish_Model_Case)

<sup>119</sup> Tuncay Şur, (Mart, 2020) “Kemalizm’in re-doktrinizasyonu:1946-1980”, Birikim Sayı 371

### 3.1 Islamism at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century

The 19<sup>th</sup> century was a modernization century as well as the century of “ism”s. The transformation of Islam towards a modern ideology coincided with the modernization process in Ottoman Empire. The transformation process of Islam towards a modern ideology finds its roots in the various answers to famous questions of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century: Why Islamic world left behind? How can the state be saved? In this context, modernization was considered as an option to get rid of the situation in which the state experienced by accepting the victorious West. The confrontation with modernity caused the emergence of the new religious interpretations in order to show that Islam is compatible with the famous concepts of the period such as science, reason, freedom, equality, consultation, etc. rather than directly heralding the separation between state and religion at the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. According to the new understanding of Islam, the present understanding and practices of Islam was the root of the problem rather than Islam itself. The understanding which continues to be widely adopted today has desired going back to the sources of revelation and the model of the Prophet’s early companions -Al-Asr al-Saadah (Golden Age of Islam)- as “true Islam” by getting rid of tradition and wrong understanding of Islam.<sup>120</sup> Even though Islamists adopted a defensive attitude against Orientalists that have seen Islam itself as the main problem for the progress, on the other hand, they shared paradoxically the same negative attitude against the living Islamic understanding and Islamic tradition as the root of the problem.<sup>121</sup> However, according to Islamists, there was no doubt that Islam could not be an obstacle to progress, rationality, and science by accepting the advanced and lead position of the West. The reflection of this understanding can be found in intellectuals’ thoughts such as Sayyid Jamal ad-Din ‘al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Rida. Afghani defended the return to Qur’an only and reinterpreted verses in this way to prove the compatibility of Islam with science, rationality and, reform.<sup>122</sup> Similarly, Abduh and Rida highlighted

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<sup>120</sup> İsmail Kara, (2011) “İslam Düşüncesinde Paradigma Değişimi”, Mehmet Ö. Alkan (Ed.), Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce-Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet’in Birikimi içinde (234-265), Cilt.1, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, s.251

Antony Black, “The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present” Edinburgh University Press, Second edition 2011 p.281

<sup>121</sup> İsmail Kara, (2011) “İslam Düşüncesinde Paradigma Değişimi”, Mehmet Ö. Alkan (Ed.), Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce-Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet’in Birikimi içinde (234-265), Cilt.1, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp.238-239

<sup>122</sup> Based on Abd al-Qadir al-Maghribi’s reports, Sayyid Jamal al-Din "al-Afghani": A Political Biography, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1972. Pp.392-393

the reason and judgment and defended the return to sources of revelation.<sup>123</sup> On the other hand, Young Ottomans<sup>124</sup> discussed Western political concepts in light of Islamic principles during the Tanzimat reform era in accordance with the atmosphere of the period.<sup>125</sup> However, the reign of Abdulhamid II and his pan-Islamist policies caused the cleavages in intellectuals' previous thoughts that one can easily see Islamist, nationalist, and even secular aspects together.<sup>126</sup> Therefore, even though pan-Islamist sentiments that desire for the unity of Islam can be traced back, it was intensified and became the state's ideology during the reign of Abdulhamid II.<sup>127</sup> In other words, while Islamist discourse represented the demand for liberty, equality, fraternity and the constitutional administration, on the one hand, it also represented to squelch opponents and provide the union of Muslims in obedience to the Caliph Abdulhamid II on the other hand.<sup>128</sup> Hence, it is crucial to note that the usage of the religious discourses did not show consistency. It is not surprise to see that Islamist discourse can be seen in opposition sentiments against Abdulhamid II in this regard, for instance, İsmail Kara draws attention in his article to the increasing support of the ulema as a fragmented body rather than homogeneous for the opposition to Abdulhamid II and their participation in the İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti (the Committee of Union and Progress) movement.<sup>129</sup> Besides, leading Islamists such as Mehmet Akif Ersoy, Said Nurs-i, Mustafa Sabri Efendi, Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır supported the opposition to Abdulhamid II and discussed the prominent concepts of the period through the magazines and newspapers such as Sırat-ı Müstakim, Sebilurreşad, Beyan'ül-Hak, İttihad-ı İslam, Volkan. However, after the constitutional revolution of 1908, the adherents of constitutional administration separated into factions because of the policies of

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<sup>123</sup> Antony Black, (2011) second edition "The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present", pp.325-327

<sup>124</sup> p.s The concept of ittihâd-ı İslam (Union of Islam) was first used by Namık Kemal in the issue of Hürriyet newspaper dated on May 10, 1869. Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, Available at <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/ittihad-i-islam>

<sup>125</sup> Antony Black, (2011) second edition "The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present", pp.286

İsmail Kara, (2017) "İslamcıların Siyasi Görüşleri I: Hilafet ve Meşrutiyet," Dergah Yayınları, İstanbul. pp.22-24

Ira Lapidus, (2002) "A History of Islamic Societies," edition 2, Cambridge University Press, pp.460

Erik Jan Zürcher, "Turkey: A Modern History", third edition, pp.66

<sup>126</sup> Antony Black, (2001) First edition "The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present", pp.311

İsmail Kara, "İslamcıların Siyasi Görüşleri I: Hilafet ve Meşrutiyet," Dergah Yayınları,2017, İstanbul. pp.24

<sup>127</sup> Jacob M. Landau (1994), The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organisation, rev. edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press. pp.24

<sup>128</sup> İsmail Kara, (2017) "İslamcıların Siyasi Görüşleri I: Hilafet ve Meşrutiyet," Dergah Yayınları, İstanbul. pp.37-38

Mehmet Ö. Alkan, (2003) "Resmi ideolojinin doğuşu ve evrimi üzerine bir deneme", Cumhuriyet'e devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyetin Birikimi, 377-401

<sup>129</sup> İsmail Kara, (2005) "Turban and Fez: Ulema as Opposition", Elisabeth Özdalga (ed.), Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy (Londra: Routledge,)

İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti (the Committee of Union and Progress). The secular policies of the CUP caused the opposition of the religious circles.<sup>130</sup> However, like all government policies, the policies of the CUP were not steady. Even though Islamist discourse declined after the second constitutional period,<sup>131</sup> it began to be used again until the end of the Turkish war of independence due to the remaining only large Muslim population after losing all lands in the Balkans.<sup>132</sup> Since even though The CUP was considered the pioneer for Turkification policies, saving the integrity of the rest of the state, especially the Arab lands, was the main aim at the end of the day. For that reason, Islamist policies were maintained after the Balkan wars of 1912–13. Feroz Ahmad considers this process as a turning-point in ideology “from secular Ottomanism to Islamist Ottomanism” by force of historical reality.<sup>133</sup> He points out that the appointment of Islamist Said Halim Pasha as Grand Vezir and changing language policy on Arabic as examples of this changing ideology.<sup>134</sup>

This period has provided rich material in terms of legitimization of the prominent concepts such as the consultation, council, liberty, equality through Quran and Hadith. When examining the historical process from the discursive tradition perspective, we see the discursive tradition and the domain of orthodoxy were formed by reinterpreting the verses of Qur’an in order to legitimize these concepts in the historical context as a remedy to save state during Tanzimat (1839-1876) and Constitutional Eras.<sup>135</sup> For instance, in desiring for the constitutional administration, intellectuals highlighted mainly two verses and hadiths<sup>136</sup>; Surah Ash-Shuraa (Consultation) (42:38) “respond to their Lord; keep up the prayer; conduct their affairs by mutual consultation; give to others out of what We have provided for them”<sup>137</sup> and Surah Ali Imran (The Family of Imran) (3:159) “*By an act of mercy from God, you [Prophet] were gentle in your dealings with them— had you been harsh, or hard-hearted, they would have dispersed and*

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<sup>130</sup> Feroz Ahmad (1969) “The Young Turks: the Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish politics 1908–1914”, Oxford: Clarendon, p.42

<sup>131</sup> i.e Derviş Vahdeti who was convicted and executed because of the 31 March incident blaming İttihad ve Terakki (the Union and Progress) for changing their attitude on Islam with Second Constitutional period.

İsmail Kara, (2017) “İslamcılarının Siyasi Görüşleri I: Hilafet ve Meşrutiyet,” Dergah Yayınları, İstanbul. pp.37-39

31 March Incident was described as reactionary rebellion by İttihad ve Terakki

Mehmet Ö. Alkan, (2009) “Resmi ideolojinin doğuşu ve evrimi üzerine bir deneme”, Cumhuriyet’e devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyetin Birikimi, (ed) Tanıl Bora ve Murat Gültekingil, İstanbul. pp. 377-401 p.395

<sup>132</sup> Gökhan Çetinsaya, (2009) “İslâmî Vatansızlıktan İslâm Siyasetine”, Modern Türkiye’de Siyasî Düşünce-I, Cumhuriyet’e devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyetin Birikimi, Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyetin Birikimi, (ed) Tanıl Bora ve Murat Gültekingil, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp. 265-272 p.272

<sup>133</sup> ibid p.132

<sup>134</sup> ibid p.137

<sup>135</sup> İsmail Kara traces the discursive tradition of this period and the domain of orthodoxy in his seminal work. See; “İsmail Kara, “İslamcılarının Siyasi Görüşleri I: Hilafet ve Meşrutiyet,” Dergah Yayınları, 2017, İstanbul. pp.39-44

<sup>136</sup> İsmail Kara, (2017) “İslamcılarının Siyasi Görüşleri I: Hilafet ve Meşrutiyet,” Dergah Yayınları, İstanbul. pp.159-160

<sup>137</sup> The Qur’an, Oxford World’s Classics, translated by M. A. S. Abdel Haleem, Oxford University Press, 2004. p.14

*left you— so pardon them and ask forgiveness for them. Consult with them about matters, then, when you have decided on a course of action, put your trust in God: God loves those who put their trust in Him.*”<sup>138</sup>

İsmail Kara points out that Islamists highlighted Surah al Anfal Ayat 60 (8:60), “*Prepare whatever forces you [believers] can muster, including warhorses, to frighten off God’s enemies and yours, and warn others unknown to you but known to God. Whatever you give in God’s cause will be repaid to you in full, and you will not be wronged*”<sup>139</sup> in quest of new power during modernization process.<sup>140</sup> On the other hand, Surah Ali Imran (The Family of Imran) Ayat 103 (3:103) “*Hold fast to God’s rope all together; do not split into factions. Remember God’s favour to you: you were enemies and then He brought your hearts together and you became brothers by His **grace**; you were about to fall into a pit of Fire and He saved you from it— in this way God makes His revelations clear to you so that you may be rightly guided.*” was highlighted for desiring the unity of Islam.<sup>141</sup> In addition, Surah Al-Hujurat Ayat 10 (49:10) “*The believers are brothers, so make peace between your two brothers and be mindful of God, so that you may be given mercy*” was underlined for the Muslim brotherhood.<sup>142</sup>

### **3.2 The Politicization of Islam through the establishment of the new nation-state**

The radical implementations and regulations in the process of the transition to the nation-state have created cleavages in different areas. According to İsmail Kara, The republican experience after 1923 was not an expectable extension of the Ottoman modernization process, especially in terms of the relationship between religion and state. According to Kara, it was not the primary issue of bracketing Islam through the new interpretations or transforming the religious culture at the beginning of the Ottoman modernization process. The main aim of modernization was just the salvation of the state in this period. On the other hand, the identification of the continuity of the state with the continuity of Islam led to the attempt for the reconciliation between religion and modernization.<sup>143</sup> In other words, modernization did not mean contrast to religion at first. Moreover, modernization movements were

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<sup>138</sup> ibid p.46

<sup>139</sup> ibid p.114

<sup>140</sup> İsmail Kara, (2017) “İslamcıların Siyasi Görüşleri I: Hilafet ve Meşrutiyet,” Dergah Yayınları, İstanbul. p.27

<sup>141</sup> ibid p.29

<sup>142</sup> ibid p.31

<sup>143</sup> ibid p.27

religious movements at the same time.<sup>144</sup> As a part of the late Ottoman modernization process, Even the Turkish national struggle process had, not surprisingly, the pan-Islamist and pro-caliphate discourse.<sup>145</sup> The leading Islamists such as Mehmet Akif Ersoy, Eşref Edip Fergan played an active role in the process. The lots of people from ulama took part in the first parliament of Turkey that was existed from 23 April 1920 to 11 August 1923. Furthermore, As Mete Tunçay articulates, it was gone further during this period in terms of the political use of religion in comparison with the Ottoman period.<sup>146</sup> For instance, Friday sermon (khutbah) of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk at the Zagan Pasha Mosque in Balıkesir was including the religious discourse. However, later, the ideology of the new Republic have bracketed Islam and Muslimism in the words of Ismail Kara.<sup>147</sup> Thus, Islam began to represent the contrast to the West and modernity after 1923. The three main amendments that were promulgated on 3 March 1924 were a decisive role in the relationship between religion and state; the abolition of the caliphate, the abolition of the Ministry of Sharia and Pious Foundations, and the enactment of the Law of Unification of Instruction (Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu). In addition to these amendments, the various regulations enforced by Kemalist ideology have deepened the cleavage not only in terms of the relationship between religion and state but also the marginalization of the living Islam in society. The regulations, as I will address below, have shown that the new regime aimed at eliminating Islam not only from the public space but also from the new Turkey.<sup>148</sup>

The fundamental characteristic of modernization project imposed by Kemalist ideology was based on the antagonism between Islam and the West. In other words, it was impossible to be modern with Islam. According to Salman Sayyid, Kemalist ideology used four elements on the way to bracket Islam and construct the new nation-state: laicism, nationalism, modernization, and westernization.<sup>149</sup> In the first strategy, laicism did not mean only “separation of state from the institutions of Islam but also the liberation of the individual mind from the traditional Islamic concepts and practices.”<sup>150</sup> According to Kemalist ideology, laicism was the major element of modernization. In order to reach this main element,

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<sup>144</sup> İsmail Kara, (2011) “İslam Düşüncesinde Paradigma Değişimi”, Mehmet Ö. Alkan (Ed.), Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce-Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet’in Birikimi içinde (234-265), Cilt.1, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, s.234

<sup>145</sup>İsmail Kara, (2017) “İslamcıların Siyasi Görüşleri I: Hilafet ve Meşrutiyet,” Dergah Yayınları, İstanbul. p.24

<sup>146</sup> Mete Tunçay, (2009) “İkna (İnandırma) Yerine Tecebbür (Zorlama)”, Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, C.2, Kemalizm, İstanbul, p.92

<sup>147</sup> ibid p.28

<sup>148</sup> Bobby S. Sayyid (1997) “A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism”, London & New York : Zed Books p.64

<sup>149</sup> ibid p.64

<sup>150</sup> ibid p.64

three strategies were used. First, Islam was considered as a code of private ethics. Second, the hostile policy was re-cultivated against Islam through legislative programs. Last, Islam was constructed as the other to Kemalism. For that reason, Islam represented the constitutive outside of the Kemalist discourse.<sup>151</sup> Nationalism, as another element of the Kemalist project, was crucial to formulate a Westphalian nation-state by putting the multinational Ottoman model behind. This meant the discovery of “Turkish” as a political subjectivity at the same time. For that reason, “The Turkish History Thesis” was used by emphasising the Central Asia roots.<sup>152</sup> According to Sayyid, the new official history which ignored the Ottoman past constructed by the Kemalist project provided the collective memory by creating a new Turkish national identity.<sup>153</sup> Another element in the transition to modern nation-state articulated by Salman Sayyid was the modernization. According to him, the Kemalist project considered modernization as a project rather than a technique, unlike Ottoman reformers. Modernization was the main goal instead of being a step for the aim.<sup>154</sup> Finally, the last element was the Westernization for the Kemalist project. Kemalist ideology considered that being modern is identical to being Western. It had mimetic character in terms of being based completely on the West. For that reason, for Kemalists, it was not adequate to transform institutions. Daily life should have got its share from this process.<sup>155</sup> The East and the things that belong to the East were founded as the other of the West. Thus, all things that belonged to the East were archaic and the impediment to being modern. Islam represented the main character to be the Eastern at this point. Therefore, stressing the constitutive relationship between East and Islam provided Kemalists that de-orientalization would identify with de-Islamization.<sup>156</sup> Disposing of Islam would seem the best remedy for being Western in this regard.

The fundamental part we are particularly interested in is the effects of the Kemalist project on Islam. De-Islamization or the bracketing of Islam have brought along new challenges despite the sedimented and the rooted relationship between Islam and state. The history of the new Turkey is the history of these new challenges stemming from the breakdown of the sedimented and the rooted relationship, in my opinion. Salman Sayyid articulates the effects of Kemalism on the role of Islam in two aspects. According to him, the Kemalist project reactivated Islam. In other words, the contingency of Islam and its articulation with particular hegemonic structures became possible thanks to Kemalist interventions. Another one, the antagonism that was conducted between Islam and Kemalism, has prevented the

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<sup>151</sup> *ibid* p.65

<sup>152</sup> *ibid* p.66

<sup>153</sup> *ibid* pp.66-67

<sup>154</sup> *ibid* p.67

<sup>155</sup> *ibid* pp.67-68

<sup>156</sup> *ibid* p.69

dissolution of Islam. Islam was founded as the other of the Kemalist discourse that represents ant-modern, primitive, traditional. However, according to Sayyid, even though Kemalists did not depoliticize Islam, paradoxically, they politicized it by removing it from the centre of their constructions of political order<sup>157</sup>. Thus, this has led to the emergence of Islamism as the supreme challenge against the Kemalist hegemony.

### 3.3 Islamism during One-Party Period

Erik Jan Zürcher describes Turkey's government from the promulgation of the Law on the Maintenance of Order in March 1925 as "*an authoritarian one-party regime and, not to put too fine a point on it, a dictatorship.*"<sup>158</sup> Republican People's Party dominated Turkish politics as the only power from this date forward. State and party became the same thing day by day. The top-down, Jacobin interventions and regulations regarding secularizing and modernizing society encountered unsurprisingly resistance in society. However, The Independence Tribunals became the primary tool to quell these oppositions and resistances. Under the Law on the Maintenance of Order, nearly 7500 people were arrested and 660 were executed.<sup>159</sup> Furthermore, the legitimacy of this suppression process was ensured by Mustafa Kemal's The Speech (Nutuk).<sup>160</sup> The Speech dominated Turkish politics and the official history and ensured Kemalist hegemony. In such a situation, it was not a surprise that there was no remarkable opposition against the Kemalist hegemony until the Second World War.<sup>161</sup>

Even though the 1924 constitution assured that the Great National Assembly of Turkey is the only source of power, delegates' voting in the assembly was the outcome of the (closed) meetings of the parliamentary party, and the voting process was the formality. Parliamentary elections were held in every four years during this period. However, it had only the ceremonial qualification. The slates of candidates for parliamentary seats were determined by the chairman of the party, the executive chairman and the secretary-general. Then, these slates were approved by the party congress. Thus, there was no opportunity that citizens could get into parliament democratically.<sup>162</sup>

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<sup>157</sup> *ibid* p.73

<sup>158</sup> Erik Jan Zürcher, (2004) "Turkey: A Modern History". London and New York: I. B. Tauris. p.176

<sup>159</sup> *ibid* p.173

<sup>160</sup> *ibid* pp.174-175

<sup>161</sup> *ibid* p.176

<sup>162</sup> *ibid* pp.176-177

Zürcher indicates that the secularization efforts imposed by Kemalists was implemented in three areas during 1925-1935 years. *“The first was the secularization of state, education and law: the attack on the traditional strongholds of the institutionalized Islam of the ulema. The second was the attack on religious symbols and their replacement by the symbols of European civilization. The third was the secularization of social life and the attack on popular Islam it entailed.”*<sup>163</sup>

The abolition of the sultanate and caliphate, then, the proclamation of the republic and the new constitution in 1922–24 represented the apogee of the process of secularization of state, education and law. In addition, the clause that made Islam the state religion of Turkey was purged from the constitution in 1928. Ulama no longer had control over family law with the adoption of the Swiss civil code and the Italian penal code in 1926. The forming of associations on a religious basis was banned on the strength of this penal code. The Law on the Unification of Education in March 1924 provided the secularization of the educational system. Religious colleges like medreses were removed. Instead, theological faculty and imam hatip schools were founded. As an important step in the way of secularization of the state, the Ministry of Sharia and Pious Foundations and the function of Şeyhülislam were abolished. However, after that, that Diyanet İşleri Müdürlüğü (Directorate for Religious Affairs) and the Evkaf Umum Müdürlüğü (Directorate-General for Pious Foundations) were established. It proves the state control of religion in the new state rather than aiming at the western-style laicism based on the separation of the religion and the state.

In Zürcher’s categorization, the second area of the secularization efforts constituted the attack on religious symbols and their replacement by the symbols of European civilization. The fez was outlawed for men in 1925. Instead of traditional headgear, hat and cap were brought as new and legal headwear for men. Wearing veil also became the symbol of the archaism, primitivity and anti-modernity. Also, the presence of women with modern attire in public sphere was encouraged. The clergy were also banned from using their various titles, and all other Ottoman titles such as efendi, bey, and paşa were also outlawed.<sup>164</sup> Turkey’s Surname Law was accepted in 1934. With the decree of 1935, Sunday became the official day of rest instead of Friday. In addition, The Western clock and calendar in 1926, Western numerals in 1928 and Western weights and measures in 1931 were adopted. These amendments gave new Turkey European image and made its work easier on the subject of disconnecting from the Islam world. In line with this purpose, as a drastic step, the Latin alphabet was adopted in 1928. “Turkish historical thesis” was also adopted which refers Turks’ Central Asia roots by preferring to ignore Ottoman period. According to Zürcher, this was one of the aims to construct a new national identity

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<sup>163</sup> ibid p.186

<sup>164</sup> Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, (2005) “Turkish Dynamics: Bridge Across Troubled Lands”, p.57

and strong national cohesion.<sup>165</sup> Last one was the secularization of social life and the attack on popular Islam it entailed. According to Zürcher, “Kemalists now touched such vital elements of popular religion as dress, amulets, soothsayers, holy sheikhs, saints’ shrines, pilgrimages and festivals”.<sup>166</sup> This caused that Kemalists cut ties with the mass of people. This had the supreme effect on the transformation of Islam to tool of the opposition and resistance in comparison with the other steps. The proscription of Dervish orders (tarikats) which has importance of Muslims in daily life was the one of these vital elements of daily life of Islam. Since they had the importance during Ottoman period in terms of being a network source of the cohesion, protection and social mobility. The proscription caused that the Tarikats had gone underground. The call to prayer (ezan) in Arabic was replaced by Turkish one. This meant also the nationalization of Islam. In order to transmit these amendments to rural, which they were substantially effective on the urban, “People’s Rooms” and “Village Institutes” were constituted.

These all drastic and rapid amendments to impose the state and the society being modern, laic and national naturally put a different complexion not only on the rooted relationship between Islam and state but also daily life of the society. The emergence of Islamism as a challenge and the politicization of Islam was the expectable result of this turnaround. However, even though this period witnessed the politicisation of Islam, Islamism as an ideology and movement was naturally weak. There was no remarkable political opposition or religious publishing.<sup>167</sup> In such an oppression condition I illustrated, Islamism showed its face mainly under the cover of nationalism and conservatism.<sup>168</sup> However, according to Kara, this form of the nationalism and the conservatism differs from the nationalism based on the ethnicity or on the history that emphasizes pre-Islamic period such as “Turkish historical thesis”. This type of nationalism and conservatism in which Islamism resided during this period particularly underlined Muslim Anatolian history, Seljukian and Ottoman periods. From this point of view, producing ideas through the history, tradition, historical figures enabled intellectuals to criticize Kemalist ideology in some ways.<sup>169</sup> Since these were the concepts Kemalists preferred to ignore and unget. However, the Islamist opposition against Kemalist ideology had indirect and moderate characteristics rather than being strong, radical and direct in the atmosphere of repression. The development of Islamism was neither intellectually equipped to preserve the essence of religion nor powerful to open up to secular one and face the challenges from it in that sense.<sup>170</sup> This situation is also

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<sup>165</sup> Erik Jan Zürcher, (2004) “Turkey: A Modern History”. London and New York: I. B. Tauris. p.191

<sup>166</sup> *ibid* p.192

<sup>167</sup> İsmail Kara, (1998) “Şeyhendifinin Rüyasındaki Türkiye”, Kitabevi Yayınları”. p. 258.

İsmail Kara, (1985) “Cumhuriyet Türkiye’sinde Dini Yayıncılığın Gelişimi Üzerine Birkaç Not.” Toplum ve Bilim, sayı: 29/30 (Bahar-Yaz), p. 154.

<sup>168</sup> İsmail Kara, (2013) “Türkiye’de İslamcılık Düşüncesi ve Hareketi Üzerine Birkaç Not”, Türkiye’de İslamcılık Düşüncesi ve Hareketi: Sempozyum Tebliğleri, (İstanbul, 17-18-19 Mayıs 2013), ed. İsmail Kara ve Asım Öz. 15-43. İstanbul: Zeytinburnu Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları. pp.27-28

<sup>169</sup> *ibid* p.28

<sup>170</sup> Ahmet Çiğdem, (2005) “İslamcılık ve Türkiye Üzerine Notlar”. In Y. Aktay, T. Bora, & M. Gültekin (Eds.), Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık (2nd ed., pp. 26–33). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

related to the attempt of the state for controlling religion through formal institutions such as Diyanet İşleri Müdürlüğü (Directorate for Religious Affairs) and imam hatip schools. These institutions have contributed the interpretation of religiosity in accordance with the framework formed by Kemalist ideology rather than constituting independent *intelligentia*.<sup>171</sup>

The process with the end of the Second World War brought along unrest on several counts in new Turkey for against İsmet İnönü's government. Economic issues, inflation, insufficient infrastructure services, the central state's effective control over the countryside, the Varlık Vergisi (wealth tax) accompanied with jakobin laicism policies, which have already affected the relationship between state and society. The increasing unrest was towards Republican People's Party as well as the state because of the identification of both.<sup>172</sup> Besides, the government needed American political and military support and the Marshall Plan. That is why Turkey had to adopt the political and economic ideals such as democracy and free enterprise cherished by the Americans.<sup>173</sup> Thus, democratization was a remedy towards the increasing unrest and external pressures. In this moderation process, Şemseddin Günaltay who can be called as Islamist became prime minister in 1949 was seen as a gesture toward pious people in society.<sup>174</sup> Religious-education lessons were added to curriculum as elective course at the fourth- and fifth-grade levels in 1949. The Ankara University Faculty of Theology was opened in the same year. In addition, some of the tombs and shrines (*türbeler*) that had been closed since 1925 were allowed to reopen in 1950.<sup>175</sup> These developments clearly showed the increasing moderation to religious one before the transition to multi-party period.

Because of developments both in the international area and in the country, Demokrat Party (Democratic Party) was officially founded on 7 January 1946 and won 53.4 percent of the vote against the RPP's 39.8 per cent by using the slogan; "Enough! Now the people have their say" in the elections of 14 May 1950 despite the moderation process. This meant the new stage not only for the Turkish political history but also Islamism.

Under the influence of the increasing unrest in society and external pressures towards the single-party administration, this period allowed Islamism to criticise to some extent Kemalist ideology and its policies especially through magazines and journals.<sup>176</sup> For instance, *Journal of Sebilürreşad* that was

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<sup>171</sup> *ibid* p.31

<sup>172</sup> Erik Jan Zürcher, (2004) "Turkey: A Modern History". London and New York: I. B. Tauris. p.208

<sup>173</sup> *ibid* p.209

<sup>174</sup> Necdet Subaşı (2005) "1960 Öncesi İslâmî Neşriyat: Sindirilme, Tahayyül ve Tefekkür", *İslamcılık Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce*, s. 217-231, İstanbul: İletişim. p.225

<sup>175</sup> *ibid* p.226

<sup>176</sup> İsmail Kara, (2013) "Türkiye'de İslamcılık Düşüncesi ve Hareketi Üzerine Birkaç Not", *Türkiye'de İslamcılık Düşüncesi ve Hareketi: Sempozyum Tebliğleri*, (İstanbul, 17-18-19 Mayıs 2013), ed. İsmail Kara ve Asım Öz. 15-43. İstanbul: Zeytinburnu Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, p.28

closed down with the promulgation of the Law on the Maintenance of Order in March 1925 began to issue again in 1948. Hareket Journal that started publishing in 1939 by Nurettin Topçu became a prominent voice during the repression period in terms of using marginalized concepts such as ethics, responsibility, duty, truth, consciousness, infinity, eternity, faith, will, altruism.<sup>177</sup> Even though Islam was not mentioned too much in the early issues with the effect of the period, the religious issues and debates were seen much more with the transition to multiple-party period.<sup>178</sup> On the other hand, Büyük Doğu (The Great East) that was published by Necip Fazıl Kısakürek since 1943 was a leading representative of the strong opposition to Kemalist ideology even regarding its title. Moreover, Necip Fazıl reformulated Islam as a harsh ideology.<sup>179</sup> His personality and influential rhetoric has become effective on the Islamism and religious people in Turkey. The newspaper gradually adopted clearer and more contentious opponent discourse with the multiple-party period.<sup>180</sup> These examples were important in terms of showing the sprouting of Islamism during this period. Even though this period allowed Islamism to criticise to some extent Kemalist ideology and its Westernization policies, it cannot be mentioned longing for the caliphate or the sultanate. On the contrary, the republican administration was adopted for Islamists.<sup>181</sup> Analysing Islamist discourses during this period is not included in the scope of this thesis, however, the fundamental characteristic of Islamist discourse in this context was the eclectic especially on nationalism and conservatism. Furthermore, Islamism adopted anti-communist attitude in the bipolar world which provided it a convergence with the right, even paradoxically with Kemalist ideology.<sup>182</sup> Burhanettin Duran explains this eclectic feature of Islamism with its Sunni aspect. Sunni Islam prioritizes the state in terms of its constitutive relationship with religion and ummah.

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<sup>177</sup> Necdet Subaşı, (2005) “1960 Öncesi İslâmî Neşriyat: Sindirilme, Tahayyül ve Tefekkür”, *İslamcılık Modern Türkiye’de Siyasî Düşünce*, s. 217-231, İstanbul: İletişim. p.224

<sup>178</sup> *ibid* p.224

<sup>179</sup> Burhanettin Duran (2005) “Cumhuriyet Dönemi İslâmcılığı: İdeolojik Konumları, Dönüşümü ve Evreleri” Aktay, Yasin (Ed.), *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasî Düşünce*, Cilt-6 (İslamcılık) (2.b.) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları): 129-156. p.139

<sup>180</sup> Necdet Subaşı (2005) “1960 Öncesi İslâmî Neşriyat: Sindirilme, Tahayyül ve Tefekkür”, *İslamcılık Modern Türkiye’de Siyasî Düşünce*, s. 217-231, İstanbul: İletişim. p.225.

<sup>181</sup> Burhanettin Duran (2005), “Cumhuriyet Dönemi İslâmcılığı: İdeolojik Konumları, Dönüşümü ve Evreleri” Aktay, Yasin (Ed.), *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasî Düşünce*, Cilt-6 (İslamcılık) (2.b.) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları): 129-156. p.133

<sup>182</sup> Ömer Laçiner, (2005) “İslamcılık, Sosyalizm ve Sol”, (Ed.) Tanıl Bora- Murat Gültekinil, *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasî Düşünce*, Cilt-6 (İslamcılık) (2.b.) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları): 469-475. p.470

According to this understanding, even laic-secular state is indispensable to protect interests of Muslims and Islam.<sup>183</sup> This understanding has been determinant on the Islamist opposition during these years.

### **3.4 Islamism in the Rule of the Democratic Party, 1950–60**

The victory of Democratic Party (DP) was the manifestation of the years in which there were oppression, economic problems, inflation, and insufficient infrastructure services. After the accession to power, Democratic Party started with efforts of cutting the identification of the Republican People's Party (RPP) and the state. The victory of DP by 408 seats in the parliament against the RPP's 69 in the election of 1950 and then by 503 seats against RPP's 31 in the elections of 2 May 1954 enabled to consolidate its power. For that reason, DP considered that representing majority gave it absolute power and legitimacy to do whatever it deemed necessary.<sup>184</sup> However, the bureaucracy, the army and intellectuals did not seen in this majority.<sup>185</sup> After the victory, first few years were the years of the economic booming, liberal free-market economy, the cheap credits to the farmers, the encouragement of the foreign investment, new roads. Everything was being seen well than before. However, the economic problems, unplanned urbanization, soaring inflation showed its face after 1954. According to Zürcher, "*The Democrats' basic problem was that they tried to do too much too quickly and with insufficient means at their disposal.*"<sup>186</sup> Furthermore, the growing authoritarianism accompanied with all these developments. As a result of these, while the RPP increased its number of seats from 31 to 178, DP's the number of seats decreased from 503 to 424 in the election of 1957. The opposition naturally increased its pressure on the DP with assurance of the election of 1957. On the other hand, intolerant and authoritarian attitudes was increasing against the opposition. In such a condition, the investigatory commission was established to investigate the activities of the opposition. This escalated the tension in the country. As a result of these developments, the military seized control of power on 27 May 1960 and arrested all DP ministers and deputies, including Menderes and the president of the republic, Celâl Bayar.<sup>187</sup>

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<sup>183</sup> *ibid* p.130

<sup>184</sup> Erik Jan Zürcher, (2004) "Turkey: A Modern History". London and New York: I. B. Tauris. p.222

<sup>185</sup> *ibid* p.224

<sup>186</sup> *ibid* p.228

<sup>187</sup> *ibid* p.240

When we look at the laicism policies of the state, it is the fact that the rigid laicism policies of Kemalists was loosened to some extent during this period. Reciting Ezan (The prayer call) was allowed in Arabic again in every mosque. The number of imam hatip schools (preacher schools) and mosques increased. The sale of religious literature was allowed again.<sup>188</sup> However, the loosening on the rigid policies had been already started with the transition process to the multi-party system, as I mentioned above. According to Zürcher, “RPP itself became more tolerant of religion after the seventh party congress in 1947. It reintroduced elective religious education in schools and training establishments for preachers. Ankara University announced the establishment of a Faculty of Divinity and in 1949 the tombs and shrines (*türbeler*) were allowed to reopen.”<sup>189</sup> However, while DP was blaming RPP as communists and unbelievers, RPP was blaming DP for using religion for political purposes and for damaging the secularist principles of the state during the 1957 elections.<sup>190</sup> In fact, there was nothing new for Turkey style of laicism in terms of the control of state over religion. Nevertheless, it was the fact that the relative loosening laicism policies caused anxiety on the majority of the educated elite especially including civil servants, teachers and academics and military, which were faithfully devoted to Kemalist dogmas.<sup>191</sup> According to them, there were indicators to prove these concerns right. It was the period in which tarikats (religious order) such as Risale-i Nur (The epistle of light) or Süleymanlılar (followers of Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan) emerged. In addition, Nakşibendi tariqa which has a deep-rooted history in this territory revived its activities.<sup>192</sup> These formations started to engage with formal religious institutions of the state. İsmail Kara articulates that the attitude of these religious formations towards the spreading official religious understanding through Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) and imam hatip schools (preacher schools) contain sometimes adverseness and sometimes compliance in regard of having legitimacy and making use of being official.<sup>193</sup> In addition this developments, the urbanization, industrialisation and migration that begun to develop in this period would be determinant on the future of Islamism. Pious families would become more visible in urban, their children in universities, their capital in economy.

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<sup>188</sup> *ibid* p. 233

<sup>189</sup> *ibid* p.233

<sup>190</sup> *ibid* p.232

<sup>191</sup> *ibid* p.234

<sup>192</sup> İsmail Kara, (2013) “Türkiye’de İslamcılık Düşüncesi ve Hareketi Üzerine Birkaç Not”, Türkiye’de İslamcılık Düşüncesi ve Hareketi: Sempozyum Tebliğleri, (İstanbul, 17-18-19 Mayıs 2013), ed. İsmail Kara ve Asım Öz. 15-43. İstanbul: Zeytinburnu Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, pp.27-28 p.30

<sup>193</sup> *ibid* p.30

### 3.5 Period of the Intellectual Islamism: 1960–80

After the military coup, National Unity Committee (Millî Birlik Komitesi) was established under presidency of General Cemal Gürsel and was started works for making new constitution. Then, the ban on the political activity was lifted in order to hold the election in 1961. In the meantime, new parties were formed. The most prominent one among these was the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi), which was seen as a continuation of DP. New constitution was accepted by the referendum on 9 July 1961. According to Zürcher, “The new constitution was more liberal than the old one in the sense that it tolerated a wider spectrum of political activity than before, both to the left and to the right.”<sup>194</sup> This did not instantly cause the emergence of Islamist parties and formations. However, the former repressive policies of Kemalists was not maintained. On the contrary, it was made an effort for spreading the modern, rationalist religious understanding through the formal religious education, the publication of ‘enlightened’ sermons by The Directorate for Religious Affairs. Thus, the religion was in control of the state.<sup>195</sup>

On the other hand, this period witnessed the increase in the number of translations of new intellectuals from the Islamic world such as Sayyid Qutb, Hassan al-Banna, Abu al-A'la al-Maududi, Ali Shariati. These translations had an important impact on new Muslim people in Turkey. According to İsmail Kara, the most important one was that these translations prompted new Muslim people to think that they should adopt different religious understanding from ordinary Muslim people. Furthermore, this new understanding led new Islamists to separate from the former nationalist and conservative frame.<sup>196</sup> The fundamental characteristic of this new religious understanding, which we can call Islamism, under the influence of new translations from the new intellectuals around other Muslim societies was adopting the return to main sources. The desire for the Islamic state became prominent goal during the late 1960s and especially 1970s. Translations that highlight that Islam has its own holistic system were carried out in this direction.<sup>197</sup> According to Kara, this new understanding was inclined to new Salafism and Wahhabism. In addition, it was an activist, radical, having intense political demands, opposite to the regime, supporter of the jihad. Its connection is weak not only with the history of the Republic but also

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<sup>194</sup> Erik Jan Zürcher, (2004) “Turkey: A Modern History”. London and New York: I. B. Tauris. p.246

<sup>195</sup> *ibid* p.247

<sup>196</sup> Yücel Bulut, (2013) “Türkiye’de İslâmcılık ve Tercüme Faaliyetleri” Türkiye’de İslâmcılık Düşüncesi ve Hareketi: Sempozyum Tebliğleri, (İstanbul, 17-18-19 Mayıs 2013), ed. İsmail Kara ve Asım Öz. 339-369 İstanbul: Zeytinburnu Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları. p.362

<sup>197</sup> *ibid* p.363

with the Ottoman History. This new understanding considers the history of Islamism as limited to Egypt, Pakistan, and then Iran. Thus, it stands aloof from traditional Islam, thereby, from Islamic Sufism, tariqats, and jamaats. Instead, it is the Ummah-oriented, trumpet-tongued, tumescent, demandant, challenging, and is partly exclusionary because of using the concepts of takfir and shirk.<sup>198</sup> That is why Ismail Kara defines this period (1960-1980) as the period of Radical and Intellectual Islamism.<sup>199</sup> On the other hand, the one of the crucial magazines, *Diriliş*, for Islamism in Turkey started to publishing in this period. Unlike the other Islamists such as Hareket and Büyük Doğu that are connected with nationalism, *Diriliş* became prominent with its emphases for the concept of civilization that has more Ottomanist and the ummah-oriented character.<sup>200</sup> On the other hand, it differs from the radical Islamist understanding of the period in terms of its emphasis for the tradition.<sup>201</sup> Thus, this developments caused diversification of Islamism in Turkey. Under the influence of the 1961 constitution enabled favourable opportunities for political diversity, Islamism in the budding formally appeared in the political arena of Turkish history, as well.

The National Order Party (NOP) (Millî Nizam Partisi) was established in 1970 under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan. However, the party was banned by the Constitutional Court on 20 May 1971 on the grounds that the party acted against the political system determined by Kemalist ideology in the atmosphere of the military ultimatum of 12 March 1971.<sup>202</sup> The party was considered Islamist in view of its founding declaration that stresses concepts such as morality, interest-free order its slogans and the statements of Erbakan who declares that everyone could be a member of the party except masons, Zionists and communists.<sup>203</sup> However, according to Ruşen Çakır, the main problem of the NOP was not able to separate from the right in ideational sense and thus was obliged to adopt eclectic and heroic discourse. Thus, the NOP had all aspects at the same time: Ottomanist, the adherent of national independence, Islamist, and modernist in terms of developmentalist discourses.<sup>204</sup> After the closure of the party, the party was re-emerged under the name of the National Salvation Party (NSP) (Millî Selamet

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<sup>198</sup> İsmail Kara, (2013) “Türkiye’de İslamcılık Düşüncesi ve Hareketi Üzerine Birkaç Not”, Türkiye’de İslamcılık Düşüncesi ve Hareketi: Sempozyum Tebliğleri, (İstanbul, 17-18-19 Mayıs 2013), ed. İsmail Kara ve Asım Öz. 15-43. İstanbul: Zeytinburnu Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları. p.32

<sup>199</sup> ibid p.31

<sup>200</sup> Burhanettin Duran, (2013) “Türkiye İslamcılığında Medeniyet Söylemi ve Sezai Karakoç’un Düşüncesi, Türkiye’de İslamcılık Düşüncesi ve Hareketi Sempozyum Tebliğleri. s. 289-306 p.292

<sup>201</sup> ibid p.293

<sup>202</sup> Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, (2005) “Millî Nizam Partisinin Kuruluşu ve Programının İçeriği”, Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık, C.6, Ed. Tanıl Bora- Murat Gültekingil, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, C.6. pp.576-590, p. 579

<sup>203</sup> ibid p.576

<sup>204</sup> Ruşen Çakır, (2005) “Millî Görüş Hareketi”, Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık, C. 6, Ed. Tanıl Bora, Murat Gültekingil, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, pp. 545-576 p.546

Partisi) in 1972. The ideology of the party, that is, Milli Görüş (National Vision) was based on five main principles; internal peace, the cohesion between the state and nation, the ground for “A Great Turkey Once Again”, the material development and the moral development.<sup>205</sup> From this date on, the NSP joined the short-term coalition governments. In addition, it was the period that Iran Revolution in 1979 caused accelerator and enthusiastic effect on Islamism not only in Turkey but also around the world. In the effect of the rise of Islamism, the NSP held a public demonstration in Konya named Kudüs (Jerusalem) shortly before the military coup on 12 September 1980. The Islamic confession of faith and various hadiths and verses were used as banner in this demonstration. After the military coup, the coup plotters defined the demonstration as the final straw.<sup>206</sup>

### **3.6 Islamism after 1980**

The crossroad that Islamism came after 1980 and the characteristics that it had in historical context are the major issue of this thesis. With the globalization that implies “the increasing connection between different social contexts or regions, the spreading of neoliberal economic reconstruction around the globe, the borderless international financial network and complicated communications and information technology<sup>207</sup>, Islamism was naturally a changing phenomenon in this changing world. Before scrutinizing Islamism in Turkey context, I will first turn my attention to the changing context of the world and its effects on Islamism, especially on the relationship with modernity. The globalization tendencies and its effects that have gradually taken hold of the world were not limited to only one realm. Various recent phenomena from the economic realm to cultural realm were influenced by this process, including the understanding of the modernity. This process led to the both homogenisation and fragmentation at the same time with some elements. While the increasing sensitivity to some values such as individualism, material values and consumerism caused homogenization among different societies on the one hand, the increasing emphasis on local actors, culture, identity, tradition, religion

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<sup>205</sup> Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, (2005) “Milli Nizam Partisinin Kuruluşu ve Programının İçeriği”, Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık, C. 6, Ed. Tanıl Bora- Murat Gültekingil, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları. p. 581

<sup>206</sup>S. Alpman Polat, Kudüs: Simidin Ortasındaki Boşluk, Birikim Dergisi, 21 December 2017, <https://birikimdergisi.com/haftalik/8662/kudus-simidin-ortasindaki-bosluk>

<sup>207</sup>Anthony Giddens (1990) “The Consequences of Modernity”, Cambridge: Polity Press. p.64

Ziya Öniş, (1997). “The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective”, Third World Quarterly, 18: 4. pp. 743–66. p.745

created fragmentation, on the other hand<sup>208</sup> Therefore, in such a context, the rigid modernity understanding based on the convergence was not supposed to remain same. Since the structural changes in family life, the economic and political structures, urbanization, modern education, mass communication, and individualistic orientations have gradually taken hold of the different societies around the world.<sup>209</sup> These elements reside in modernity have led to the challenges on the classical understanding of modernity that desires the convergence by wiping out cultural, institutional, structural, and mental differences in the non-West thanks to the modernization process. The effects of these modern elements in non-West entailed the hybridization with historical experiences, cultures, traditions. Thus, different trajectories that were held by different social, political, and intellectual actors and social movements are no longer seen as the divergence, and modernity is no more seen as equated with Westernisation. Thus, it was no surprise that Islamism that has been marginalized because of its anti-Western nature gained an advantage thanks to this new paradigm. However, it was not possible to suppose that Islamism would remain the same under the effect of these global tendencies and changes in the historical context. Islamism confronted with modernity and its elements more than ever in this globalization process, which is one of the fundamental consequences of modernity.<sup>210</sup> The structural changes in family life, economic and political structures, urbanization, modern education, mass communication, and individualistic orientations have expectably influenced Islamism, as is the case with different phenomena around the world.<sup>211</sup> Thereby, the confrontation with modernity led to various blurred and hybrid manners on Islamism. Arguments that were propounded by scholars such as Olivier Roy, Asef Bayat, Vali Nasr, Gilles Kepel, Nilüfer Göle, as I mentioned in the first chapter, attempted to examine the new phase of Islamism and grasp the hybrid manners in this new phase. These scholars have drawn the attention in this direction to the rise of Islamic capital, the inclusion of Islamists in the political system, the changing discourses of Islamists on democracy, pluralism and toleration, the

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<sup>208</sup> Ziya Öniş, (1997) “The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective”, *Third World Quarterly*, 18: 4, pp. 743–66. p.747

<sup>209</sup> S. N. Eisenstadt, *Multiple Modernities*, Daedalus, Vol. 129, No. 1, Multiple Modernities (Winter, 2000), pp.1-29

<sup>210</sup> Anthony Giddens (1990) “The Consequences of Modernity”, Cambridge: Polity Press. p.175

<sup>211</sup> S. N. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities”, *Daedalus*, Vol. 129, No. 1, Multiple Modernities (Winter, 2000), pp. 1-29

emphasis on religious ethics rather than the desire for the Islamic state, the hybrid re-Islamization forms, an increasing number of veiled women in campuses, cafes, cinemas etc.

In such a historical context, Turkey was not outside of the trends at stake. Turkey that started to 1980s with a destructive military coup –especially on democracy and human rights- entered quickly in the process of neoliberal restructuring with coming the Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party- MP), led by Turgut Özal to power alone in the general election of 1983. The party had the support of the former Justice Party, National Salvation Party and Nationalist Action Party.<sup>212</sup> However, the victory of the MP was substantially about Özal’s personality. He had the liberal, anti-statist, anti-bureaucratic image and was heralding a quick return to civilian order.<sup>213</sup> Also, he was on good terms with big business circles which aspire to liberalization. Furthermore, it was known that he had a relationship with Nakşibendi order.<sup>214</sup> Most of all, he appealed to an average voter in terms of his background and discourses.

It was the period of “the increasing dominance of economic liberalization”. The MP government took steps to liberalize further the Turkish economy and institutionalize free-market capitalism.<sup>215</sup> Privatization, decentralization, foreign investments, export-led growth were the principal features of Özal’s policies in the transition to market-oriented economy. However, MP could not maintain the wave in the economic success of the previous decade. Thus, neoliberal restructuring brought along its weaknesses. Income and wealth disparities, the high rates of inflation, unrestrainedly ongoing migration were on the table as the other side of the coin besides the initial economic success that caused a rosy picture in terms of the economic dynamism, the rising entrepreneurship, and the growing power of private capital, steadily integration into international markets.<sup>216</sup> Moreover, political fragmentation and, thereby, instability was added in this view with the return of the former politically banned leaders in 1987 through new parties.

Another crucial point that emerged in the effects of the globalization process was the situation of the nation-state. The state that lost gradually its authority on the economic activity by force of neoliberal restructuring begun to lose the ability to protect “the negative repercussions of these massive economic changes and shield the excluded from unfavourable consequences” at the same time.<sup>217</sup> In such a context, the weakening of the nation-state was not limited to the economic realm. These developments naturally led to a set of changes in politics and society, too. The politics of identity/recognition came to the fore

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<sup>212</sup> Erik Jan Zürcher, (2004) “Turkey, A Modern History”, 3rd edn, London, p.283

<sup>213</sup> Feroz Ahmad (1993) “The making of modern Turkey” (London: Routledge) p.190

<sup>214</sup> Erik Jan Zürcher, (2004) “Turkey, A Modern History”, 3rd edn, London, p.283

<sup>215</sup> Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, (2005) “Turkish Dynamics: Bridge Across Troubled Lands”, p.132

<sup>216</sup> Ziya Öniş, (1997) ‘The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective’, *Third World Quarterly*, 18: 4, pp. 743–66. p.751

<sup>217</sup> *ibid* p.745

in different forms such as the resurgence of Islam, the Kurdish question and the liberal claims to rights and freedoms.<sup>218</sup> Thus, Özal's period witnessed the rise of the remarkable visibility of Islamic currents from economic life to social and cultural life. Nilüfer Göle calls this period the emergence of Contemporary Islamism. One of the chief characteristics of the period was the rise of Islamic capital, which significantly has affected the visibility of Islam in different realms, from politics to culture and its relationship with modernity. Thanks to Özal's liberation policies, the 1980s created an opportunity for the Anatolian bourgeoisie in some provincial cities such as Kayseri, Konya, Yozgat, Denizli, Çorum, Aksaray and Gaziantep. Despite the lack of direct support from the government, the opportunities at stake triggered a process of production and capital accumulation in Anatolia with the opening of the economy to the outside.<sup>219</sup> Even though Motherland party's liberation policies created an opportunity for them, nevertheless, the inequality between smaller entrepreneurs and big companies was still problem. Thus, in its networking activities, Islam became a very useful resource by instituting a communal bond of mutual trust among provincial entrepreneurs.<sup>220</sup> In addition, "the massive inflows of Saudi capital into the country", "the establishment of interest-free banking that enabled the savings of religious persons to bring to these new banks and provided funds to the religious business circles not using banks for capital loans", the remarkable inflows of remittance of workers in Europe -especially from Germany-, "Islamic sects and religious community structures that carried out intra-community solidarity through donation and aid", the increasing of the Islamic-oriented media such as newspapers, magazines, and radio and television channels, the political inclusion especially through local administrations which I will mention below, contributed the rise of Islamic capital.<sup>221</sup> With these developments, in Ziya Öniş's words, "*by the 1990s Islamic networks had grown significantly in strength, establishing themselves as major actors on the economic scene.*"<sup>222</sup> The Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association (MÜSİAD) was established in 1990. The establishment of MÜSİAD was significant since there was no organisation to represent the provincial entrepreneurs before on such a scale. In contrast to Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TÜSİAD) members who were located in Istanbul and the surrounding Marmara region, MÜSİAD membership was distributed all over the country.<sup>223</sup> On the other hand, it was considered that they had different ideological camps.<sup>224</sup>

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<sup>218</sup> Fuat Keyman and Berrin Koyuncu. (2005), "Globalization, Alternative Modernities and the Political Economy of Turkey." *Review of International Political Economy* 12(1): 105–128. p.109

<sup>219</sup> Ömer Demir, Mustafa Acar and Metin Toprak, (Nov., 2004), "Anatolian Tigers or Islamic Capital: Prospects and Challenges", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 6 pp. 166-188 p.167

<sup>220</sup> Ayşe Buğra, (Apr. 2002), *Labour, Capital, and Religion: Harmony and Conflict among the Constituency of Political Islam in Turkey*, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 2 pp. 187-204 p.194

<sup>221</sup> Ömer Demir, (2005), "Anadolu Sermayesi ya da İslamcı Sermaye", *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşünce: İslamcılık C: 6*, ed. By Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, pp. 870-886.

<sup>222</sup> Ziya Öniş, (1997), "The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective", *Third World Quarterly*, 18: 4, pp. 743–66. p.758

<sup>223</sup> *ibid* p.758

<sup>224</sup> Seda Demiralp, (2009) "The Rise of Islamic Capital and the Decline of Islamic Radicalism in Turkey", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 315-335 p.321

While TÜSİAD was considered “a secular, Western orientation and the representative of big business in Turkey”, MÜSİAD was Eastern-oriented, the representative of the green capital. Besides this visibility of Islamic orientation in the economic realm, it may be remarked that this visibility can also be considered as an indicator of the blurred modernity because of “*producing the co-existence between Islamic identity and free-market ideology, supporting the exposure of Turkish economy and society to the globalized world, and acting as a pressure group that sees the possibility of creating a democratic and economically advanced Turkey in the process of European integration.*”<sup>225</sup>

Another crucial phenomenon that coincided with the rise of Islamic capital was the rise of the Welfare party during the 1990s that was established as a continuation of the former National Salvation Party after the military coup in 1980. These phenomena were not independent of each other. Despite the growing at stake, the provincial bourgeoisie was still disadvantaged compared to the major exporting companies. At this point, Necmettin Erbakan prompted this disadvantaged provincial bourgeoisie to cooperate “*by criticizing the privileged role of Istanbul-based conglomerates and "regionally uneven industrialization" in Turkey and succeeded canalize them under his party*”<sup>226</sup> Even though this period witnessed the erosion of the state’s sovereignty in economic activities, the state was still “a key distributor of economic rents to the private sector.”<sup>227</sup> Thus, in this period when the politicisation of state institutions and the weakening of the bureaucracy, “*direct contact with politicians became increasingly important for businessmen or private firms to achieve greater and preferential access to state resources.*”<sup>228</sup> In such a context, Welfare Party was seen as the political expression of this disadvantaged provincial bourgeoisie. However, this was the win-win relationship in one sense. The Islamic capital provided a major financial base for the Welfare Party on the other hand. According to Ziya Öniş, “*It is undoubtedly the case that, without the degree of financial resources available, the Welfare Party could not have found itself in a position to implement its unique organisational tactics, paving the way for the electoral success of the mid-1990s.*”<sup>229</sup>

On the other hand, in such a context, it is worth mentioning the moderation tendencies at the point in which the rise of Islamic capital and the rise of Welfare Party. Erbakan and his friends proposed the

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<sup>225</sup> Fuat Keyman and Berrin Koyuncu, (2005), “Globalization, Alternative Modernities and the Political Economy of Turkey.” *Review of International Political Economy* 12(1): 105–128. p.120

<sup>226</sup> Seda Demiralp,(2009), “The Rise of Islamic Capital and the Decline of Islamic Radicalism in Turkey”, *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 315-335 p.319

<sup>227</sup> Ziya Öniş, (1997), “The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective”, *Third World Quarterly*, 18: 4, pp. 743–66. p.752

<sup>228</sup> *ibid* p.752

<sup>229</sup> *ibid* p.757

“just order” project to offer an alternative interest-free economic model in 1985. However, this project was eclectic, complex and utopic.<sup>230</sup> The project referred to the third road between the free-market capitalism of the West and the state-controlled socialism of the former Eastern Bloc.<sup>231</sup> In this regard, the project was not independent of the neo-liberal restructuring years, just as the new name of the party; Welfare. On the other hand, the discourses of Necmettin Erbakan were also complex and inconsistent regarding Kemalist ideology and modernity. For instance, he openly declared that “If Atatürk were alive today he would undoubtedly vote for the Welfare Party (...) the things that were accomplished in Atatürk’s era are in accordance with our own beliefs.”<sup>232</sup> In addition these moderation tendencies, in Seda Demiralp’s words “*Islamist entrepreneurs dropped their support from more religiously framed Islamist agendas when they grew in size and became competitive in the more developed markets of western Turkey and Europe in the late 1990s. The departure of their politically most aggressive and financially most resourceful ally, the provincial entrepreneurs, left radical Islamists in the Welfare party without power.*”<sup>233</sup> Thus, Islamism was the fuller of paradoxes than ever, but also in the moderation.

Another crucial point in Turkey context was the reflection of the paradigm of multiple modernities. As mentioned above, the paradigm of the multiple modernities that has predicated that the different modernization trajectories cannot be considered as a divergence reinforced its effect on the academic circles and, thereby, gradually on the political realm. In Turkey’s context, these debates were discussed through the criticism of the Kemalist ideology that adopts that modernization is identical to Westernization. These debates that propounded by leading scholars contributed to Turkish academia such as Mete Tunçay, Erik Jan Zürcher, Şerif Mardin, Nilüfer Göle, Büşra Ersanlı-Behar, Taha Parla, Levent Köker during as from the beginning of 1980s is named as the paradigm of post-Kemalism by İlker Aytürk.<sup>234</sup> According to İlker Aytürk, the post-Kemalist paradigm emerged as a justifiable struggle for justifiable reasons.<sup>235</sup> There were some reasons that led to the emergence and the prevalence of this paradigm. The most important reason seems the military domination that has considered itself as the only representative and guardian of the Kemalist ideology and intervened in the politics for that

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<sup>230</sup> Ruşen Çakır, (İstanbul, 17-18-19 Mayıs 2013), “Milli Görüş Hareketi: Dün, Bugün, Yarın”, Türkiye’de İslamcılık Düşüncesi ve Hareketi: Sempozyum Tebliğleri), ed. İsmail Kara ve Asım Öz. 755-776. İstanbul: Zeytinburnu Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, 2013. pp.764-766

<sup>231</sup> Ziya Öniş, (1997), “The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective”, Third World Quarterly, 18: 4, pp. 743–66. p.754

<sup>232</sup> TURKEY’S ISLAMISTS: FROM POWER-SHARING TO POLITICAL INCUMBENCY p.73 Erbakan: ‘Çiller boşuna çırpıyor’, [Çiller is struggling pointlessly], Milliyet, 23 February 1994

<sup>233</sup> Seda Demiralp, (April 2009), “The Rise of Islamic Capital and the Decline of Islamic Radicalism in Turkey”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 41, No. 3 pp. 315-335 p.316

<sup>234</sup> See for arguments by İlker Aytürk in “Post-post Kemalizm: Yeni bir paradigmayı beklerken”, (2015), Birikim, 319, pp. 34-48 available at [https://www.academia.edu/19569728/Post\\_post\\_Kemalizm\\_Yeni\\_Bir\\_Paradigmay%C4%B1\\_Beklerken](https://www.academia.edu/19569728/Post_post_Kemalizm_Yeni_Bir_Paradigmay%C4%B1_Beklerken)

<sup>235</sup> ibid p.35

reason.<sup>236</sup> On the other, mentioned scholars have abraded the hegemony of the Kemalist ideology and its official narrative by daring to criticize it with intellectual studies.<sup>237</sup> The other reason that has enabled strengthening the post-Kemalist paradigm was the coalition of the Islamists, liberals, a part of the left and Kurds against the Kemalist hegemony.<sup>238</sup> On the other hand, there were certain external factors that contributed the rise of post-Kemalist paradigm such as globalization process, the negotiating for EU membership, the effect of post-modernism, the communication revolution, the period of neoliberalism, the end of Cold War, the breakdown of Middle East Order with The Gulf Wars, the effects of the criticisms on Orientalism by Edward Said, Subaltern Studies.<sup>239</sup> With these internal and external factors, *“all person and movements that are out of the Kemalist narrative, is inimical to it, is opponent to it, that are ignored and hostilized because of de-tuning it became favourite topic of the post-Kemalist academia.”*<sup>240</sup> At this point, Islamists found themselves in privileged positions to speak out in the period of the rise of “the others” with the end of the Cold War. Despite the eclectic aspects of Islamism from time to time, especially with nationalism and conservatism, as I mentioned above, Islamism has always been considered as the other against military guardianship. Religious one can easily represent as the other against Kemalist ideology because of its identification of modernization with the West. In this regard, reactionism as a concept despite its different meanings has been provided to the military guardianship of the Kemalist ideology a tool to legitimate the labelling of the religious one as the other or hostile during Turkish political history.<sup>241</sup> However, in the effect of the post-cold War context in which liberal democracy proclaimed its victory, the increasing attraction to some concepts such as democracy, human rights, pluralism, and toleration created a yardstick also for Islamists. Thereby, it was no surprise that debates were conducted by Islamist intellectuals through these concepts. Analysing Islamist discourses in this historical context, which I summarized in this chapter, is the major aim of this thesis. Hence, the fourth chapter will try to analyse Islamist discourse in paradoxes.

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<sup>236</sup> ibid p.35

<sup>237</sup> ibid p.35-36

<sup>238</sup> ibid p.36

<sup>239</sup> ibid p.37-38

<sup>240</sup> ibid p.38

<sup>241</sup> Bekir Berat Özipek (2005), “İrtica Nedir?” Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 6 / İslamcılık. Ed. By Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp.236-244.

#### IV. THE REPRESENTATION OF ISLAMISM IN “BİLGİ VE HİKMET”

Bilgi ve Hikmet is a convenient magazine to analyse the new phase of Islamism and Islamist discourse. The magazine was published between 1993 and 1995 as twelve issues. During this period, its average selling was between 3000 and 5000.<sup>242</sup> The leading writers and academicians of the period wrote in the magazine. These were Ali Bulaç, Abdurrahman Arslan, Ömer Çelik, Kadir Canatan, Ergün Yıldırım, Eyüp Köktaş, Mustafa Aydın, Ali Coşkun, Düccane Cündioğlu, Davut Dursun, Rasim Özdenören, Mehmet Bekaroğlu, Ömer Dinçer, Kenan Çamurcu.

According to Ferhat Kentel, through issues of the magazine, the magazine mainly tries to find an answer to the question that was formulated in its first issue. It discusses on the question of how can Islam (sacred texts -Qur'an, hadiths-, tafsir, Islamic law, past practices, tradition, etc.), how it can be experienced, how it can be interpreted, and how the fragmentation created by the modern world in human beings can be overcome in the tangible world and modern society by putting modernity, tradition and the relationship between them at the center.<sup>243</sup> Kentel indicates the concept of “surpassing” to determine the base line of the magazine. Thus, this concept is formulated outside of the protestantized / secularized modernist Islamist line which is compatible with modern structures on the one hand, and outside of the “political Islamist” line that competes and conflicts with modern structures on the other hand by making a reference to “transcendental”. Moreover, it means transcending modernity and responding to the modern world. From this point of view, according to Kentel, the discourse of the magazine is mainly inward-oriented. That is to say, the main aim is to re-establish the community of Islam.

Despite this, it is hard to say that the magazine follows the traditional line in intellectual sense. According to Islamists, the tradition should also be surpassed since it has the risk of “becoming same”.<sup>244</sup> On the other hand, as a crucial feature, Bilgi ve Hikmet does not experience the process of February 28<sup>245</sup>. That is why the intellectual perception stemming from this process has not reflected on the

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<sup>242</sup> Ferhat Kentel, (2005) “1990’ların İslâmî düşünce dergileri ve yeni Müslüman entelektüeller : Bilgi ve Hikmet, Umran, Tezkire” (Ed.) Tanıl Bora- Murat Gültekingil, Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, Cilt-6 (İslamcılık) (2.b.) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları): 721-781. p.729

<sup>243</sup> ibid p.730

<sup>244</sup> ibid p.734

<sup>245</sup> The postmodern coup of February 28, 1997 in Turkey.

magazine.<sup>246</sup> However, the traces of the period have been explicitly seen in the magazine. The most important one is “the coexistence with differences.” The problems stemming from modernity, in fact, apply to Muslims. Responsibility is related to Muslim, as well. However, the seeking for the dialog has motivated the magazine to look for the common ground with people from different ideologies, backgrounds, philosophy of life. That is why the magazine is remarkable since it is the most article-issuer by writers and academicians out of the Islamic movements. The leading writers and academicians who cannot be called as Islamist such as Ali Bayramoğlu, Tanıl Bora, Kemal Karpat, Ferhat Kentel, Ömer Laçiner, İştâr Tarhanlı, Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, Günter Seufert, Binnaz Toprak, Mümtaz’er Türköne have written in the magazine.<sup>247</sup>

#### 4.1 The Preface of Bilgi ve Hikmet

The first issue of Bilgi ve Hikmet was published by the title of “İslam’ın Modern Dünyaya cevabı nedir? (What is the answer of Islam to the modern world?)”. The preface of Bilgi Hikmet written by Ali Bulaç that starts with “basmala” says a lot about the issue on which this research would like to focus. Ali Bulaç in the preface articulates the main aim of the magazine;

*“The magazines are the vehicle in which information production occurs in the modern times. However, this is the situation in which the functional one takes precedence over the aim. In fact, magazines are sort of volunteer, inherently civil schools that educate and raise the cluster in the core circle, then reader in the second circle, and the large mass in the last circle.”*<sup>248</sup> Bulaç highlights the importance of the magazines such as Sırat-ı Müstakim, Sebilürreşad, Büyük Doğu, İslam Medeniyeti, Diriliş, Hareket, Düşünce, Maveria, İlim ve Sanat, İslami Araştırmalar Dergisi, Yönelişler and Kitap Dergisi by drawing the attention to the rich inheritance of Islamic knowledge and irfan (wisdom, awareness). From this point of view, Bulaç adds *“Our aim is to add to our rich tradition one more circle rather than being competitor or alternative to ones.”*<sup>249</sup> In addition, Bulaç articulates the near future goals referring to the

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<sup>246</sup> Ferhat Kentel, (2005) “1990’ların İslâmî düşünce dergileri ve yeni Müslüman entelektüeller : Bilgi ve Hikmet, Umran, Tezkire” (Ed.) Tanıl Bora- Murat Gültekingil, Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, Cilt-6 (İslamcılık) (2.b.) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları): 721-781. p.730

<sup>247</sup> ibid p.734

<sup>248</sup> The original text: “Modern zamanlarda bilgi üretiminin gerçekleştiği araçlar olarak dergiler birer taşıyıcıdır. Ancak bu, fonksiyonel olanın amacın önüne geçtiği bir durumdur. Gerçekte ise dergiler, çekirdek halkada toplanan bir kümeyi, ikinci geniş halkada okuru ve son halkada geniş bir kitleyi eğiten, yetiştiren birer okul, gönüllü, kendinden, sivil mekteplerdir.”

<sup>249</sup> The original text: “Amacımız birilerine alternatif veya rakip olmak değil, zengin geleneğimize bir halka daha eklemektir.”

relationship with modernity. *“It is possible to comprehend what we aim in the near future through the name of our magazine we chose and the period we determined. First of all, putting the modernity and its all derivatives and domains that reduce knowledge to scientific knowledge that is a particular kind of the knowledge and eradicate hikmah (wisdom) from the life of human’s knowledge, intellectual and irfan (wisdom) on the agenda is the one of our main targets.”*<sup>250</sup> In addition, as this research would like to focus on, Bulaç clearly indicates the new phrase not only for Islamic world but also for Turkey in the new interdependent world. Bulaç writes, *“We are in the period when the world is re-established, the current concepts swiftly become old-fashioned by being eroded and all things from the politics to culture, from economy to the form of social relations are reorganized. We see that concepts and tools we have are mostly insufficient. The mobility is experienced in the religious resurgence one the one hand, on the other hand there is no strong alternative to modernity neither Christian-Jewish Sphere nor realms where Islam struggle with. There is no doubt that it is not because of Islam, which it is the authentic and real alternative, but because of the views of Muslims and Islamists who locate Islam according to modernity against the modern world. It appears that insisting on this view comes to nothing than whistling in the wind at present and also it will not work in the future. We think that there is a serious mistake and it is time to reconsider and review it.”*<sup>251</sup>

As it is seen that the preface shows the Islamist desire for offering an alternative to modernity by finding concepts which can challenge to the modernity in the new phase of the world. In this way, Bulaç articulates that the problem is not only applied to Muslims but also all people who discern that all things are stopped up and look a way for that. In the direction, Ali Bulaç invites intellectuals from all strata with Muslims for finding a way out who share the same mission. For that, Bulaç writes, *“Because apart from those who assume that modernism cannot be surpassed, nobody is not sure about any secular ideology and doctrine as before. We think that we should enter into the mutual discussions under the common grounds, into the mutual exchange of ideas and into the dialogues regardless of their political*

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<sup>250</sup> The original text, “Yakın vadede neyi amaçladığımız dergimize seçtiğimiz isim ve belirlediğimiz perioddan anlamak mümkün. En başta bilgi’yi, bilginin özel bir türü olan bilimsel bilgiye indirgeyen ve insanın bilgi, entelektüel ve irfan hayatından hikmet’i söküp atan modernite ve modernitenin bütün türev ve etkinlik alanlarını gündeme getirmek ana hedeflerimiz arasında yer almaktadır.”

<sup>251</sup> Dünyanın yeniden kurulduğu, geçerli kavramların hızla aşınıp gelenekselleştiği ve siyasetten kültüre, ekonomiden sosyal ilişkiler biçimine kadar herşeyin yeni baştan harmanlandığı bir zamandayız. Elimizdeki kavram ve araçların çoğunlukla yetmediğini görüyoruz. Bir yandan dini uyanış alanında büyük bir hareketlilik yaşanırken, öte yandan ne hristiyan ve yahudi dünyasında ne de resmi İslam’ın mücadele verdiği katlar ve katmanlarda moderniteye sahici alternatifler çıkmıyor. Bu, kuşkusuz özünde sahici ve gerçek alternatif olan İslam’dan değil, fakat onu modern dünya karşısında moderniteye göre konumlandırılan müslüman ve İslamcılarının bakış açısından kaynaklanmaktadır. Öyle anlaşılıyor ki bu bakış açısında daha fazla ısrar etmek, boşa kürek çekmekten başka bir sonuç vermiyor, verecek gibi de görünmüyor. Bizce ortada ciddi bir yanlışlık var ve bunun üzerinde durup düşünmenin, bir çok şeyi gözden geçirmenin artık zamanıdır.”

view, philosophy and ideology by following Hanifs<sup>252</sup> in pre-Islam period and hadith of the Prophet Muhammad who says “; those who were best in Jahiliyyah (Pre-Islamic Period of Ignorance) are best in Islam”<sup>253</sup> For that reason, we are opening the pages of our magazine to them.”<sup>254</sup>

## 4.2 The Perceptions of Modernity

Modernity and its confrontation with Islam is the main issue of the magazine. The primary aim is to surpass modernity and its major premises such as nation-state, secularism, monism. The first issue that was published by the title of “İslam’ın Modern Dünyaya cevabı nedir? (What is the answer of Islam to the modern world?)” demonstrates this object.

The crisis of modernity is the one of the shared remark by Islamists who write in the magazine. This remark differs from the prevailing understanding of the late 19th century. Modernity is no more a condition that represents a necessity for conformism for Islamists. In the new historical context, the famous question of the late 19th century, “Why Islamic world left behind?” is considered as the wrong question. According to Ali Bulaç, Islamists’ recent history was basically an attempt for seeking the answer to wrong question despite its intellectual productivity.<sup>255</sup> The reasons of the idea that Islamists prompted to think that they left behind, therefore, to ask this wrong question are complex: the conjuncture in which they live, the devastation in their souls because of the failure of the state, the undeniable supremacy of the powerful West in economic, military and technological sense. This context prompted Islamists think that the situation is an eternal situation rather than a temporary and historical process. However, in the new phase, modernity seems no more worthy of imitation as much as before. The crisis of the modernity is obvious. Ali Bulaç defines the crisis; “*The argument that implies that modernity is inevitable, irrevocable and irresistible broke down as a result of collapsing the reason in all modern practices that we are living and the confrontation with the nature because of scientific*

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<sup>252</sup> “One who is utterly upright in all of his or her affairs, as exemplified by the model of Abraham (Ibrahim) with his pure monotheism, sincerity, and complete submission and obedience to God.”

Oxford dictionary of Islam (2003) “The Oxford Dictionary of Islam”, Edited by John L. Esposito, Published by Oxford University Press. p.108

<sup>253</sup> Riyad as-Salihin 371, Introduction, Hadith 371

<sup>254</sup> The original text, “Çünkü modernizmin aşılmaz olduğunu varsayanların dışında, hiç kimse eskisi kadar herhangi bir seküler ideoloji ve öğretilerden artık emin değil. Biz İslam öncesi Haniflerin ve “Cahiliye’de iyi olan İslam’da da iyidir” şeklinde buyuran Peygamber(s.a)’ın telmih ve işaretinden hareketle, hangi görüş, siyasi felsefe, ve ideolojiye mensup olursa olsun, herkesle bazı ortak paydalar altında ortak tartışmalara, karşılıklı fikir alış-veriş ve diyaloglara girebileceğimizi, girmemiz gerektiğini düşünüyor ve dergimizin sayfelerini onlara da açıyoruz.”

<sup>255</sup> Ali Bulaç, “Modern Dünya ile Çatışma ve Uyumdan Modernite’yi Aşmaya”, “Modern Dünyaya Karşı Üç Tutum: Çatışma, Uyum ve Aşma” Bilgi ve Hikmet sayı:8, pp.3-25, p.3

*knowledge. Now, the reason is no longer the independent, individual reason that leads human's life and its decision-making, on the contrary, it is a reason that is a bound for the central homogenization and imposes itself as the universal. This reason is trying to live in the political interest, moral corruption, inequality between continents, poverty in mass, weapons of mass destruction, and spiritual fragmentation. If this reason was a healthy reason, may be the paradise would not be founded under the sun, but life would not be turned to hell on this scale.*"<sup>256</sup>

Similarly, Abdurrahman Arslan articulates the crisis of the modern project. Arslan articulates that 20<sup>th</sup> century is in the condition which it has consumed most of the opportunities which have brought with Enlightenment.<sup>257</sup> According to him, the reason of the crisis is that modernity cannot reproduce itself regarding life space.<sup>258</sup>

As is seen, modernity no longer represents the supremacy. Therefore, the question of this new context in which modernity experiences crisis is different; "How can modernity be surpassed?" The attitudes of Islamists against modernity since at the beginning of the confrontation is not accepted. According to Abdurrahman Arslan, it is not possible to answer to modernity with the concepts that are formed by modernity itself. For that reason, the historical inheritance that occurred as a result of the approximate tricentenary struggle has constituted an impediment for a new answer. Similarly, Ömer Çelik argues that answer to the question at stake should be looked for the out of the tradition that represents by ulama.<sup>259</sup>

Therefore, the previous attitudes and efforts for the answer to modernity is not accepted. Ali Bulaç defines attitudes as moderate and conflicting (radical) Islam.<sup>260</sup> In the conflicting attitude, the understanding is based on the adaptation and occupation of the methods of the enemy to prevail it. This attitude has a top-down, radical, oppressive, totalitarian regime profile as Iran case. However, According

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<sup>256</sup> The original text: "Modernite'nin "kaçınılmaz, geri çevrilemez ve karşı konulamaz" olduğu yolundaki argüman, yaşadığımız bütün modern pratiklerde aklın çökmesi ve bilimsel bilgilerin bizi tabiatla karşı karşıya getirmesiyle çökmüştür. Şimdi artık insanın hayatını, karar alışlarını yönlendiren bağımsız bireysel akıl değil, tam aksine merkezi homojenleşmeye doğru yönelmiş ve kendini evrensel olarak tanımlayan bir akıldır; bu akıl siyasi çıkar, ahlaki çöküntü, kıtalar arasında eşitsizlik, kitlesel yoksulluk, kitle imha silahları ve ruhsal parçalanmışlık üzerinde varlığını sürdürmeye çalışmaktadır. Eğer bu sağlıklı bir akıl olsaydı, belki yeryüzünde bir cennet kurulmayacaktı ama, hayat da bu ölçeklerde cehenneme dönmeyecekti."

<sup>257</sup> Abdurrahman Arslan, (1993) "Peygamber Ümmetinden Ulus'un Devletine", İslam ve Modern/Ulus Devlet, Bilgi ve Hikmet Dergisi Sayı:3 pp.16-30 p.17

<sup>258</sup> Abdurrahman Arslan, "Yeni Bir Anlam İçin Yeni Bir Gelecek" İslam'ın Modern Dünyaya Cevabı Nedir, Bilgi ve Hikmet: Sayı 1,

<sup>259</sup> Ömer Çelik, (1993) "Aydınlık, din, gelenek ve modernite" İslam'ın Modern Dünyaya Cevabı Nedir, Bilgi ve Hikmet: Sayı 1, pp.128-147, p.147

<sup>260</sup> Ali Bulaç. (1994) "Modern Dünya ile Çatışma ve Uyumdan Modernite'yi Aşmaya", "Modern Dünyaya Karşı Üç Tutum: Çatışma, Uyum ve Aşma" Bilgi ve Hikmet: Sayı 8, pp.3-25

to Bulaç, Modernity cannot be surpassed through the enemy's weapons. Islamists should find distinctive weapons and vehicles for it. Islam has sufficient means regarding required vehicles and weapons in this regard.<sup>261</sup>

Ali Bulaç states, *“Considered in its general conceptual framework, although conflicting Islam seems to be an open and uncompromising struggle against the dominance of the forces of unbelief and polytheism embodied in the West, this struggle eventually transforms Islam into the nationalized ideology of the state which aims at the development, enhancing production and gaining military and economic power and further to that, there is legitimization of secularization through religious forms, that is, the displacement of the religion as in Christian Europe. Even if Islamists are not adequately aware of it, this is related to our consciousness situation because of external environment in which we live. For that reason, may be, the first thing that is needed to do is to return our dislocated Muslim consciousness into its own axis, briefly, needed “to make the religion pure for Allah (Surah 39 (Az-Zumar, 14))”*<sup>262</sup>

The other attitude is based on the adaptation of modern world. Ali Bulaç defines it, *“Moderate Islam, unlike the other (conflicting Islam), against the inevitableness that the reel politics brings forth, by asserting that methods such as directly conflicting or frontal striking cannot be in use, draws attention to the process in which the international system and all cultural and social structures that became addicted to it are obliged to join at the determination of the relationships between Islam and modern world.”*<sup>263</sup>

In this regard, both attitudes against the struggle with modernity are wrong. It is not authentic and sufficient way to surpass modernity since modernity cannot be surpassed by methods of modernity itself. Both attitudes cause only secularization and the protestanization of Islam. In this phase, it is necessity to return its own sources. According to Bulaç, when former Islamists misread their main sources, Qur'an

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<sup>261</sup>Ali Bulaç (1994) “Modern Dünya ile Çatışma ve Uyumdan Modernite'yi Aşmaya”, Bilgi ve Hikmet: Sayı 8 “Modern Dünyaya Karşı Üç Tutum: Çatışma, Uyum ve Aşma”, pp.3-25, p.10

<sup>262</sup> The original text: “Genel Kavramsal çerçevesi ile ele alındığında, Çatışmacı İslam her ne kadar Batıda somutlaşan “küfür ve şirk” güçlerinin egemenliğine karşı açık ve ödünsüz bir mücadele gibi görünüyorsa da, bu mücadele sonunda İslam dinini, kalkınma, üretimi arttırma, askeri ve ekonomik güç elde etme amaçlı bir devletin ulusallaştırılmış ideolojisine dönüştürür ve bunun bir adım ötesinde sekülerleşmenin dini formlara bürünerek meşruiyet bulması, yani Hristiyan Avrupa'da olduğu gibi dinin yerini alması vardır. İslamcılar bunun yeterince farkında değilseler bile, bu, bizim –içinde yaşadığımız dış çevre faktörleri dolayısıyla- bilinç halimizle ilgili bir durumdur. Bundan dolayı belki de ilk yapılması gereken şey, kaymaya uğramış müslüman bilincimizi tekrar kendi mihverine iade etmek, kısaca “dini sadece Allah'a halis kılmak” (39/ Zümer, 14) olmalıdır.”

<sup>263</sup> The original text: “Uyumlu İslam, diğerinden farklı olarak, real politik dünyanın önümüze koyduğu kaçınılmazlıklar karşısında, doğrudan çatışma veya cepheden vurma yönteminin geçerli olamayacağını öne sürerek, İslam ve modern dünya arasındaki ilişkilerin belirlenmesinde uluslararası sistemin ve bu sisteme bağımlı hale gelmiş bulunan bütün kültürel ve toplumsal yapıların katılmak durumunda oldukları sürece dikkat çeker.”

and Hadith, to answer the question of “why Islamic world left behind?” However, these both sources can be read in correct way.<sup>264</sup>

However, the main question is of “what is the modernity?” “what are its premises?” According to Islamists, as a historical consequences of Enlightenment, modernity is inherently not compatible with Islam. The premises of modernity is determined by Ali Bulaç as individualism, secularization, nation-state. According to Bulaç, one should start with these premises if he/she wants to surpass modernity.<sup>265</sup>

### 4.3 Islamic State

Third issue of the magazine is published by the title of “İslam ve Modern/ Ulus Devlet (Islam and Modern/ Nation-State). The question of the issue is articulated by Ali Bulaç in the preface. The question is “Is it possible to islamicize a state by protecting its modern and nation structure or to design a modern nation state on the basis of Islamic form? And if it is not possible islamicize the modern nation state like science, what are the alternative political projects of Muslims, what should it be?”<sup>266</sup>

In this regard, Islamists consider the quality of the modern nation-state. The modern nation state is considered as a production of modernity. It is not compatible with Islam. According to Ali Bulaç, the modern state emerged as the product of radical change of heart that starts with Renaissance and Reformation, and reach logical results with Enlightenment.<sup>267</sup> He states “*those who see and display active political struggle as the only valid solution without questioning the modern state, even if they capture political power, should not entertain hope to do nothing but joining in modern system with Islamic form and symbols.*”<sup>268</sup>

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<sup>264</sup> Ali Bulaç. (1994) “Modern Dünya ile Çatışma ve Uyumdan Modernite’yi Aşmaya”, Bilgi ve Hikmet: Sayı 8 “Modern Dünyaya Karşı Üç Tutum: Çatışma, Uyum ve Aşma”, pp.3-25, p.10

<sup>265</sup> Ali Bulaç (1994) “Modern Dünya ile Çatışma ve Uyumdan Modernite’yi Aşmaya”, Modern Dünyaya Karşı Üç Tutum: Çatışma, Uyum ve Aşma, Bilgi ve Hikmet: Sayı 8 pp.3-25 p.7

<sup>266</sup> Ali Bulaç (1993) “Devlet Tartışması” İslam ve Modern/Ulus Devlet, Bilgi ve Hikmet Dergisi Sayı:3 pp.1-2 p.2

<sup>267</sup> Ali Bulaç (1993) “Modern Devletin Totaliter ve Ulus Niteliği” İslam ve Modern/Ulus Devlet, Bilgi ve Hikmet Dergisi Sayı:3 pp.3-15 p.12

<sup>268</sup> The original text: “Modern devleti sorgulamaksızın, aktif politik mücadeleyi geçerli tek çözüm yolu olarak görenler ve gösterenler, siyasi iktidarı ele geçirseler bile, bu modern sisteme İslami form ve sembollerle katılmaktan başka bir şey yapabilecekleri ümidine kapılmamalıdır.”

Islamists articulate that the modern state differs from the traditional state. Traditional state was based on autonomy of differences and relative pluralism. However, the modern nation-state is based on monism that does not permit pluralism. On the contrary to this monism, Islamists highlights the differences, pluralism, multi-legalism.

According to Ömer Çelik, the modern state is one of the crucial tools and products of modernity. The most important characteristics of the modern state is that it has got a broad, extensive and formal area of influence that ought not to in fact. Before discussing this problem, Islamization will just reproduce same problem under the religious form at the end of the day.<sup>269</sup> It is an obligation to address objection and criticism to modern nature of the state on the basis of the political theory in order to surpass modernity. Islamic world have to produce political administration in accordance with its civilian and plural tradition. The civilian tradition and pluralist structure that remain hidden in its history make it possible.<sup>270</sup> Similarly, according to Ergün Yıldırım, it is not possible to overcome political crises as long as not be gone into a multi-legalist and multilingual societal organization process.<sup>271</sup> In addition, Abdurrahman Arslan notes that it seems quite difficult that the classical modern form of the state can stay same in period when new societal values, relationships and organizational forms are at stake.<sup>272</sup>

Eyüp Köktaş criticizes the nation-state modal, as well. According to him, it is not possible to think in a nation-state before questioning the philosophical basis adopted by nation-state.<sup>273</sup>

According to Islamists, regardless of its ideology, all modern states are same in nature; unitary, authoritarian, totalitarian, and centralized. In addition, it is totally modern and secular in terms of its form and content. As long as the state has same structure, the crisis at stake cannot be overcome by staying in the nation-state or Islamicize it.

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<sup>269</sup> Ömer Çelik, (1993) "Aydınlık, Din, Gelenek ve Modernite", İslam'ın Modern Dünyaya Cevabı Nedir, Bilgi ve Hikmet: Sayı 1, pp.128-147, p.147

<sup>270</sup> Ömer Çelik, (1993) "Devlet'in Modern Doğası: "İyi" Siyasetten "Etkin" Siyasete", İslam ve Modern/Ulus Devlet, Bilgi ve Hikmet Dergisi, Sayı:3 pp.31-41

<sup>271</sup> Ergün Yıldırım, (1993) "Modern Ulus Devlet", İslam ve Modern/ Ulus Devlet, Bilgi ve Hikmet Dergisi, Sayı:3 pp. 42-52 p.52

<sup>272</sup> Abdurrahman Arslan, (1993) "Peygamber Ümmetinden Ulus'un Devletine", İslam ve Modern/Ulus Devlet, Bilgi ve Hikmet Dergisi Sayı:3 pp.16-30 p.17

<sup>273</sup> Eyüp Köktaş. (1994) "Medine Vesikası: İslam'ın Çoğulculuk Referansı", Bir Arada Yaşamın Formülü Nedir?, Bilgi ve Hikmet: Sayı:5, pp.55-60, p.60

On the other hand, the Ummah is a primary concept that requires to refuse the nation-state. It is not possible to harmonize ummah with the modern state which leads to the fragmentation of Ummah. Abdurrahman Arslan describes the modern state with its territorial, demographic, totalitarian and interest-driven in international era features.<sup>274</sup> All nations pursue their own national interests. This situation can cause the conflict of two states that the majority of their citizens are Muslims. However, Ummah as a concept reflects the pluralism. Ummah is not exclusionary. It is open to everyone. All the world is its homeland. It is universal and rises with the faith.<sup>275</sup> Abdurrahman Arslan underlines the importance of Ummah. Arslan writes that ummah is not a community in which domination is formed by founding on the territory, it is the ummah for having faith in Allah. This means holding on together to the rope of God.<sup>276</sup> Ummah cannot be limited to a certain territory. In addition, the identities of believers cannot be defined in regards to a territory.

In addition, the modern state does not permit different identities and the ways of life. It determines a national culture, a national identity and wants to control every sphere of the individual' life and, moreover, public sphere. However, Islam allows person to choose its identity and the way of life.<sup>277</sup> According to Abdurrahman Arslan, all identities belong to Allah. The relationship with different identities is managed in accordance with the justice. The demand for abandoning these different identities means the intervention to verses of Allah. Islam prioritizes "principle" rather than materialistic one in the foreign policy.<sup>278</sup>

According to Bulaç, the point to be emphasized primarily is the topic of how will modernity be surpassed? rather than forming a new modern Islamic state or gaining a victory against the opponent civilizations in the place where Islam is brought down to civilization battle.<sup>279</sup>

As is seen, Islamists have generated a discursive tradition about Islamic state by addressing itself to conceptions of the Islamic past and future, with reference to a particular Islamic practice in the present.

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<sup>274</sup> Abdurrahman Arslan, (1993) "Peygamber Ümmetinden Ulus'un Devletine", İslam ve Modern/Ulus Devlet, Bilgi ve Hikmet Dergisi Sayı:3 pp.16-30 p.22

<sup>275</sup> ibid.23

<sup>276</sup> ibid p.29

<sup>277</sup> Ali Bulaç, (1995) "Din, Devlet ve Siyaset", Din-Devlet İlişkisi ve Laiklik, Bilgi ve Hikmet: 11, pp.6-13, p.13

<sup>278</sup> Abdurrahman Arslan, (1993) "Peygamber Ümmetinden Ulus'un Devletine", İslam ve Modern/Ulus Devlet, Bilgi ve Hikmet Dergisi Sayı:3 pp.16-30 p.30

<sup>279</sup> Ali Bulaç. (1994) "Bir arada Yaşamın Mümkün Projesi: Medine Vesikası", Bir Arada Yaşamın Formülü Nedir?, Bilgi ve Hikmet: Sayı:5 pp.3-15, p.9

Pluralism and ummah are major concepts that have represented the past practices and cannot be compatible with the nation-state modal in the present. Therefore, Islamist discourse have formed “orthodoxy” by founding the distinctive relationship -a relationship of power to truth.

#### **4.4 Democracy; pluralism**

Pluralism and coexistence as prominent concepts in the magazine has been considered as essential concept to surpass modernity. However, it has been not attributed to democracy. Ali Bulaç articulates, *“Representative democracies, which are majority regime, cannot be pluralistic in nature. If pluralism means the participation of more than one party in a political race for the purpose of seizing political power, it is certain that it has no legal guarantee and practical value for the minority groups as a result of the race. In any case, both religious and ethnic minorities and political groups that lost the race and remained in opposition have to live according to the will of the majority. The most important reason for this is that the modern state has delegated the general legislative right to the assemblies that hold the majority. The state's singular understanding of law prevents the emergence of many legal communities on a pluralist basis.”*<sup>280</sup>

Similarly, Kadir Abdiimamoğlu underlines that democracy prioritizes the representation of majority. He associates it with the Trojan horse that is so gorgeous in the formal basis. However, he argues that democracy is not working in practice by indicating Bosnian Genocide Case, Israeli’s violence or the accession of Hitler to power by democratic ways.

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<sup>280</sup> The original text: “Kendileri bizatihi çoğunluk rejimi olan temsili demokrasiler doğaları gereği çoğulcu olamazlar. Eğer çoğulculuk, siyasal iktidarın ele geçirilmesi amacıyla birden fazla partinin siyasi yarışa katılması demek ise, bunun yarış sonucunda azınlıkta kalan gruplar bakımından hiçbir hukuki güvenceye ve pratik bir değere sahip olmadığı muhakkaktır. Her durumda hem dini ve etnik azınlık, hem de yarış kaybedip muhalefette kalan siyasi gruplar, çoğunluğun iradesine göre yaşamak durumundadırlar. Bunun en önemli sebebi, modern devletin genel yasama hakkını çoğunluğu elinde bulunduran meclislere devretmiş olmasıdır. Devletin tekil hukuk anlayışı çoğulcu temelde çok sayıda hukuk toplulukların ortaya çıkmasına engel teşkil etmektedir.”

Ali Bulaç. (1994) “Bir arada Yaşamının Mümkün Projesi: Medine Vesikası”, Bir Arada Yaşamının Formülü Nedir? Bilgi ve Hikmet: Sayı:5 “Bir Arada Yaşamının Formülü Nedir?” pp.3-15, p.5

Kadir Abdiimamoğlu. (1994) “Modern Anayasa Hukuk Açısından Medine Vesikası” “Bir arada Yaşamının Formülü Nedir?” Bilgi ve Hikmet:5, pp.38-45, pp.41-42

In addition, Rasim Özdenören argues that democracy is not compatible with Islam in terms of the source of the sovereignty. Since democracy is based on the popular sovereignty. However, according to Islam, ultimate sovereignty (hakimiyyah) belongs solely to Allah. Therefore, these two different mentality cannot get along with each other.<sup>281</sup>

Hence, Islamists refuse democracy. However, pluralism still seems the major concept to surpass modernity by separate it from the democracy. In order to deal with the situation in which modernity has experienced crisis on one hand, the different identities have experienced the problem of the representation, there is a need for a consistent conceptual modal.<sup>282</sup> However, this pluralism does not mean modern pluralism. In this regard, the pluralism is sought in the Madina Document rather than the traditional historical heritage. Ali Bulaç brackets the former political modals such caliphate, sultanate, imamate. According to him, these modals is part of our historical experiences. Even though it cannot be right to refuse historical experiences entirely, it cannot be asserted that it can be brought into today.<sup>283</sup>

The discussion on Madina Document basically stems from the necessity of administration. Ali Bulaç proves this necessity with a hadith “When three people set out on a journey, they should appoint one of them as their leader.”<sup>284</sup> According to him, this hadith shows the necessity of the civil administration. However, the question is “how coexistence is possible despite differences?” Ali Bulaç sees the solution in legal pluralism. According to Bulaç, if there is no compulsion in religion (Surah Al-Baqarah -256), thereby, it is necessary not to be pressure and force on the law.<sup>285</sup> Bulaç justifies the necessity of tolerance to differences with two verses: Surah Az-Zumar Verses 15-16. From these verses, Ali Bulaç argues that “no doubt that everyone cannot choose true and there will be those who want to serve other than Allah. However their reckoning belong to Allah. Allah torments them in the hell.”<sup>286</sup>

In addition, pluralism and coexistence are justified with Surah Al-Mumtahanah, verses 8-9: “and He does not forbid you to deal kindly and justly with anyone who has not fought you for your faith or driven you out of your homes: God loves the just. But God forbids you to take as allies those who have fought

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<sup>281</sup> Rasim Özdenören, (1993) “Türkiye demokrasinin neresinde, demokrasi İslam’ın neresinde?”, İslam’ın Modern Dünyaya Cevabı Nedir?, Bilgi ve Hikmet: Sayı 1, pp.82-95, p.90

<sup>282</sup> Ali Bulaç (1994) “Bir Arada Yaşamının Mümkün Projesi: Medine Vesikası”, Bilgi ve Hikmet: Sayı:5 “Bir Arada Yaşamının Formülü Nedir?” pp.3-15, p.9

<sup>283</sup> ibid p.9

<sup>284</sup> ibid p.10

<sup>285</sup> ibid p.13

<sup>286</sup> The original text: “Kuşkusuz herkes doğru bir seçimde bulunamaz ve Allah’tan başkasına kulluk etmek isteyenler çıkacaktır. Ancak bunların hesabı Allah’a aittir ve Allah onları cehennemde çetin bir azaba uğratacaktır.”

*against you for your faith, driven you out of your homes, and helped others to drive you out: any of you who take them as allies will truly be wrongdoers.*”<sup>287</sup>

Similarly, Eyüp Köktaş underlines that what essential for Muslims is peace and war is unwished situation. He also proves this argument with Surah Al-Mumtahanah, verses 8-9.<sup>288</sup>: In addition, He finds the reflection of pluralism in Surah Al Maidah verse 48: *“We have assigned a law and a path to each of you. If God had so willed, He would have made you one community, but He wanted to test you through that which He has given you, so race to do good: you will all return to God and He will make clear to you the matters you differed about.*”<sup>289</sup>

## **Medina Document**

Ali Bulaç, Islamist who made Medina Document a current issue, defines the document as the juridical document of a political union. The general framework of this document represents a societal project. The document defines all parties, that is, Muslims, Jewish and Polytheists that took part in the contract as an ummah by separating them from people. Ummah means the political union as a technical concept. Thus, Muslims, Jewish and Polytheists were considered as autonomous political unions. The document enables the multi-legalism by acknowledging all parties as autonomous. Moreover, the document does not dictate any ideology and religion. It permits political, cultural, ethnical, legal pluralism. Every autonomous political union has the right to determine its own cultural, educational, economical, healthcare fields. According to the document, there is an administration body. However, it is confined to executive power. The administration undertakes the common and indivisible issues regarding financial routine and technical matters. These require the taxation and legislation. All parties take part in the taxation and legislation processes in accordance with its financial capacity and population. Legislature will be determined by election.

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<sup>287</sup> The Qur'an, (2004) Oxford World's Classics, translated by M. A. S. Abdel Haleem, Oxford University Press., Surah Al-Mumtahanah, 60:8-9

<sup>288</sup> Eyüp Köktaş. (1994) “Medine Vesikası: İslam’ın Çoğulculuk Referansı”, Bir Arada Yaşamının Formülü Nedir?, Bilgi ve Hikmet: Sayı:5, pp.55-60, p.59

<sup>289</sup> The Qur'an, (2004) Oxford World's Classics, translated by M. A. S. Abdel Haleem, Oxford University Press., Surah Al-Ma’ida 5:48

After these, Bulaç puts forth the applicability of this frame to today. According to him, the document is suitable for bringing the new dimensions to the concepts in crisis such as politics, power and state. He highlights the document is a part of Qur'an and sunnah. In light of the Qur'an and sunnah, the document provides the way for designing the state beyond thinking it as an apparatus that controlling tightly the all areas of the life. Bulaç underlines that as long as the state hands over its authority on economy, science, culture, art, healthcare etc. to different communities that have different identities and religions, the genuine pluralism cannot be designed. For that reason, the most important characteristic of the document is confining state to only its executive aspect. Therefore, it provides genuine pluralism by enabling to choose their own identity, religion and legal system. Administration is based on the participation instead of being bottom-up and singular political organization. From this point view, Madina Document is presented as an alternative societal project to surpass modernity. According to Islamists, the prominent concepts of the period such as democracy, freedom, participation, pluralism find their real meaning in this project.

According to Ömer Çelik, this frame that proposed by the document enables the possibility of surpassing modern-state. The document ends the monism upon the public sphere by considering the political organization as the consensus of “good” and “fair” the understandings of different legal communities. Therefore, power is no more an inciting factor against the co-extience. Moreover, thanks to the project that formed by the Document, the differences have been protected by respecting everybody's understanding on what is good. By accepting the different understandings on what is good and not permit the sovereignty of the one on another, the state became only the formation of the different legal systems and different understanding of the “good” order through political participation. From this point, it differs from democracy since democracy based on legal monism holds in the authoritarian modern state despite the right to vote. In addition, this alternative project brings a new dimension to the relationship between the power and freedom. Today, freedom has been considered in association with liberalism. However, “freedom” is, in fact, based on economic freedom. However, political freedom is limited. Freedom is mostly related to private sphere. Freedom is asked out of the public sphere. However, the Alternative Social Project based on the Madina Document does not content with this negative freedom understanding. The projects heralds the broader freedom; the right to own legal system, language, education system. In project, political power is thought as “participation” instead of “domination”. Therefore, the understanding of negative freedom which means only not being affected from the forces and restrains of political power can be surpassed thanks to the Project. On the other hand, surpassing

negative freedom does not mean reaching positive freedom. According to Çelik, positive freedom means accepting political power as privileged. That is to say, it is accept to existence of the negative freedom, on the other hand. Therefore, political power is essentially legitimated as an organisation opposite to freedom. Because positive freedom is a limited concept which means various intervention opportunities against already “accepted” and “legitimated” organization. For that reason, the project heralds surpassing the vicious circle between negative and positive freedom. The project is based on coexistence. Therefore, the political freedom is provided through sharing the public sphere with the others. On the other hand, as an important characteristic, the Project is based on “the legal communities” instead of the legal community. In fact, the notion of “legal communities” contains objection in itself. This preference contributes to surpass the vicious circle of the democracy. Ömer Çelik articulates that “In the modern social order, trying to achieve public happiness within the law defined by the state highlights the positivist bases of political power and makes it impossible to evaluate political power according to the concept of "good". Achieving public happiness within the social structure rising on the basis of “defined” –a formal law- legislation puts "strategic action" towards political power ahead of "good political administration" understandings for legal communities excluded from the public sphere. This naturally highlights the struggle schemes based on eliminating others for the power.”<sup>290</sup>

However, the project resolves the basis which delays and narrows down the seeking for "good political administrations and determines traditional and modern struggle ways towards pushing “the others” out for political power thanks to its multi-legal aspect. The project heralds the new power style, which can be defined as the power of civil society. In this new style, the distinction between civil society and political society lost its rigidity and intensity in modern society in favour of civil society since it is formed as a result of seeking for “common good” and the participation. Therefore, political power losses its function and power which enables it to emplace different civil society clusters at each other as in the nation-state form. According to Ömer Çelik, the one of the most important evolution occurs in the concept of political development thanks to the Project. The notion of political order has undergone a radical change with the modern society and its political liberal order. In this order, democracy is the determinative for “political development”. However, it is approached to question of “how do people continue their existence aggregately? from the “order” perspective, on the other hand. In such an

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<sup>290</sup> The original text: “Modern toplumsal düzende, devlet tarafından tanımlanmış bir hukuk içinde, kamusal mutluluğu elde etmeye çalışmak, siyasal iktidarın "iyi" kavramına göre değerlendirilmesini imkansız kılmaktadır. Tanımlanmış –resmi bir hukuk- yasama temelinde yükselen toplumsal yapı içinde kamusal mutluluğa ulaşmak, kamusal alanın dışına itilmiş hukuk toplulukları için siyasal iktidara yönelik "stratejik eylemi" "iyi siyasal yönetim" anlayışlarının önüne geçirmektedir, bu da doğal olarak iktidar için diğerlerini bertaraf etmeye dayanan mücadele şemalarını öne çıkarmaktadır.” Ömer Çelik, (1994) “Beraber Yaşama Sorunu İnsanın Anlam Arayışı ve Siyasal Otorite” Bir Arada Yaşamının Formülü Nedir? Bilgi ve Hikmet: Sayı:5 “Bir Arada Yaşamının Formülü Nedir?” pp.16-32, p.29

understanding, democracy prioritizes “stability”. Therefore, it cannot be anticipated that democracy would contribute the coexistence. However, the Project prioritizes participation instead of domination.<sup>291</sup>

Kadir Abdiimamoğlu in his article which examine the Madina Document from Modern Constitutional Law underlines the multi-legal aspect of the Document. “The Document sets aside the classical state-individual dichotomy that dominates our definitions of constitutional law, and puts the dialogue to the basis of the political formation within the framework of law in the social, political and cultural fields established between various legal groups.”<sup>292</sup>

Abdiimamoğlu articulates that the state has not a dominant role as in constitutional laws in the Document. The only field that the central authority takes effect on it is judgement in which the conflict between different groups is solved. On the other hand, the document leaves the issues out of the judgment such as legislation, culture, science, economy, health, education etc. to civil society. It is understood that the state is put into a narrow frame. Correspondingly, the norms based on public law decline while the relationships and norms based on private increase. In this new modal based on the project, the state is not sacred and the individual does not devote himself/herself to it. On the other hand, Abdiimamoğlu accepts the deficiency of the Document to apply it to today. For instance, even though the Document is based on the multi-legalism, people need common vital necessities. This entails the existence of the executive organ. However, the Document does not mention such an organ. On the other hand, the document leaves the issues out of the judgment in the case of the conflicts of parties. However, it is not determined that in what way this juridical authority would be established. In addition, the “juridical discretion” makes the physical structure of the juridical authority important. On the other hand, it is possible to emerge different understandings in a legal order. However, Abdiimamoğlu is hopeful that the Document presents an alternative against one-dimensional order established by modernity and its institutions despite its above-mentioned gaps.

Similarly, According to Eyüp Köktaş, the one of the most documents which can be taken as reference for the pluralist political design of Islam is Medina Document. Köktaş articulates that the Document

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<sup>291</sup> ibid pp.23-31

<sup>292</sup> The original text: “Vesika, anayasa hukuku tanımlarımıza hakim olan klasik devlet-birey ikilemini bir tarafa atarak, hukuk çerçevesindeki siyasal oluşumun temeline, muhtelif hukuk zümreleri arasında kurulan sosyal, siyasal ve kültürel sahalardaki diyalogu koyuyor.”

Kadir Abdiimamoğlu. (1994) “Modern Anayasa Hukuk Açısından Medine Vesikası” “Bir arada Yaşamın Formülü Nedir?” Bilgi ve Hikmet:5, pp.38-45, pp.43

provides a basis for the coexistence of different religious and ethnic communities by centering society instead of the state. What the problem of democratic systems is they have not a permanent basis for the coexistence. The major reason of this is to ignore different legal communities. The representation of different and opponent dispositions in civil society cannot be a permanent solution. The key concepts for the pluralist political design are “power sharing” and “the law based participation.” From this point of view, the Document underlines principles based on political unity. The document enables the formation of communities and refuses the double standards.<sup>293</sup>

Madina Document is the crucial reference from “discursive tradition” framework for this research. Therefore, Islamists discourse addresses itself to conceptions of the Islamic past and future, with reference to a particular Islamic practice in the present, as Talal Asad points out.

The basis concern of the Islamist discourse in the magazine is for the concepts of pluralism and the coexistence. Madina Document has represented the major Islamic practice for these concepts. Therefore, it has been founded a relationship of power to truth and has been formed orthodoxy. In fact, Islamist discourse on the democracy and Madina Document are the samples of Islamist discourse have the power to regulate, uphold, require, or adjust correct practices, and to condemn, exclude, undermine, or replace incorrect ones. Moreover, the emphasized verses and hadiths for these adopted concepts by Islamists, I indicated above, have contributed the discursive tradition that includes and relates itself to the founding texts of the Quran and Hadith. The emphasises that I quoted have shown that the Islamists discourse on democracy, pluralism, Madina documents has formed the power to truth according to the historical context. Therefore, Bilgi ve Hikmet has become an arena where Muslims have the power to regulate, uphold, require, or adjust correct practices, and to condemn, exclude, undermine, or replace incorrect ones.

#### **4.5 Women Issue**

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<sup>293</sup> Eyüp Köktaş, (1994) “Medine Vesikası: İslam’ın Çoğulculuk Referansı”, Bir Arada Yaşamının Formülü Nedir?, Bilgi ve Hikmet: Sayı:5, pp.55-60, pp.58-60

The Islamist discourse on women issue is analysed through an article written by Cihan Aktaş. Cihan Aktaş starts her words by articulating that the new life style in based on modernization is a fact. No point in complaining. According to her, Muslims tend to abdicate responsibility that stems from the confrontation with modernity by making woman issue the current issue. Aktaş criticises the criticising of modernity through woman. The attitudes and understandings against the woman that see her deficient and restrict her from the public sphere has been considered as deviation. According to Aktaş, this understanding, in fact, means the breakaway from the Quran. In her opinion, Muslim men have chalked the confrontation with modernity up to women since they cannot face to it. Moreover, they have used the fabricated hadiths, anecdotes rather than applying to Quran and Sunnah.

Aktaş articulates, “Muslims became estranged to their features of being fair and righteous as they drift apart the essence of Qur’an. The understandings that not in accord with the essence of Qur’an have started to describe Muslim woman as deficient, inclined to go to the bad in case of reading and learning, incline to cause the unrest and depravement in case of going out, incapable to elect and be elected as done in pre-islamic age of ignorance period.”<sup>294</sup> The point which was especially emphasized by Cihan Aktaş is the highlighting of the traditional position of women by Islamists. According to her, the traditional position of woman was uncompromisingly and exaggeratedly used as an essential Islamic feature in order to separate Islamic world from the West. However, according to Aktaş, it is not fair to anticipate remaining the traditional position of woman same while the perception of space and home is changing in the modern time. Modernity heralds the separation between private sphere and public sphere. There is a sharp contrast between of them. However, the private sphere is the “eviscerated” sphere because of capitalism. Private sphere is restricted and is weakened. Home is no more a production area. In that sense, home is, now, a place where cannot be produced value but insanity for women.<sup>295</sup> Thus, in the point where the home is associated with the woman, the woman is much more affected by the changing perception of the home. From this point of view, it is not possible to think that the

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<sup>294</sup> The original text: “Müslümanlar Kur’ani ruha uzak düştükçe hakşinas ve adil olma özelliklerine de yabancılaşmışlardır. Kur’ani ruhla bağdaşmayan anlayışlar, müslüman kadını cahili inanışların tanımladığı gibi eksik yaratılışlı, okumak ve öğrenmekle kötü yola düşebilir, sokağa çıktığı takdirde fitne ve fesada yol açabilir, seçmeye ve seçilmeye ehliyetsiz bir varlık olarak tanımlamaya başlamışlardır.”

Cihan Aktaş, (1995) “Kadının Özel Alan’la Tanımlanması”, Din- Devlet İlişkisi ve Laiklik, Bilgi ve Hikmet Sayı:11, İz yayıncılık pp.154-164 p.154

<sup>295</sup> Cihan Aktaş, (1995) “Kadının Özel Alan’la Tanımlanması”, Din- Devlet İlişkisi ve Laiklik, Bilgi ve Hikmet Sayı:11, İz yayıncılık pp.154-164 pp.157-158

traditional position of the woman would remain same while “home” is changing. In such a case, the belief that the role of woman is only limited to housework is not compatible with Islam.<sup>296</sup>

In addition, Aktaş criticises the belief that considers the veiling as the restrictive factor. According to her, these beliefs have been justified by fabricated hadith. For instance, women in Medina uses chador.<sup>297</sup> This has been based on a hadith. According to the hadith, when Ibn Umm Maktum, who was blind, came to visit The Prophet Muhammad. The Prophet told his wives to hide themselves from him. Women said that he is blind and is unable to see them, nor does he know them. However, the Prophet replied them “Are you also blind and unable to see him?” According to Aktaş, highlighting this hadith when talking about the position of woman means not to know sunnah.<sup>298</sup> Instead, Aktaş quotes from Muhammed Gazali. Muhammed Gazali reaches different conclusion depending on the hadith in which women have been described in the way of carrying water in the wars and patching wounded people up. The keeping of women in houses is not compatible with Qur’an. On the contrary, the segregation and seclusion is given to women as the penalty in case of adultery.<sup>299</sup> Aktaş points out the anecdote conveyed by Sa’d b. Utman in order to show that the veiling broadens the existence field of the woman instead of restricting her as the spatial; “I was with Dhu al-Nun the Egyptian... and behold, someone arrived and I said “O teacher, someone has come”, and he said to me, “See who it is, for no one sets foot in this place, except my friends”, I looked and lo, it was a woman, and I said “It is a woman” and he said “She is a friend, by Lord of the Ka’ba” then he run up to her and greeted her... and said, “I am your brother Dhu al-Nun and there is no one present (i.e no strangers)”, and she said, “May God welcome your soul in peace” Then he said, “What led you to enter this place?” and she said, “A verse from the book of God...His most exalted Words says, “Is not God’s earth wide? Therefore, wander about in it.”<sup>300</sup>

In addition, Aktaş underlines the importance of the visibility of the women in mass media. Aktaş quotes from Sonya Poryamin, who is Iranian production director. Poryamin articulates that women should not been kept women away from cultural events by legitimizing this belief with Surah Al-Baqarah (The Cow) (2:228). Cihan Aktaş quotes that “We cannot anticipate that women can respond to this devastating

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<sup>296</sup> ibid p.161

<sup>297</sup> Veil. Full-length garment covering a woman from head to foot, typically black in color.

Oxford dictionary of Islam (2003) “The Oxford Dictionary of Islam”, Edited by John L. Esposito, Published by Oxford University Press. p.52

<sup>298</sup> ibid p.163

<sup>299</sup> ibid p.163

<sup>300</sup> Margaret Smith, (2001) “Muslim Women Mystics: The life and Work of Rabi’a and other Women Mystics in Islam” Oneworld Publications, pp.35-36

İn Turkish, Margaret Smith, (1991) “Bir Kadın Sufi: Rabia”, İnsan Yayınları, İstanbul, p.54

and well-supported cultural attack with world-view and personal efforts women can find the opportunity to obtain while washing the clothes and dishes, cooking, housecleaning, and babysitting.”<sup>301</sup>

However, women, now, realize what Islam presents them by separating what is completely historical and what is essentially Islamic. Islam does not restrict women from education, social life, political and cultural events. This is an easily comprehensible fact in the case of rereading sources in the new way.<sup>302</sup>

From discursive tradition framework, Cihan Aktaş has explicitly formulated the power to truth on women issue according to the historical context. In the period when veiled women were more visible in campuses, cafes, cinemas etc. and also in the intellectual debates, even in the political participation with their new mode of dresses, these visibility of women in public sphere has been approved through emphasized hadiths and anecdotes. Aktaş strongly objects to the understanding which restricts women with private sphere and sees it incompatible with Islam by referencing relevant hadiths and anecdotes. Therefore, Islamist discourse on the women issue has the power to regulate, uphold, require, or adjust correct practices, and to condemn, exclude, undermine, or replace incorrect ones in accordance with the historical context.

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<sup>301</sup> The original text: “Biz kadınların çamaşır ve kap kacak yıkarken, yemek yaparken, ev temizlerken ve çocuk bakarken fırsat bulup da edineceği bir hayat görüşüyle, kişisel çabalarla bu yıkıcı ve donanımlı kültürel hücumu mukabele etmesini bekleyemeyiz.” ibid p.164

<sup>302</sup> ibid p.164

## CONCLUSION

The main feature of this thesis is to examine Islamist discourse in the historical context since every discourse is naturally dependent on its period. The major characteristic of The Post-cold war context was the globalization. While globalization caused to spread modernity and its institutions around the world, modernity and its concepts started to experience different stories. The victory of liberal democracies, the rise of identity politics, the increasing emphasis on human rights, pluralism, coexistence, tolerance were the major characteristics of the period. Globalization led to remarkable changes in family life, economic and political structures, urbanization, modern education, mass communication, and individualistic orientations. No doubt that the venture of Islamism has been affected by this process. 1990s under the influence of these concepts was the turning point for Islamism. The old-fashion dichotomies like tradition and modern have started to become blurred in Islamist discourses with the effects of social and political developments. Multiple modernities as an alternative paradigm and its reflections in Muslim societies –post-Islamism as an alternative Islamism– has gained currency in academia in such a context. The hybrid manners such as the rise of Islamic capital, the inclusion of Islamists in the political system, the changing and moderating discourses of Islamists on democracy, pluralism and toleration, the emphasis on religious ethics rather than the desire for the Islamic state, the hybrid re-Islamization forms, an increasing number of veiled women in campuses, cafes, cinemas etc. were shown as the evidences for the new phase. Turkey was not outside of the developments of the context. The process that started with the coming of Motherland Party to power was indicating the new process. The liberation policies of MP caused the rise of the remarkable visibility of Islamic currents from economic life to social and cultural life. The rise of Islamist capital, the rise of Welfare Party followed that. Moreover, Kemalism started to come under serious criticism some leading intellectuals because of its authoritarian, totalitarian, guardian, top-down, jacobin, and elitist nature.

However, it was also a context in which determinative Kemalist modernization has been not only questioned and the understanding of modernity has been not only transformed but also Islamism and Islamist discourse has transformed in terms of its contradictory and unsteady relationship with modernity and its concepts.

This thesis examined the Islamist discourse through the chosen concepts; Islamic state, democracy; pluralism and women issue through an Islamist magazine named “Bilgi ve Hikmet”. The reason why these concepts was chosen is that the concepts were most prominent concepts which was discussed during this period in academic circle around the world. For that reason, I believe they are the nodal

points to grasp the new phase of Islamism in accordance with the historical context. On the other hand, the magazine, *Bilgi ve Hikmet*, which was published between 1993 and 1995, is convenient to examine these concepts thoroughly in the historical context at stake.

In light of the examination, the results are shown below;

- The main issue of the magazine is modernity. The first edition was published on the question of what is the answer of Islam to the modern world? From this point of view, the major aim of the magazine is to surpass modernity and its premises. In Islamists' view, modernity is no more a condition to reach in this historical context. From this point of view, Islamist discourse of this period differs from the guideline which is taken by Ismail Kara. Islam is still considered capable to find solutions to problems. However, modernity is the responsible for all the problems of the humanity.
- According to them, the nation-state as a major formation of modernity is in decline. I believe that the most important reason of this is the globalization process. Because territory has lost its importance through the increased interaction among different nations. On the other hand, the politics of identity/recognition increased thanks to the process.
- In accordance with the context, it is obvious that Islamic state is not a target for them since it is only the other side of the coin. No doubt that there is the effect of the common perception of and disappointment to Iran revolution and Islamic State even though there is no remarkable criticism on it. For that reason, for Islamists, initially, it is an obligation to surpass the nation-state which regenerates handicaps of modernity again and again.
- In this way, for them, democracy cannot be a solution, as well. Because it is based on the majority regime rather than heralding pluralism in nation-state order.
- It is obvious that Islamists mostly underline the importance of pluralism. It is the key concept for the coexistence. From this point of view, it seems that coexistence has a major importance in Islamists' understanding. The coexistence based on pluralism which includes multi-legal, multi-cultural, multi-lingual, multi-national, multi-religious is found on the Madina Document. Madina Document is the main reference to surpass modernity for Islamists in this regard. There is a possibility for peaceful coexistence thanks to its multi-legal, multi-cultural, multi-lingual, multi-national, multi-religious aspect. It is not possible to get rid of handicaps and rigidity of the nation-state by Islamicising it. However, the document provides a new and remarkable basis for this.

- On the other hand, another concept which thesis is interested in is women issue, which there is only one article on this issue is written by Cihan Aktaş. In the article, women issue is discussed in accordance the context. The criticism of modernity through women is criticized. Women cannot be restricted with the private sphere. On the contrary, the women in public sphere are appreciated. For this aim, the relevant hadith and anecdotes are highlighted.
- It is understood that Islamists put forth their opinion in the historical context in which political participation, freedom, toleration, human rights, identity, pluralism and equality increased their popularities and became yardstick. As it is seen that Islamists are not independent from their context. Islamists take a reposition themselves to take advantage of changing political opportunities. Therefore, Islamist discourse is redefined in accordance with the historical context.
- Even though they discuss controversially these yardstick concepts at times, they agree with the importance of pluralism. They found the right trace of this crucial concept in Madina Document. However, there is not a remarkable reference to inheritance of the history of Islam for after the Al-Asr al-Saadah (Golden Age of Islam).
- In accordance with broader transnational social contexts, Islamists bring relevant verses, hadiths and anecdotes forward by generating discursive tradition. Therefore, Islamic meanings and truths in accordance with the historical context is formed, by creating orthodoxy.
- From this point of view, I argue that modernity is, in fact, regenerated by Islamists even though they desire to surpass it. Because they uses historical references that belongs to past within “the reflexivity of modernity.” Antony Giddens explains this reflexivity in this way; *“There is a fundamental sense in which reflexivity is a defining characteristic of all human action. All human beings routinely “keep in touch” with the grounds of what they do as an integral element of doing it.”*<sup>303</sup> In traditional cultures, *“Tradition is a mode of integrating the reflexive monitoring of action with the timespace organisation of the community. It is a means of handling time and space, which inserts any particular activity or experience within the continuity of past, present, and future, these in turn being structured by recurrent social practices.”*<sup>304</sup> However, the reflexivity has a different character in modernity, which modernity has fundamentally changed all traditional types of social order and created discontinuities. In this new reflexivity, the tradition and past serve for an aim. It is not precious not only for belonging the past. In Giddens’ words, *“tradition can be justified, but only in the light of knowledge which is not itself*

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<sup>303</sup> Anthony Giddens (1990) “The Consequences of Modernity”, Cambridge: Polity Press. p.36

<sup>304</sup> *ibid* p.37

*authenticated by tradition. (...) Justified tradition is tradition in sham clothing and receives its identity only from the reflexivity of the modern.*”<sup>305</sup>

- From this perspective, the references to the past or historical heritage, for instance to the Madina document that this research basically interested in, is a part of “discursive tradition”. Islamists generate orthodoxy, that is, Islamic meanings and truths in accordance with their historical context by referencing Qur’an and Sunnah. However, the ways of their attribution is, in fact, basically modern. In fact, the references are decontextualized, they are removed from its own historical reality to today and used just because to serve to today perfunctorily. As Giddens highlights, “*The reflexivity of modern social life consists in the fact that social practices are constantly examined and reformed in the light of incoming information about those very practices, thus constitutively altering their character.*”<sup>306</sup> The way of the re-interpretation of the Madina Document in the historical context demonstrates the reflexivity of the modernity in that sense.
- From this point of view, I argue that Islamists contribute the convergence with modernity in this regard.

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<sup>305</sup> ibid p.38

<sup>306</sup> ibid p.38

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